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Return  this  book  on  or  before  the 


A HISTORY  OF  POLITICAL 
THEORIES 

ANCIENT  AND  MEDIAEVAL 


BY 

WILLIAM  ARCHIBALD  DUNNING,  Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY  IN  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


Nefo  gorfc 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  & CO.,  Ltd. 

1902 


All  rights  reserved 


COPYBIGHT,  1902, 

By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped  January,  1902. 


Norbjoob  $regg 

J.  S-  Cushing  & Co.  — Berwick  & Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  US.  A. 


CONTENTS 


Introduction 


PAGE 

. XV 


CHAPTER  I 

Institutional  Basis  of  Greek  Theory 


1.  The  Hellenic  Peoples  in  General 1 

2.  The  Constitution  of  Sparta 6 

3.  The  Constitution  of  Athens 11 

References 16 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Political  Philosophy  of  Plato 


1.  The  Precursors  of  Plato 18 

2.  General  Character  of  Plato’s  Thought  . . . . .23  V*''" 

3.  The  Republic 27  V’"" 

4.  The  Statesman 34 

5.  The  Laws 37  " 

6.  Plato’s  Theory  and  Hellenic  Facts 43 

References 47 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Politics  of  Aristotle 

1.  Method  and  Character  of  the  Politics 49 

2.  The  Nature  of  the  State  and  of  the  Household  ...  55 

3.  Organization  of  the  State  : Constitution,  Citizenship,  Govern- 

ment   62 

4.  The  Sovereign  Power 67 

5.  The  Forms  of  Constitution 71 


xi 


flVH&w  f f J 

xii 

PAGH 

6.  The  Best  State 

7.  Revolutions 84 

8.  The  Hellenic  and  the  Universal  in  Aristotle  . . . . 93 

References . 98 

CHAPTER  IY 

Political  Theory  of  Later  Greece  and  of  Rome 

1.  Political  Extinction  of  Hellas .99 

2.  Epicurean  and  Stoic  Influences 102 

3.  The  Constitutional  Development  of  Rome  ....  106 

4.  Polybius 113 

5.  Cicero 118 

6.  The  Imperial  Jurists 125 

References  . 129 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Development  of  Medieval  Institutions 

1.  Christianity  in  the  Declining  R<  ’ man  Empire  . . . 131 

2.  Rise  of  the  Papacy  . 136 

3.  Rise  of  the  Mediawal  Empire  ......  141 

4.  The  Era  of  Conflict  between  tin*  Secular  and  the  Spiritual 

Power  . * 144 

References  151 

CHAPTER  VI 

Political  Theory  in  Tin  Early  Ciiurch 

1.  Jesus  and  the  Apostles  ...  . . . . 1 5^ 

2.  Hi  flthlfl  of  the  Church:  i&lbroee,  Augustine.  Gregory 

the  Great  . . . . . . .151 

References  ....  16( 

/ 

f 


CONTENTS 


Xlll 


CHAPTER  VII 

Theories  during  the  Development  of  Ecclesiastical 
PIegemony 

PACK 


1.  Development  and  Method  of  Reasoning 161 

2.  The  Dogma  of  the  Two  Powers 165 

3.  The  Argument  for  Sacerdotal  Preeminence  ....  169 

4.  The  Argument  for  Princely  Independence  . . . .176 

5.  St.  Bernard  and  John  of  Salisbury  181 

References 188 


CHAPTER  VIII 

St.  Thomas  Aquinas  and  his  School 

1.  General  Character  of  the  System 

2.  Theory  of  Law  and  Justice 

3.  The  Nature  and  Forms  of  Political  Authority 

4.  The  Functions  of  Government 

5.  The  Secular  and  the  Spiritual  Power  .... 

6.  St.  Thomas’s  Doctrine  as  formulated  by  iEgidius  Romanus 

7.  Summary 

References 


/ 


. 189 
. 192 
. 197 
. 202  / 
. 205 
. 207 
. 212 
. 214 


CHAPTER  IX 

Theories  during  the  Decline  of  the  Papal 
Hegemony 

1.  Pro-papal  Doctrine 215 

2.  New  Elements  in  the  Anti-papal  Theory  ....  220 

3.  The  Supporters  of  Philip  the  Fair 224 

4.  The  De  Monarchia  of  Dante 230 

5.  The  Conflict  between  Lewis  of  Bavaria  and  Pope  John  XXII  235 

6.  Marsiglio  of  Padua 238 

7.  William  of  Ockam 244 

8.  Marsiglio  and  Ockam  on  Sovereignty  and  Representation  . 248 

References . . . 253 


IV 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Passing  of  the  Middle  Age 

PAGE 

1.  Political  and  Ecclesiastical  Tendencies 255 

2.  Wycliffe  and  Huss 260 

3.  Gerson  and  the  Council  of  Constance 265 

4.  Nicholas  of  Cues  and  the  Council  of  Basel  ....  270 

5.  The  Jurists  and  the  Theory  of  the  Corporation  . . .276 

6.  Summary 280 

References 284 


CHAPTER  XI 
Machiavelli 


1.  His  Life  and  Times 285 

2.  Method  of  his  Philosophy  and  his  Point  of  View  . . .291 

3.  His  Attitude  toward  Morality  and  Religion  ....  297 

4.  Theory  of  Political  Motives 303 

5.  The  Forms  of  Government 306/ 

6.  On  the  Extension  of  Dominion 310 

7.  On  the  Preservation  of  Dominion 315 

8.  Summary  and  Conclusion 322 

References 325 

Bibliography 327 

Index 347 


1 


INTRODUCTION 

In  every  community  of  human  beings  there  may 
be  detected  some  form,  however  rude,  of  regulating 
authority,  which  determines  in  some  degree,  how- 
ever slight,  the  relations  of  the  members  of  the 
community  with  one  another.  The  forms  and  func- 
tions of  this  authority  are  as  diverse  as  the  times 
and  places  in  which  these  communities  are  found. 
The  ancient  Greek  ttoXls  and  the  modern  British 
Empire  differ  as  widely  in  characteristics  as  in  time ; 
the  Papuan  tribe  and  the  French  nation  more  widely 
than  in  place.  In  times  and  places  where  no  ad- 
vance has  been  made  out  of  the  social  conditions 
which  are  designated  as  barbarous,  the  exercise  of 
and  submission  to  this  regulating  authority  are 
matters  for  the  most  part  of  physical  force  or  un- 
reasoning habit.  With  developing  civilization,  how- 
ever, man  seeks  some  explanation  of  the  phenomena 
of  authority  that  shall  satisfy  the  rational  spirit. 
The  first  results  of  this  seeking  are  often  ridiculous 
enough,  in  the  judgment  of  more  advanced  reason, 
though  not  more  so  than  the  earliest  results  of 
investigation  into  the  phenomena  of  the  physical 
world.  But  whatever  the  results  may  be,  whenever 


XV 


XVI 


INTRODUCTION 


and  wherever  any  well-defined  ideas  are  to  be  found 
in  reference  to  the  origin,  nature  and  scope  of  the 
authority  through  which  the  relations  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  community  to  one  another  are  determined, 
then  and  there  is  material  for  the  history  of  political 
theories. 

It  is  not,  however,  the  purpose  of  this  work  to 
cover  so  wide  a field  as  is  here  indicated.  There 
is  to  be  excluded,  in  the  first  place,  the  whole  mass 
of  primitive  political  theory,  — that  is,  the  ideas 
that  are  characteristic  of  primitive  peoples.  For 
this  sweeping  exclusion  the  limitations  of  space 
would  be  an  adequate  ground ; but  there  are  others 
at  hand  of  a more  scientific  character.  It  is  hardly 
too  much  to  say  that  our  knowledge  of  primitive 
political  thought  is  as  vague  as  it  is  vast.  Recent 
research  has  enormously  extended  our  acquaintance 
with  primitive  institutions,  but  the  interpretation  of 
those  institutions  tends  to  be  rather  advanced  than 
primitive.  What  idea  the  early  Teuton  associated 
with  his  customs  he  has  nowhere  recorded ; the 
political  theory  that  passes  for  his  is  likely  to  be  in 
reality  that  of  Tacitus,  lamenting  the  Roman  Repub- 
lic, or  of  Freeman,  preaching  the  unity  of  history. 
That  primitive  politics  lies  so  largely  in  the  realm 
of  conjecture  and  controversy  is  an  ample  justifica- 
tion for  its  exclusion  from  the  work.  But  it  is  even 
possible  to  concede  that  primitive  political  theory  is 
not  political  at  all,  but  purely  sociological.  Of  all 


INTRODUCTION 


XVII 


the  multifarious  projects  for  fixing  the  boundary 
which  marks  off  political  from  the  more  general 
social  science,  that  seems  most  satisfactory  which 
bases  the  distinction  on  the  existence  of  a political  1 
consciousness.  Without  stopping  to  inquire  too 
curiously  into  the  precise  connotation  of  this  term, 
it  may  safely  be  laid  down  that  as  a rule  primitive 
communities  do  not  and  advanced  communities  do 
manifest  the  political  consciousness.  Hence,  the 
opportunity  to  leave  to  sociology  the  entire  field  of 
primitive  institutions,  and  to  regard  as  truly  politi- 
cal only  those  institutions  and  those  theories  which 
are  closely  associated  with  such  manifestation.  A 
history  of  political  theories,  then,  would  begin  at 
the  point  at  which  the  idea  of  the  state,  as  distinct  p 
from  the  family  and  the  clan,  becomes  a determining 
factor  in  the  life  of  the  community. 

The  appearance  of  the  idea  of  the  state  implies  a 
relatively  high  stage  of  intellectual  development  in 
any  people,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
reflection  on  political  subjects  has  assumed  the  char- 
acter of  a science  in  the  technical  sense  of  that  term. 

A history  of  political  theories  may  properly  include 
much  that  would  be  out  of  place  in  a history  of 
political  science.  The  title  of  this  work  has  been 
chosen  in  view  of  this  distinction.  Many  political  < 
doctrines  of  the  utmost  historical  interest  and  value 
have  had  an  origin  and  a career  quite  out  of  relation 
to  any  formal  body  of  scientific  dogma.  To  set  rigid 


XV111 


INTRODUCTION 


barriers  against  the  consideration  of  such  doctrines 
would  almost  certainly  result  in  a distortion  of  both 
history  and  philosophy.  It  would  be  to  make  Greek 
v philosophy  begin,  rather  than  culminate,  with  Aris- 
totle ; to  leave  the  Middle  Ages  almost  a total  blank ; 
to  pass  Burke  by  with  at  most  a simple  allusion ; 
and  to  ignore  nearly  all  that  has  been  wrought  by 
one  of  the  most  thoroughly  political  communities 
known  to  history,  namely,  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  Finally,  it  would  give  recognition  to  an 
idea  that  has  produced  much  error  and  confusion 
1 in  these  latter  days  — the  idea  that  formal  political 
science  is  more  a cause  than  a result  of  objective 
political  history. 

While  the  scope  of  the  work  thus  is  not  to  be 
identical  with  that  of  political  science,  it  is  also  to 
be  distinguished  from  that  of  political  literature. 
As  we  shall  often  pass  far  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  one,  we  shall  often  be  well  within  the  limits 
of  the  other.  The  value  and  interest  of  a truly 
comprehensive  history  of  the  literature  of  politics 
are  not  to  be  doubted ; but  in  the  purpose  of  the 
present  work  exhaustiveness  is  not  a controlling 
factor.  We  shall  pass  over  with  scant  notice  or  in 
total  silence  much  that  may  have  the  highest  value 
from  the  standpoint  of  literary  art,  or  of  poetic 
fancy,  or  even  of  abstract  logic.  The  criterion  of 
selection  will  be  a pretty  definite  and  clearly  dis- 
cernible relationship  between  any  given  author’s 


INTRODUCTION 


XIX 


work  and  the  current  of  institutional  development. 
The  history  of  political  theory,  in  other  words,  is 
to  be  kept  always  in  touch  with  the  history  of 
political  fact ; and,  with  this  purpose  in  view,  it  will 
be  indispensable  at  times  to  depart  entirely  from  the 
field  of  literature  and  to  derive  a notion  of  theory 
from  an  immediate  interpretation  of  institutions. 

In  addition  to  the  considerations  just  treated,  an 
orientation  of  our  subject  requires  some  reference 
to  the  relation  of  political  to  other  philosophy.  A 
high  degree  of  differentiation  in  the  field  of  human 
knowledge  is  a characteristic  mark  of  very  advanced 
civilization.  Among  primitive  peoples  the  ideas  that 
later  come  to  be  designated  as  political  are  inex- 
tricably blended  with  conceptions  known  to  us  as 
legal,  ethical,  theological,  ecclesiastical  and  even 
mathematical.  The  disentanglement  of  this  con- 
fused mass  and  the  isolation  and  definition  of  what 
is  purely  political  is  practically  never  fully  accom- 
plished. But  progress  is  made  in  the  work,  and  the 
history  of  political  theory  is  in  a large  sense  merely 
an  account  of  the  progress.  Where  for  any  reason 
progress  in  this  direction  ceases,  the  history  of 
political  theory  ceases.  Hence  it  is  that  the  scope 
of  the  present  work  will  be  limited  practically  to 
the  philosophy  of  the  European  Aryan  peoples.  The 
Oriental  Aryans  never  freed  their  politics  from  the  ? 
theological  and  metaphysical  environment  in  which  ‘ 
it  is  embedded  to-day.  The  Semitic  Jews  and 


XX 


INTRODUCTION 


Saracens  at  times  achieved  rather  more,  but  their 
achievement  was  not  permanent.  The  Turanian  Chi- 
nese attained  a strikingly  advanced  position  in  the 
evolution  of  ethical  doctrine ; but  neither  in  theory 
nor  in  practice  did  they  ever  take  the  further  "and 
decisive  step  of  discriminating  between  ethical  and 
political  conceptions.  The  Aryans  of  Europe  have 
shown  themselves  to  be  the  only  peoples  to  whom 
^ the  term  “ political  ” may  be  properly  applied,1  and 
it  is  to  their  theories  that  this  history  will  substan- 
tially be  confined. 

x From  the  fact  that  political  philosophy  in  all  ages 
. has  stood  in  such  intimate  relationship  with  other 
L philosophy,  it  is  inevitable  that  a historical  treat- 
ment of  the  special  should  involve  a good  deal  of 
. attention  to  the  general  field.  Particularly  obsti- 
ij  ' nate  is  the  entanglement  of  politics  with  ethics  and 
^jurisprudence.  A by  no  means  insignificant  propor- 
tion of  the  thought  of  political  philosophers  has  been 
devoted  to  defining  the  interrelationship  of  the  three, 
or  to  demonstrating  that  no  distinction  can  be  drawn 
between  them.  Ethical  and  juristic  concepts,  there- 
v fore,  must  figure  largely  in  a history  of  political 


1 Cf  Burgess,  Political  Science  and  Comparative  Constitutional  Law , 
Vol.  I,  p.  30  et  seq.  Critics  of  the  use  of  this  term  have  assailed  it  as 
implying  an  arrogant  assumption  of  superiority  for  our  own  race. 
The  assaults  are  without  foundation.  Whether,  from  the  standpoint 
of  God,  or  nature,  or  the  Unknowable,  or  abstract  reason,  “ political 
peoples  ” are  superior  to  other  peoples,  is  not  involved  in  the  term ; 
the  only  point  is  that  a distinction  may  be  perceived  between  the  two 
classes  of  peoples. 


INTRODUCTION 


XXI 


concepts.  Indeed,  the  special  character  of  such  a 
history  will  be  pretty  clearly  determined  by  the 
importance  which  the  particular  writer  attaches  to 
the  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  related  sciences.  To 
him  who  looks  upon  the  state  as  primarily  an  ethi- 
cal entity,  the  development  of  political  ideas  will 
present  one  aspect ; to  him  who  looks  upon  the  state 
as  primarily  jural,  that  development  will  present  a 
distinctly  different  aspect.  Possibly  an  ideal  history 
would  eliminate  absolutely  the  idiosyncrasy  of  the 
writer;  but  a useful  history  can  be  produced  on 
either  of  the  lines  suggested.  At  the  present  day 
the  juristic  conception  of  the  state  seems  to  be  the  1 
most  characteristic  and  the  most  useful.  So  far, 
then,  as  discrimination  and  selection  are  inevitable, 
the  present  history  will  prefer  those  lines  of  develop- 
ment in  which  political  ideas  appear  as  legal  rather 
than  as  ethical. 

A further  limitation  of  the  field  of  the  work  is 
made  necessary  by  the  extent  to  which  differentia- 
tion has  proceeded  within  the  confines  of  distinctly 
political  theory.  Until  within  quite  modern  times, 
writers  on  politics  included  in  their  works  a treat- 
ment of  the  topics  that  are  included  to-day  under 
the  heads  of  public  law  and  political  economy.  But 
the  whole  group  of  special  sciences  which  these 
names  suggest  — international  law,  constitutional 
law,  administrative  law,  pure  and  applied  economics, 
finance  and  statistics  — have  sloughed  off  and  have 


XXII 


INTRODUCTION 


expanded  until  each  has  a history  and  a dogma  quite 
too  comprehensive  for  any  but  special  treatment. 
Political  theory  proper  still  furnishes  the  heads  of 
chapters  for  these  special  branches,  and  the  reflex 
influence  of  the  offshoots  upon  the  main  stem  has 
been  very  considerable.  Some  general  account  of 
the  movement  of  ideas  in  the  special  fields  is,  there- 
fore, in  some  cases  indispensable.  As  a rule,  how- 
ever, it  will  be  necessary  to  leave  the  special  just 
where  it  becomes  clearly  distinguishable  from  the 
general. 

No  history  of  political  theories  of  just  the  charac- 
ter indicated  in  the  foregoing  sections  has  ever  been 
published,  — at  least  in  the  languages  of  Western 
Europe.  The  nearest  approach  to  it  is  Janet’s  elabo- 
rate and  most  admirable  work,  the  Histoire  de  la 
Science  Politique  dans  ses  Rapports  a la  Morale 
(second  edition,  Paris,  1887).  Despite  the  form  of 
the  title,  Janet  includes  much  more  than  what  is 
strictly  the  “ science  ” of  politics  in  his  survey,  and 
thus  makes  his  field  include  all  political  theories. 

)But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  avowedly  exhibits  politi- 
cal theory  in  its  relation  to  ethical  doctrine;  and 
while  the  breadth  of  his  scholarship,  the  depth  of 
his  philosophy  and  the  charm  of  his  style  are  all 
brilliantly  exhibited  in  the  parts  of  the  work  that 
deal  with  politics,  it  is  no  disparagement  of  his 
magnificent  creation  to  say  that  the  treatment  of 
[ ethical  theories  is  the  overshadowing  feature  of  the 


INTRODUCTION 


XXlll 


work  and  gives  to  it  the  special  quality  which  it  is 
the  purpose  of  the  present  treatise  to  avoid. 

In  German  literature  the  lack  of  a history  of 
political  theories  is  surprising,  in  view  of  the  enor- 
mous activity  of  scholars  during  the  last  century 
in  all  phases  of  historical  research.  Some  approach 
to  the  vacant  field  is  made  by  Robert  von  Mohl’s 
Geschichte  und  Literatur  der  Staatswissenschaften 
(Erlangen,  1855) ; but  this  is  little  more  than  a 
classified  bibliography  of  politics,  useful,  indeed,  but 
very  far  from  any  pretensions  to  the  character  of 
a connected  history.  Much  nearer  to  the  sort  of 
work  under  consideration  is  Karl  Hildenbrand’s  Ge- 
schichte und  System  der  Rechts-  und  Staatsphilo sophie 
(Leipzig,  1860).  The  point  of  view  adopted  recog- 
nizes the  importance  of  objective  history  in  determin- 
ing the  lines  of  political  theory,  and  both  the  title 
and  the  text  of  the  work  suggest  the  intimate  rela- 
tionship and  interdependence  of  juristic  and  purely 
political  philosophy.  If  the  author  had  completed 
his  work,  it  might  have  occupied  a place  in  Ger- 
man literature  analogous  to  that  of  Janet’s  in  the 
French ; but  only  a single  volume  was  ever  pub- 
lished, and  that  brought  the  history  only  to  the 
close  of  classical  antiquity.  J.  K.  Bluntschli’s  pro- 
lific pen  made  some  contribution  to  the  history  of 
political  theory  in  his  Geschichte  der  neueren  Stciats- 
wissenscliaft  (third  edition,  1881).  This  is  a solid, 
respectable  piece  of  work,  but  it  deals  only  with  the 


XXIV 


INTRODUCTION 


period  since  the  thirteenth  century,  and  it  is  devoted 
primarily  to  an  account  of  the  systematic  philosophy 
of  Germany. 

In  English  the  first  and  only  attempt  at  a history 
of  political  theory  is  to  be  found  in  the  two  volumes 
of  Robert  Blakey,  The  History  of  Political  Literature 
from  the  Earliest  Times  (London,  1855).  Though 
the  title  of  the  work  indicates  that  the  author’s 
concern  is  with  literature  alone,  his  plan  as  described 
in  the  Introduction  would  give  full  weight  to  the 
influence  of  institutions  on  political  science.  More- 
over, he  includes  under  the  term  “political  litera- 
ture” the  public ' documents  and  all  the  records  of 
governmental  action.  If  his  execution  were  at  all 
comparable  with  his  plan,  his  work  would  be  of 
great  value.  But  the  two  volumes  that  were  pub- 
lished, coming  down  to  1700  a.d.,  are  crude,  scrappy 
and  superficial,  and  abound  in  errors  of  simple  fact. 
The  promise  of  a scholarly  and  adequate  treatment 
of  the  subject  is  embodied  in  Sir  Frederick  Pollock’s 
Introduction  to  the  History  of  the  Science  of  Politics 
(Macmillan,  1890) ; but  this  slight  sketch  is  only  a 
promise,  and  the  preoccupation  of  the  talented  author 
with  the  special  field  of  jurisprudence  seems  to  have 
definitively  extinguished  by  this  time  all  hope  of 
fulfilment. 

As  compared  with  the  works  just  referred  to,  the 
present  history  is  intended  to  be  more  comprehen- 
sive than  those  of  Pollock,  Bluntschli  and  Hilden- 


INTRODUCTION 


XXV 


brand,  and  more  systematic  and  accurate  than  that 
of  Blakey ; to  avoid  the  bibliographical  character 
of  Mohl’s  three  volumes;  and,  with  the  utmost  ad- 
miration and  respect  for  Janet’s  interpretation  of 
political  theory  in  its  relation  to  ethical  theory,  to 
present  rather  an  interpretation  of  the  development 
of  political  theory  in  its  relation  to  political  fact. 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


CHAPTER  I 

INSTITUTIONAL  BASIS  OF  GREEK  THEORY 

1.  The  Hellenic  Peoples  in  General 

A history  of  political  theories  of  the  scope 
defined  above  must  begin  with  the  thought  of 
that  brilliant  aggregation  of  Mediterranean  peoples 
whose  astonishing  development  in  intellectual  cul- 
ture, twenty-three  centuries  in  the  past,  is  still  the 
wonder  and  despair  of  civilized  man.  Probably  in 
no  field  save  that  of  art  are  Greek  ideals  more 
highly  appreciated  at  the  present  day  than  in  politi- 
cal theory.  This  is  in  some  measure  due  to  the 
wide  prevalence  of  democratic  thought  and  feeling ; 
but  more  decisive  is  the  fact  that  the  great  thinkers 
of  Hellas  explored  the  entire  height  and  depth  of 
human  political  capacity  and  outlined  the  principles 
which  at  all  times  and  in  all  circumstances  must 
determine  the  general  features  of  political  life. 
With  all  its  universality,  however,  Hellenic  thought, 
like  that  of  every  other  age  and  people,  was  deter-  1 
mined  primarily  by  the  institutions  amid  which  it 
developed.  The  only  path  of  approach  to  an  accu- 
rate apprehension  of  political  philosophy  is  through 

B 1 


2 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


political  history.  Our  attention  must,  therefore, 
first  be  devoted  to  the  salient  facts  in  the  growth 
of  Greek  constitutions. 

The  opening  of  authentic  history,  about  700  B.c., 
V reveals  the  Hellenic  world  as  a group  of  little 
communities  scattered  about  among  the  hills  and 
valleys  of  the  peninsula  which  they  afterward  made 
so  famous,  and  on  the  adjacent  coasts  and  islands. 
Politically  each  community  was  isolated  and  inde- 
pendent ; but  the  tradition  of  a common  origin  per- 
vaded them  all  and  was  the  basis  of  various  social 
and  religious  institutions.  In  the  peninsula  itself 
some  tendency  was  indicated  toward  the  creation 
of  larger  political  aggregates  through  the  voluntary 
coalescence  of  neighbouring  communities  or  through 
the  forcible  absorption  of  the  weaker  by  the  stronger. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  practice  of  colonization  in 
distant  places  both  reduced  the  absorptive  power  of 
the  mother  city,  and,  through  the  autonomy  of  the 
colony,  confirmed  the  influence  of  the  characteristic 
type.  The  77-0X15,  or  city-state,  already  fixed  the  lines 
within  which  the  theory  and  practice  of  Hellenic 
politics  were  always  to  move. 

In  the  period  now  under  consideration  no  single 
form  of  government  was  universal  throughout  the 
various  communities.  But  in  practically  all  the 
more  progressive  and  powerful  states,  save  Sparta, 
some  species  of  aristocracy  or  oligarchy  prevailed/* 
The  patriarchal  kingship,  which  must  have  been 
characteristic  of  the  times  depicted  by  Homer,  had 
disappeared,  and  supreme  authority  was  vested  in 


HELLENIC  INSTITUTIONS  IN  GENERAL 


3 


a relatively  small  number  of  privileged  persons, 
whose  distinction  was  based  on  social  or  religious 
tradition.  The  power  wielded  by  these  aristocracies 
was  by  no  means  purely  political.  The  communities 
themselves  were  still  permeated  by  the  ideas  of 
family  and  clan  relationship,  and  the  aristocratic 
government  expressed  merely  the  recognition  of 
general  preeminence  to  certain  families  and  clans. 
The  heads  of  these  social  organizations  constituted 
the  body  which  regulated  the  whole  social,  economic, 
religious  and  political  life  of  the  community.  This 
aristocratic  type  w^as  characteristic  of  the  Hellenic 
world  during  the  seventh  century  b.c. 

In  the  succeeding  century  the  process  of  social 
evolution  resulted  in  the  general  prevalence  of 
another  governmental  type : aristocratic  govern- 
ment was  succeeded  by  tyrannic.  Two  causes 
figured  largely  in  this  transformation.  On  the  one 
hand  the  growth  and  prosperity  of  the  cities,  the 
expansion  of  their  commerce,  and  the  general  intel- 
lectual development  introduced  elements  into  social 
thought  and  structure  which  tended  steadily  to 
undermine  the  moral  foundations  of  the  old  system. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  degeneracy  and  dissension 
that  were  manifested  in  the  aristocracy  itself  gave 
frequent  opportunity  for  an  able  and  ambitious 
man  to  take  the  power  into  his  individual  control. 
Practically  every  important  city  of  the  Hellenic 
world  (Sparta  again  being  a notable  exception) 
passed  under  the  sway  of  a tyrant.  Monarchy 
thus  became  again  the  prevailing  type  of  govern- 


4 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ment ; unlike  the  Homeric  king,  however,  the  tyrant 
had  in  most  cases  no  support  whatever  in  social  tra- 
dition or  religious  sentiment,  but  rested  his  authority 
on  force  pure  and  simple.  The  very  fact  of  tyrannic 
power,  therefore,  must  have  had  much  influence  in 
promoting  the  rationalization  of  political  thought — 
in  removing  political  reflection  from  its  ancient  chan- 
nel to  that  which  was  marked  out  by  the  primary 
consideration,  not  of  the  right  of  the  governor,  but 
of  the  welfare  of  the  governed. 

The  violence  and  cruelty  which  characterized  the 
rule  of  the  tyrant  were  at  first  displayed  chiefly 
toward  the  aristocracy  — the  supplanted  ruling  class. 
In  time,  however,  the  whole  subject  population  felt 
the  full  force  of  his  arbitrary  sway.  The  many  and 
the  few  were  brought  by  common  suffering  to  com- 
bine for  the  common  relief.  One  by  one  the  tyrants 
were  expelled  from  Hellas  and  a new  page  was  un- 
rolled in  Greek  political  experience.  The  new  era 
presented,  however,  no  such  uniformity  as  that  of 
the  preceding  periods.  No  single  type  of  govern- 
ment attained  general  recognition  ; but  instead  there; 
developed  that  conflict  between  democracy  and  oli^ 
garchy  which  persisted  until  the  distinctive  political 
character  of  Hellas  disappeared.  The  coalition  of 
aristocracy  and  populace  that  overthrew  the  tyrants 
vanished  at  once  before  the  problem  of  providing  an 
organization  to  take  the  place  of  that  which  was 
destroyed.  To  the  aristocrats  it  seemed  obvious  that 
the  ancient  power  of  the  privileged  classes  must  be 
restored.  But  the  age  of  the  tyrants  had  been  an 


HELLENIC  INSTITUTIONS  IN  GENERAL 


5 


age  of  enormous  advance  in  material  prosperity  and 
intellectual  culture,  and  the  pretensions  of  the  old 
aristocracy,  none  too  favourably  regarded  when  the 
tyrant  came,  were  violently  resisted  when  he  dis- 
appeared. The  perturbations  of  the  Persian  wars 
gave  new  wrenches  and  strains  to  all  the  old  ideals, 
and  from  the  general  unsettlement  arose  that  demo- 
cratic wave  which  threatened  to  ingulf  all  Hellas. 
Conservatism  rallied,  however,  and  resisted  the 
shock,  and  under  the  leadership  of  Sparta  main- 
tained some  hold  on  power  till  the  coming  of  the 
Macedonian.  It  was  in  the  midst  of  the  wide- 
spread conflict  between  aristocracy  and  democracy  ^ 
that  the  most  brilliant  contributions  of  Greek 
thought  to  political  theory  began  to  appear. 

While  the  internal  politics  of  each  of  the  city- 
states  had  made  familiar  the  facts  of  aristocracy, 
tyranny,  oligarchy  and  democracy,  the  relations  of 
the  states  with  one  another  had  evoked  the  concep- 
tion  of  a Hellenic  national  unity.  From  the  earliest 
times  community  of  language,  of  oracles  and  of  re- 
ligious worship  had  served  to  mark  off  the  Hellenes 
from  the  outer  world  which  they  called  barbarian, 
and  to  impress  upon  their  consciousness  the  idea  of 
race  unity.  But  only  under  pressure  of  danger  from 
the  Persian  power  did  this  consciousness  express 
itself  in  institutions  of  a political  character.  First 
to  Sparta  and  then  to  Athens  was  assigned  by  general 
consent  of  the  threatened  states  a “ hegemony,’'  or 
ill-defined  leadership  in  the  operations  against  the 
enemy.  Each  of  the  leading  states  in  turn  sought 


6 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


to  expand  its  military  hegemony  into  an  imperial 
dominion,  but  neither  attained  more  than  a tempo- 
rary and  limited  success.  Political  unity  through 
federation  might  have  been  achieved  if  the  two 
strongest  states  could  have  cooperated  harmoniously ; 
but  socially  and  intellectually  Athens  and  Sparta 
had  nothing  in  common,  and  politically  they 
embodied  the  opposite  extremes  of  democratic  and 
aristocratic  tendency.  Hence  the  rivalry  which 
wrecked  Hellas  in  the  Peloponnesian  War.  The  idea 
of  political  unity,  however,  by  no  means  disappeared. 
It  played  a part  in  the  general  movement  of  Hellenic 
politics  throughout  the  supremacy  of  Sparta  and  of 
Thebes  (404-362  m.c.),  and  furnished  in  some  sense 
a theoretical  basis  for  the  absorption  of  the  Greek 
states  by  Macedon.  That  the  idea  received  no  recog- 
nition in  the  political  science  of  the  day  is  largely 
due  to  the  fact  that  in  every  case  in  which  the  idea 
had  been  to  any  extent  realized,  brute  force  had  been 
conspicuously  the  determining  factor  in  the  result; 
and  philosophy  had  not  yet  reached  the  stage  where 
it  could  calmly  analyze  the  workings  of  brute  force. 

2.  The  Constitution  of  Sparta 

The  institutions  which  most  influenced  Greek 
political  theory  include  not  only  those  involved  in  the 
widespread  movements  sketched  above,  but  also  many 
that  were  peculiar  to  individual  states.  Particularly 
important  in  this  respect  are  the  two  systems  which 
embodied  the  constitutions  of  Sparta  and  Athens. 
Some  special  consideration  of  the  organization  and 


TIIE  CONSTITUTION  OF  SPARTA 


7 


A 


development  of  these  two  representative  states  is 
indispensable  to  a comprehension  of  Greek  philosophy. 

In  Sparta  the  first  fact  to  be  noticed  is  the  social  j 
basis  of  the  state.  Here  we  find  a rigid  classification 
of  the  people  that  remained  substantially  the  same 
from  the  earliest  to  the  latest  period  of  her  history^/ 
The  population  of  Spartan  territory  fell  into  three 
classes  — Spartans,  Perioikoi  and  Helots.  The  last 
named  were  the  most  numerous,  but  their  position 
was  at  the  bottom  of  the  social  structure.  They 
were  the  peasant  serfs  whose  manual  labour,  almost 
exclusively  agricultural,  supplied  the  subsistence  of 
the  whole  population.  In  rights,  either  civil  or 
political,  they  had  no  share  ; their  condition  was  that 
of  abject  slavery,  from  the  burden  of  which  the  only 
relief  seems  to  have  come  through  their  employment 
at  times  as  light-armed  troops  in  the  army.  The 
class  called  Perioikoi  constituted  in  a sense  the  middle 
class  of  the  population.  They  enjoyed  full  civil 
rights  and  apparently  a degree  of  local  self-govern- 
ment. Engaged  to  some  extent  in  agriculture,  they 
conducted  practically  all  the  operations  of  industry 
and  commerce.  But  in  the  political  life  of  the  state, 
in  its  general  sense,  they  had  no  share  whatever. 

The  political  people  of  Sparta  was  to  be  found 
exclusively  in  the  first  named  of  the  three  classes  — 
the  Spartans  proper.  This  class,  representing  his- 
torically the  small  band  of  Dorians  who  conquered  a 
home  for  themselves  in  the  Peloponnesus  in  prehis- 
toric times,  was  numerically  an  almost  insignificant 
element  of  the  population ; but  it  never  lost  the 


8 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


absolute  control  which  it  originally  assumed  over  all 
the  affairs  of  public  life.  The  Spartan,  indeed1,  had 
no  occupation  but  the  training  for  and  performance 
of  public  duties.  His  support  was  drawn  from  the 
land  which  the  Helots  cultivated;  trade  and  com- 
merce were  absolutely  prohibited  to  him;  and  all 
that  remained  was  the  military  and  political  career. 

/ The  institutions  attributed  to  Lycurgus  provided 
\ a round  of  duty  which  determined  the  daily  life  of 
1 the  Spartan  down  to  very  minute  details ; and  the 
/ observance  of  the  Lycurgean  rules  gave  to  the  class 
\the  character  of  a military  brotherhood  whose  sole 
junction  was  dominion.  At  seven  years  of  age  the 
children  were  removed  from  parental  care  and  taken 
in  charge  by  the  officials  of  the  state.  By  a severe 
and  engrossing  system  of  gymnastic  training,  they 
were  brought  to  the  highest  attainable  perfection  in 
physical  development.  For  the  boys  the  training 
gradually  took  on  a purely  military  character,  so 
that  by  the  age  of  manhood  they  were  expert  in  all 
the  duties  of  a soldier ; for  the  girls  the  goal  kept  in 
view  was  the  capacity  to  bring  forth  hardy  offspring. 
Till  the  maturity  of  his  physical  life  was  passed  the 
Spartan  was  chiefly  occupied  with  military  affairs; 
in  his  declining  years  he  assumed  the  duties  of  the 
magistracy,  and  shared  in  counsel  and  administration. 

A variety  of  institutions  insured  the  maintenance  of 
the  character  which  this  system  impressed  upon  the 
community.  Most  famous  was  the  public  mess.— 
Every  adult  male  Spartan  was  obliged  to  take  his 
meals  with  his  fellows  at  a public  dining  hall,  under 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  SPARTA 


9 


the  supervision  of  the  magistrates.  The  diet  pre- 
scribed left  no  room  for  the  insidious  influence  of 
inequality  and  luxury.- / A similar  purpose  was  mani- 
fest in  the  discouragement  of  family  life  in  every 
form,  in  the  prohibition  of  the  pursuit  of  trade  or 
agriculture,  and  in  the  restriction  of  intercourse  with 
foreigners  to  the  narrowest  possible  limits.  Finally, 
an  express  provision  of  the  Lycurgean  discipline  for-  J 
bade  written  laws,  and  declared  conclusive  in  every  v 
controversy  the  "judgment  of  the  magistrate.  Liti- 
gation thus,  like  other  luxuries  that  played  so  large 
a part  in  Athenian  life,  never  gained  a foothold  in 
the  economy  of  Sparta. 

The  enormous  influence  exerted  by  the  Spartan 
constitution  on  Greek  thought  is  due  more  to  the 
peculiar  system  just  sketched,  which  marked  off 
the  Spartans  as  a class  in  the  population,  than  to  the 
•organization  through  which  this  class  performed  its 
political  functions.  Some  notice  of  this  organization  ^ 
is,  however,  necessary.  At  the  nominal  apex  of  the 
system  stood  the  kings,  two  in  number,  precisely 
equal  in  dignity  and  authority ; next  came  a'  senate^ 
of  twenty-eight  members,  elected  for  life ; third,  an 
assembly  consisting  of  the  whole  body  of  Spartans ; 
and,  finally,  the  ephors,  an  annually  elected  board  of 
five  members.  At  the  time  with  which  we  are  par- 
ticularly concerned  the  functions  of  these  different 
organs  were  somewhat  as  follows.  The  kings  held 
the  highest  official  positions  in  the  military  and  in 
the  religious  system ; their  actual  authority,  however, 
was  not  great.  The  senate  performed  a variety  of 


10 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


administrative  functions,  mostly  of  a judicial  charac- 
ter. The  assembly  had  practically  no  significance, . 
meeting  only  on  very  rare  occasions  to  register  its 
approval  of  some  especially  important  project.  In 
the  ephorate,  on  the  other  hand,  was  to  be  found  the 
real  centre  of  the  system.  This  institution  seems  to 
have  had  its  origin  in  a desire  to  set  up  a check  on 
the  authority  of  the  kings  and  senate,  at  the  time 
when  the  assembly  ceased  to  be  efficient  for  this  pur- 
pose. By  a process  of  gradual  encroachment,  the 
ephors  displaced  all  the  other  organs  in  the  final 
determination  of  administrative  and  general  policy. 

V Even  the  actual  direction  of  the  army  in  the  field 
was  at  times  taken  from  the  kings,  though  as  a rule 
the  military  authority  was  left  intact  with  royalty. 

The  aristocratic  character  of  the  Spartan  state  was 
primarily  expressed  in  the  exclusion  of  the  two  larg- 
est classes  of  the  population  from  political  life.  From 
the  standpoint  of  the  governing  class  alone,  the  actual 
nJ  system  might  appear  democratic ; for  the  ephors  were 
the  annually  elected  representatives  of  the  people. 
In  fact,  however,  but  a small  part  of  the  Spartans 
themselves,  in  historic  times,  participated  in  political 
life.  For,  despite  the  design  of  the  Lycurgean  legis- 
lator to  secure  both  equality  and  fraternity  in  his 
system,  the  former  feature,  if  it  ever  existed,  very 
early  disappeared.  The  public  tables  were  supported 
by  the  contributions  of  the  Spartans  from  the  produce 
of  their  lands.  Failure  to  contribute  entailed,  not  a 
forfeiture  of  the  right  or  duty  of  eating  at  the  com- 
mon mess,  but  the  loss  of  all  right  to  participate  in 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  ATHENS 


11 


the  government.  A progressive  decrease  in  the  num- 
ber of  landowners  in  Sparta  characterized  the  whole 
of  her  authentic  history,  with  the  consequence  that 
the  governing  class  correspondingly  narrowed.  It 
was  this  class  which  was  represented  in  the  ephorate 
— a fact  which  sufficiently  explains  the  opinion  of 
the  Greeks  themselves  that  the  Spartan  state,  while 
in  form  partly  royal  and  partly  democratic,  was  in 
essence  intensely  oligarchic.  V 

3.  The  Constitution  of  Athens 

The  Athenian  state  presented  in  every  respect  the 
sharpest  contrast  to  the  Spartan.  Historically,  the 
constitution  passed  through  all  the  various  stages 
which  characterized  the  general  development  of  Hel- 
lenic politics,  and  at  last  it  became  both  in  form  and 
in  essence  intensely  democratic.  The  social  basis  y 
of  the  state  lay  primarily  in  the  distinction  between 
slaves  and  freemen,  and  secondarily  in  the  division 
of  the  latter  into  nobles  {eviraTp&ai)  and  commons. 
The  servile  class  had  not,  however,  as  at  Sparta,  the 
character  of  a conquered  population  depressed  into 
serfage ; nor  was  there,  between  nobles  and  com- 
mons, any  such  traditional  distinction  of  race  as 
between  Spartans  and  Perioikoi.  Further,  in  the 
fulness  of  maritime  and  commercial  prosperity,  a 
large  resident  alien  element  (peroiKOi),  which  had  V 
no  counterpart  whatever  in  Sparta,  became  more  or 
less  identified  with  the  social  and  economic  life  of 
Athens.  Politically,  however,  Athenian  institutions 
involved  only  the  nobility  and  commons,  who  to- 


12 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


gether  constituted  the  citizen-body  of  the  state. 
Democratization  was  complete  when  all  members 
of  these  two  classes  stood  on  an  equality  so  far  as 
participation  in  political  power  was  concerned, 
j The  dawn  of  authentic  history  reveals  all  authority 
* of  a political  character  in  the  hands  of  the  small 
privileged  class  of  Eupatridae,  or  nobles.1  The  prin- 
cipal organs  through  which  this  authority  was  exer- 
cised consisted  of  nine  annually  elected  officers,  later 
known  collectively  as  archons,  and  a council  or" 
senate  which  took  its  familiar  name  from  the  place 
of  its  meeting,  the  Areopagus.  About  the  end  of  the 
seventh  century  b.c.,  serious  disturbances,  due  chiefly 
to  ill  feeling  between  the  wealthy  nobles  and  the 
poorer  commons,  resulted  in  the  reforms  associated 
s^with  the  name  of  Solon.  The  essence  of  the  new 
system  lay  in  the  substitution  of  wealth  for  birth 
as  the  basis  for  participation  in  political  power.  The 
monopoly  of  the  Eupatridae  was  broken,  but  the^ 
commons  were  admitted  to  power  only  in  proportion 
to  their  property.  A fourfold  classification  of  the 
whole  people  according  to  income  served  to  deter- 
mine eligibility  to  office ; the  highest  positions,  such 
as  that  of  archon,  being  open  only  to  the  first  class, 
and  no  office  at  all  being  attainable  by  the  fourth 
class.  In  the  existing  distribution  of  wealth,  this 
insured  to  the  nobles  still  a predominating  influence  in 

1 The  precise  basis  on  which  this  class  rested  is  unknown  ; perhaps 
there  was  nothing  precise  about  it.  Grote  describes  the  class  as 
“ seemingly  a few  specially  respected  gentes,  and  perhaps  a few  dis- 
tinguished families  of  all  the  gentes.”  — History  of  Greece , Pt.  II, 
ch.  xi. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  ATHENS 


13 


administration.  But  the  germ  of  democracy  lay  in 
two  new  governmental  organs  which  appeared  in 
the  Solonian  system,  the  ekklesia,  or  general  as- 
sembly of  the  people,1  and  the  Senate  of  the  Four 
Hundred.  The  assembly,  which  included  without 
' discrimination  all  classes  of  the  free  citizens,  elected 
the  archons,  approved  or  disapproved  the  official 
conduct  of  all  magistrates,  and  exercised  a general 
political  and  judicial  authority.  Its  activity  was 
regulated,  however,  by  the  Senate  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred, or  “ preconsidering  senate.”  This  was  an 
elected  body2  which  determined  when  meetings  of 
the  assembly  should  be  called  and  what  matters 
should  be  brought  before  it,  and  further  exercised  a 
wide  administrative  authority  in  seeing  that  the 
decrees  of  the  assembly  were  executed.  The  powers 
attributed  to  these  two  new  organs  limited  pro  tanto 
the  importance  of  the  senate  of  the  Areopagus.  This 
body,  being  recruited  by  the  entrance  each  year  of 
the  retiring  archons,  remained  the  stronghold  of 
the  old  governing  class,  and  continued  to  exercise 
judicial  functions  that  gave  it  a powerful  influence 
in  the- state. 

From  560  to  510  b.c.,  constitutional  life  at  Athens 
was  in  a sense  suspended  by  the  tyranny  of  Pisis- 
tratus  and  his  sons.  Yet  the  forms  of  the  Solonian 
system  were  for  the  most  part  preserved,  subject  to 
the  overruling  will  of  the  tyrant.  Upon  the  final 


1 The  ekklesia  had  probably  had  a nominal  existence  before ; it 
became  important  for  the  first  time  through  Solon. 

2 Probably  only  the  highest  class  of  citizens  were  eligible. 


14 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


expulsion  of  the  Pisistratidse  a sharp  democrat' c 
impulse  was  given  to  the  constitution  by  the  legisla- 
tion of  Kleisthenes,  and  within  the  next  century,  prin- 
cipally through  the  influence  of  Pericles,  the  progress 
~~  was  steady  to  the  complete  realization  of  democracy. 

*4  In  its  final  shape  the  system  presented  the  following 
features.  At  the  centre  lay  the  assembly  — the  gen- 
eral body  of  .citizens,  paid  for  attendance  at  its  meet- 


ings. It  was  the  supreme  political  organ  of  the  state, 
and  spoke  the  final  word  in  all  matters  that  it  chose 
to  consider.  The  function  of  the  assembly,  however, 
was  regarded  as  primarily  executive  rather  than  leg- 
islative. Its  acts  were  decrees  (i/^iV/Aara),  not  laws 
(voijlol),  and  were*  theoretically  always  subordinate  to 
the  vaguely  defined  body  of  ancient  custom  to  which  the 
term  vopoi  applied.  In  fact,  the  assembly  was  its  own 
final  interpreter  of  the  vopoi,  and  accordingly  the  latter- 
per  se  imposed  no  check  upon  the  popular  will.  Prac- 
tically, however,  there  existed  certain  restraints  upon 
the  assembly.  Every  proposition  which  was  recog- 
nized as  affecting  the  vopoi  was  subject  to  a special 
procedure  of  a judicial  character,  involving  its  consid- 
eration by  a board  known  as  the  nomotlietae.  But 
more  effective  than  this  as  a conservative  force  was 
the  indictment  for  violation  of  the  laws  (ypa^rj 
Trapavopcov).  The  mover  of  any  proposition  before 
the  assembly  was  subject  to  indictment  and  trial,  atT" 
any  time  within  a year,  for  illegal  action.  This  im- 
posed a serious  and  definite  responsibility  upon  every 
individual  who  sought  to  influence  the  assembly.  It 
enabled  the  people,  after  violating  the  vopoi  in  a fit  of 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  ATHENS 


15 


passion,  to  atone  for  its  lapse  by  punishing  the  mover 
of  the  act  which  it  had  approved.1 

The  detailed  administration  of  the  government  in 
civil  affairs  was  practically  in  the  hands  of  the  Senate 
of  the  Five  Hundred- — the  Solonian  preconsider in 
senate  as  reorganized  by  Kleisthenes.  The  body 
was  chosen  by  lot  from  the  general  body  of  citizens, 
and  its  members  alternated  by  lot  from  day  to  day 
in  presiding  over  the  conduct  of  public  business. 
Through  their  function  of  preparing  the  agenda  of 
the  assembly  they  acted  in  some  measure  as  a check 
upon  its  action.  In  military  and  diplomatic  affairs 
the  state  was  represented  by  the  generals  (o-rpar^yoi), 
a board  of  ten  elected  by  the  people  in  their  ten  v* 
administrative  divisions  called  tribes  (<£iAcu).  These 
were  the  only  officials  of  importance  that  were  chosen 
by  election,  rather  than  by  lot,  in  the  Athenian 
democracy. 

The  judicial  authority  of  the  state  — by  no  means 
so  narrowly  marked  off  from  the  domain  of  politics 
and  administration  as  in  modern  times  — was  exer- 
cised through  popular  courts,  called  dikasteries  (Si/ca- 
<TTrjpia).  Five  thousand  citizens,  drawn  by  lot  from 
the  general  body,  were  divided  into  ten  panels,  among 
which  all  important  judicial  business  was  distributed. 
Every  juror  received  pay  for  his  services.  As  the 
assembly  had  absorbed  practically  all  the  political 

1 The  trial  of  prosecutions  under  the  ypacfiTj  Trapa.vop.Civ  was  held  in 
the  dikasteries,  whose  composition,  as  described  below,  together  with 
the  procedure  that  characterized  them,  insured  a pretty  faithful  reflec- 
tion, in  their  judgments,  of  the  varying  phases  of  popular  sentiment. 


16 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


functions  of  the  archons  and  the  Senate  of  the 
Areopagus,  so  the  administrative  powers  of  these 
ancient  organs  had  all  gone  to  the  Senate  of  the 
Five  Hundred,  and  their  judicial  authority  to  the 
dikasteries.  The  archons,  indeed,  now  chosen  by 
lot  from  the  general  body  of  citizens,  had  become 
mere  presiding  officers  of  the  popular  courts,  with 
some  petty  police-court  jurisdiction  of  their  own; 
and  the  Areopagus  existed  merely  as  a court  for 
the  trial  of  homicide. 

In  general,  the  Athenian  constitution,  in  its  final 
form,  opened  to  every  citizen  an  equal  opportunity 
to  share  in  every  species  of  political  authority.  With 
reference  to  all  >who  could  claim  Athenian  citizenship, 
therefore,  democracy  was  complete.  With  reference 
to  the  total  population,  however,  the  existence  of 
a slave  and  alien  element  that  vastly  outnumbered 
the  citizens,  rendered  the  designation  democracy,  in 
the  modern  sense,  quite  inapplicable. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  trans.  by  Ward,  Book  II,  chaps, 
i and  ii ; Book  III,  chap.  i.  Duncker,  Griechisclie  Geschichte , 

I,  256-285,  375-383,  425-442,  452-476,  523-531;  II,  15 
et  seq.,  120-137,  161-219,  341  et  seq.  Grote,  History  of 
Greece,  Part  I,  chap,  xx;  Part  II,  chaps,  ii,  v-vi,  x-xi, 
xxx-xxxi,  xlvi,  lxii-lxiii,  lxv-lxvi.  Kenyon,  Aristotle  on  the 
Constitution  of  Athens,  Greek  text  (1892),  trans.  (1891). 
Ed.  Meyer,  Forschungen  zur  alten  Geschichte , I,  211-286; 

II,  1-195,  512-548.  Panta,  Der  Staat  in  der  Ilias  und 
Odyssee.  Eowler,  City  State  of  the  Greeks  and  Homans, 
p.  65  et  seq.  Freeman,  Comparative  Politics.  Fustel  de 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  ATHENS 


17 


Coulanges,  La  Cit6  antique  (The  Ancient  City,  trans.  by 
Small).  Gardner  and  Jevons,  Manual  of  Greek  Antiquities, 
Book  VI,  p.  404  et  seq.  Gilbert,  Handbuch  der  griechischen 
Staatsalterthiimer  (Constitutional  Antiquities  of  Sparta  and 
Athens,  trans.).  Gladstone,  Studies  on  Homer  and  the 
Homeric  Age,  Vol.  Ill,  chap.  i.  Greenidge,  Greek  Consti- 
tutional History.  Hermann,  Lelirbuch  der  griechischen  Anti- 
quitaten , Bd.  I (Political  Antiquities  of  Greece,  trans.).  J annet, 
Les  Institutions  sod  ales  et  le  droit  civil  & Sparta.  Mueller, 
Die  Dorier  (The  History  and  Antiquities  of  the  Doric  Pace, 
trans.  by  Tupnell  and  Lewis).  Plass,  Die  Tyrannis  in 
ihren  beiden  Perioden.  Schoemann,  Antiquities  of  Greece, 
trans. ; Athenian  Constitutional  History  . . . examined,  trans. 
Whibley,  Greek  Oligarchies. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLATO 
1.  The  Precursors  of  Plato 

It  was  only  when  the  institutional  development 
sketched  in  the  preceding  chapter  had  run  its  full 
course,  that  a coherent  and  comprehensive  form  was 
given  to  political  speculation.  Plato  and  Aristotle 
analyzed  and  Classified  the  principles  and  organs  of 
a state  life  that  had  passed  its  prime  and  was  rap- 
idly waning.  The  characteristic  features  of  this  life 
were  determined  by  influences  and  motives  in  which 
rational  generalizations  and  ideals  had  little  part, 
and  when  systematic  reflection  began,  the  result  was 
rather  explication  of  the  past  than  anticipation  of 
the  future. 

The  various  phases  of  early  social  and  political 
thought  find  some  illustration  in  the  literary  remains 
of  Hellas.  The  Homeric  epos  could  have  taken 
shape  only  in  a patriarchal  regime,  based  on  reli- 
gious myth.  Kings  appear  always  as  Zeus-born 
(hioyeve is)  and  Zeus-nurtured  (Sior/oe^eis),  and  rule 
as  shepherds  of  the  people  ( TroLfjiive 5 Xaaivj.  Some 
significance  is  attached  to  the  lesser  chiefs,  who 
likewise  claim  divine  ancestry,  but  for  the  common 
people  Homer  shows  only  a general  contempt.  In 

18 


TIIE  PRECURSORS  OF  PLATO 


10 


Hesiod  there  may  be  detected  a change  of  attitude,^- 
or  at  least  a different  point  of  view.  More  .stress  is 
laid  on  the  diffies  than  on  the  rights  of  kings,  and 
they  are  judged  with  reference  to  the  j.ustice  rather 
than  the  success  of  their  acts.  A similar  strain 
appears  in  the  sayings  attributed  to  the  Seven  Sages 
and  in  the  fragments  of  the  Gnomic  poets.  There 
is  a tendency  to  measure  kings  by  the  same  standard 
as  other  men,  and  thus  to  weaken  the  supports  of 
royalty.  From  this  it  is  clear  that  an  ethical  com 
sciousness  developed  during  the  period  of  transition 
from  the  monarchic  to  the  aristocratic  and  tyrannic 
types  of  government,  acting  as  both  cause  and  effect 
of  the  political  movement. 

That  strenuous  century  which  began  with  the  Per-  ^ 
sian  and  ended  with  the  Peloponnesian  War  brought 
the  Hellenic  world  face  to  face  with  every  kind  of 
practical  problem  in  statecraft,  on  a scale  beyond 
anything  that  had  preceded.  The  close  contact  with 
the  Persian  despotism,  the  rise  and  decline  of  the 
Athenian  Empire,  the  antithesis  and  death-grapple  of 
Spartan  oligarchy  and  Athenian  democracy,  brought 
into  the  range  of  everyday  experience  the  gravest 
questions  of  political  practice,  and  correspondingly 
stimulated  political  reflection.  Not  only  in  this  par- 
ticular field,  however,  but  in  every  department  of 
intellectual  life  there  was  the  greatest  activity.  Lit- 
erary and  plastic  art  achieved  the  triumphs  which  — 

have  rendered  the  age  of  Pericles  famous  for  all 
. . ^ 
time,  and  general  philosophy  began  under  the  guid- 
ance of  the  Sophists  and  Socrates  to  take  the  path 


20 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


which  led  straight  to  the  immortal  work  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle^  The  ethical  consciousness  which  had 
been  awakened  during  the  preceding  centuries  found 
scope  now  for  the  fullest  development,  especially  in 
the  administration  of  democratic  government.  As 
in  every  other  age  of  what  may  be  called  aggressive 
enlightenment,  the  general  religious  faith  of  the 
Greek  world  was  tending  to  disappear  at  this  time, 
and  the  peoples  entered  upon  the  realization  of  popu- 
lar supremacy  without  a sure  support  in  even  that 
somewhat  inadequate  moral  doctrine  which  the  old 
myth-ridden  theology  had  embodied.  Questions  of 
right  and  wrong  in  political  practice  imperatively 
demanded  a rational  solution ; and  it  was  in  offering 
some  sort  of  satisfaction  to  this  demand  that  the 
Sophists  came  into  prominence. 

L The  work  of  the  group  of  men  commonly  desig- 
nated by  this  term  requires  no  special  analysis  in  this 
place.  After  bearing  for  twenty-two  centuries  the 
obloquy  of  the  civilized  world,  due  chiefly  to  the 
odium  philosopliicum  which  Plato  manifested  toward 
them,  they  at  last  received  a measure  of  just  recog- 
nition through  the  insight  of  Hegel1  and  Grote.2 

^The  function  of  the  Sophists  was  primarily  educa-/./ 
tional.  They  supplied  the  demand  for  instruction  in 
all  that  would  fit  a young  man  for  a successful  career* 
in  the  practical  life  of  a citizen.  Such  a career,  in  ^ 
the  conditions  then  existing,  could  be  achieved  only 

1 Geschichte  der  Philosophic , in  his  Works  (Berlin,  1840),  Vol.  XIV, 

' p.  5 et  seq. 

2 History  of  Greece , Pt.  II,  ch.  67. 


THE  PRECURSORS  OF  PLATO 


21 


through  the  exercise  of  political  functions ; for  indus- 
try, commerce  and  agriculture  were  not  recognized 
as  worthy  pursuits  for  the  citizen.  The  teaching  of  - 
the  Sophists,  therefore,  centred  about  those  branches 
which  were  most  essential  in  public  life,  especially 
Vketori^nji^a^ory.  jFrom  a modern  standpoint  the 
education  which  they  gave  tended  to  be  technical 
rather  than  liberal;  they  emphasized  rather  the  prac- 
tical methods  of  pushing  a policy  to  success  than  the 
philosophic  basis  on  which  the  choice  of  policy  should 
rest.  It  was  at  this  point  that  Socrates,  himself  a 
public  teacher,  not  distinguishable  to  the  masses  from 
the  rest  of  his  class,  took  issue  with  his  fellows  and 
laid  the  foundations  of  a moral  science  which  should 
include  within  it  the  whole  of  political  science. 
Plato,  the  pupil  of  Socrates,  represented  the  rest  of 
the  teaching  body  of  the  day  as  tending  to  set  up  ^ 
pleasure  and  pain  as  ultimate  moral  standards,  and 
might  as  the  criterion  of  political-^dght.  That  such 
doctrine  was  current  at  the  time  seems  beyond  dis- 
pute, but  that  it  was  held  by  the  Sophists  as  a class  is 
more  than  doubtful.  Against  the  doctrine  in  all  its 
phases  a vigorous  protest  was  expressed  in  that  career 
which  makes  Socrates  so  conspicuous  a figure  in  the 
history  of  enlightenment. 

It  is  only  indirectly  that  Socrates  claims  attention 
in  connection  with  political  theory.  His  most  char- 
acteristic work  was  in  the  capacity,  first,  of  inventor 
of  a scientific  method,  and  second,  of  foun5eF~bT^an^ 
ethical  system.  The  method  which  he  introduced- 
was  that  of  doubt  and  definition.  In  the  exuber- 


22 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ance  of  intellectual  growth  that  attended  the  triumph 
of  democracy  at  Athens  there  was  a fair  field  for  the 
criticism  of  so  cynical  a mind  as  that  of  Socrates. 
With  the  frost  of  his  tantalizing  irony,  he  nipped 
many  a promising  blossom  of  political  omniscience. 
He  insisted  that  every  claimant  to  the  possession  of  1 
knowledge  should  define  with  precision  the  nature  o¥" 
his  treasure.  Definition  is  notoriously  the  most  diffi- 
Os,  cult  task  of  the  trained  thinker ; the  demand  for  it 
from  the  ordinary  or  the  immature  mind,  or  even 
from  the  superior  and  cultivated  mind  suddenly  and 
with  premeditated  craft,  could  have  only  the  ludi- 
crous results  in  which  Socrates  found  such  delight.^ 
But  the  influence  of  his  method  in  the  stimulation  of 
close  thinking  and  exact  reasoning  needs  no  better 
illustration  than  the  works  of  his  disciples. 

\ The  ethical  system  of  which  Socrates  laid  the  : 
^ foundation  is  embodied  for  the  most  part  in  the  v 
^ doctrine  that  virtue  is-identical  with  knowledge,  vice  • 

•'  with  ignoraaice,  A proper  appreciation  of  this  doc- 
trine requires  that  it  be  taken  in  close  connection 
with  the  theory  of  knowledge  which  his  method  im- 
plied. If  by  one  who  “ knows  ” we  understand  one 
whose  knowledge  is  of  that  thorough  and  ultimate 
kind  that  will  satisfy  the  demands  for  exact  defini- 
tion, then  the  dictum  that  nobody  who  knows  the 

right  will  do  the  wrong  is  not  so  hopelessly  absurd 

as  might  at  first  sight  appear.  Accordingly,  to  Soc- 
rates, the  just  man  is  he  who  knows  what  is  just. 
From  this  point  of  view  he  formulated  a doctrine 
which  expressed  his  idea  as  to  the  relation  of  politics 


THE  PRECURSORS  OF  PLATO 


to  ethics.1  / Specifically,  the  knowledge  which  was 
identical  with  justice  He  laid  down  to  be  a knowledge"" 
of  the  laws.  But  laws  He  proceeded  to  define  as 
including  the  two  species  — written,  or  the  laws  of 
the  state,  and  unwritten,  or  the  will  of  the  gods. 
The  former  he  held  to  be  of  limited  and  local  obliga- 
tion ; the  latter  to  be  of  universal  binding  force,  and-- 
hence  to  take  precedence  of  all  others.  Xenophon’s 
record  of  the  conversation  in  which  Socrates  lays 
down  this  doctrine  is  the  first  appearance  in  extant 
literature  of  a theme  which  has  been  a staple  of  sci- 
entific controversy  in  every  succeeding  age  — the  rela- 


tion, namely,  of  political  to  divinely  sanctioned  moral 
obligation.  In  both  his  life  and  his  death  the  great 
Athenian  illustrated  a steadfast  conviction  that  what 
he  conceived  to  be  the  will  of  the  gods  must  guide 
his  actions  in  preference  to  the  undoubted  will  of  the 
Athenian  state. 

Beyond  what  has  just  been  mentioned,  the  work  of 
Socrates  did  not  enter  into  the  field  of  political  the- 
ory. The  general  principles  which  he  laid  down 
became,  however,  the  guiding  lines  of  his  disciple 
Plato,  in  whose  system  both  moral  and  political 
philosophy  received  elaborate  treatment. 


2.  General  Character  of  Plato's  Thought 

An  accurate  description  of  Plato’s  political  theories 
in  a reasonable  compass  is  for  various  reasons  a task 
of  much  difficulty.  His  treatment  of  politics  is  in  a 
large  measure  incidental  to  other  topics,  and  takes 

1 Xenophon,  Memorabilia , IV,  4. 


24 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


on  a different  character  with  each  variation  in  the 
point  of  view.  As  a path-breaker  in  systematic 
ethics  and  metaphysics  he  frequently  employs  politi- 
cal doctrine  merely  as  a resource  in  surmounting  the 
obstacles  which  he  meets,  with  scant  attention  to  the 
coherency  of  the  doctrine.  The  progressive  modifi- 
cation of  his  ideas  with  the  advance  of  age  is  also 
clearly  discernible  in  his  works ; so  that  the  chro- ! 
nology  of  his  productions  must  be  considered  in  an 
account  of  his  views.  And  finally,  the  peculiar  char-' 
acter  of  Plato’s  genius  impressed  upon  his  philosophy , 
a poetic  vagueness  which  makes  the  comprehension  I 
of  it  more  a matter  of  feeling  than  of  cold  reason- 
ing. Especially  is  this  true  of  his  most  famous  work, 
The. Republic.  All  his  philosophy  is  represented  here;' 
but  the  treatise  is,  after  all,  essentially  a romance^ 
embellished  with  a series  of  brilliant  but  not  care-M 
fully  correlated  essays  on  morals  and  metaphysics  }1 
The  most  satisfactory  approach  to  his  political 
thought  is  through  his  relation  to  the  work  of  Soc- ; 
rates.  The  latter,  as  has  been  stated,  founded,  first, ; 
a theory  of  knowledge  and  a method  for  all  science, 
and,  second^ a .system  of  ethical  doctrine.  Plato  ex- 
panded the  first  into  a far-reaching  metaphysics,  i 
and  developed  the  other  into  a comprehensive  ethics. j 
Definition,  which  the  Socratic  irony  had  demanded 
as  the  starting-point  of  all  real  knowledge,  was  itself ' 
defined  by  Plato.  It  was  shown  to  involve  the  rejec- 
tion of  the  transient  and  accidental  in  any  phenom- 
enon, and  the  determination  of  the  permanent  and 
essential.  Beal  knowledge,  therefore,  was  attainable 


PLATO’S  THOUGHT  IN  GENERAL 


25 


only  through  a process  of  abstraction  which  should  ^ 
leave  that  residuum  of  qualities  which  has  later  been 
named  the  general  notion.  The  discovery  of  the 
general  notion  was  an  achievement  of  the  first  im- 
portance in  the  history  of  the  human  intellect,  and 
Plato’s  exuberant  fancy  ran  riot  among  the  possibili- 
ties inherent  in  his  advance.  Not  things  as  they  5 
presented  themselves  to  common  observation,  but  ^ 
things  as  embodied  in  their  abstract  ideas,  were  the 
subject-matter  of  real  knowledge  — of  philosophy  in 
its  true  sense.  Not  this,  that  or  the  other  horse,  but 
horse  in  general,  or  the  idea  of  horse,  was  the  real 
horse  and  the  subject  of  equine  science ; and,  piling 
abstraction  on  abstraction,  not  this,  that  or  the  other 
policy,  but  policy  in  general,  was  real  policy  and  the 
subject  of  political  science.  This  idealism,  which  by 
the  linguistic  vagary  of  a later  age  is  both  identical 
with  and  at  the  remotest  extreme  from,  realism,  per- 
vades the  whole  of  Plato’s  thinking  on  politics,  but^ 
determines  in  a particular  way  the  character  of  his 
dialogue  on  The  Statesman , and  of  some  parts  of  The 
Republic. 

In  the  development  of  Socrates’s  ethical  doctrine 
Plato  made  equal  progress  beyond  the  point  reached 
by  his  master.  He  was  faithful  to  the  dogma  that 
virtue  was  identical  with  knowledge ; but  his  theory 
of  knowledge  gave  a much  better  support  to  the 
doctrine  than  it  originally  possessed.  Real  virtue 
was  only  the  ultimate  “idea”  of  virtue,  and  real~ 
knowledge  was  only  the  perception  of  this  idea. 
Hence  good  in  its  true  sense  could  only  be  predi- 


26 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


cated  of  one  who  had  attained  this  absolute  and 
abstract  knowledge.  The  Socratic  dogma,  accord- 
ingly, assumed  substantially  this  form,  that  \the 
all- wise  philosopher  alone  could  attain  to  virtue. ) 
But  Plato  was  too  faithful  to  the  practical  purpose 
of  his  master’s  teaching  to  be  satisfied  with  so 
barren  a moral  doctrine  as  this.  Human  conduct 
required  some  less  forbidding  guidance  than  exhor- 
tation to  the  attainment  of  the  unattainable.  Hence 
Plato  worked  out  a scheme  of  practical  and  particu-b' 
lar  virtues  for  the  actualities  of  life,  fie  based  thi^> 
system  on  a psychology  which  embodied  a threefold 
analysis  of  the  human  soul  into  the  rational,  the, 
spirited, os)  and  the  sensual  or  appetitive  facuh 


ties.  From  the  interrelationship  of  these  elements 
he  drew  his  definition  of  the  particular  viytp.es. 
Courage  was  the  subordination  of  the  spirited  to  the 
rational  faculty;  temperance  (croi^poa-uvrj),  the  sub- 
jection of  the  appetitive  to  the  rational.  And  justice 
was  described  (one  can  hardly  say  defined1)  as  th(| 
regulative  virtue  which  produces  a general  harmon^ 
in  character  and  general  good  order  in  conduct] 


\ 


The  just  man,  he  says,  is  like  a well-ordered  city; 
^e  unjust,  like  anarchy.  These  three  particular 
virtues  were  presented  with  profound  and  fascinating 
art  by  Plato,  but  he  never  lost  sight  of  his  funda- 
mental principle,  that  they  were  rooted  in  “ opinion  ” 
(Sof a),  that  partial,  fluctuating  knowledge  which  even 
common  men  possess,  while  the  one  supreme  virtue , 
wisdom  in  its  absolute  sense  (cro<£ta),  was  immanent 
1 See  Republic , IV,  443. 


PLATO’S  THOUGHT  IN  GENERAL 


27 


only  in  the  complete  and  permanent  “ science  ” 
(i7TLCTT7]ixrj)  to  which  the  philosopher  attained.  The 
abstract  ideal  of  the  good,  as  determining  fixed  and 
immutable  canons  of  morality,  was  the  standpoint 
from  which  he  assailed  the  utilitarian  ethical  and 
political  doctrines  which  he  ascribed  to  the  Sophists. 
In  his  view  right  and  justice  remained  always  the 
same ; the  demands  of  a narrow  and  temporary  ex- 
pediency could  never  change  them  — could  never 
convert  them  into  injustice  and  wrong.  • 

In  the  expansion  of  the  Socratic  metaphysics  and 
ethics  is  inseparably  infolded  Plato’s  political  theory. 
His  thought  on  politics,  profound  and  brilliant  as  it 
often  was,  never  assumed  the  independent  and  sys- 
tematic form  of  a science.  Three  dialogues  contain 
substantially  all  his  political  ideas,  The  Statesman , 
The  Republic , and  The  Laws.  Of  these  the  first 
is  primarily  an  exercise  in  dialectic,  and  the  sec- 
ond is  mainly  a treatise  on  ethics,  individual  and 
social.  Only  the  third  sets  out  with  a deliberate 
purpose  of  dealing  with  political  subjects,  and  in 
this,  the  work  of  his  old  age,  the  writer  proceeds 
steadily  within  the  lines  which  the  matured  habit  of 
a long  life  has  made  indispensable.  In  all  three  of 
the  works,  however,  there  is  much  that  is  most  val- 
uable and  suggestive  from  both  the  historical  and 


the  scientific  point  of  view. 


& 


3.  The  Republic  J 

The  Republic  is  in  every  respect  Plato’s  great- 
est work.  Both  the  substance  of  his  thought  and 


28 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  form  in  which  it  is  expressed  have  fascinated  all 
succeeding  generations  and  have  stimulated  endless 
imitation.  The  familiar  name  of  the  dialogue,  how- 


ever, gives  a somewhat  erroneous  idea  of  its  true 


character.1  The  ideal  state,  whose  outlines  are  so 
boldly  and  beautifully  set  forth  as  often  to  monopo- 
lize the  attention  of  the  reader,  is  avowedly  a mere 
incident  in  the  main  theme  of  the  dialogue.  Plato 
proceeds  to  formulate  the  conception  of  a state  in 


whick-h1  .prflYml?  in  order  to  discover  by  anal- 
ogy the  philosophic  idea  of  justice  in  the  individual 


man.2  This  method  expresses  in  itself  the  two  dom- 


V inant  characteristics  of  the  writer’s  political  philoso- 
jfphy  — its  idealism  and  its  subordination  to  ethical 
science. 


1 


The  first  cause  of  the  state  Plato  finds  in  the  di- 
versity of  meri-s-  desires  and  tbe 
assistance  in  satisfying  them.3  A community  arising 
from  this  cause  must  embrace  three  classes  of  neonle  i 
producers  of  sustenance,,  to  supply  the  physical  wants 
of  the  population ; warriors,  protect  the  labourers 
and  insure  a sufficient  territory  for  the  purposes  of 
the  state ; and  finally,  counsellors  and  magistrates, 
to  regulate  the  general  welfare  of  the  community. 
These  three  classes,  working  in  proper  correlation, 
will  insure  the  maximum  of  well-being  throughout 
the  state.  Every  member  of  the  community  must 
be  assigned  to  the  class  for  whir.h  hp.  proves  himself 


✓ 


1 The  alternative  title,  On  Justice , is  more  expressive  of  the 
contents.  This  title,  however,  was  not  known  to  Aristotle.  Cf 
Jowett,  The  Dialogues  of  Plato,  III,  vi. 

2 Rep.  H,  368. 


* Ibid.  369. 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO 


29 


host  fitted.  Thus  a perfect  harmony  and  unity  will 
'characterize  both  the  state  and  every  person  in  it.1 

In  laying  down  this  social  and  economic  basis  for 
his  republic  the  philosopher  manifests  a high  apprecia- 
tion of  the  principle  of  specialization  and  division  of  * 
labour  which  has  received  such  marked  attention  in 
"recent  days.  His  assignment  of  political  functions 
has  hardly  so  modern  a tone.  To  the  third  of  the 
classes  mentioned  above,  the _ guardians  (c pvXaKes ),  as 
he  calls  them,  consisting  of  the  oldest  and  wisest  of 
the  jym mupity.  he  ascribes  untrammelled  discretion 
in  the  ordering  of  the  state’s  affairs.  This  class, 
on  whose  character  and  attributes  TPlato  dwells 
with  the  most  particular  interest,2  is  the  ultimate 
product  of  the  long  course  of  training  in  which  the' 
life  of  a citizen  must  be  passed.  Only  those  who 
have  proved  themselves  perfect  in  true  knowledge  ^ 
may  enter  the  class,  and  the  judgment  of  the  guar- 
dians themselves  is  conclusive  as  to  the  qualification. 

To  the  members  of  this  close  corporation  is  assigned 
a manner  of  life-which  is  conceived  to  be  appropriate  ' 
to  their  exalted  character.  They  have  nq  individual 
family  or  property  interests  ; they  live  in  public,  eat 
at  common  tables  and  sleep  in  tents.  With  the  sup- 
port of  ..their  phyBicaToxis.tenee  reduced  to  the  abso- 
lute minimum  of  concern  to  them,  they  are  enabled 
to  cultivate  philosophy  and  rise  to  those  heights  of 

. . . so  each  may  become  not  many  men,  but  one,  and  the 
city  may  be  not  many,  but  one.”  — Rep.  Ill,  424. 

2 The  warriors  are  described  almost  exclusively  with  reference  to 
the  selection  of  guardians  from  among  them,  and  the  labouring  class 
receives  practically  no  attention  at  all  after  the  first  brief  definition. 


80 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


omniscience  which  afford  an  unerring  insight  into 
all  human  affairs.  Hence  their  fitness  to  guide  the 
state  without  other  rule  than  the  true  wisdom  in 
which  they  share. 

Upon  the  relation  of  this  picture  of  an  ideal  com- 
munity to  Plato's  ethical  discussion  it  is  unnecessary 
here  to  dwell.  In  brief,  the  allegory  is  simply  this : 
/ The  three  classes  of  the  people  symbolize  the  three 
' ^ faculties  of  the  soul,  — appetitive,  spirited  and  ra- 
^ tional,  — and  the  just  man,  like  the  ideal  state,  is 
found  where  the  first  two  are  in  proper  subordina- 
\ tion  to  the  third.1 


On  the  political  side  proper  the 


ideas  which  he  brings  out  inTnghest  relief  are,  first,  ^ 
the  necessity  of'  an  organic  unity  in  social  life ; sec-  L 
si  ond,  the  importance  of  systematic  education,  as  con-  ) 
N trasted  with  haphazard  legislation,  in  regulating  the  j 
common  interest ; and  third,  the  ratitma 1-^basis  of^ 


^ aristocracy  m government. 


The^  ideal  unity  of  a state  Plato  explains  in  his  x 
celebrated  discussion  of  communism.2  As  private  1 
property  and  family  relationships  appear  to  be.  the 
chief  sources  of  dissension  in  every  community, . 


^neither  is  to  have  recognition  in  the  perfect  state. 
Unity  and  harmony  require  that  no  individual  should 
differ  from  any  other  in  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain  in  respect  to  any  third  person  or  any  object 
> whatever.  All  must  “ rejoice  and  grieve  alike  at 
the  same  gains  and  the  same  losses  ” ; “ the  words 
6 mine  ’ and  ‘ thine  ’ must  be  pronounced  by  all  simul- 
taneously.”3 Private  property,  therefore,  can  have 
1 Rep.  IV,  427  et  seq.  2 Ibid.  Bk.  V.  3 Ibid.  V,  462. 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO 


31 


no  existence  in  the  ideal  state,  and,  further,. Plato  • 
works  oiiLan,.-ingeniQHS  . sdieme  througli  which  chil- 
dren  shall  not  know  their  own  parents,  or  parents 
their  own  children.  The  discord-making  devotion-' 
of  ^fathers,  and  especially  of  mothers,  to  their  own 
offspring  is  thus  precluded  at  the  outset.  Indeed, 
the  relations  of  the  sexes  in  general  *are  ‘ to  be  / 

of  individual 

)solute  con- 
trol of  the  magistrates.  MQn~~and  women  are  to  be 
mated  witli  sole  reference  to  a harmonious  balance 
of  qualities  in  the  young ; and  the  elements  of  per- 
fect character  thus  insured  at  birth  are  to  be  devel- 

^ " I 


wholly  aeyere.fl .from  the  influence 

emotion,  Wd  are  tTo  beT 


oped  to  maturity~^By  a system  of  uniform  public 
education. 

ry  In  education  Plato  sees  the  only  true  way  to  the 
permanent  stability  of  the  state.  The  hope  of 
moulding  the  citizens  to  the  system  of  the  commu-^ 
nity  by  legislation  must  always  be  futile.  ( If  the 
character  of  the  people  is  sound,  laws  are  unneces- 
sary ; if  unsound,  laws  are  useless.  Character  can 
be  fixed  only  by  a training  that  begins  with  the  ear- 
liest years  and  proceeds  on  lines  suitable  to  the 
maturing  of  the  mind  until  the  climax  of  life.  In 
the  ideal  state  the  function  of  the  magistrates  is 
practically  limited  to  the  conduct  of  such  a training^__ 
Physical  and  mental  culture  receive  equal  attention 
in  the  earlier  years.  After  the  age  of  twenty  ther^ 
latter  gradually  assumes  the  chief  place,  and  after 
thirty  those  individuals  who  have  shown  the  most 

1 Education  is  treated  in  Bk.  VII  of  The  Republic. 


32 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


^ capacity  confine  themselves  to  the  pursuit  of  dialec- 
tic — the  ultimate  science.  As  the  developments  of 
this  training  enable  the  magistrates  to  determine 
the  peculiar  capacity  of  the  novices,  the  latter  are 
assigned  to  the  respective  classes  for  which  they  are  » 
found  to  be  fitted.  The  residuum  of  exalted  minds^ 
who -are  adapted  to  philosophy  in  its  highest  sense 
enter  at  fifty  into  the  class  of  magistrates  and  assume 
their  part  in  administration.  Premising  the  unerr- 
ing wisdom  of  those  who  have  attained  to  true 
knowledge,  the  relations  between  the  individual  and 
society  are  so  determined  by  this  system  as  to  pre- 
clude any  of  the  discord  that  inheres  in  the  ordinary 
political  life. 

It  appears  from  the  whole  tenor  of  the  discussion 
in  The  Republic  that  the  Platonic  ideal  of  government  • ^ 
is  aristocratic.  The  particular  form  of  aristocracy 
— that  of  intellect  — is  determined  largely  by  the 
philosopher’s  preoccupation  with  his  philosophical 
theories.  The  real_state.  exists  only  in.  the  abstract 
^ idea  of  the  state ; and  hence  the  real  rulers  are  only  - 
those  wTho  possess  the  knowledge  of  this  idea.  In 
the  presence  of  this  conception,  the  democratic  idea~ 
of  government  by  the  uninstructed  masses,  as  well  - 
as  the  monarchic  notion  of  government  by  the  unin-’ 

^ structed  one,  had  no  room  for  existence.  But  Plato 
had  more  than  a mere  theoretical  basis  for  his  dislike 
of  democracy.  The  Athenians,  in  the  full  tide  of 
democracy, -liad  nut  Socrates  to  death  — a man  in 
whom  Plato,  like  all  his  other  disciples,  could  find 
no  guile.  _ This  act  must  have  contributed  powerfully 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO 


38 


to  confirm  the  conclusions  of  his  philosophy  — that 
authority  was  only  justifiable  when  based  on  the.- 
broadest  culture* 


Unless  it  shall  come  to  pass  that  philosophers  are  kings, 
or  that  those  who  are  now  called  kings  and  potentates  be 
imbued  with  a sufficient  measure  of  genuine  philosophy  — that 
is  to  say,  unless  political  power  and  philosophy  be  united,  . . . 
there  will  be  no  cessation  of  ills  for  states,  nor  yet,  I believe, 
for  the  human  race;  neither  can  the  commonwealth,  which  we 
have  now  sketched  in  theory,  ever  till  then  see  the  light  of 
day.1 


The  relation  of  existing  polities  to  his  ideal  is 
indicated  by  Plato  in  a fanciful  account  of  the 
process  through  which  the  various  types  have  origi- 
nated.2 The  process  is  one  of  progressive  degenera- 
tion from  the  perfect  aristocracy,  through  timocracy, 
oligarchy  and  democracy,  to  tyranny.  By  timocracy,  ^ 
the  form  exhibiting  the  least  deviation  from  the  , 
ideal,  he  means  a system  dominuted^by  the  love  ^ 
of  Jhonour  (ti/xt?)  or  glory,  rather  than  of  justice;3  and 

it  is  very  significant  that  he  regards  Sparta  agTessen- 
^ * * ~ ^ ® ~ — - 

tially  of  this  type.  Oligarchy  springs  from  the  rise 

of  private  property,  and  is  the  j:ule  of  the  wealthy  nf 

few  over  the  poorer  many.  Democa^y^everses  ■ 

this  situation  and  exaggerates  liberty  into  anarchy. 

Finally,  like  a true  Greek,  Plato  sets  tyranny  at  the 

end  of  the  scale  — at  the  farthest  remove  from  the 

abode  of  justice.  But  the  tyrant  is  merely  the  fruit 

of  democracy.  By  taking  advantage  of  the  dissension 

among  the  people  he  makes  himself  their  master. 


1 Rep.  V,  473.  2 Rep.  VIII,  546  et  seq. 

3 Power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  warrior  rather  than  of  the  guardian  class. 


34 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


4.  The  Statesman 

In  The  Statesman  Plato’s  chief  purpose  is  to  J 
develop  the  “ idea  ” of  a ruler,  and  to  set  political 
science  in  its  proper  place  in  the  broad  scheme  of 
knowledge.  The  result  is  embodied  in  an  identifica- 
tion of  the  true  statesman  with  the  all-wise  philoso^ 
pher,  and  an  identification  of  politics  with  education 
v and  character-building.1  These  conceptions  have 
already  been  formulated  in  The  Republic , but  they 
receive  in  The  Statesman  a more  precise  definition, 
and  are  cast  in  a more  rigidly  scientific  mould.  The 
ideal  ruler  and  the  abstract  political  science  are  set 
off  with  the  utmost  distinctness  from  the  practical 
politician  and  the  principles  of  practical  administra- 
tion. Plato  here,  as  elsewhere  in  his  vorks,2  relegates 
to  a wholly  inferior  category  those  arts  and  those  men 
that  are  concerned  with  the  management  of  military 
and  fiscal  details  in  the  city’s  life,  and  even  those 
who  administer  justice  according  to  the  laws.  The 
^ function  of  the  true  statesman  is  to  make  the  citizens 
conform  to  the  ideal  standards  of  virtue ; and  true 
political  science  is  that  knowledge  by  which  men  are 
taken  care  of  either  with  or  without  law,  either  with 
or  without  their  own  consent.3  From  the  point  of 
view  of  ultimate  truth  there  is  no  significance  what- 
ever in  the  various  characteristics  which  are  com- 
monly employed  in  discriminating  governments  as 

1 Statesman , 306  et  seq.  3 Gorgias,  515. 

8 Statesman,  293. 


THE  STATESMAN  OF  PLATO 


35 


good  or  bad.  That  the  rulers  be  few  or  many,  or 
rich  or  poor,  or  that  the  subjects  obey  willingly  or 
unwillingly,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter.  The 
true  physician  is  he  who  cures  us,  u whether  he  cures 
us  against  our  will  or  with  our  will  . . . whether  he 
practises  out  of  a book  or  not  out  of  a book,  and 
whether  he  be  rich  or  poor  ” ; and  the  principles  he 
applies  are  true  medical  science.  . Not  otherwise  are 
to  be  judged  the  statesman  and  his  science. 

This  conception  of  politics  precludes  the  considera- 
tion of  law  and  legislation  as  factors  in  ideal  govern-  Hr* 
ruent.1  But  in  The  Statesman , as  in  The  Republic , 
Plato  discusses  the  relation  between  the  ideal  and 
the  actual,  and  this  gives  the  opportunity  for  a strik- 
ing analysis  of  the  function  of  law  (i'o/aos).  Ideally  the 
discretion  of  the  all-wise  philosopher  is  a perfect  guar- 
antee of  excellence  in  administration,  and  stands  in 
marked  contrast  to  the  narrow  and  inflexible  pre- 
scriptions of  a past  time.  To  restrain  the  discretion 
of  such  a being  by  rigid  rules,  would  be  like  restrict- 
ing the  trained  physician  or  the  skilled  pilot  to  spe- 
cific modes  of  action  regardless  of  circumstances. 
But  conceding  that  the  all-wise  philosopher  is  una- 
vailable,  Plato  attributes  the  utmost  importance  to*^ 
law,  as  the  expression  of  experience  and  practical 
wisdom.  No  actual  man  or  group  of  men  possesses 
so  much  of  the  spirit  of  true  political  science  as  is 
embodied  in  the  written  laws  and  national  customs 
of  a people,2  and  undeviating  conformity  to  these 

1 Cf  supra , p.  31. 

2 ra  yeypafxfxtva  /cat  TraTpua.  ZOrj.  — Statesman,  301. 


36 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


is  the  first  essential  of  those  imperfect  systems  of 
government  which  exist  among  men. 

On  the  basis  of  this  conception,  Plato  frames  a 
classification  of  governments  which  differs  consider- 
ably from  that  outlined  in  The  Republic } As  one 
basis  of  division,  he  adopts  that  of  the  number  of 
persons  exercising  supreme  authority  — a basis  al- 
ready common  in  Greek  thought  and  employed  by 
Herodotus ; but  crossing  this,  Plato  applies  also  the 
relation  of  the  government  to  law.  His  ideas  may 
be  expressed  in  the  subjoined  table : — 

Subject  to  Law  Unrestrained  by  Law 

The  rule  of  One  is  Itoycilty  Tyrunny 

The  rule  of  the  Few  is  Aristocracy  Oligarchy 

The  rule  of  the  Many  is  Democracy  Democracy 


None  of  these  forms,  of  course,  is  absolutely  good. 
But  practically  considered,  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
citizen,  the  rule  of  one  is  at  the  same  time  the  best  ^ 
and  the  worst  of  the  six.  That  is  to  say,  when  sub- 
ject to  law  it  is  the  best,  and  when  unrestrained  by 
law  (tyranny)  it  is  the  worst.  Aristocracy  and  oli- 
garchy are  intermediate  in  respect  to  good  and  evil. 


The  rule  of  the  many  stands  in  a position  the  reverse  ? 
of  that  occupied  by  monarchy.  That  is  to  say,  democ- 
racy is  the  worst  of  governments  that  are  subject  to  1 
law,  but  the  best  of  those  that  are  without  law.  This 
relative  excellence  arises,  however,  exclusively  from 


1 Supra,  p.  33. 

2 Cf  the  discussion  of  the  Persian  conspirators  after  the  death  of 
the  false  Smerdis,  Bk.  Ill,  c.  80.  The  historian  puts  Greek  ideas  into 
barbarian  mouths. 


THE  LAWS  OF  PLATO 


87 


the  fact  that  democracy  is  in  every  respect  weak  and 
inefficient,  and  unable  to  effect  much  either  of  good  ^ 
or  of  evil;  it  is  therefore  least  oppressive  of  the 
three  where  the  restraints  of  law  are  absent.1 

Thus,  from  a point  of  view  quite  different  from  that 
in  The  Republic,  Plato  is  enabled  to  demonstrate  the 
same  conclusion  that  democracy  is  essentially  bad. 

5.  The  Laics 


The  last  and  most  extensive  treatise  of  Plato  on 
politics,  The  Laws , signifies  by  its  title  the  last  step 
in  the  transition  of  his  philosophy  from  the  field  of 
the  ideal  to  that  of  the  actual.  In  The  Republic  he 
considers  the  ideal  state  almost  exclusively.  In  The 
Statesman  he  retains  this  point  of  view,  but  descends, 
as  we  have  just  seen,  to  the  discussion  of  some  highly 
significant  phases  of  actual  government.  In  The 
Laics,  finally,  he  formally  abandons  his  idealism,  and 
seeks  to  set  forth  a system  that  would  be  workable 
among  imperfect  men.  ; Having  demonstrated  in  The 
Statesman  that  a regime  of  legal  and  constitutional 
limitations,  though  logically  irreconcilable  with  the 
perfect  ideal  of  government,  was  indispensable  to  ex- 
cellence in  actual  states,2  he  purposes  in  The  Laws  to 
formulate  a code  that  shall  absolutely  determine  the 
life  of  the  community,  and  shall  thus  insure  the  best 
results  possible  in  a practicable  political  system. 

The  spirit  of  this  code  manifests  very  clearly,  how- 
ever, the  persistence  of  the  earlier  ideas.  Plato  clings 


X 

iL. 

t 

'L 

✓ 


1 Statesman,  303. 

2 For  a striking  passage  sustaining  the  thesis  that  law  should  be 
above  man,  see  Laios,  IV,  715. 


38 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


X 


as  far  as  possible  to  the  broad  principles  of  The  Repub- 
lic, introducing  modifications  with  frank  reluctance 
only  when  the  requirements  of  a practical  community 
seem  imperatively  to  demand  it.  Thus(  he  concedes 
the  necessity  of  marriage  ancLof  family  life  ; but  the 
government  is  authorized  to  persuade  the  union  of 
couples  in  whose  contrasting  qualities  is  found  the 
hope  of  well-balanced  offspring,  to  inspect  and  regu- 
late the  most  intimate  details  of  domestic  routine,  and 
to  compel  the  presence  of  the  women  as  well  as  the 
men  jit  the  public  mess.1)  Again,  (education  ceases  to 
be  the  almost  exclusive  occupation  of  the  magistrates, 
but  a system  is  prescribed  which  is  to  be  most  rigidly 
enforced  upon  all  the  youth,  and  the  intellectual  and 
artistic  development  of  the  citizens  is  made  subject 
to  a thoroughgoing  censorship,  in  comparison  with 
which  the  most  rigid  system  of  actual  history  would 
be  lax  and  lifeless. \ 

sj  In  respect  to  property  also  Plato  concedes  that  -the'^ 
communism  of  The  Republic  is  impracticable^  The  ft 
principle  of  priv^e_p3fopeily__is ^ therefore  admitted, 
but  the  evils  of  an  inequitable  distribution  are  guarded 
against  by  precautions  that  to  the  modern  mind  seem 
fatal  to  the  principle.  The  philosopher  fully  appre- 
ciates the  economic  basis  of  political  discord.  A > 
tranquil  state  will  be  one  in  which  there  is  neither 
extreme  poverty  nor  extreme  wealth;  hence  the  laws 


1 Laws , VI,  773  et  seq.  For  the  administration  of  these  powers 
Plato  would  have  the  primary  authority  in  the  hands  of  a ward  com- 
mittee of  women,  whose  chief  duty  should  be  the  close  supervision 
of  young  couples  for  the  first  ten  years  of  married  life. 


THE  LAWS  OF  PLATO 


39 


. > 

must  promote  equality  of  possessions.1  Especially 
must  tlie  ownership  by  citizens  of  equal  shares  of  land  Mr 
be  safeguarded ; and  through  the  discouragement  of 
commercial  pursuits  by  all  possible  means  the  accu-^ 
mulation  of  wealth  in  other  forms  must  at  least  be 
impeded.2  Despite  ..all .legislation  to  obstruct  it,  how- 
ever, inequality  in  property  will  arise,  and  so  far  as 
it  is  inevitable, vit  must  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
organization  of  government.  Accordingly,  Plato 
bases  his  classification  of  the  people,  for  the  assign- . 
ment  of  offices  and  honours,  on  wealth,  and  not,  as  nr 
Tlie  Republic , on  intellect.  Four  classes  are  provided  } 
for.  The  first  consists  of  those  who  possess  only  the 
equal  allotment  of  land  which  the  state  guarantees 
to  every  citizen  as  the  “ limit  of  poverty.”  The 
other  three  classes  are  determined  by  the  possession 
of  wealth  to  the  amount  of  two,  three  and  four 
times  the  value  of  the  share  of  land ; and  property 
accumulated  by  any  citizen  in  excess  of  the  fourfold 
measure  is  subject  to  summary  confiscation  by  the 
government.3 

In  describing  the  governmental  organization  of  his 
polity  Plato  avowedly  seeks  a mean  between  mon-  \.  f 
archy  and  democracy.  These  two  forms  he  takes 
&s„  representative  of  the  contradictory  principles  of 
authority  and  liberty.  Either  principle  carried  to|^ 
excess  results  in  disaster  to  the  state,  as  may  be  seen 

1 Laws,  V,  744. 

2 Gold  and  silver  are  excluded  from  the  state  by  Plato’s  code,  except 
so  far  as  the  treasury  of  the  state  requires  a store  for  use  in  foreign 
relations.  V,  742. 

8 V,  744. 


40 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


in  the  history  of  Persia  and  of  Athens.1  Moderation^ 
^ k essential  to  the  maintenance  of  good  feeling 
between  rulers  and  ruled;  and  Plato  attributes  the 
highest  importance  in  politics  to  this  relation  — to 
the  principle  of  friendship,  as  he  calls  it.  Indeed,  lie4" 
lays  it  down  as  according  to  nature  that  gQyernmgnt  ^ 
^ should  be  “ the  rule  of  law  over  willing  subjects, _and 
‘ pi>t  a^rule  ^compulsion  ” — a proposition  which  is  ! 
much  like  the  “ natural  law  ” of  modern  days,  that 
government  rests  on  the  consent  of  the  governed.2 
^.The  monarchic  government,  then,  must  be  so  organ-> 
ized  as  to  check  the  undue  extension  of  the  principle  ' 
of  authority;  Sparta,  in  the  restraints  imposed  by 
senate  and  ephors  upon  the  kings,  seems  to  Plato  to 
have  attained  this  end.  On  the  other  hand,  dejno- 
-V  cratic  liberty  must  be  prevented  from  degenerating  1 
into  license.3  Especially  must  the  conception  of 
equality,  which  is  the  foundation  of  democracy,  be 
properly  understood.  For  equality  is  of  two  kinds;  1 
^ absolute  and  proportionate.  The  former  requires 
that  every  citizen  have  precisely  the  same  oppor- 
tunity to  perform  every  public  service;  the  latter, 

1 Laws , III,  693  et  seq.  Plato’s  analysis  of  the  decline  of  these  two 
governments  is  characteristic.  In  the  one  case  the  primary  cause,  he 
declares,  was  the  failure  of  the  strong  monarchs,  Cyrus  and  Darius, 
to  give  their  sons  a proper  education  ; in  the  other,  the  failure  of  the  1 
authorities  to  exclude  corrupting  novelties  in  music  and  drama  from 
the  Athenian  stage. 

2 Laws , III,  690 ; cf  VIII,  832.  For  an  anticipation  of  the  contract 
theory  of  the  relation  between  king  and  people,  see  Plato’s  interpreta- 
tion of  early  Peloponnesian  history,  III,  684. 

3 Even  the  sports  of  the  children  are  to  be  carefully  watched,  lest 
innovation  should  creep  in  and  plant  the  seeds  of  destructive  radical- 
ism in  politics.  VII,  797. 


THE  LAWS  OF  PLATO 


41 


that  part  in  the  government  be  proportioned  to  thq^ 
merit  of  each.  In  appointment  to  office,  therefore, 
choice  by  lot  will  be  the  mode  expressive  of  absolute 
equality ; some  other  mode,  such  as  election,  must  be^> 
combined  with  this  if  proportionate  equality  is  to  find 
recognition.1 


The  details  of  the  administrative  - organization^ 
which  Plato  sketches  out  for  his  state  need  not 
particularly  detain  us.2  The  chief  place  in  the  ad- 
ministration he  gives  to  a baard. of  thirty-seven,  called 
guardians  of  the  laws,  chosen  by  election  in  three 
stages  by  the  citizens  who  bear  arms.  Only  men 
of  fifty  years,  of  age  and  upward  are  eligible,  and 
each  retires  when  he  reaches  seventy.  These  guar- 
dians constitute  the  general  advisory  and  supervisory 
authority  for  the  whole  administration.  Military 
officials  are  elected,  on  nomination,  primarily,  by^ 
the  guardians.  Provision  is  also  made  for  an  admin- 
istrative council  of  360,  chosen  through  a combina- 
tion of  election  and  lot,  with  functions  similar  to 
those  of  the  Athenian  preconsidering  senate.  A 
general  assembly  of  the  citizens  (e/c/cX^cria)  is  pre- 
sumed,3 rather  than  described,  as  an  element  in  the 
governmental  system,  but  its  functions  consist  chiefly 
in  the  election  of  the  various  magistrates.  The 
judicial  organization  is  based  formally  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  all  citizens  should  have  a voice  in  the  ^ 
administration;  of  justice)  but  the  methods  of  pro- 
cedure and  appeal  are  so  arranged  as  to  insure  a 


2 See  Bk.  VI,  at  large. 
3 Cf.  VI,  758,  764. 


1 Laws,  VI,  757. 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


±2 


J 


predominant  influence  to  a select  court  of  magis- 
trates.1 Finally,  as  the  capstone  of  the  whole  gov- 
ernmental edifice,  Plato  ordains  a council  consisting 
of  the  ten  olde.si-^paxdian  priests 

that  have  been  distinguished  for  virtue,  and  those 
magistrates  who_have:  had^harge  of  education,  to-  ' 
gether  with-  aT  nu mber  of  younger  men  equaTto  that 
of  the  older.2 


To  this  body,  whMr"shall  meet  daily 
between  dawn  and  sunrise,3  is  assigned  the  supreme  _ 
4uty  of  determining  when  and  to  what  extent  changes  J 
shall  be  made  in  the  laws  of  the  state.- 

For  legislation  in  the  familiar  modern  sense-no ' 
especial  provision-is  made  in  The  Laws.  The  pre- 
scriptions of  the  code  are  assumed  to  cover  all 
important  points  — all  matters  that  are  worthy 
the  wisdom  of  a scientific  lawgiver.  Moreover,  the 
form  of  'the  code  is  such  as  to  present,  not  only  the 
rule,  but  the  purpose  and  justification  of  the  law> 
so  that  persuasion  as  well  as  penalty  shall  play  a 
part  in  securing  obedience.  This  Plato  considers 
a very  important  feature  of  legislative  art.4  On  the 
basis  of  the  laws  thus  formulated,  the  elaboration 
of  details  may  be  left  to  administrative  officials 
guided  by  experience.5 6  Finally,  no  written  laws.  >1 
however  detailed,  will  altogether  displace  the  customs 
or  unwritten  laws  of  a people ; hence  it  is  that  the 


1 VI,  767,  768.  2 XII,  951,  961. 

8 This  body  is  known  commonly  as  the  “ nocturnal  council.” 

4 Bk.  IV,  718;  cf.  also  VII,  822.  As  Janet  points  out,  Plato  dis- 

cerns the  principle  of  the  expose  de  motif  of  modern  continental  legis- 

lation. 

6 Bk.  VI,  770;  cf  VIII,  828. 


PLATO’S  THEORY  AND  GREEK  FACTS 


43 


utmost  attention  is  to  be  paid  to  the  education  of 
the  young.1 

It  is  impossible  to  discover  in  The  Laws  the  crite- 
rion by  which  Plato  distinguished  the  general  and 
important  from  the  secondary  and  unimportant  in 
legislation.  The  work  is  for  the  most  part  an  un- 
systematic assemblage  of  ideas  on  the  most  diverse  ^ 
features  of  social  life.  Besides  the  matters  already 
considered,  it  embodies  regulations  touching  many 
varieties  of  crime  and  tort,  various  phases  of  con- 
tract law,  testament,  trade,  witchcraft,  the  treatment 
of  slaves,  treasure-trove,  funerals,  agriculture,  divorce 
and  many  other  things.  In  this  mass  of  matter 
there  is  much  that  is  exceedingly  valuable  from  the 
standpoint  of  social  history  and  comparative  juris- 
prudence. The  philosophy  of  the  state  is  chiefly 
to  be  found  in  the  points  that  have  already  been 
particularly  considered. 


6.  Plato's  Theory  and  Hellenic  Facts 

The  a priori  and  idealizing  method  of  Plato’s  politi- 
cal philosophy  does  not  conceal  from  even  the  casual 

▼ 

reader  the  intimate  relation  between  the  doctrines 
enunciated  and  the  currents  of  practical  Greek  poli- 
tics. It  does  not  require  the  explicit  eulogy  of  Sparta 
which  several  times  occurs2  to  reveal  that  the  Pelo- 

tute  the  model  from  which  the  philosopher  draws  his 
inspiration.  The  foundations  of  The  Bepublic  are 
indeed  carefully  laid  in  abstract  ethics  and  dialectic. 


1 VII,  793. 


2 Rep.  X,  599 ; Laws , III,  691  et  seq. 


44 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


but  the  superstructure  discloses,  both  in  general  effect 
and  often  in  details,  the  lines  of  the  Lycurgean  insti- 
tutions. In  JSparta,  as  in  The  Republic , the  govern- 
ing class  was  occupied  exclusively  with  political 
affairs,  lived  a life  of  publicity  and,  in  theory  at 
least,  of  austerity,  participated  in  and  supervised  a 
vigorous  discipline  designed  to  maintain  a uniformity 
of  type  among  citizens,  and  ruthlessly  sacrificed  every 
individual  or  family  interest  to  the  interest  of  the 
state.  Lycurgus  in  the  real,  as  Plato  in  the  ideal, 
commonwealth  prohibited  written  laws  and  money  of 
gold  and  silver ; and  in  the  one  polity  as  in  the  other, 
Qxdyandry  and  the  exposure  of  weak  and  deformed* 
infants  were  recognized  as  useful  and  proper  devices 
for  preserving  the  physical  integrity  of  the  people.^ 
Sparta's  succes^fuL-career-in , Hellenic  politics,  culmi-  * 
nating  in  the  destruction  of  Athenian  power  through 
the  Peloponnesian  War,  made  a powerful  impression 
upon  all  reflecting  Greeks.  It  is  hardly  surprising 
that  the  philosopher  should  have  attributed  special 
virtue  to  the  peculiar  constitution  of  the  triumphant 
little  state.  Not  only  her  success  abroad,  but  also 
the  stability  of  her  government  at  home,  made  her 
exceptional  in  Hellas.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Spartans  were  notoriously  without  part  in  the  intel- 
lectual progress  of  the  times.  Hence  the  criticism 
which  Plato  makes  upon  their  system,  and  hence  the 
deviation  of  his  ideal  from  their  practical  state.  He 
finds  their  training  one-sided — physical  and  military, 
without  balance  on  the  side  of  intellect  and  philos- 
ophy. The  method  of  their  discipline  he  adopts, 


PLATO’S  THEORY  AND  GREEK  FACTS 


45 


but  the  substance  will  not  fulfil  the  demands  of  a 
rounded  character,  and  is  supplemented,  therefore, 
in  The  Republic,  by  adequate  attention  to  the 
lacking  elements. 

In  The  Laics  Plato  makes  some  amend  to  his 
native  Athens  for  the  injuria  spretce  formce  in  his  ear- 
lier work^  Hellenic  history  during  his  later  life  had 
furnished  ground  for  a revision  of  judgment  as  to  the 
supreme  efficiency  of  the  Spartan  system,  even  in  the 
purely  military  and  political  sense.  That  Athens, 
once  crushed  to  the  earth,  had  shown  sufficient  recu- 
perative power  to  stand  once  more  on  equal  terms 
with  her  conqueror,  may  well  have  contributed  some- 
thing to  the  modification  of  the  philosopher’s  ideas. 

It  is  certain,  at  all  events,  that  many  more  sugges- 
tions of  Athenian  institutions  are  to  be  found  in  The 
Laics  than  in  The  Republic.  The  governmental 
organization  in  the  first-mentioned  work  bears  veryl/' 
obvious  kinship  to  the  constitution  of  Solon;  the^ 
fourfold  classification  of  the  people  according  to 
wealth,  and  the  form  and  functions  of  the  great  ad- 
ministrative council,  are  almost  identical  with  con- 
spicuous features  of  the  Solonian  scheme ; and  both 
the  guardians  of  the  laws  and  the  “ nocturnal  coun- 
cil” strongly  suggest  the  senate  of  the  Areopagus. 
Perhaps  the  extent  to  which  democratic  ideas  ought 
to  be  recognized  in  political  practice  was  about  the 
same  in  the  minds  of  Plato  and  of  Solon.  For  the 
development  of  popular  government  effected  through^ 
Kleisthenes  and  Pericles,  Plato  shows  no  more  sym- 
pathy in  The  Laics  than  in  The  Republic.  He  is,  in 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


fact,  by  Athenian  standards,  some  two  centuries 
behind  the  times. 

In  general,  then,  (Che  political  philosophy  of  Plato  * 
jn  valves  an  interpretation  of  Greek  history  and  a 


judgment  upon  existing  institutions?)  His  perception 
of  the  principles  that  underlie  these  institutions  is 
in  many  cases  keen  and  sure,  but  his  attempts  to 
suggest  practical  improvements  that  shall  more  faith- 
fully express  the  principles  never  tajke  him  beyond 
the  bounds  of  Hellenic  experience.  / His  conception 
of  the  state  is  that  of  a small  group  of  persons  striv- 
ing to  realize  a high  ideal  of  moral  and  intellectual 
attainment  through  self-discipline  and  through  the 
judicious  adaptation  of  the  powers  of  a much  more 
ulcerous  body  of  persons  associated  with  them  in 
e political  community,  /To  him  the  state  exists 1 
only  in  the  select  few,  devoted  exclusively  to  its 
service.  ^No,J2itizen,  he  holds,  should  engage  in 
mercantile  pursuits  or  mechanical  trades ; these 


occupations  are  suited  only  to  slaves  and  aliens.1 
Nor  is  the  attainment  of  great  power  or  great 
wealth  an  end  to  be  considered  for  either  the  city  or 
the  citizens.2  Not  dominion  by  land  and  sea,  but 
excellence  and  happiness  must  be  the  aim  of  the  trm 


legislator.  In  The  Laivs  Plato^fixes  the  number  o 
citizens  at  jj040,  with  slaves  and  other  elements  duly 
proportioned  to  the  needs  of  these,  and  commands, 
that  this  number  shall  remain  absolutely  fixed.  Suc^ 
a rule,  he  believed,  wrould  insure  a sufficient  equip- 
ment of  all  the  qualities  necessary  to  social  happiness. 

1 Laws,  VIII,  842,  846.  2 Ibid.  V,  742. 


PLATO’S  THEORY  AND  GREEK  FACTS 


47 


The  aristocratic  city-state  thus  was  the  absolute  1/ 
limit  of  Plato’s  thought.  Not  even  that  degree  of 
imperialism  which  had  been  realized  by  Athens  and 
Sparta  received  recognition  in  his  philosophy.  Yet 
at  the  time  of  his  death  a far  more  striking  imperial- 
ism was  near  at  hand  in  the  Greek  world.  But  so 
fixed  is  the  backward  look  of  philosophy  that  some 
nineteen  centuries  were  destined  to  elapse  before 
political  theorists  freed  themselves  from  the  influ- 
ence of  the  city-state  idea,  and  adjusted  their  specu- 
lations to  the  fact  of  systems  in  which  the  citizens 
were  numbered  by  millions. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Bekker,  Platonis  Scripta  Graece  Omnia:  Bd.  IV,  pp.  479 
et  seq.  ( HoXltlkos ) ; VI,  251-560 ; VII,  1-229  (noXircta)  ; VII, 
403-566;  VIII  (No/utot).  Benard,  Platon , pp.  399-^483. 
Blakey,  I,  pp.  47-53.  Bosanquet,  A Companion  to  Plato’s 
Republic.  Davies  and  Vaughan,  The  Republic  of  Plato, 
trans.  Fouillee,  La  Philosophie  de  Socrate , I,  35-138,  259- 
390;  II,  1-75;  La  Philosophie  de  Plato , II,  33-95.  Gomperz, 
Griechische  Denker,  Bd.  I,  Buch  III,  chaps,  iii  and  v (Greek 
Thinkers,  trans.).  Grant,  Greece  in  the  Age  of  Pericles. 
Grote  : History  of  Greece,  Part  II,  chaps,  lxvii-lxviii ; Plato 
and  other  Companions  of  Socrates,  Vol.  I,  chap,  vi;  II,  pp. 
475-500  {Statesman)]  III,  27-242  {Republic),  301^450  {Laws). 
Henkel,  Geschichte  der  griechischen  Lehre  vom  Staat,  pp.  38-74, 
121  et  seq.  Hildenbrand,  Geschichte  und  System  der  Rechts 
und  Staatsphilo sophie,  pp.  41-222.  Janet,  Vol.  I,  pp.  53-164. 

J owett  and  Campbell,  Plato’s  Republic,  Greek  Text. 
Jowett,  The  Dialogues  of  Plato,  trans.,  3d  edition.  Loos, 
Studies  in  Aristotle  and  Plato,  p.  179  et  seq.  Mahaffy, 
History  of  Classical  Greek  Literature,  Vol.  II,  chap,  vii, 
especially  pp.  194-210.  Mohl,  Geschichte  der  Staatswissen - 


48 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


schaften,  I,  171  et  seq.  Nettleship,  Lectures  on  the  Republic 
of  Plato ; Theory  of  Education  in  Plato’s  Republic,  in  Hellenica, 
pp.  61-165.  Newman,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  Vol.  I,  pp. 
50-55,  374-461,  552.  Pater,  Plato  and  Platonism,  pp.  66,  240. 
Ritter,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  Bd.  II,  pp.  443-522  (History 
of  Ancient  Philosophy,  trans.,  Yol.  II,  pp.  385-452).  Stall- 
baum,  Platonis  Opera  Omnia  (1881),  pp.  266-285  ( Politicus ), 
289-384  ( Be  Pepublica ),  384-498  ( De  Legibus).  Susemihl, 
Die  genetische  Entwickelung  der  platonischen  Philosophie , I, 
312-329  {Der  Staatsman) ; II,  58-312  {Der  Staat ) ; 559-696 
{Die  Gesetze).  Van  der  Rest,  Platon  et  Aristote , pp.  6-344. 
Voigt,  Das  jus  naturale,  Vol.  I,  §§  17-23.  Zeller,  Die  Phi- 
losophie der  Griechen,  I,  932-1041  {Die  Sophisten ) ; II,  1,  91 
et  seq .,  281  et  seq.,  867-925  {Staat),  946-982  {Gesetze) ; Plato 
and  the  Older  Academy,  trans.,  chaps,  x,  xi,  xiii. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  POLITICS  OF  ARISTOTLE 

1.  Method  and  Character  of  The  Politics 

The  capital  significance  of  Aristotle,  in  the  history 
of  political  theories,  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  gave  to 
politics  the  character  of  an  independent  science.*/  He 
differs  from  his  master,  Plato,  much  more  in  the 
form  and  method  than  in  the  substance  of  his  thought. 
Most  of  the  ideas  which  seem  characteristically  Aris- 
totelian are  to  be  found  in  Plato.1  But  the  Platonic 
expression  of  them  is  generally  suggestion  or  allusion 
or  illustration ; while  in  Aristotle  they  appear  as 
definite,  clean-cut  dogmas,  bearing  an  unmistakable 
relation  to  the  general  system  of  scientific  doctrine. 
This  contrast  is  rooted  in  the  respective  intellectual 
peculiarities  of  the  two  philosophers.  Plato  is  im-^/ 
aginative  and  synthetic ; Aristotle  is  matter-of-fact 
and  analytic.  Ideas  present  themselves  to  Plato  more 
through  metaphor  and  analogy;  to  Aristotle  more 
through  the  processes  of  exact  logic.  Plato  is 
more  impressed  by  the  unity  pervading  phenomena ; 
Aristotle,  by  the  diversity.  In  ethics  and  politics, 
accordingly,  while  Plato,  working  deductively  from 

1 Susemihl  notes  seventy-two  places  in  The  Politics  that  are  par- 
alleled to  a greater  or  less  extent  in  Plato.  Aristoteles  Politik  (Leip- 
zig, 1879),  Einleitnng,  p.  11,  note. 

e 49 


4r  50 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


his  philosophic  conceptions  of  virtue  and  the  good, 
blended  inextricably  the  two  bodies  of  doctrine,  Aris*! 
totle,  proceeding  by  extensive  observation  and  minute 
^ analysis  of  objective  facts,  marked  out  for  each  sci- 
ence an  independent  field. 

The  foundation  of  his  political  theory  was  laid  by 
Aristotle  in  a detailed  study  of  practically  all  the 
existing  governmental  systems,  both  Hellenic  and 
barbarian.  More  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  polities 
are  said  to  have  been  analyzed  in  a work  which  is 
quoted  in  ancient  literature  as  The  Constitutions  (ai 
7 roXtretat).  Of  this  work  the  only  part  now  known 
by  more  than  slight  fragments  is  the  recently  discov- 
ered Constitution  of  Athens } From  this  it  is  clear 
that  the  author  studied  governments  both  in  their 
history  and  in  their  contemporary  wrorking,  and  that 
his  method  was  in  the  fullest  sense  objective  and 
scientific.  In  his  systematic  work,  The  Politics , Aris- 
totle draws  abundantly  from  the  great  store  of  facts 
accumulated  in  The  Constitutions.  It  is  not  exact, 
however,  to  say  that  the  principles  of  The  Politics 
are  strictly  generalizations  from  these  facts.  To  a 
less  extent  than  Plato,  but  yet  to  a very  great  extent, 
Aristotle  depends  for  the  categories  and  broad  outline 
of  his  philosophy  upon  the  ideas  that  characterized 
contemporary  Hellenic  thought.  The  results  of  his 
study  of  other  ages  and  other  peoples  are  employed 
more  in  the  correction  and  illustration  than  in  the 

1 Cf  Aristotle  on  the  Constitution  of  Athens.  Translated,  with 
introduction  and  notes,  by  F.  G.  Kenyon.  London,  George  Bell  & 
Sons,  1891. 


POLITICS  AND  ETHICS  IN  ARISTOTLE 


51 


foundation  of  his  political  science.  His  method  is 
inductive,  but  not  purely  inductive.  The  intimate 
relations  which  he  enjoyed  with  the  half-barbarian 
court  of  Macedon1  seem  never  to  have  moved  him 
from  the  conviction  that  in  the  pure  Greek  society 
and  government  was  to  be  found  the  political  ideal. 
That  Aristotle,  while  not  like  Plato  an  idealist,  never- 
theless was  often  determined  in  his  philosophy  by  an 
ideal,  will  appear  clearly  enough  in  what  is  to  follow. 

The  creation  of  an  independent  science  of  politics  S 
by  Aristotle  was  accomplished  by  the  disentanglement 
of  political  from  ethical  conceptions.  In  Plato’s 
thought  the  two  were  completely  blended.  The  sep- 
aration effected  by  Aristotle  was  not  so  much  the 
conclusion  of  a deliberate  logical  process  as  the  un- 
conscious outcome  of  the  analytic  method  which  he 
applied  with  such  rigour  to  the  solution  of  ethical 
problems.2  Rejecting  Plato’s  conception  of  a single 
universal  abstract  “good,”  Aristotle  considers  that 
“ good”  is  relative  to  each  species  of  being.  What,i/ 
he  asks,  is  the  science  which  treats  of  the  highest 
“good”  of  man?  His  answer  is:  political  science. 
For  the  good  of  man  is  the  perfect  development  and 
activity  of  all  the  powers  that  are  in  him,  and  this>^ 
result  is  impossible  to  the  individual  without  the 
association  of  his  fellows  — that  is,  without  the  770X15. 
Therefore,  the  good  of  the  individual  is  merged  in 
that  of  the  state.  But  the  state  he  conceives  as 

1 His  father  was  court  physician  to  King  Amyntas,  and  he  himself 
was  the  tutor  of  Alexander  the  Great. 

2 Grant,  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  I,  Appendix  C. 

iiiiiXbKbilY  OF  iUtUwii 
JLfBKARY 


52 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


cLVTapKTjs,  or  self-sufficing  — that  is,  as  dependent  on 
no  more  ultimate  form  of  being  for  the  realization  ol 
the  good  which  is  its  end.  Therefore  the  science  of 
“V  the  state,  politics,  is  the  dominant,  u architectonic  ” 
science,  embracing  within  itself,  as  a part,  that  which! 
treats  of  man  as  an  individual. 

From  the  ab^acL^ointjo|^  thus,  ethics  is  a 
^ subdivision  of  politics.  But  Aristotle’s  treatment  of 
ethics  never  partook  so  much  of  abstract  and  ulti- 
mate philosophy  as  of  practical  wisdom.  The  prin- 
ciple of  morality  which  he  consistently  set  forth  was 
"^that  of  a rational  choice  of  the  mean  between  two 
extremes  of  conduct.1  The  application  of  this  prin- 
ciple involved  the  fullest  recognition  of  human  free 
will  and  led  Aristotle  often  to  ascribe  to  the  self-con- ! 
scious,  rational  intelligence  of  the  individual  the 
character  of  self-sufficiency  which  he  had  ascribed 
to  the  state.  Thus,  from  the  pr^ticaLpoint  of 
view,  at  least,  ethics  was  impressed  with  the  char- 
acter of  an  independent  science.  But  Aristotle  him- 
self was  not  clear  at  this  point.  He  often  refers  to 
ethics  as  politics,  sometimes  intimates  that  the  two 
are  distinct,  and  in  at  least  one  case  seems  to  refer 
to  ethics  as  a different  science.2  His  uncertainty  is 
illustrated  also  in  the  repeated  consideration  in  The 
Politics 3 of  the  question  whether  the  virtue  of  the 

1 For  a charming  exposition  of  Aristotle’s  Ethics,  see  Janet, 
Histoire  de  la  Science  Politique , I,  103  et  seq. 

2 The  Politics , VII,  i,  13,  irepas  a)(o\r}<s.  The  peculiar  usage  of  . 
<rxo\rj<s  here  has  caused  the  passage  to  be  suspected.  Cf.  Susemihl, 
note  709. 

8 in,  iv ; v,  10 ; xviii,  1.  IV,  vii,  2.  VII,  xiv,  8. 


POLITICS  AND  ETHICS  IN  ARISTOTLE  53 

good  citizen  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  good  man.'/ 
His  conclusion  seems  to  be,  after  much  vacillation, 
that  the  answer  is  negative  in  the  practical,  but^ 
affirmative  in  the  ideal  or  perfect  state.  Other  evi- 
dence unites  with  this  conclusion  to  indicate  that 
Aristotle  conceived  of  politics  in  a double  sense : 
first,  with  Plato,  as  a pure  science  (cro^ta),  con-  . 
cerned  with  the  absolute  good  of  man,  and  the  abso-  * 
lute  perfect  state ; second,  as  a practical  science 
((^po^crtg),  treating  of  the  constitutional  and  legal 
relations  of  actual  men  in  actual  societies.  In  the 
order  of  thought,  then,  politics  in  the  first  sense 
would  be  prior  both  to  ethics  and  to  politics  in  the 
second  sense : pure  political  science  would  embody  v7 
the  abstract  theory  of  which  ethics  and  practical^ 
political  science  would  be  two  distinct  applications.1 
While  such  seems  to  have  been  the  thought  of  the 
philosopher,  his  treatment  of  politics,  at  least  in  the 
works  that  have  come  down  to  us,  was  almost  exclu- 
sively, like  that  of  ethics,  on  the  practical  side. 
Hence,  whether  or  not  he  fully  realized  the  outcome 
of  his  work,  the  separation  of  the  two  sciences  was 
definitely  accomplished.  The  abstract  ideal  politics, 
in  which  the  norms  of  individual  and  social  excel- 
lence were  identical,  received  only  scanty  attention 
and  exercised  little  influence  on  later  thought.  But 
the  keen,  cold  analysis  to  which  he  subjected  the 
forms  and  motives  of  practical  social  and  political 


1 Cf.  Nicomachean  Ethics,  VI,  8,  and  the  note  of  Grant,  op.  cit. , 
II,  169.  In  the  Rhetoric , I,  4,  5,  Aristotle  uses  the  expression  rj  irepl 
ra  7/077  ttoXltikt],  which  is  very  significant. 


54 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


activity  gave  to  reflection  on  this  subject  an  indi-j 
viduality,  a mould  and  a technique  that  it  was  never 
again  to  lose. 

In  the  Aristotelian  works  on  ethics  are  to  be 
found  expositions  of  many  of  the  principles  which 
lie  nearest  the  border  line  of  politics.  Justice  is 
defined,  and  the  distinction  between  distributive  and  I 
corrective  justice,  already  noticed  by  Plato,  is  care- 
fully worked  out.1  The  relation  of  justice  to  law  is 
examined,  and  natural  (to  <\>vctlk6v)  is  marked  ofl 
distinctly  from  legal  right  (to  vo/likov).  Equity  also 
( rj  imeLKeLa)  is  clearly  defined  as  corrective  of  law. 
But  it  is  in  The  Politics  that  the  full  and  rounded 
exposition  of*  these  principles  is  to  be  found,  as 
applied  in  operations  of  state  life.  There  are 
indications  that  this  work  embodied  originally  a 
comprehensive  and  well-proportioned  plan.  As  the 
treatise  has  come  down  to  us,  however,  the  plan  is 
far  from  clear  and  the  execution  is  confused  and 
defective.  The  text  abounds  in  repetitions,  contra- 
dictions, obscurities  and  obvious  gaps.  This  result 
is  probably  due,  not  only  to  accidents  and  errors  in 
the  transmission  of  the  manuscript  through  the  cen- 
turies, hut  also  to  the  fact  that  the  work  never  re- 
ceived a final  revision  by  its  author.  The  difficulty 
^pf  ascertaining  Aristotle’s  views  has  further  been 
increased  by  the  very  zeal  of  the  modern  commenta- 
tors, who,  with  the  praiseworthy  purpose  of  making 
the  philosopher’s  work  worthy  of  his  reputation, 
have  emended,  conjectured,  transposed,  elided  and 

1 Nicomachean  Ethics , Bk.  V. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  STATE  AND  HOUSEHOLD 


55 


inserted  with  an  energy  and  a diversity  that  leaves 
the  reader  only  the  impression  of  hopeless  confusion. 
But  without  radical  editing,  the  treatise  as  it  stands, 
with  all  its  imperfections,  is  as  impressive  an  embodi- 
ment of  scientific  genius  and  political  insight  as  is 
the  mutilated  Vatican  torso  of  the  sculptor’s  art.1 


2.  The  Nature  of  the  State  and  of  the  Household 
In  the  first  book  of  The  Politics  the  philosopher 
sets  forth  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  the 
state  (770X19).  It  is  an  association  — an  association 
of  human  beings  — and  the  highest  form  of  human 
association.  In  the  order  of  time  it  is  preceded  by 
the  household  (olklcl)  and  the  village  (kco/atj)  ; in  the 
order  of  thought  it  is  prior  to  both.  The  household 
has  its  source  in  the  association  of  male  and  female 
for  the  propagation  of  the  race  and  the  association 
of  master  and  slave  for  the  production  of  subsistence. 
The  village  has  its  source  in  the  association  of  house- 
holds for  the  better  satisfaction  of  their  wants.  The  H- 
state  springs  from  the  union  of  villages  into  an  asso- 
ciation of  such  size  and  character  as  to  be  self- 
sufficing.  It  is  the  last  and  the  perfect  association,  A. 
Originating  in  the  bare  needs  of  living,  it  exists  for 
the  sake  of  complete  life.2  And  because  the  indi- 


y 


1 The  most  annoying  form  of  editorial  modification  is  that  which 
consists  in  transposing  the  order  of  paragraphs,  chapters  and  books. 
No  reference  can  be  good  for  more  than  a single  one  of  the  really 
erudite  editions  of  The  Politics.  Without  regard  to  the  relative 
merits  of  the  various  arrangements  before  the  world,  I have  followed 
here  the  order  of  Jowett,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle  (Oxford,  1885), 
to  which  all  references  have  been  made  to  apply. 

2 No  mere  translation  can  express  all  that  is  contained  in  the 
famous  dictum  of  Aristotle:  Ti.vofj.evr}  fiev  to v £r)v  eveKev,  ovcra  <$€  rot) 
eu  £ rjv . 


56 


POLITICAL  THEOEIES 


vidual  can  fulfil  the  end  of  his  existence  — can  live 
^ a complete  life  — only  in  the  state,  Aristotle  declares 
that  man  is  by  nature  a political  animal.1  This 
dogma  leaves  no  room  for  such  discussion  as  has 
figured  in  later  political  theory,  of  a%  “ state  of 
nature  ” in  which  the  individual  lives  a life  of  bliss- 
ful isolation  from  his  kind.  The  being  who  cannot 
live  in  association  with  his  fellows,  or  who  has  no 
need  to  do  this,  is,  Aristotle  says,  either  on  the  one 
hand,  a beast,  or  on  the  other,  a god.  There  is  no 
place  in  the  philosophy  of  human  phenomena  for 
the  consideration  of  such  a being. 

This  conception  of  the  state  in  its  essential  char- 
acter does  not,  however,  preclude  the  investigation 
of  the  less  ultimate  forms  of  association  which  pre- 
vail among  men.  Historically  the  7ro\is  was  pre- 
ceded by  conditions  in  which  the  household,  ruled 
by  the  patriarch,  was  the  typical  community.  In 
this  fact  is  to  be  found  the  explanation  of  the 
monarchic  government  of  the  earliest  states ; 'for 
the  primitive  king  merely  retained  through  custom 
the  authority  of  the  patriarch.  But  Aristotle  insists 
that  this  historical  relation  of  household  to  state 
must  not  be  allowed  to  distort  our  conception  of 
their  logical  relation.  It  is  one  of  his  numerous* 
charges  against  Plato  that  the  latter  represented  the 
state  to  be  merely  a large  household  and  the  ruler 

1 *Av0pa)7ros  <f)vcrei  tto\ltlkov  £oW.  “ Nature  ” here  means,  as  Aris- 
totle explains,  that  condition  in  which  all  potentialities  are  fully 
developed  — where  everything  fulfils  its  re'Aos,  or  true  end.  He 
sometimes  uses  “nature”  in  the  sense  of  primitive  or  undeveloped 
condition. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  STATE  AND  HOUSEHOLD  57 

t— 

of  the  state  to  be  essentially  the  head  of  a family. 
Such  a conception  Aristotle  holds  to  be  false ; state  Tfv 
and  household  differ,  not  in  degree,  but  in  kind.  To 
prove  this  he  enters  upon  an  exhaustive  analysis  of 
the  household,  in  the  course  of  which  are  set  forth 
the  philosopher’s  views  upon  many  of  the  funda- 
mental questions  of  economics.1 

The  main  argument  is  summarily  as  follows : The 
household  consists  of  an  individual  holding  dominion 
over  wife,  children  and  property,  including  slaves. 
The  relation  of  the  head  of  the  household  to  these 
three  elements  is  not  one,  but  various.  He  rules  the 
wife,  not  as  absolute  despot,  but  as  constitutional 
adviser ; he  rules  the  children,  not  as  absolute  des- 
pot, but  as  the  king,  who  looks  to  their  good  rather^ 
than  his  own  ; while  property,  both  slaves  and  other, 
he  rules  in  full  despotism,  for  the  exclusive  advan- 
tage of  himself.  In  this  manifold  relation  of  the 
head  of  the  household  to  the  subordinate  elements 
lies  the  essential  distinction  between  the  household 
and  the  state ; for  in  the  latter,  according  to  Aris-  \ 
totle,  the  relation  of  the  ruler  to  each  of  the  citizens  ^ 
is  precisely  the  same. 

This  argument,  in  itself,  is  not  especially  striking ; 
it  adds  nothing  to  the  force  of  the  distinction  made 
in  the  primary  principle,  that  the  household  exists 
for  the  sake  of  the  physical  needs  of  life,  the  state 
for  the  moral  and  intellectual  needs.  But  the  de- 
tailed discussion  of  the  nature  and  the  function  of 
the  various  elements  of  the  household  embodies  much 

1 The  care  of  the  household  he  calls  oikovo/xux. 


58 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


that  is  of  high  significance  in  social  and  economic 
history  and  theory.  At  the  very  outset  he  is  con- 
fronted by  the  necessity  of  finding  a rational  justifi- 
cation for  slavery.  The  slaves  constitute  one  of  the 
natural  elements  of  the  household,  as  he  analyzes  it. 
“ But  some  contend,”  he  says,  “ that  the  distinction 
between  slave  and  freeman  is  a fact  only  of  law  and 
not  of  nature,  and  that  it  is  rooted  not  in  justice  but 
in  violence.” 1 To  meet  this  contention  he  presents 
I the  first  scientific  discussion  of  the  institution  in 
v"  extant  literature.  He  concedes  that  the  relation  of 
master  and  slave  is  rational,  only  if  it  corresponds 
to  some  universal  principle  of  nature.  Such  a prin- 
ciple is  that  which  requires  the  combination  of  com- 
mand and  obedience  for  the  attainment  of  any  human 
purpose.  Men  differ  from  one  another  in  capacity 
for  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  functions.  There 
are  those  whose  high  endowment  of  reason  fits  them 
to  command  and  direct ; there  are  those  whose  slight 
endowment  fits  them  only  to  comprehend  and  carry 
out  orders.  The  former  are  by  nature  masters ; the 
latter  are  by  nature  slaves.  Intellectual  strength 
is  the  chief  characteristic  of  the  former;  physical 
strength,  of  the  latter.  The  combination  of  the  two 
is  essential  to  the  realization  of  those  purposes  for 
which  the  household  exists;  therefore  slavery  is  in 
^ accordance  with  nature.  Aristotle  is  quite  aware 
that  the  actual  institution  does  not  correspond  to 
this  rational  foundation.  He  admits  that  in  fact 
many  slaves  are  superior  to  their  masters  in  intellect. 

1 1,  iii,  4. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  STATE  AND  HOUSEHOLD 


59 


This,  however,  does  not  affect  the  reasoning;  it  is 
more  or  less  accidental,  due,  he  believes,  to  the 
absence  of  any  clearly  discernible  outward  mark  by 
which  the  natural  slave  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  natural  master.  The  common  practice  of  enslav- 
ing prisoners  of  war,  Aristotle  points  out,  can  find  ^ 
justification  only  so  far  as  the  fact  of  success  in 
battle  can  be  taken  as  evidence  of  the  superior  in- 
tellectual endowment  of  the  victors;  but  a judg- 
ment on  this  point  is  subject  to  many  qualifications. 
Finally,  the  principle  he  lays  down  is  the  logical 
foundation  of  the  widespread  feeling  among  the 
Greeks  that  they  ought  to  hold  in  slavery  only  per- 
sons of  other  races;  for  the  inherent  intellectual 
superiority  of  Hellenes  over  barbarians  was  one  of 
the  primary  and  universal  axioms  of  Greek  thought.1 

As  to  its  animate  elements,  then,  the  .household  is 
organized  with  reference  to  the  gradation  of  intellec- 
tual  capacity.  This  capacity  exists  in  the  woman  in  ^ 
a weaker  form  and  in  the  child  in  a less  developed 
form  than  in  the  man.  In  the  slave  it  has  no  exist- 
ence  whatever.  Hence  arise  the  three  varieties  of 
paternal  dominion,  all  working  for  the  realization  of 
the  highest  good  of  the  whole  household.  As  to  the 
inanimate  possessions  of  the  household,  there  is  no 
question  of  the  absolute  dominion  of  the  father. 
Aristotle  assumes  without  examination  the  validity 
of  the  principle  of  private  property.  As  to  methods 
of  acquisition,  however,  he  finds  room  for  much  re- 

1 Cf  Plato,  The  Republic , V,  469 ; Aristotle,  The  Politics,  I,  vi,  6 ; 
VII,  vii,  3. 


60 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


flection,  in  the  course  of  which  he  develops  many 
familiar  principles  of  political  economy.  The  pro- 
duction of  wealth  has  for  him  no  high  philosophical 
significance.  He  regards  it  as  a more  or  less  dis- 
agreeable  necessity  incidental  to  the  maintenance  of 
life,  and  hence  as  a function  of  the  household,  but  the 
lowest  of  its  functions.1 2  From  this  point  of  view  he 
distinguishes  between  natural  and  unnatural  methods 
of  acquiring  wealth.  The  natural  methods,  which 
alone  fall  within  the  scope  of  true  economic  science 
oLKovofALKij),  are  those  through  which  mere  neces- 
sary subsistence  is  procured.  Among  these  he  enu- 
merates cattle-raising,  agriculture  and  hunting,  the 
last  including  as  subordinate  species,  fishing,  the 
chase  of  land  animals,  and  — oddly  enough  — brigan- 
dage (\rj err eia).' 2 The  unnatural  methods  of  acquisition 
are  those  which  aim,  not  at  the  mere  maintenance  of 
^ life,  but  at  endless  accumulation  of  wealth.  These 
fall  within  the  field  of  a distinct  science,  chrematis- 
tics  ( rj  xPVlJiarLcrrLKy)-  Of  these  methods  trade, 
whether  in  the  form  of  barter  or  in  that  of  sale  for 
money,  may  be  natural,  when  pursued  merely  with 
a view  to  procuring  necessities  of  life,  and  not  as 
an  end  in  itself.  But  through  the  use  of  money 
to  facilitate  exchange  men  have  been  led  to  see  in 

1 Household  management  (olkovo/xui)  has  for  its  purpose  rather  to 
make  the  members  of  the  family  virtuous  than  to  make  them  rich. 
I,  xiii,  1. 

2 I,  viii,  7 and  8.  The  philosopher  further  notes  that  war,  also,  is 
a species  of  hunting,  and  is  allied  to  economic  science  so  far  as  it  aims 
to  bring  into  servitude  men  who,  being  slaves  by  nature,  are  unwilling: 
to  submit.  I,  viii,  12. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  STATE  AND  HOUSEHOLD 


61 


V 


money  itself  the  end  of  trade ; and  hence  has  arisen, 
among  other  evils,  the  lending  of  money  at  interest^ 
In  this  practice  money  is  made  to  reproduce  itself 
instead  of  being  applied  to  the  procurement  of  the 
needs  of  life.  Such  a mode  of  acquisition,  therefore, 
has  no  logical  justification  and  is,  he  concludes, 
wholly  unnatural. 

This  discussion  of  economics  is  on  the  whole  as 
remarkable  for  its  weak  as  for  its  strong  features. 
The  keen  analytical  faculty  which  is  so  characteristic 
of  Aristotle  achieves  excellent  results  in  shaping  the 
questions  that  are  to  be  solved.  The  elementary 
ideas  of  production  and  exchange  are  fairly  pre-\/ 
sented.  He  sees  clearly  enough  the  distinction 
between  value  in  use  and  value  in  exchange,  and  ^ 
the  primary  function  of  money  has  never  been  better 
elucidated  than  by  him.  But  he  fails  entirely  to 
grasp  the  notion  of  capital,  and  accordingly  does  not]'** 
rise  above  the  very  primitive  and  absurd  conception! 
of  interest.  His  glaring  weakness  at  this  point,  and 
the  no  less  remarkable  freak  of  including  brigand- 
age in  the  normal  methods  of  acquiring  wealth, 
both  may  be  traced  back  to  an  ambiguity  in 
his  conception  of  nature  (^ucrt?).  This  term  has, 
throughout  the  history  of  political  theory,  proved  a 
stone  of  stumbling  to  philosophers.  Aristotle,  how- 
ever,  at  the  beginning  of  The  Politics / assigns  to 
the  word  a clear  and  unambiguous  meaning;  namely,^ 
a condition  of  perfect  development  of  all  potentials  ^ 
ties.  But  here  at  the  end  of  the  first  book  he  evi- 


1 1,  ii,  8. 


62 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


dently  thinks  of  it  as  denoting  a primitive  and 
undeveloped  condition.  In  one  place  man  is  political 
by  nature,  because  the  state  is  characteristic  of  fully 
developed  humanity.  In  the  other  place  brigandage  I 
is  a natural  method  of  obtaining  wealth,  "because  it 
is  a practice  of  undeveloped  men,  and  the  taking  of 
interest  is  not  natural  because,  apparently,  it  is  not  I 
found  among  undeveloped  men. 

3.  Organization  of  the  State:  Constitution , Citizen- 
ship, Government 

In  approaching  the  consideration  of  the  constitu- 
tion which  shall  most  faithfully  embody  the  true 
principles  of  political  science,  Aristotle  first  examines  ! 
critically  those  systems,  whether  actual  or  theoreti-  I 
cal,  which  have  attained  a general  reputation  for  j 
excellence.  In  the  second  book  of  The  Politics , the  * 
constitutions  of  Sparta,  Crete  and  Carthage,  and  I 
the  actual  or  projected  legislation  of  distinguished 
thinkers,  like  Hippodamus,  Phaleas  and  Solon,  are  i 
described  and  their  most  conspicuous  features  com- 
mented upon.  But  the  first  place  in  the  book  is 
devoted  to  a severe,  and  at  times  distinctly  unfair, 
criticism  of  Plato’s  ideas,  as  embodied  in  The  Repub- 
lic and  The  Laws.  From  the  standpoint  and  with 
the  method  adopted  by  Aristotle,  it  is  a matter  of 
no  great  difficulty  to  exhibit  many  weaknesses  in 
the  Platonic  theories.  But  probably  the  most  sig- 
nificant feature  of  the  critique  is  the  attack  on  the 
philosophic  supports  of  communism.  Aristotle  con- 
cedes that  unity  is  of  fundamental  importance  in 


ARISTOTLE  ON  COMMUNISM 


63 


any  conception  of  the  state,  but  the  means  advocated 
by  Plato  for  attaining  it  he  holds  to  be  destructive 
of  the  end  in  view.  Thus,  Plato  says  that  if  a man 
does  not  know  his  own  children,  he  will  feel  an 
equally  high  affection  for  all  the  children  in  the 
state.  But,  answers  Aristotle,  the  sense  of  personal 
possession  is  the  whole  basis  of  affection ; therefore*^ 
the  result  will  be,  not  great  love  for  all,  but  no  love 
for  any.  Again,  the  degree  of  harmony  to  be  ex- 
pected from  community  of  property  is  less  than  that 
from  a regime  of  individual  ownership ; for,  he 
argues,  the  disputes  that  arise  among  persons  having 
joint  interests  are  notoriously  frequent  and  distress- 
ing, and  without  private  property  there  would  be  no 
room  for  the  establishment  of  those  valuable  social 
bonds  which  accompany  the  exercise  of  liberality,  in 
accordance  with  the  saying  that  all  things  are  in 
common  among  friends.1  The  Platonic  reasoning  is, 
in  fact,  vitiated  from  the  outset  by  an  erroneous  con-  i 
ception  of  the  unity  that  is  essential  to  the  state. ; k / 
It  is  not  a unity  which  consists  in  the  obliteration  / 
of  all  diversities  in  individuals.  Such  a conception 
is  fatal  to  the  idea  of  the  state,  as  identity  in  musical 
tones  is  fatal  to  the  idea  of  harmony.  JThe  unity  of'“'~? 
the  state  is-  that  which  arises  out  of  the  proper 
organization  of  relations  among  individuals  who  7 
differ  from  one  another  as  rulers  and  ruled. 

From  this  point  of  view  Aristotle  proceeds  to  the 
positive  presentation  of  constitutional  relations.2  A 


1 Both  Plato  and  Aristotle  attached  much  importance  to  friendship 

(</>iAta)  as  a social  virtue;  cf  supra , p.  40.  2 In  Bk.  m. 


64 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


state,  objectively  considered,  is  an  assemblage  of 
citizens.  What  is  a citizen  ? This  question  is  an- 
swered primarily  on  a basis  of  fact  — and  of  purely 
Hellenic  fact.  The  citizen,  he  says,  is  one  who 
participates  in  the  functions  of  juror  and  legislator 

+ (8t/cacrTT75  kcll  eK/cX^o^acrr^s),  either  or  both.  In 
other  words,  citizenship  signifies  merely  the  enjoy- 
y ment  of  political  rights,  and  a state  is  a group  of 
persons  exercising  these  rights.  No  part  of  the  com- 
munity not  possessing  such  rights  comes  within  the 
purview  of  politics  proper.  But  Aristotle  raises  the 
further  question,  Who  ought  to  be  citizens  ? Espe- 
cially, Are  mechanics  and  labourers  fit  for  inclusion 
in  this  class  ? His  answer  is  negative.  The  prime 
^ qualification  for  citizenship  is  capacity  both  to  rule 
and  to  be  ruled,  and  the  cultivation  of  this  twofold 
capacity  is  indispensable.  But  those  who  must  labour 
in  order  to  live  are  too  dependent  on  the  commands 
of  others  ever  to  develop  the  capacity  themselves  to 
command.1  Freedom  from  concern  about  the  neces- 
sities of  life  is  indispensable  to  the  proper  performance 
of  political  duties.2  The  working  classes  are,  indeed, 
essential  to  the  state’s  existence ; but  this  does  not 
constitute  them  citizens.  While  in  practice  they 
have  been  admitted  to  citizenship  in  many  states, 
this,  Aristotle  thinks,  has  been  justified  only  by  the 
regrettable  lack  of  true  material. 

The  state,  then,  which  the  philosopher  must  con- 
sider consists  in  a self-sufficing  body  of  such  citizens 
as  he  has  defined.  The  general  system  of  author- 


1 III,  iv  and  v. 


2 II,  ix,  2. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  GOVERNMENT  65 

ity  through  which  the  functions  of  the  state  are 
performed  is  the  constitution  (iroXiTeia).  In  the 
constitution  are  determined  the  number  and  inter- 
relationship of  the  various  organs  of  government,  the 
methods  through  which  they  are  manned,  and,  par- 
ticularly, the  abode  of  the  supreme  or  sovereign' 
power  (to  Kvpiov , rj  Kvpia  a p\v)'1  On  this  last  point 
depends  the  difference  between  constitutions ; for 
the  governing  body  (noXiTevpa)  is  sovereign,  and 
makes  the  constitution  what  it  is.  Accordingly, 
where  the  people  is  the  governing  body,  the  consti- 
tution is  a democracy ; where  the  few  govern,  it  is 
oligarchy.2 

Aristotle  employs  this  conception  of  the  consti- 
tution in  determining  when  the  identity  of  a state 
changes.  With  logic  that  has  not  been  confined  to 
ancient  times  and  European  lands,  Greek  govern- 
ments had  sought  to  repudiate  debts  on  the  ground 
that  they  had  been  contracted  not  by  the  state,  hut 
by  the  oligarchy  or  the  tyrant.  What,  the  philoso- 
pher asks,  is  the  essence  of  the  state,  and  when  does 
it  cease  to  be  itself  and  become  another  ? And  he 
answers : The  essence  of  the  state  is  the  constitution, 
and  the  state  changes  its  identity  when  the  constitu- 
tion changes,  e.g.  when  from  democracy  it  becomes 
oligarchy  or  tyranny.  But,  he  hastens  to  add,  “it 
is  quite  another  question  whether  the  state  should  or 

1 IV,  i,  10. 

2 III,  vi,  1.  Aristotle  says : Kvpiov  iravraxov  to  7 roXtrevpxi ; but  be 
does  not  appear  to  mean  what  would  be  conveyed  to  modern  minds 
by  the  literal  rendering : “ The  sovereign  is  everywhere  the  govern- 
ment.” Cf.  ad  loc.  Jowett,  Zeller,  Susemihl. 


66 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


should  not  fulfil  engagements  when  it  changes  its 
constitution.”  This  very  impotent  conclusion  is 
perplexing,  especially  as  The  Politics  contains  no 
further  discussion  of  the  matter.  From  his  identifi- 
cation of  the  state  with  its  constitution  the  obvious 
inference  would  be  that  a democracy,  for  example, 
^ is  not  responsible  for  the  engagements  of  a tyrant 
whom  it  has  displaced.  Either  Aristotle  here  means 
by  constitution  something  more  than  what  he  says  in 
defining  the  term,  or,  not  wishing  to  commit  himself  1 
to  the  approval  of  the  repudiation  of  contracts,  he 
deliberately  evades  the  logical  dilemma.1 

From  the  nature  of  the  state  and  of  the  constitu-  1 
tion  as  defined  above,  the  philosopher  draws  one 
conclusion  as  to  the  normal,  or  natural,  organization 
of  government.  Though  the  state  arises  from  man's 
impulse  to  association  with  his  kind,  rather  than 
from  a deliberate  search  for  mutual  assistance,  yet 
the  advantages  springing  from  political  organization 
N have  a great  influence  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
social  bond.  These  advantages,  then,  should  be  com- 
^ mon  to  all  the  citizens.  All  alike  should  profits  by 
the  capacity  of  each  in  either  ruling  or  being  ruled. 
Hence  the  constitution  should  provide  for  the  service 
in  office  of  each  of  the  citizens  in  his  turn.  Such  at 
least  should  be  the  rule  where  the  state  is  really  a 
society  of  equal  citizens.  Quite  different,  the  philos- 
opher sententiously  observes,  is  the  actual  practice ; 

1 A third  alternative,  always  to  be  presumed  in  The  Politics,  is  that 
the  text  is  corrupt  or  defective.  But  there  is  no  indication  of  such 
a condition  in  this  passage.  Ill,  iii,  9. 


ARISTOTLE  ON^WEREIGNTY 


«7 


for,  through  selfish  craving  for  the  emoluments  of 
public  service,  men  seek  for  and  cling  to  office  as  if 
their  lives  depended  on  it.1 

4.  The  Sovereign  Power 

Conceiving  the  essence  of  the  state  to  be  expressed 
in  the  constitution,  and  the  crucial  feature  of  the 
constitution  to  be  the  supreme  or  sovereign  authority 
(to  Kvpiov),  the  question  at  once  arises  : On  what 
rational  principle  is  the  abode  of  this  sovereignty  to  ^ 
be  determined  ? Controversy  is  particularly  keen, 
Aristotle  notes,  between  those  who  favour  the  prin- 
ciple of  mere  numbers  and  those  who  favour  that  of 
wealth  and  intelligence.  The  former,  advocating 
democracy,  claim  that  all  who  are  equal  in  respect 
to  freedom  should  be  recognized  as  equal  in  political 
power,  and  that,  accordingly,  the  sovereignty  should 
rest  in  the  general  body  of  citizens.  Against  these 
the  advocates  of  oligarchy  contend  that  superiority 
in  wealth  or  intelligence  or  birth  should  carry  ^ 
superiority  in  power,  and  that  the  supreme  authority 
should  therefore  rest  in  the  few.  Both  these  argu- 
ments, Aristotle  declares,  miss  the  precise  criterion.  / 
which  is  to  be  found  only  after  reaching,  a correct/ 
conception  of  the  nature  and  end  of  the  state.  The 
state  is  not  an  association  for  the  acquisition  of 
wealth,  or  for  the  mere  maintenance  of  life,  or,  like 
an  international  alliance,  for  the  promotion  of  defi- 
nite political  and  commercial  interests  of  the  con- 
tracting parties.  The  end  of  the  state  is  not  that 

1 m,  vi,  10. 


68 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


certain  persons  shall  have  a common  dwelling-place, 
and  shall  refrain  from  mutual  injury  and  shall  be  in 
habitual  intercourse  with  one  another.  The  state 
embraces  within  itself  associations  for  all  these  and 
other  purposes,  but  such  associations  are  based  on 
friendship  a)  and  look  merely  to  living  together. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  . state  has  for.,  its,,  end  living 
\ well — living  happily-and  nobly:  it  is  an  association 
not  for  mere  life,  but  for  noble  actions.1 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  greater  share  in 
\ political  power  should  belong  to  those  who  contribute 
most  to  the.  perfect  life.  Virtue,  especially  that 
species  called  justice,  is  to  be  the  criterion,  rather 
than  freedom  or  birth  or  wealth.  Must  sovereign 
power,  then,  be  ascribed  to  the  mass  of  the  people, 
or  to  some  limited  class,  or  to  some  individual  ? 
Primarily,  Aristotle  answers,  to  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
\ pie.  For  the  aggregate  virtue 2 of  the  whole  people 
exceeds  that  of  any  particular  part.  The  same 
answer,  indeed,  would  follow  from  a rigid  applica- 
tion of  the  principle  of  wealth  ; for  the  whole  is 
wealthier  than  any  of  its  parts.  But  popular  sover- 
eignty, as  thus  conceived,  is  subject  to  an  important 
qualification. 

In  the  controversies  of  Hellenic  politics  over  oli- 


1 III,  ix. 


2 Virtue  (aperr/)  must  always  be  understood  in  its  ancient  philo- 
sophical sense.  It  connotes  much  more  than  strict  moral  excellence. 
“ Ability  ” would  be  perhaps  nearer  to  the  Greek  idea,  though  defec- 
tive as  connoting  no  moral  quality  whatever.  Custom  has  confirmed 
the  translation  of  aperrj  by  virtue,  and  I shall  adhere  to  this,  subject 
to  the  caution  here  noted. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  SOVEREIGNTY 


69 


garchy  and  democracy  the  underlying  thought  was 
that  the  people  (6  8 rj^os)  and  the  few  (oi  oXiyoi)  in 
any  given  community  constituted  in  fact  two  states,*^ 
each  existing  or  ceasing  to  exist  as  the  one  or  the 
other  faction  gained  control.  This  idea  had  much 
justification  in  the  facts  of  the  conflict.  Democratic 
triumph  in  most  cases  meant  the  actual  physical 
expulsion  of  the  oligarchs  from  the  community ; 
while  oligarchic  triumph  meant  the  exclusion  of  the 
mass  of  the  people  from  all  political  rights  and 
hence  from  the  state,  in  the  sense  in  which  Aristotle 
defined  it.1  The  unsatisfactory  character  of  Aris- 
totle’s discussion  as  to  the  identity  of  the  state 2 
illustrates  how  prone  he  was  to  adopt  the  popular 
conception,  and  regard  sovereignty  as  inhering  in  the 
dominant  faction  of  the  community.  But  more  com- 
monly he  conceives  the  sovereign  power  rather  as  the 
highest  authority  in  the  administrative  hierarchy,  or 
as  that  part  of  the  administrative  organization  which 
deals  with  the  most  important  questions  of  policy. 
In  other  words,  he  thinks  of  the  sovereign  as  subor-\J 
dinate  to  the  state,  and  of  the  state  as  existing  apart 
from  any  particular  possessor  of  the  chief  govern- 
mental power. 

The  latter  conception  of  sovereignty  is  that  which 
the  philosopher  employs  in  deciding  that  the  mass  of 
the  people  must  be  sovereign.  This  does  not  imply 
that  either  the  people  as  a whole  or  every  individual 
alike  is  best  adapted  to  administer  all  the  offices  of 
the  state ; but  that  the  greatest  and  most  fundamen- 

1 Supra , p.  64.  2 Supra , p.  65. 


70 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tal  questions  must  be  finally  passed  upon  by  the 
whole  people.  In  practice  this  would  mean,  he  ex- 
plains, that  the  function  of  the  popular  body  should 
be  chiefly  the  election  and  censure  of  the  officers  of 
administration.  For  such  functions  the  people  as  a 
whole  is  eminently  fitted.  It  may,  indeed,  be  argued 
that  statesmen  of  eminent  wisdom  and  experience 
would  give  a better  judgment  than  the  mass  — that 
the  few,  rather  than  the  many,  are  the  logical  sov- 
ereign in  this  sense.  But  Aristotle  rejects  this  con- 
tention. The  verdict  of  the  general  public  is  valid 
in  politics,  just  as  it  is  in  musical  contests  and  in 
banquets ; not  the  musician  and  the  cook,  but  they 
who  hear  the  music  and  eat  the  dinner  are  best  quali- 
fied to  render  judgment. 

The  sovereignty  of  the  whole  people,  therefore, 

I subject  to  the  qualification  that  it  be  manifested  in 
the  election  of  magistrates  and  in  holding  them  to 
account  for  their  conduct  in  office,  is  the  primary 
solution  of  the  problem  as  to  the  location  of  ultimate 
power  in  the  state.  This  solution  presumes,  however, 
that  the  citizens  are  on  the  whole  not  far  from  the 
same  general  level  of  virtue.  Suppose,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  among  them  is  a small  number,  or  even  a 
single  individual,  whose  virtue  overwhelmingly  ex- 
ceeds that  of  all  the  rest,  whether  taken  individually 
or  collectively.  In  such  a case,  there  can  be,  Aris- 
totle holds,  but  one  answer : the  preeminently  virtu- 
ous few  or  one  is  the  logical  sovereign.  It  is  a 
consciousness  of  this  fact,  he  explains,  that  has  led 
democracies  to  devise  the  institution  of  ostracism. 


THE  SOVEREIGNTY  OF  LAW 


71 


An  actual  popular  sovereign  cannot  tolerate  in  the 
body  politic  an  individual  who  in  any  way  embodies 
the  possibility  of  becoming  the  ideal  sovereign. 

Finally,  above  every  form  of  personal  sovereignty, 
whether  of  the  one,  the  few,  or  the  whole  people, 
must  be  placed,  according  to  Aristotle,  the  sover-  V 
eignty  of  the  law  (oi  voijlol).  Only  where  the  law  is 
uncertain  or  incomplete  may  the  authority  of  man 
be  conclusive.  Granting  that,  as  some  contend,  the 
rigidity  of  law  works  frequent  injustice;  yet  less  injus- 
tice will  spring  from  the  prescriptions  of  customary 
law  (oi  vojjLOL  oi  Kara  to  eOos)  than  from  the  unchecked 
will  of  any  man.  For  such  law  is  free  from  the 
influence  of  human  passions.  The  rule  of  law,  Aris-  . 
totle  finely  says,  is  the  rule  of  god  and  reason  only ; * 
in  the  rule  of  man  there  appears  in  addition  some- 
thing of  the  brute.1 


5.  The  Forms  of  Constitution 

Aristotle  primarily  classifies  constitutions,  first,  ^ 
according  to  the  mere  number  of  those  in  whomk/ 
sovereign  power  is  vested,  and,  second,  according  ^ 
to  the  end  to  which  the  conduct  of  government  is 
directed.  The  latter  principle  distinguishes  pure 
from  corrupt  forms,  for  the  true  end  of  the  state  is 
the  perfection  of  all  its  members.  When  the  govern- 
ment is  administered  with  this  end  in  view,  the  stat^ 
is  pure ; when  the  administration  aims  at  the  inter- 
est, not  of  all  the  citizens,  but  of  the  governing  body 


1 HI,  xvi,  5. 


72 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


alone,  the  state  is  corrupt.  The  classification  of  con- 
stitutions then  assumes  this  form  : 1 — 


Sovereignty  of 
The  one 
The  few 

The  whole  people 


Pure  Form 
Royalty 
Aristocracy 
Polity 


Corrupt  Form 
Tyranny 
Oligarchy 
Democracy 


In  respect  to  this  classification  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  the  pure  forms  are  based  on  an  ideal  which 
belongs  to  political  science  in  its  broadest  and  most 
abstract  sense  ; 2 while  the  corruptions  (wape/c/Scio-eis), 
so  called  because  they  deviate  from  the  ideal,  are 
what  fall  strictly  within  the  field  of  politics  in  its 
practical  and  independent  character.  Aristotle’s  con- 
ceptions of  royalty  and  aristocracy  are  hardly  less 
idealistic  and  fanciful  than  Plato’s.  Royalty  is  sub- 
stantially the  rule  of  the  one  perfect  man;  aristoc- 
racy is  the  rule  of  the  few  perfect  men,  not  easily 
to  be  distinguished  in  their  attributes  from  Plato’s 
“ guardians.”  If  Aristotle  had  confined  himself  to 
an  abstract  and  idealistic  treatment  of  these  various 
constitutions,  his  work  would  have  exhibited  little 
divergence  from  Plato’s.  But  in  The  Politics , as  we 
have  it,3  the  discussion  is  of  an  eminently  practical 


1 III,  vii.  Cf  also  Nick.  Eth.  V,  10,  where  a somewhat  different 
nomenclature  is  employed. 

2 Supra,  p.  53. 

3 The  text  of  Books  IV,  VI,  VII  and  VIII,  which  cover  this 
subject,  is  in  a condition  of  such  corruption  as  to  render  the  precise 
order  of  thought  which  Aristotle  intended  to  follow  hopelessly  uncer- 
tain. By  transposition  of  the  order  of  the  books  and  by  high-handed 
rearrangement  of  paragraphs,  various  plausible  schemes  have  been 
devised  in  which  coherency  of  development  is  preserved.  These  are 
all  ingenious,  and  most  of  them  are  scientific.  Whether  any  of  them 
is  Aristotelian,  no  one  can  say. 


FORMS  OF  CONSTITUTION 


73 


character,  and  the  ideal  constitutions,  while  cropping 
out  from  time  to  time,  are  quite  overwhelmed  in  the 
mass  of  historical  and  critical  commentary  on  the  >4- 
perversions,  which  alone  are  in  vogue  among  actual 
men.  Only  in  the  case  of  the  polity  is  an  ideal  ^ 
brought  into  close  relation  with  a possible  constitu- 
tion. The  term  TroXtreia,  which  means  constitution 
in  general,  is  applied  by  Aristotle  also  to  the  special 
form  of  democratic  constitution.  And  polity,  in  this%. 
narrow  sense,  he  views  in  some  places  as  an  abstract  f 
ideal,  but  in  others  as  a system  quite  susceptible  of 
realization  through  a proper  tempering  of  actual 
democracy. 

For  monarchy  the  philosopher  can  find  a rational 
justification  only  in  the  purely  ideal  case  of  an  indi- 
vidual absolutely  preeminent  in  virtue.  To  such  an 
ideally  perfect  man  may  be  ascribed  the  right  to 
rule,1  unrestrained  by  law.  But  for  actual  states  the 
best  possible  law  has  a better  ground  for  supremacy 
than  the  best  possible  man.  And  for  the  work  of 
government  subject  to  law,  the  capacity  of  an  indi- 
vidual can  never  equal  that  of  an  aggregation  of 
individuals.  The  many  is  less  easily  corrupted  than 
the  one ; and  even  though  the  one  may  have  nominal  ^ 
supremacy,  the  physical  impossibility  of  conducting 
the  administration  single-handed  renders  necessary 
a plurality  in  government  which  is  not  different  in 
kind  from  a plurality  immediately  under  the  consti- 
tution. Aristotle’s  conclusion  is,  in  fact,  that  mon- 

1 But  Aristotle  points  out  that  not  even  here  could  the  principle 
of  hereditary  succession  be  recognized. 


74 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


archy  not  only  is  illogical,  but  also  is  practically 
impossible.1  Tyranny,  the  corrupt  form  of  royalty, 
Aristotle  regarded  as  resting  purely  on  force,  and 
therefore  as  having  no  place  in  a purely  rational 
system  of  politics. 

For  his  detailed  examination  of  the  non-monarchic 
constitutions,  Aristotle  points  out  that  the  different 
forms  rest  upon  a deeper  foundation  than  that  of 
mere  number  in  the  sovereign  body.  Oligarchy  and 
democracy  signify,  respectively,  the  domination  of 
the  rich  and  that  of  the  poor  ; while  practically  these 
classes  are  the  few  and  the  many,  the  greater  impor- 
tance lies  in  the  economic,  not  in  the  arithmetical, 
fact.  But  these  two  forms  again  require,  according 
to  Aristotle,  further  subdivision.  Democracies  differ 
from  one  another,  and  the  same  is  true  of  oligarchies ; 
here  again  the  various  shades,2  of  which  he  enumer- 
ates four  under  each  form,  have  a close  relation  to 
social  and  economic  facts.3  The  form,  amount  and 
diffusion  of  wealth  play  a large  part  in  the  peculiar 
adjustments  of  political  organization. 

In  the  detailed  treatment  of  aristocracy  and  polity, 
the  original  character  of  the  two  is  almost  entirely 
lost  sight  of  by  Aristotle.  Their  relation  to  oligarchy 

1 He  considers  only  Greek  states.  The  system  of  the  great  barbarian 
monarchies  does  not  lie  within  his  category  of  constitution  (ttoXitcio)  . 

2 The  distinction  between  these  varieties  is  made  to  turn  partly 
upon  the  extent  to  which  government  is  subject  to  law.  This  cri- 
terion had  been  used  by  Plato. 

8 For  example,  the  four  varieties  from  most  moderate  to  most 
extreme  democracy  correspond  in  general  to  the  predominance  of 
agricultural,  mechanical,  mercantile  and  maritime  pursuits  among 
the  mass  of  the  people.  IV.  iv.  21  and  vi  i_« 


FORMS  OF  CONSTITUTION 


75 


>k 


and  democracy  appears  no  longer  as  that  of  the  pure 
to  the  corrupt,  dependent  upon  the  end  to  which 
government  is  directed.  On  the  contrary,  the  dis- 
tinctions are  made  to  turn  upon  the  characteristic 
principle  that  determines  participation  in  political 
functions.  The  principles  that  are  in  conflict  for 
supremacy  in  every  community,  Aristotle  says,  are  V 
liberty,  wealth,  virtue  and  good  birth  (evyivei a).  I 
Where  part  in  the  conduct  of  the  government  is 
assigned  on  the  basis  of  liberty  (and  equality,  which 
is  an  essential  element  in  liberty),  the  constitution  is 
democratic ; where  on  the  basis  of  wealth,  it  is  oli- 
garchic ; where  on  the  basis  of  virtue,  in  the  strictly 
ideal  sense,  it  is  aristocratic. 1 Polity  is  the  constitu- 
tion that  embodies  a blending  (/xtfis)  of  the  two  prin-'i 
ciples,  liberty  and  wealth.  When  with  these  two 
virtue  also  is  combined,  the  resulting  form  is  entitled 
to,  and  generally  receives,  the  name  of  aristocracy. 
But  this  mixed  aristocracy  he  carefully  distinguishes 
from  the  pure  and  ideal  aristocracy  of  which  the 
principle  is  virtue  alone. 

The  full  application  of  Aristotelian  analysis  thus 
gives  a rather  formidable  aggregate  of  forms  of  con- 
stitution ; and  it  is  doubtful  if  the  philosopher  in  his 
best  estate  could  have  assigned  an  actual  govern- 
ment clearly  and  categorically  to  any  one  particular 
class.  Certainly  The  Politics , as  we  have  it,  is  very 
far  from  clear  in  distinguishing  each  from  all  the 


1 Good  birth  Aristotle  disregards ; for,  he  says,  it  is  merely  long- 
standing wealth  and  virtue.  rj  cvyevaa  Zcttiv  aperr)  xat  7 rAovros 
apxcuos. 


IV,  viii, 


76 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


rest.  Polity  and  the  mixed  aristocracy  are  especially 
difficult  to  disentangle,1  and  various  shades  of  democ- 
racy and  oligarchy  approach  perplexingly  near  to 
both.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  success 
of  the  philosopher  in  detecting  the  broad  underlying 
influences,  historical,  social  and  economic,  through 
which  the  manifold  variety  in  political  organization 
is  determined.  It  is  his  realization  of  the  diversity 
in  these  influences  that  leads  him  more  or  less  un- 
consciously to  shift  from  time  to  time  the  basis  of 
his  classification. 

The  practical  significance  of  the  distinction  between 
constitutions  on  the  basis  of  principle  is  best  revealed 
in  his  refined  analysis  of  the  three  elements  essential 
to  every  government.2  These  necessary  elements 
are  : first,  a deliberative  organ  (to  ^ov\evopevov) ; 
second,  a system  of  magistracies  (to  nepl  ras  d/x^as) ; 
and,  third,  a judicial  organ  (to  Si/ca£o*').  On  the 
divergencies  of  form  and  function  in  these  three 
elements  depends  the  character  of  the  various  consti- 
tutions. It  is  because  these  divergencies  are  practi- 
cally infinite  in  number  that  the  forms  of  constitution 
shade  imperceptibly  from  one  to  another  of  the  promi- 
nent types.  In  extreme  and  unquestionable  democ- 
racy the  deliberative  organ  would  be  an  assembly  of 
all  the  people,  determining  directly  all  questions 
pertaining  to  this  organ ; 3 the  magistracies  would  be 


1 Sparta  is  given  in  different  places  as  an  example  of  each  of  these 

forms.  Cf  IV,  vii,  4 and  ix,  6-10.  2 IV,  xiv  et  seq. 

8 Aristotle  enumerates  as  such : peace,  war  and  alliances ; legisla- 
tion ; infliction  of  penalties  in  cases  punishable  with  death,  exile  and 


FORMS  OF  CONSTITUTION 


77 


filled  by  lot,  and  all  citizens  would  be  eligible  for  all  ^ 
offices ; the  administration  of  justice  would  be  in  the  L* 
hands  of  a jury  court,  chosen  by  lot  from  the  general 
body  of  citizens  and  exercising  jurisdiction  over  all 
kinds  of  cases.  In  extreme  oligarchy,  the  delibera- 
tive  organ  would  be  a close  corporation  of  very 
wealthy  citizens,  with  unlimited  powers ; the  magis- 
tracies would  be  based  on  a high  property  qualifica- 
tion for  eligibility ; and  the  jury  court,  with  general  c 
jurisdiction,  would  consist  of  a small  body,  elected 
on  a high  property  qualification.  Polity  would  ex- 
hibit some  such  combination  as  this  : for  the  delibera- 
tive organ,  a body  of  citizens,  with  at  most  a moderate 
property  qualification,  exercising  jurisdiction  over 
only  a part  of  the  subjects  normal  to  this  organ ; 1 
the  magistracies  filled  through  election,  either  alone  ^ 
or  in  combination  with  the  lot,  but  with  a property 
qualification  for  eligibility ; the  administration  of 
justice  divided  among  a number  of  courts  and  magis-  L 
trates,  the  jurors,  like  the  magistrates,  being  chosen 
by  a combination  of  lot  and  election,  and  with  a 
moderate  property  qualification.  Practically,  the 
most  conspicuous  characteristics  of  the  various  forms 
are  conceived  to  be:  in  democracy,  concentration  of 
important  functions  in  the  general  body  of  citizens,  u 
assignment  of  offices  by  lot,  as  the  guaranty  of  per- 
fect equality,  and  compensation  for  public  services ; 
in  oligarchy,  concentration  of  functions  in  a narrow 


confiscation  of  property ; election  of  magistrates  and  review  of  tlieir 
official  conduct. 

1 The  other  subjects  would  be  in  charge  of  various  magistrates. 


78 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


body  of  the  wealthy,  assignment  of  offices  on  a 
/property  qualification,  and  unpaid  public  services;  in 
^polity,  diffusion  of  functions  among  various  organs, 
assignment  of  offices  by  a combination  of  lot  and 
election.  Practical  or  mixed  aristocracy  would  be 
determined  by  the  employment  of  oligarchic  forms, 
subject  to  a primary  regard  for  fitness,  rather  than 
for  wealth,  in  the  ruling  body. 

6.  The  Best  State 

In  approaching  the  question  as  to  which  form  of 
constitution  is  the  best,  the  same  analytical  method 
which  so  minutely  distinguished  the  different  varie- 
ties is  applied,  with  the  result  that  no  categorical 
answer  is  recognized.  We  must  consider,  Aristotle 
declares,  not  only  what  form  is  the  best  absolutely 
j(  (ttju  apLCTTrjv  a,7r\a>s),  but  what  is  the  best  attainable 
by  actual  men  and  on  the  average  (paXiara  7 racrais 
Tats  noXecnv  appo^ovorav),  and  what  is  the  best  under 
given  conditions  (e/c  tu v vttok€. ipevcjv). 

As  to  the  absolute  or  ideal  state,  there  is  no  room 
"to  doubt  that  the  dominion  of  absolute  and  ideal  vir- 
tue or  fitness  must  determine.  That  is,  the  best  must 
rule ; if  one  man  is  preeminent  in  excellence  (aperrj), 
the  form  will  be  royalty;  otherwise,  pure  aristocracy. 
Leaving  these  aside  and  considering  actual  men,  the 
criterion  of  preference  among  constitutions  is  the 
same  as  in  respect  to  individual  conduct : the  mean 
(to  picrov)  must  control.  In  human  society  extremes 
* of  wealth  and  poverty  are  the  main  sources  of  evil. 
The  one  brings  arrogance  and  a lack  of  capacity  to 


ARISTOTLE  ON  THE  BEST  STATE 


79 


obey;  the  other  brings  slavishness  and  a lack  of 
capacity  to  command.  Where  a population  is  divided 
into  the  two  classes  of  very  rich  and  very  poor,  there 
can  be  no  real  state ; for  there  can  be  no  real  friend- 
ship between  the  classes,  and  friendship  is  the  essen- 
tial principle  of  all  association.1  That  state,  there- 
fore, will  be  the  best  in  which  the  middle  class  isi 
stronger  than  either  or  both  of  the  extremes.  In 
such  a state  the  influences  which  make  for  peace 
and  order  will  wholly  prevail  and  stability  will  be 
insured.  The  constitution  which  in  all  respects  em- 
bodies the  principle  of  the  mean  is  polity.  This  con- 
stitution, therefore,  must  be  on  the  average  the  best.2 

But  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  this  form,  which 
is  on  the  average  the  best,  is  necessarily  the  best  for 
every  people  and  under  every  set  of  conditions.  Cir- 
cumstances, Aristotle  holds,  may  make  any  form  the 
best.  The  general  principle  here  is  that  the  element 
which  desires  the  existing  constitution  to  stand  shall 
be  stronger  than  those  which  desire  change.  In  other 
words,  stability  is  the  criterion ; and  that  constitu- 
tion is  best  which  under  the  circumstances  will  last 
the  longest.  In  this  sense,  democracy  is  best  where 
the  poor  greatly  exceed  the  rich  in  numbers ; oligar- 
chy, where  the  superiority  of  the  rich  in  resources 
and  power  more  than  compensates  for  their  inferior- 
ity in  numbers ; polity,  where  the  middle  class  is 
clearly  superior  to  all  the  rest. 

1 7/  KOLV(DVLCL  ffnXlKOV,  IY,  xi,  7. 

2 Mixed  aristocracy  is  not  clearly  enough  distinguished  by  Aris- 
totle from  polity  to  warrant  giving  it  a preferential  position.  Theo- 
retically, it  would  apparently  stand  first  of  the  two. 


80 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


So  far  as  it  is  possible  to  arrange  an  order  of  ex- 
cellence with  reference  to  all  the  various  points  of 
view  from  which  Aristotle  considers  the  different 
forms  of  government,  the  following1  would  convey 
his  ideas:  1,  ideal  royalty;  2,  pure  aristocracy;  3, 
mixed  aristocracy;  4,  polity;  5,  most  moderate 
democracy ; 6,  most  moderate  oligarchy ; 7,  the  two 
intermediate  varieties  of  democracy  and  oligarchy, 
the  former  having  preference  over  the  corresponding 
grades  of  the  latter;  8,  extreme  democracy;  9,  ex- 
treme oligarchy;  10,  tyranny. 

The  plan  of  The  Politics  contemplates  a detailed 
exposition  of  the  conditions  essential  to  the  best  con- 
stitution. It  is  not  clear  whether  this  feature  of  the 
work  was  intended  by  Aristotle  to  deal  primarily 
with  the  best  absolutely  or  with  the  best  on  the 
average.2  In  his  treatment  of  the  subject  there  is 
much  that  is  abstract  and  idealizing,  suggesting  that 
he  has  in  mind  the  pure  aristocracy ; there  is 
also  very  much  of  the  characteristic  Aristotelian 
practicality,  suggestive  of  the  polity.  But  in 
the  text  of  The  Politics , as  it  has  come  down 
to  us,  the  details  of  constitutional  organization 
are  wholly  lacking;  and  attention  is  confined  to 
the  determination  of  the  most  favourable  external 
conditions  for  the  state  and  the  most  effective  meth- 
ods of  character-building  for  the  people.3  A prelim- 

1 Cf.  Susemihl,  note  1305. 

2 Book  III,  end.  Here  the  discussion  is  announced  in  general 
terms.  The  specific  purpose  is  a moot  question  in  the  controversies 
of  the  commentators  as  to  the  order  of  the  books. 

3'The  best  state  is  the  subject  of  Bks.  VII  and  VIII,  the  latter 
being  a mere  fragment. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  THE  BEST  STATE 


81 


inary  discussion,  devoted  to  a nearer  definition  of  the 
true  end  of  the  state,  develops  the  conclusion  that 
for  the  state,  as  for  the  individual,  the  best  life  lies 
in  the  pursuit  of  virtue,  rather  than  of  power  or  “ 
wealth.  As  there  is  nothing  noble  or  exalted  in  the 
ruling  of  slaves  by  an  individual,  so  there  is  nothing 
noble  or  exalted  in  the  exercise  of  despotic  dominion 
by  a state.  Conquest,  therefore,  through  aggressive 
war  is  not  to  be  recognized  as  an  end  to  be  kept 
in  view  by  the  philosophic  legislator.1 2  A peaceful 
career,  devoted  to  self-perfection  through  the  harmo- 
nious and  unceasing  activity  of  all  the  elements  of 
political  and  social  organization,  is  the  true  ideal, 
and  that  which  involves  complete  happiness  for  both 
state  and  people. 

The  realization  of  this  ideal  depends  partly  upon 
external  conditions,  which  must  be  more  or  less 
determined  by  chance,  but  to  a far  greater  extent 
upon  the  character  and  culture  of  the  people,  which^” 
may  be  fixed  through  scientific  legislation.  Aris- 
totle’s treatment  of  both  branches  of  the  subject 
strongly  suggests  that  of  Plato  in  The  Laws.  He 
aims  to  present  the  desirable  features  of  a city-state, 
without  exceeding  the  limits  of  the  possible,  and  he 
employs  constantly  the  doctrine  of  the  mean.  The 
size  of  the  population  and  the  extent  of  territory 


1 But  Aristotle  recognizes  the  justice  of  non-despotic  dominion, 
i.e.  that  which  is  directed  to  the  good  of  the  subject  state  rather 
than  of  the  master  state.  VII,  xiv,  21. 

2 In  strict  accordance  with  his  theory  of  slavery,  Aristotle  inti- 
mates that  aggressive  war  is  just  when  directed  against  those  who  are 
by  nature  slaves.  Ibid. 


% 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


must  be  sufficiently  great  to  make  the  state  self-suf- 
ficing. But  the  number  of  people  must  not  exceed 
what  can  be  well  supervised  (evo-vvoi rro?) ; the  com- 
munity must  be  a city  (7 roXis)  and  not  a people 
(e^os).1  The  city  should  be  situated  near  enough 
to  the  sea  to  procure  what  is  necessary  from  abroad, 
but  not  near  enough  unduly  to  stimulate  commerce 
and  the  seafaring  class.  In  natural  endowments  the 
population  should  resemble  the  Greeks,  who  combine 
the  spirit  and  courage  of  the  northern  races  with  the 
intellectual  keenness  of  the  Asiatics.2  The  elements 
essential  to  make  the  state  self-sufficing  are  agricul- 
turists, artisans,  warriors,  well-to-do  people,  priests, 
and  administrators  (/cptral  tcov  hiKaiaiv  /cal  crvfMfrepov- 
T(ov)  • Of  these  the  first  two,  on  principles  already 
mentioned,  while  in  the  state  cannot  be  of  it.  The 
other  classes  are  as  to  personnel  one.  They  must 
constitute  the  citizens  proper,  must  own  the  land  (in 
severalty,  save  a part  owned  by  the  state),  and  must 
perform  at  successive  periods  of  life  the  functions  of 
warriors,  administrators  (participants  in  all  forms  of 
^purely  political  life)  and  priests.  Performing  thus  in 
succession  the  various  duties  of  citizenship,  they  will 


1 “ What  commander,”  he  asks,  “ could  marshal  so  huge  a host,  or 
what  herald,  save  with  the  voice  of  Stentor  ? ” That  is,  the  limit  of 
the  number  of  citizens  depends  upon  the  possibility  of  conducting 
a public  assembly  at  which  all  should  be  present.  VII,  iv,  11. 

2 The  Hellenes,  he  observes,  are  in  a peculiar  measure  fitted  for 
political  life,  and  could,  if  united  in  a single  government,  rule  the 
world.  (VII,  vii,  2,  3 ; cf.  Plato,  Republic , IV,  435.)  Several  philoso- 
phers since  Aristotle  have  adopted  his  principle,  and  have  applied  it 
so  as  to  show  that  their  own  particular  people,  because  lying  south 
of  some  nations  and  north  of  others,  are  especially  qualified  for 
domi^on. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  THE  BEST  STATE 


83 


maintain  that  equality  which  is  distinctive  of  the 
free  citizen  and  will  round  out  the  civic  character 
by  experience  in  both  ruling  and  being  ruled.  Sup- 
ported by  the  produce  of  their  land,  they  will  enjoy 
that  leisure  without  which  true  virtue  is  impossible. 

In  addition  to  these  important  considerations  Aris- 
totle discusses  many  minor  features  of  the  internal 
ordering  of  the  city,  and  devotes  particular  attention 
to  the  arrangements  for  defence  against  attack.  His 
ideal  city  is  not  contemplated  as  remote  from  the 
contingencies  of  foreign  war.  The  topography  of 
the  site,  the  water  supply,  the  arrangement  of  the 
streets, — all  must  have  reference  to  a possible  siege ; 
and  fortifications,  both  walls  and  citadel,  he  regards 
as  indispensable.  Clinging  firmly  to  his  principle 
that  aggressive  war  is  excluded  from  the  purposes  of 
the  ideal  state,  he  maintains  that  a full  provision  of 
all  the  latest  improvements  in  warlike  equipment 
must  be  made  as  the  surest  guaranty  against  attack. 

As  to  the  means  through  which  the  ideal  character 
is  to  be  developed  in  the  citizens  of  the  state,  Aris- 
totle finds  it,  as  did  Plato,  in  scientific  education 
(TrcuScia).  The  ultimate  function  of  the  state  is  ped--V 
agogic.  For  the  perfection  of  the  community  de-  ' 
pends  upon  the  perfection  of  its  constituent  members, 
and  the  perfection  of  the  latter  can  be  achieved  only  ' 
through  the  cultivation  of  moral  and  intellectual 
excellence.  Hence  a system  of  uniform,  compulsory, 
public  education  is  the  first  essential  of  the  best  state, 
and  the  administration  of  such  a system  is  the  most 
important  function  of  government.  Aristotle’s  proj- 


84 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


cct  of  educational  legislation  is  of  tlie  same  general 
character  as  that  of  Plato.  It  aims  at  mental  cul- 
ture rather  than  practical  utility,  lays  due  stress 
upon  the  physical  side  of  the  training,1  and  attaches 
to  music  a moral  significance  and  a character-making ; 
influence  that  are  quite  incomprehensible  to  the  mod-  j 
ern  mind.  The  full  application  of  this  system  is  to  j 
begin  in  the  case  of  each  citizen  at  the  age  of  seven.  I 
But  no  less  important  to  Aristotle  than  to  Plato 
seems  governmental  supervision  of  life  from  its  very 
inception.  We  find  in  The  Politics  provision  for  aj 
rigid  regulation  of  the  times  and  conditions  of  mar- 
riage and  procreation  and  of  the  care  of  the  young.2 , 
Thus  will  be  insured  the  ideal  basis  for  the  later 
training,  the  finished  product  of  which  will  be  a 
matured  manhood  of  physical  grace  and  beauty,  com- 
bined with  a moral  and  intellectual  fitness  for  the 
lofty  thought  and  noble  action  that  are  worthy  of 
the  free  man’s  leisure. 

7.  Revolutions 

Ideally,  the  stability  of  a constitution  would  be  in-  j 
sured  by  the  system  just  described.  From  this  point 
of  view,  Aristotle  made  no  important  advance  over  j 
Plato.  Practically,  however,  instability  and  trans-  j 
formation  had  been  a most  characteristic  feature  of  I 

1 In  connection  with  this,  Aristotle  inveighs  even  more  strongly  I 
than  Plato  against  the  undue  attention  given  by  the  Spartans  to  I 
merely  military  exercises,  and  declares  that  the  decline  of  Sparta  j 
proves  that  the  system  has  been  a failure. 

2 The  physical  integrity  of  the  population  is  to  be  maintained  by  I 
the  exposure  of  defective  infants,  and  the  legal  limit  of  its  size  by  the 
practice  of  abortion.  VII,  xvi,  15. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  REVOLUTIONS 


85 


Hellenic  constitutional  life,  and  as  such  it  afforded  a 
particularly  appropriate  field  for  the  application  of 
the  Aristotelian  method.  Plato’s  systematic  treat- 
ment of  the  subject  was  limited  to  a fanciful  sketch 
of  the  evolution  of  existing  constitutions  from  his 
ideal  form ; 1 Aristotle  devoted  to  it  a whole  book  of 
The  Politics , embodying  an  enormous  mass  of  his- 
torical facts  and  a masterly  exhibition  of  scientific 
analysis.  The  general  trend  of  development,  from 
royalty  through  oligarchy  and  tyranny  to  democracy, 
was  explained  by  Aristotle  as  a concomitant  of  social 
and  economic  progress  in  Hellas.2  A more  specific 
determination  of  the  sources  of  constitutional  trans- 
formation was  imperatively  required,  not  only  to 
complete  the  system  of  rational  political  specula- 
tion, but  also  to  explain  the  chronic  insurrection 
and  revolution3  which  made  the  reality  of  Hellenic 
politics  so  different  from  the  calm  and  orderly  ex- 
istence of  the  philosophic  ideal.  Indeed,  the  ideal 
doubtless  took  its  character  largely  from  the  aversion 
which  the  violent  and  ignoble  features  of  actual 
politics  inspired  in  the  reflecting  mind. 

The  most  general  cause  of  revolutionary  move- 
ments (crracrt?)  Aristotle  finds  to  be  the  craving  of 
men  for  equality.  As  already  noticed,  equality  has 

1 Supra,  p.  33.  Aristotle’s  criticism  of  this  part  of  Plato’s  work 
is  unmerciful,  and  also  to  a considerable  degree  unfair.  Politics , V, 
xii,  7-18.  Cf  Jowett’s  notes  ad  loc. 

2 Cf  III,  xy,  11-13 ; IV,  xiii,  9-12. 

3 The  political  history  of  Hellas  during  the  two  centuries  preced- 
ing the  Macedonian  conquest  was,  from  this  standpoint,  not  unlike 
the  history  of  Latin  America  since  1800. 


86 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


a double  character — absolute  and  proportional.  The 
masses  are  ever  seeking  for  absolute  equality  — for 
the  same  privileges  and  power  that  are  possessed  by 
the  few ; the  few  strive  for  proportionate  equality  — 
for  a superiority  in  privilege  and  power  corresponding 
to  their  superior  wealth  or  ability  or  birth.1  By 
this  one  broad  principle,  thus,  may  be  explained  the 
manifold  phenomena  of  the  conflicts  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  oligarchy  and 
democracy.  Of  the  particular  causes  which  are 
operative  in  revolutions  the  philosopher  enumerates 
a large  number,  grouping  them  according  as  they  lie 
more  in  the  sphere  of  human  passions  (jealousy,  arro- 
gance, fear,  etc.)  or  in  that  of  impersonal  facts.  His 
1 remarks  under  the  latter  head  exhibit  his  insight  at 
its  best,  tracing,  as  he  does,  political  transformation 
to  obscure  social  and  economic  sources.2  Particular 
stress  is  laid  upon  the  fact  that  the  causes  of  revolu- 
tions are  to  be  regarded  as  quite  distinct  from  the 
occasions.  The  latter  may  be,  and  often  are,  inci- 
dents of  trifling  character;  the  former  are  always 
profound.  Thus  the  private  quarrel  of  Harmodius 
and  Aristogiton  with  the  Pisistratidae,  while  undoubt- 
edly the  occasion,  was  by  no  means  the  cause  of  the 
downfall  of  the  tyranny  at  Athens. 

These  doctrines  as  to  the  causes  of  revolutions  are 
applied  by  Aristotle  to  each  of  the  special  forms  of 

1 But  noble  birth,  he  explains  again,  signifies  merely  inherited 
wealth  and  virtue.  Cf.  supra , p.  75,  note. 

2 V,  iii.  For  example,  he  notes  how  an  oligarchy  based  on  a prop- 
erty qualification  may  be  converted  into  democracy  by  a mere  rise  in 
values.  Cf.  V,  vi,  17. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  REVOLUTIONS 


87 


constitution.  Democracy,  oligarchy,  polity  and  aris- 
tocracy are  subjected  in  turn  to  a searching  examina- 
tion, through  which  the  manner  of  their  undoing  is 
laid  bare.1  This  investigation  duly  sets  forth  the 
influences  which  produced  the  broad  trend  of  gov- 
ernment from  monarchy  to  democracy,  but  at  the 
same  time  explains  all  the  manifold  deviations  from 
this  general  order.  Democracy  has  not  always  been 
the  last  term  of  the  series,  but  has  often  passed  into~^ 
oligarchy  and  tyranny.  For  both  these  transforma- 
tions the  demagogues  have  been  responsible.  In  the 
early  days  the  fighting  demagogue,  by  posing  as  the 
friend  of  the  people,  made  himself  tyrant;  in  later 
days  the  talking  demagogue,  ever  assailing  the  rich, 
drives  them  to  oligarchic  revolution  in  self-defence. 
More  common,  however,  is  the  transformation  of 
democracy  from  the  more  moderate  to  the  extremest 
variety,  through  the  conviction  impressed  by  the 
demagogues  upon  the  masses  that  the  people  are 
above  even  the  law.  Oligarchy,  Aristotle  finds,  falls 
chiefly  through  dissensions  and  ambitions  in  the  — 
privileged  classes  themselves.  Where  the  rulers 
are  harmonious,  he  says,  an  oligarchy  is  not  easily 
overturned.  But  this  form  of  constitution  may,  like 
democracy,  be  transmuted,  not  into  a wholly  distinct 
form,  but  into  another  variety  of  itself;  and  this 
often  happens.  As  to  the  mixed  constitutions,  aris- 

1 This  investigation  is  an  almost  perfect  example  of  the  applica- 
tion of  the  historical  method  in  political  science.  The  facts  adduced 
by  Aristotle  as  the  basis  of  his  reasoning  constitute  a valuable  body 
of  sources  for  Greek  history,  and  at  the  same  time  throw  a rather 
lurid  light  on  Hellenic  politics. 


88 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tocracy  and  polity,  revolutions  may  most  often  be 
^ traced  to  an  inexact  adjustment  of  the  different 
principles  which  are  combined  in  them.  Aristoc- 
racy tends  to  become  oligarchy,  through  the  undue 
encroachment  of  the  richer  classes  ; polity  to  become 
[ democracy,  through  the  undue  aspiration  of  the 
I poorer  classes.  Stability  can  be  maintained  only 
by  proportionate  equality  and  by  giving  to  each 
his  own.  It  is  in  these  mixed  constitutions  in  par-i 
ticular  that  transformations  are  apt  to  take  place 
unnoticed,  through  the  imperceptible  modification  of 
social  and  economic  conditions. 

A Aristotle  follows  up  his  elaborate  array  of  the  causes 
that  produce  revolutions  by  an  equally  impressive 
array  of  means  for  preventing  them.1  The  character 
v of  the  particular  causes  suggests  at  once  the  character 
of  the  corresponding  remedies.  In  the  mixed  consti- 
tutions especial  care  must  be  taken  to  detect  the 
obscure  beginnings  of  new  conditions  making  for  polit- 
ical change.  In  aristocracy  and  oligarchy  the  inferior 
— classes  must  be  well  treated,  and  the  principles  of 
democratic  equality  must  be  strictly  applied  among 
the  privileged  classes.2  The  body  of  citizens  inter- 
ested in  political  stability  must  often  be  roused  by 
the  cry  that  the  constitution  is  in  danger.3  No  single 
man  should  be  permitted  to  attain  to  power  either 
suddenly  or  in  a disproportionate  degree.  “ Men,”  the 
philosopher  reflects,  “ are  easily  spoiled,  and  not  every 

1 V,  viii. 

2 E.g.  offices  must  be  held  for  short  terms,  so  that  all  may  partici- 

pate in  them.  8 V,  viii,  8. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  REVOLUTIONS 


89 


one  can  bear  prosperity.”  Access  to  positions  of 
power  should  be  made  gradual  and  slow,  and  undue 
influence  on  the  part  of  any  individual  should  be  met,  \ 
if  necessary,  by  ostracism.  In  every  state,  further, 
the  utmost  care  should  be  taken  to  exclude  the  officers  ^ 
from  all  opportunity  of  pecuniary  gain.  Especially 
important  is  this  in  oligarchy ; for  while  the  massed- 
may  be  contented  to  leave  political  office  to  others 
and  devote  themselves  to  money-making,  they  will 
always  resent  being  excluded  from  positions  that  bring 
not  only  honour  but  also  profit.  The  surest  way  to 
satisfy  both  the  classes  and  the  masses  is  to  throw  the 
offices  open  to  all,  but  without  salaries.  This  will  in- 
sure in  practice  the  manning  of  the  offices  chiefly  by 
the  well-to-do.  But  every  care  must  be  taken,  through 
public  statements  as  to  the  condition  and  conduct  of 
the  finances,  to  inspire  confidence  that  the  treasury  is 
not  being  exploited  by  the  officials.  It  is  desirable, 
moreover,  that  no  class  should  have  a monopoly  of  the 
offices.  In  oligarchy  the  poor,  and  in  democracy  the^/ 
rich,  should  be  encouraged  to  share  in  those  adminis-  ^ f 
trative  functions  which  do  not  affect  the  sovereign  / 
power.1  This  corresponds  to  the  broad  dictate  of  good 
policy,  not  to  push  to  extremes  the  principle  of  any 
particular  form.  Extremes  provoke  resistance  ; the 


1 The  qualities  demanded  by  Aristotle  in  those  who  fill  the  supreme 
offices  of  the  state  are  strikingly  suggestive  of  Jefferson’s  triad  of  test 
questions.  Aristotle  enumerates : “ (1)  loyalty  to  the  established  con- 
stitution; (2)  the  greatest  administrative  capacity;  (3)  virtue  and 
justice  proper  to  each  form  of  government.”  Jefferson  asked : “ Is 
he  honest?  Is  he  capable?  Is  he  faithful  to  the  constitution?” 
The  Politics,  V,  ix,  1 ; Jefferson’s  Works  (1854),  IV,  405. 


90 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


mean  should  be  observed ; for,  whatever  element  may 
rule,  all  the  other  elements  are  valuable  to  the  state. 
Finally,  the  most  efficient  of  means  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  state  from  revolution  is  that  which  is  in 
^ general  the  least  considered  — a system  of  education 
^ in  the  spirit  of  the  constitution.  Legislation  is  likely 
to  avail  little  unless  the  youth  of  the  city  are  trained 
to  appreciate  what  is  truly  essential  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  their  particular  system.  But  this  does  not 
mean  that  oligarchic  training  is  to  involve  merely 
what  is  agreeable  to  the  wealthy,  and  democratic 
training  what  is  agreeable  to  the  masses.  That  would 
only  emphasize  the  evils  which  already  exist.  For  in 
oligarchies  the  aristocratic  youth  pass  their  time  in 
idleness  and  profligacy,  while  the  masses  are  left  to 
toil  and  plot  rebellion;  and  in  democracies  distorted 
notions  of  liberty  and  equality  lead  to  license  and  to 
the  overthrow  of  all  constitutional  restraint.1 

Aristotle's  discussion  of  the  monarchic  constitutions 
is  particularly  noteworthy  for  his  finished  exposition 
of  tyranny  as  an  art.  Royalty,  as  a practical  insti- 
tution, is  in  his  eyes  only  a more  or  less  interesting 
survival  from  archaic  times  and  conditions.  It  was 
essentially  the  unchecked  rule  of  £ supereminent 
individual  or  family  over  willing  subjects.  But  with 
general  enlightenment  the  preeminence  of  any  one 
man  has  become  impossible,  and  the  passing  of  roy- 
alty  cannot  be  prevented ; for  when  the  subjects  cease 
to  yield  the  monarch  willing  obedience,  whatever  abso- 
lute power  he  retains  must  rest  on  force,  and  he  is 

i V,  ix,  15. 


ARISTOTLE  ON  TYRANNY 


91 


therefore  no  king,  but  a tyrant ; and  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  submits  to  limitations  on  his  power,  he  may 
remain  king  in  name,  but  is  no  longer  a monarch  in 
fact.  As  distinct  from  royalty,  tyranny  is  to  Aristotle 
a political  phenomenon  sufficiently  modern  to  demand 
the  same  scientific  consideration  as  actual  constitu- 
tions.1 Of  all  the  species  of  government  it  is  as  a 
rule  the  least  permanent ; therefore  the  causes  which 
lead  to  its  downfall  require  special  attention.  In 
general  these  causes  are  the  same  as  those  which 
operate  in  the  extremest  varieties  of  democracy 
and  oligarchy.  The  inherent  likeness  of  these 
forms  to  tyranny  is,  in  fact,  the  theme  of  reiter- 
ated comment  by  Aristotle.2 

To  counteract  the  influences  working  against  him 
and  to  maintain  his  power,  the  tyrant  has,  the  phi- 
losopher points  out,  the  choice  between  two  dia- 
metrically opposite  policies.  That  most 


adopted  is  one  of  ruthless  and  unqualified  i 
the  best  citizens  are  slain  or  banished;  whatever 
makes  for  a noble  and  exalted  life  among  the  people 
is  suppressed ; association  for  intellectual  or  social 
purposes  is  forbidden ; espionage  renders  dangerous 
all  freedom  of  intercourse ; vast  enterprises,  whether 
of  peace 3 or  of  war,  are  devised  to  keep  the  people 

1 Tyranny  was  not  a rroXtreLa  in  the  Aristotelian  sense  of  the  term. 
IV,  viii,  2. 

2 E.g.  “ The  people  likes  to  be  a monarch.  Wherefore,  the  para- 
site is  esteemed  by  both,  . . . for  the  demagogue  is  the  parasite  of 
the  people.”  V,  xi,  12. 

8 Aristotle  cites  the  Egyptian  Pyramids,  among  other  examples  of 
this. 


92 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


occupied  and  poor;  and  the  tyrant  himself,  sur- 
rounded by  a servile  crowd  of  foreigners,  lives  a life 
of  undisguised  luxury  and  selfishness.  The  more 
rare,  but  in  Aristotle’s  opinion  the  more  effective, 
policy  is  that  according  to  which  the  tyrant  keeps  a 
firm  hold  on  the  essence  of  power,  but  disguises  the 
reality  of  the  tyranny  by  the  semblance,  at  least,  of 
beneficent  rule.  The  administration  is  ostentatiously 
economical ; the  public  interest  is  made  a subject  of 
the  ruler’s  grave  concern ; those  who  come  in  contact 
with  him  are  inspired  with  respect,  rather  than  with 
fear ; he  patronizes  genius,  shows  constant  respect  for 
the  things  of  religion  and  avoids  all  public  displays 
of  sensuality  or  luxury.  It  is  essential  to  this  policy, 
however,  that  the  tyrant  shall  win  a reputation  for 
at  least  the  military  virtues ; that  he  shall  select  his 
subordinates  from  men  of  plodding,  rather  than  enter- 
prising character;  and  that,  while  inspiring  the  rich 
and  the  poor  with  distrust  of  each  other  and  confi- 
dence in  him,  he  shall,  when  choice  must  be  made 
between  them,  side  always  with  the  stronger.1  In 
short,  the  characteristics  of  monarchic  rule  of  this 
kind  are  that  it  be  rather  paternal  than  despotic,  that 
it  be  based  on  moderation  rather  than  excess,  and 
that  it  be  popular  — winning  the  classes  by  friend- 
ship and  the  masses  by  the  arts  of  the  demagogue. 
On  such  principles  the  tyrant’s  rule  will  be  better  for 

1 Another  and  very  famous  dictate  of  policy  suggested  by  Aristotle 
is,  that  all  the  rewards  and  honours  of  state  should  be  bestowed  by 
the  ruler  in  person,  while  the  punishments  and  disgraces  should  flow 
through  other  channels.  V,  xi,  26. 


THE  HELLENIC  IN  ARISTOTLE 


93 


the  subjects,  will  be  more  lasting,  and  will  tend  to 
have  a beneficial  influence  on  the  character  of  the 
ruler  himself. 


8.  The  Hellenic  and  the  Universal  in  Aristotle 


The  foregoing  sketch  of  Aristotle’s  work  should  at 
least  suggest  the  importance  of  the  purely  Hellenic 
elements  in  his  political  philosophy.  His  historical 
research  went  far  beyond  the  confines  of  Hellas,  but 
the  system  which  he  framed  was  determined  in  its 
most  essential  characteristics  by  the  conditions  that 
prevailed  within  those  confines.  The  postulates  of  ^ 
his  thought,  as  of  Plato’s,  were : the  general  superi- 
ority of  the  Greeks  over  other  races ; the  inherent 
necessity  and  justice  of  slavery  as  the  basis  of  social 
organization ; the  typical  character  of  the  city-state 
in  political  organization ; the  incompatibility  of  bread- 
winning pursuits  with  the  moral  and  intellectual 
attributes  of  good  citizenship;  the  supreme  impor- 
tance of  state-directed  education  and  training  in  the 
maintenance  of  political  virtue ; and,  finally,  the  sub- 
ordination of  all  personal  motives  and  conduct  to 
the  dictates  of  law  — conceived  either  as  the  purely 
impersonal  and  more  or  less  mystic  product  of  divine 
or  natural  forces,  or  as  the  formulated  wisdom  of 
some  individual  of  almost  superhuman  sagacity.1 
In  the  course  of  the  ages  most  of  these  ideas  either 


4r 


1 Aristotle,  while  ascribing  law  in  general  to  the  slow  working  of 
custom,  manifests  at  times  the  influence  of  the  common  Hellenic  idea, 
that  a perfect  code  may  be,  as  it  has  been,  projected  into  operation 
by  an  all-wise  legislator. 


94 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


have  passed  entirely  out  of  consideration  or  have 
been  so  modified  as  to  lose  the  significance  which 
Aristotle  attached  to  them.  But  when  we  look  fur- 
ther into  his  philosophy,  beneath  the  general  outlines 
determined  by  these  Hellenic  dogmas,  we  find  a long 
series  of  principles  which  are  as  ultimate  as  human 
nature  itself,  and  which,  in  almost  the  exact  shape 
in  which  Aristotle  formulated  them,  are  features  of 
political  science  at  the  present  day. 

Prominent  among  these  is  the  distinct  and  unequivo- 
cal conception  of  the  ultimate  problem  of  politics  — 
^the  reconciliation  of  liberty  and  authority.  The 
primar}'  fact  of  the  state  he  represents  to  be  the  dis- 
tinction between  rulers  and  ruled.  That  is,  political 
organization  is  inconceivable  without  the  submission 
of  one  human  will  to  another.  The  anarchist’s  con- 
ception of  liberty  and  equality,  incompatible  with  this 
doctrine,  is  denounced  by  Aristotle.  Describing  the 
tendencies  of  extreme  democracy,  he  says : — 

Equality  is  held  to  signify  the  rule  of  the  majority,  and 
liberty  and  equality  to  mean  that  each  may  do  as  he  will. 
Hence,  in  democracies  each  follows  his  own  inclinations.  But 
this  is  evil.  Eor  life  in  subjection  to  the  constitution  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  slavery,  but  as  the  highest  welfare.1 

This  view  as  to  the  relation  between  the  individual 
and  the  state  is  duly  supplemented  by  the  doctrine  as 
to  the  qualifications  under  which  the  personal  author- 
ity in  government  is  manifested.  The  most  charac- 
teristic function  of  the  officer  is,  indeed,  declared  to 
be  the  issuing  of  orders.2  But  above  the  officer  he 

2 IV,  xv,  4. 


1 V,  ix,  15. 


THE  UNIVERSAL  IN  ARISTOTLE 


95 


insists  must  be  the  impersonal  factors  in  the  consti- 
tution— namely,  public  opinion  and  customary  law. 
The  latter  force  he  describes  with  perfect  clearness ; 
the  former,  though  less  distinctly  defined,  is  undoubt- 
edly what  he  has  in  view  in  ascribing  to  the  people  as 
a whole  the  function  of  final  judgment  on  official  con- 
duct and  in  defending  the  thesis  that  the  opinion  of 
the  mass  is  preferable  to  that  of  the  expert.1  ^ 

In  respect  to  the  ultimate  idea  of  sovereignty  Aris- 
totle discerns,  rather  than  adopts,  the  theories  dT 
modern  times.  He  realizes  the  importance  of  a de- 
terminate human  superior,  whose  undoubted  will  is 
final ; but  he  recurs  again  to  the  thought  of  a law 
controlling  even  this  sovereign.  He  prefers  that  this 
ultimate  human  superior  should  be  the  whole  people ; * 
but  he  qualifies  this  solution,  first,  by  limiting  it  to 
a society  in  which  the  general  level  of  virtue  — i.e. 
of  moral  and  intellectual  attainment  — is  high,  and 
second,  by  limiting  the  field  of  sovereign  legislative 
activity  to  the  region  not  previously  occupied  by  law, 
Aristotle  cannot,  in  fact,  think  of  the  sovereign  as| 
essentially  legislator.  The  normal  function  of  the 1 
supreme  organ  is  administration;  but,  almost  with- 
out being  aware  of  it,  the  philosopher  resigns  the  key 
to  his  whole  position  by  assuming  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  sovereign  to  legislate  when  on  any  point  “ the-^- 
law  is  either  inadequate  or  improper.’ ’ 2 Nothing 
more  than  this  was  needed  to  justify  the  proceedings 
of  the  popular  assembly  in  extreme  democracy,  which 

1 Supra , pp.  69-70. 

2 wOcra  fxrj  Svvarov  rov  vo/xov  Kpivuv  rj  oAcos  rj  ev.  Ill,  xv,  6. 


96 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


I 


V 


I 


Aristotle  wholly  abhors;  for  the  substitution  of 
decrees  of  the  assembly  for  law  would  be  merely  a 
judgment  by  the  sovereign  that  the  law  was  either 
inadequate  or  improper.1 

The  doctrine  of  The  Politics  as  to  the  three  ele- 
ments necessary  in  the  organization  of  constitutional 
government  is  another  example  of  striking  insight. 
In  this  case,  however,  the  relation  of  his  theory  to 
the  modern  theory  of  the  separation  of  powers  may 
easily  be  mistaken.  Aristotle  distinguishes  three 
essential  organs,  which  he  designates  as  the  delibera- 
tive, that  pertaining  to  the  offices,  and  the  judicial. 
Each  of  these  has  something  in  common  with,  respec- 
tively, the  legislative,  the  executive  and  the  judicial 
departments  of  modern  analysis.  But  he  contem- 
plates no  such  distinction  in  respect  to  functions  as 
has  been  made  the  basis  of  the  latter.  His  delibera- 
tive organ  is,  indeed,  legislative,  but  only  to  the  extent 
indicated  above  — that,  namely,  of  supplementing  the 
preexisting  law ; his  officers  are  executive,  but  scarcely 
more  so  than  the  deliberative  organ ; and  his  judicial 
organ  differs  from  the  deliberative  rather  in  constitu- 
tion and  procedure  than  in  function. 

Finally,  the  permanent  and  universal  side  of  Aris- 
totle’s philosophy  is  peculiarly  illustrated  by  the 
importance  which  he  attaches  to  economic  influences 
in  political  organization  and  activity.  From  the 
theoretical  point  of  view  the  validity  of  private  prop- 
erty is  maintained,  and  from  the  practical  point  of 
view  the  eternal  friction  between  those  who  have  and 


i Cf  IV,  iv,  31. 


THE  UNIVERSAL  IN  ARISTOTLE 


97 


those  who  have  not  is  made  to  explain  many  of  the 
most  conspicuous  phenomena  of  government.  On 
this  turn  his  classification  of  forms,  his  adjustment 
of  administrative  machinery,  and,  to  a very  large 
extent,  his  explanation  of  revolutions.  And  from 
this  is  derived  that  doctrine  which  has  been  so  im- 
pressively confirmed  by  later  history,  that  stability  V 

and  prosperity  are  most  to  be  found  where  extremes 

of  wealth  and  poverty  are  unknown  and  the  middle 
class  is  the  strongest. 

If  The  Laws  of  Plato  leaves  in  one’s  mind  the  ^ 
vague  but  unmistakable  suggestion  of  an  Atticized  \ 
Sparta,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle  leaves  somewhat 
more  distinctly  the  impression  of  a Spartanized 
Athens.  This  corresponds  to  the  success  of  the 
later  philosopher  in  combining  in  his  thought  the 
Hellenic  and  the  universal.  For  no  other  Hellenic 
state  was  so  universal  as  Athens.  In  both  things 
material  and  things  of  the  spirit  she  sounded  the 
depths  and  crowned  the  heights  of  human  nature. 

A genius  peculiarly  susceptible  to  Athenian  inspira- 
tion must  necessarily  be  in  many  respects  as  univer- 
sal as  humanity  itself.  Such  a genius  was  Aristotle’s, 
and  such  was  the  character  of  his  philosophy.  And 
hence  it  is  that  we  find,  in  systems  so  diverse  as 
those  of  military  Rome,  of  the  theological  Middle 
Age  and  of  the  materialistic  modern  era,  the  essential  i 
features  of  political  organization  and  activity  expli-^’ 
cable,  and  actually  explained,  on  the  lines  of  the  Aris- 
totelian analysis. 


98 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


SELECT  REFERENCES 

Blakey,  I,  pp.  53-62.  Bradley,  Aristotle’s  Conception  of 
the  State,  in  Hellenica,  pp.  166-222.  Burnet,  Ethics  of  Aris- 
totle, introduction  and  text.  Congreve,  The  Politics  of 
Aristotle,  introduction.  Cope,  Introduction  to  Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric,  pp.  239-244  (Aristotle’s  idea  of  the  law  of  j 
nature).  Davidson,  Aristotle  and  Ancient  Educational 
Ideals,  pp.  151-235.  Grant,  the  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  essays 
and  text.  Henkel,  Geschichte  der  griechischen  Lehre  vom 
Staat , pp.  74-97.  Hildenbrand,  pp.  250-487.  Jackson, 
The  Fifth  Book  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics.  Janet,  I, 
191-232.  Jowett,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  introduction, 
trans.  and  notes.  Lang,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  introductory 
essays.  Loos,  Politics  of  Aristotle  and  the  Republic  of  Plato. 
Mahaffy,  Classical  Greek  Literature,  II,  414-427,  424 
et  seq.  Newman,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  Yol.  I (introduc- 
tion). Oncken,  Die  Staatslelire  des  Aristoteles.  Peters,  The 
Nicomachean  Ethics,  trans.  Raumer,  Die  Begriffe  von  Becht, 
Staat  und  Politik , pp.  16-21.  Ritter,  Geschichte  der  Pliilo- 
sophie,  Bd.  Ill,  pp.  301-405  (trans.  Ill,  259-340).  Saint- 
Hilaire,  Politique  d’Aristote,  preface.  Susemihl,  Aristoteles 
Politik  (1879).  Susemihl  and  Hicks,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle, 
introduction  and  text.  Teichmuller,  Die  aristotelische  Ein- 
theilung  der  Verfassungsformen.  Thurot,  Etudes  sur  Aristote. 
Van  der  Rest,  Platon  et  Aristote , pp.  345-598.  Welldon, 
English  trans.  of  the  Politics,  with  notes.  Whibley,  Greek 
Oligarchies,  chaps,  i,  ii  and  iv,  §§  28,  29  and  30.  Wilamo- 
witz-Moellendorff,  Aristoteles  und  Athen,  I,  39  et  seq., 
II,  363  et  seq.  Zeller,  Die  Philosophie  der  Griechen,  Bd.  II,  ii, 
pp.  672-754  (Aristotle  and  the  Earlier  Peripatetics,  trans., 
Yol.  II,  chaps,  xii  and  xiii). 


CHAPTER  IV 


POLITICAL  THEORY  OF  LATER  GREECE  AND  OF  ROME 

1.  Political  Extinction  of  Hellas 

When  Aristotle  died,  322  b.c.,  Alexander  the 
Great  had  already  been  dead  a year.  But  though 
the  philosopher  survived  his  former  pupil,  in  none  of 
his  works  as  we  know  them  is  there  any  sign  that  he 
realized  the  significance  of  that  pupil’s  astonishing 
career.1  It  was  indeed  less  easy  then  than  it  is  now 
to  perceive  that  Hellas  was  politically  extinct,  and 
that  the  conditions  which  determined  the  character 
of  Plato’s  and  Aristotle’s  philosophy  were  to  be 
henceforth  of  little  or  no  consequence  in  the  march 
of  history.  Through  the  conquests  of  Alexander  and 
the  partition  of  his  dominion  among  his  successors, 
the  constitutional  city-state  was  entirely  overwhelmed 
by  the  absolute  military  empire  as  the  type  of  politi- 
cal organization ; and  through  the  fusion  of  races  and 
of  culture  that  sprang  from  the  new  conditions,  the 
pure  and  exclusive  Hellenic  character  was  gradually 
supplanted  by  the  moral  and  intellectual  type  which  ^ 
we  call  Hellenistic.  But  for  centuries  after  the 

1 Much  ingenuity  has  been  displayed  by  certain  commentators  in 
discovering  allusions  to  Alexander  and  his  work  in  The  Politics. 

But  all  that  have  been  adduced  are,  in  fact,  illusions  of  the  critics, 
rather  than  allusions  of  the  philosopher.  See,  for  example,  Oncken, 

Die  Staatslehre  des  Aristoteles , Buch  III,  iv,  passim. 

99 


100 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Macedonian  conquest  government  in  many  of  the 
Greek  cities  continued  to  move  in  the  forms  of 
the  classical  era.  From  time  to  time,  moreover, 
there  arose  conditions  in  which  for  a little  while  or 
in  some  degree  these  forms  were  imbued  with  real 
vitality.  Especially  in  the  Hellenic  peninsula  itself, 
which  pertained  to  the  least  powerful  of  Alexander’s 
successors,  was  this  the  case.  And  here  developed 
and  flourished  for  a time  a constitutional  system 
which  seemed  well  adapted  to  counteract  the  particu- 
laristic tendencies  of  the  Hellenic  spirit.  In  the 
career  of  the  iEtolian  and  the  Achaean  League,  the 
principles  of  federal  government  were  so  developed 
and  administered  as  to  maintain  throughout  central 
Greece  and  the  Peloponnesus  for  several  generations 
a large  degree  of  autonomy.  But  what  availed 
against  Maced  on  was  not  a match  for  the  conquer- 
ing power  of  Rome,  and  before  the  policy  of  this 
latter,  federation  went  the  way  that  the  city-state  had 
gone  before.  The  complex  constitutional  organiza- 
tion of  the  Achaean  League  became,  like  the  Athenian 
democracy  and  the  Spartan  oligarchy,  a mere  insig- 
nificant phase  of  local  government  in  the  imperial 
dominion  of  Rome. 

The  two  centuries  of  social  and  political  trans- 
formation that  followed  the  death  of  Alexander  were 
characterized  by  a steady  decline  in  systematic  politi- 
cal speculation.  The  spirit  of  the  times  was  little 
favourable  to  philosophizing  about  government.  In 
the  kaleidoscopic  changes  attending  the  succession  to 
Alexander’s  power  the  salient  fact  was  the  domina- 


POLITICAL  EXTINCTION  OF  HELLAS 


101 


tion  of  military  force,  and  of  military  force  resting^ 
not  upon  any  principle  of  popular  organization,  but 
upon  mercenary  service  pure  and  simple.  Empire 
building  was  the  order  of  the  day,  and  the  welding 
of  civilizations.  In  such  a transition  period  political 
philosophy  is  wont  to  lose  its  bearings,  and  to  await 
in  silence  the  subsidence  of  the  storm.  When  the 
turmoil  has  ceased  and  a new  order  has  become 
established,  philosophy  reappears,  with  formulas 
adapted  to  the  situation,  and  works  out  a system 
just  in  time  to  be  overthrown  by  some  new  convul- 
sion. Thus  it  was  that  from  the  rise  of  Alexander’s 
empire  to  the  establishment  of  Roman  dominion  in 
the  East,  political  theory  was  practically  dumb ; 
Polybius  and  Cicero  then  explained  the  conspicuous 
fact  of  the  pax  Bomana  by  a well-rounded  theory, 
which  the  work  of  Julius  and  Augustus  promptly 
deprived  of  all  relation  to  reality. 

In  the  lost  Greek  and  Hellenistic  literature  of  the 
third  and  second  centuries  before  the  Christian  era 
there  was  doubtless  much  that  treated  of  political 
topics.1  But  that  the  works  lacked  originality  and 
influence  is  apparent  from  the  character  of  the  greats 
philosophical  systems  which  arose  and  flourished  dur- 
ing that  period.  The  schools  of  Plato  and  Aristotle 
sank  into  insignificance  as  compared  with  those  of 

1 Cicero,  De  Legibus,  III,  6,  mentions  with  praise  the  works  of 
Heraklides  Ponticus,  a follower  of  Plato,  Theophrastus,  an  Aristote- 
lian, Dio  the  Stoic  and  Demetrius  Phalereus.  To  the  writings  of  the 
last  named,  who  had  much  experience  in  the  government  of  Athens, 
both  philosophic  excellence  and  practical  value  are  ascribed  by 
Cicero,  who  then  characteristically  classes  himself  with  Demetrius. 


102 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  Stoics,  the  Epicureans  and  even  the  Sceptics; 
and  these  three  later  schools,  various  as  was  their 
doctrine  in  other  respects,  agreed  in  minimizing  the 
concern  of  philosophy  with  political  affairs.  To  the 
problems  of  ethics  they  devoted  especial  attention, 
and  they  worked  out  elaborate  codes  of  conduct 
adapted  to  the  promotion  of  right  living.  But  while 
Plato  and  Aristotle  had  found  the  key  to  the  good 
life  in  a scientifically  organized  state,  Zeno  and  Epi- 
curus found  it  in  absolute  indifference  to  political 
conditions.  The  separation  of  politics  from  ethics 
was  carried  to  the  extreme,  and  the  individual,  over- 
whelmed in  the  state  by  the  earlier  systems,  was  by 
the  later  set  to  solve  the  problems  of  life  in  isola- 
tion.1 The  relation  of  this  attitude  of  philosophy 
to  external  conditions  is  obvious.  Public  life  in  the 
Greek  cities  was  fast  losing  importance.  The  springs 
of  political  action  were  to  be  found,  not  in  the  assem- 
bly or  the  council  of  a given  city,  but  at  the  courts  of 
the  Macedonian,  the  Syrian  and  the  Egyptian  mon- 
archs,  and  in  the  camps  of  the  Roman  consuls. 
Reflecting  minds  turned  away  from  the  considera- 
tion of  constitutional  forms  which  had  no  reality, 
and  dignified  the  loss  of  political  life  by  the  theory 
that  such  life  was  irrational. 

2.  Epicurean  and  Stoic  Influences 

There  were,  however,  certain  features  of  Epicurean 
and  Stoic  doctrine  that  were  destined  to  exercise 

1 Cf.  Zeller,  Die  Philosophic  der  Griechen  (Leipzig,  1880),  Bd.  3, 
Theil  1,  s.  19. 


EPICUREAN  INFLUENCES 


103 


V 


a,  considerable  influence  on  the  politics  and  on  the 
political  theory  of  later  ages.  Epicurus  and  his 
followers  took  a cognizance  of  society  and  the 
state,  but  only  to  emphasize  the  indifference  of  the 
philosopher  in  reference  to  them.  Social  and  legal 
relations  were  explained  as  resting  wholly  upon  indi- 
vidual self-interest,  and  upon  the  desire  of  each  to^ 
secure  himself  against  injury.  Obedience  to  law, 
it  was  held,  is  rational  only  so  far  as  law  promotes^, 
this  end.  Justice  has  no  existence  in  the  abstract; 
it  inheres  merely  in  some  convention  for  mutual 
advantage.  The  wise  man  will  have  no  part  in 
political  life  unless  his  interests  imperatively  require 
it.  Such  life  is  burdensome  and  incompatible  with 
the  repose  of  spirit  essential  to  an  ideal  existence. 

In  these  views  we  have  a line  of  thought  which 
had  already  been  represented  to  some  extent  by  the 
Sophists,  and  which  was  destined  to  gain  great  celeb- 
rity centuries  later  in  the  series  of  doctrines  known 
as  the  contract  theory  of  the  state.  ^The  practical 
teaching  of  Epicureanism  was  that  of  submission  to 
any  form  of  political  authority  that  was  attended  by 
peace  and  order.  To  the  devotee  of  this  school  it  was 
a matter  of  total  indifference  whether  the  quiet  which 
he  demanded  was  due  to  smoothly  working  constitu- 
tional government  or  to  efficient  despotism.  Hence 
the  Macedonian  garrison  was  to  him  as  good  a politi- 
cal sovereign  as  any  other.  The  suitability  of  such 
a philosophy  to  the  life  of  Hellas  after  Alexander  is 
self-evident.  In  Rome,  under  Augustus,  analogous 
conditions  prevailed,  and  there  Epicurean  indifferent- 


104 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ism  found  an  attractive  exposition  in  the  genial 
exhortations  of  Horace.1 

The  influence  of  Stoic  doctrine  on  later  political 
thought  and  practice  was  of  quite  another  character. 
This  influence  developed  chiefly  through  the  theory 
j of  justice  and  law.  The  Stoics  conceived  of  nature 
X-  in  a pantheistic  sense  as  the  embodiment  of  supreme 
^Universal  law.  Justice  they  held  to  be  immanent  in 
.^nature  — a form  of  universal  reason,  and  therefore 


M 


- f {fixed  and  immutable.  The  ideal  life  was  the  life  in 
conformity  to  this  universal  law.  From  the  practi- 
cal point  of  view  such  conformity  was  to  he  sought 
through  the  cultivation  of  the  human  reason,  pure 
and  simple.^,  Those  who  through  this  process  divested 
themselves  of  all  influence  of  the  emotions  and  of 
^ material  conditions  were  alone  worthy  of  imitation. 

'J  They  alone  would  attain  the  true  goal  of  philosophy, 
$ and  all  such,  regardless  of  external  circumstances, 
would  be  as  fellow-citizens  of  one  great  republic. 
Stoicism,  in  short,  brought  into  prominence  the  fate- 
ful doctrines  of  naJijxalJa^  and  cosmnp^olitisii^ 

The  latter  doctrine  had,  indeed,  been  definitely 
enunciated  by  the  Cynics,  on  whose  teaching  Zeno 
founded  the  Stoic  school.  But  before  the  work  of 
..Alexander  the  Great  had  been  achieved  the  soil  was 
not  favourable  for  the  development  of  such  an  idea. 
When,  however,  the  barrier  between  Greek  and  bar- 
barian had  been  entirely  broken  down,  in  fact,  when 
Athenian  and  Thracian  and  Asiatic  and  Egyptian 
had  become  actual  members  of  one  political  system, 

1 In  Epist.  I,  iv,  16,  the  poet  avows  his  Epicureanism. 


STOIC  INFLUENCES 


105 


the  value  of  civil  and  social  distinctions  on  the  basis 
of  petty  race  and  state  lines  faded  away,  and  world 
citizenship,  with  all  its  far-reaching  social  corollaries 
became  an  acceptable  doctrine  to  reflecting  men.  In  its 
early  form  the  idea  had,  of  course,  little  practical  sig- 
nificance. The  qualifications  for  participation  in  the 
Stoic  cosmopolis  were  as  purely  ideal  and  as  absolutely 
unattainable  as  those  of  Plato’s  philosopher  guardi- 
ans. To  some  extent,  perhaps,  the  dogma  of  world 
citizenship  embodied  the  reaction  of  intellect  against 
physical  force  : excluded  by  the  reign  of  violence  from 
influence  in  the  actual  political  life  of  the  day,  phi- 
losophy conceived  a republic  in  which  reason  and 
intelligence  should  have  their  own.  In  this  sense 
cosmopolitism  was  wholly  aristocratic.  But  the  ethi- 
cal doctrine  of  the  Stoics  tended  always  to  take  a 
practical  form ; and  hence  the  democratic  interpreta- 
tion of  world  citizenship  made  great  progress  in  the 
discussion  of  social  duty.  Cosmopolitism,  in  fact, 
expanded  into  humanitarian  ism . The  dignity  which 
at  first  was  ascribed  exclusively  to  men  of  especially 
exalted  intelligence  came  to  be  ascribed,  in  theory 
at  least,  to  all  who  possessed  human  nature.  Such 
a tendency  could  not  but  produce  very  important 
results  in  a society  based  upon  the  institution  of 
slavery. 

It  was  under  the  sway  of  the  Roman  state  that 
political  and  social  conditions  came  to  correspond 
most  clearly  to  the  Stoic  ideals.  Universal  law  and 
universal  citizenship  became  practical  facts.  Pri- 
marily these  results  were  due  to  the  military  and 


L 


106 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


administrative  genius  of  the  Romans,  and  were  not  in 
the  least  determined  by  abstract  philosophy.  In  the 
constructive  work  of  the  Republic,  Stoicism  played  no 
part.  Its  doctrines  found  a home  only  in  the  spirit  of 
men  like  Cato  the  Younger,  Cicero  and  Brutus,  whose 
ideas  were  as  impotent  in  the  presence  of  Caesar  as 
Aristotle’s  had  been  in  the  presence  of  Alexander. 
But  in  the  social  adjustment  during  the  stable  days 
of  the  Principate,  Stoic  doctrines  exercised  a positive 
and  far-reaching  influence.  Preached  by  Seneca,  the 
chief  minister  of  state,  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  the 
Emperor,  the  universal  brotherhood"  of  man  necessa- 
rily became  something  more  than  a sterile  abstrac- 
tion ; and  the  conception  of  a law  of  nature  and  a 
principle  of  justice  common  to  all  men,  became  pro- 
lific in  practical  fruit  when  accepted  and  developed 
by  Papinian,  Paul  and^Ulpian,  who  were  succes- 
sively chief  justices  of  the  Empire,  and  whose  opinions 
had  the  force  of  law  throughout  the  civilized  world. 
Christianity  took  over  and  adapted  these  doctrines, 
that  were  represented  both  in  theory  and  in  fact  in 
the  Roman  Empire,  and  transmitted  them,  with  the 
profoundest  results,  to  modern  times. 

3.  The  Constitutional  Development  of  Rome 

The  contribution  of  Rome  to  the  literature  of  po- 
litical theory  was  very  slight,  and  its  influence  is  in 
no  way  comparable  to  that  exerted  on  later  philoso- 
phy by  her  actual  institutions.  For  this  reason,  as 
well  as  for  a better  understanding  of  the  little  con- 
temporary theory  that  did  appear,  some  consideration 


THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION 


107 


must  be  devoted  to  the  governmental  organization 
through  which  her  power  was  developed  and  main- 
tained. 

Rome  made  her  appearance  in  history  as  a 
monarchic  city-state.  As  a republican  city-state  she  y 
achieved  her  greatness ; but  in  her  decline  she  was 
in  the  fullest  sense  imperial  and  despotic.  The  royal 
period  lasted  from  prehistoric  times  to  about  500  B.c. 
The  governmental  organs  were  an  elective  king,  with 
ultimate  civil  and  military  authority;  an  advisory 
council  called  the  senate ; and  an  assembly,  the 
comitia  curiata,  whose  chief  function  was  the  election 
of  the  king,  and  the  formal  bestowal  of  supreme 
and  lifelong  authority  upon  him.  Political  rights 
pertained  to  only  part  of  the  population,  known  as 
patricians ; the  remaining  part,  which  before  the  end 
of  the  royal  period  had  become  the  larger,  was  known 
as  the  plebs.  The  pressure  of  this  latter  element  for 
some  share  in  the  government  became  strong  under 
the  later  kings,  and  resulted  in  the  organization  of  a 
new  assembly,  the  comitia  centuriata , in  which  plebs  _ 
as  well  as  patricians  had  a part.  The  purely  patri- 
cian assembly,  the  comitia  curiata , continued  to  exist. 

In  510  b.c.  Tarquinius  Superbus  was  expelled  from 
the  state,  and  the  Republican  era  began.  For  two 
centuries  Rome’s  constitutional  development  turned 
chiefly  upon  the  conflict  between  patricians  and 
plebeians  for  control  of  the  government.  The  ulti- 
mate result  was  the  amalgamation  of  the  two  classes  ^ 
in  a single  body  of  Roman  citizens  enjoying  entire 
equality  in  political  as  well  as  in  civil  rights.  Before 


108 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


this  end  was  achieved,  however,  great  changes  were 
effected  in  the  governmental  organization.  Upon  the 
destruction  of  royalty,  the  power  of  the  king,  both 
civil  and  military,  was  vested  in  two  annually  elected 
officers  called  consuls.  To  the  consulship  only  patri- 
^ cians  were  eligible,  though  the  election  was  by  the 
comitia  centuriata } In  the  course  of  time  other  patri- 
cian magistracies  were  established  to  share  with  the 
consuls  the  governmental  power.  The  ^praetors  took 
over  much  of  the  judicial  administration,  and  the 
censors  were  clothed  with  the  extensive  authority 
incidental  to  the  census  and  lustration.  For  great 
emergencies  the  dictatorship  also  played  for  a time 
a prominent  part  in  the  constitutional  system.  Ple- 
beian policy  was  directed  steadily  to  the  attainment 
of  eligibility  to  these  magistracies,  but  at  the  same 
time  the  whole  plebeian  body  developed  an  exclusive 
organization  of  its  own,  side  by  side  with  that  of 
the  other  order.  An  assembly,  the  concilium  plebis , 
^ adopted  resolutions  {plebis  scita)  which  were  recog- 
nized by  its  members  as  binding,  and  elected  officers 
to  conduct  business  under  its  direction.  The  chief 
of  these  officers  was  the  tribune  ( tribunus  plebis ), 
in  whom  was  recognized  from  the  outset  the  right 
to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the  plebeians  in  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  patrician  government,  and  to  interpose 
an  effective  veto  upon  any  consular  act.  Ultimately 
the  plebeians  attained  the  right  to  fill  the  great 
patrician  magistracies,  and  the  tribunate  thus  lost  its 

1 At  the  outset  this  assembly  was  so  organized,  on  the  basis  of 
wealth,  that  the  patrician  element  was  assured  the  controlling  power. 


THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION 


109 


primary  significance.  But  the  office  remained,  and, 
with  the  great  powers  which  had  become  attached  to 
it  during  the  conflict  of  the  orders,  it  played  a most 
important  part  throughout  the  later  history  of  the 
constitution. 

With  the  amalgamation  of  the  orders  the  plebeian 
assembly  developed  also  into  a feature  of  the  regular 
constitution.  When  the  distinction  between  patrician 
and  plebeian  vanished,  the  concilium  plebis  became 
the  comitia  tributa , which  was,  in  the  later  days  of 
the  Republic,  the  most  familiar  law-making  organ 
of  the  state.  The  comitia  centuriata  still  remained  ^ 
the  organ  for  the  election  of  consuls;  it  also  held 
them  responsible  for  their  conduct  in  office,  acted  as 
ultimate  court  of  appeal  in  criminal  procedure,  and 
retained  its  original  power  to  pass  finally  upon  the 
questions  of  peace  and  war.  The  old  comitia  curiata 
gradually  lost  significance  during  the  Republican 
period,  and  endured  as  a mere  form  in  the  transac- 
tion of  unimportant  religious  business.  The  senate, 
on  the  other  hand,  continued  to  play  a large  part 
in  the  operations  of  the  government.  Originally  a 
stronghold  of  the  patricians,  it  retained  to  the  end 
an  aristocratic  character.  After  the  amalgamation 
of  the  orders  its  membership  became  limited  practi- 
cally to  those  persons  who  had  held  the  great  magis- 
tracies, and  it  thus  embraced  the  most  eminent  and  v 
experienced  politicians  of  the  Republic.  In  theory  its 
function  was  merely  advisory ; its  resolutions  ( sena - 
tus  consulta)  lacked  the  technical  character  of  law 
(lex)  which  inhered  only  in  acts  sanctioned  in  the 


110 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


assemblies  by  the  Populus  Romanus.  But  certain 
departments  of  governmental  business  came  to  be 
controlled  so  exclusively  by  tbe  senate  that  it  was 
practically  coordinate  with  the  popular  bodies.  This 
was  particularly  the  case  after  Roman  dominion  had 
been  widely  extended.  Relations  with  foreign  na- 
tions and  with  the  subjects  and  allies  of  Rome  were 
almost  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  senate;  and 
the  same  was  true  of  the  state  finances  and  the  regu- 
lation of  social  and  political  privileges. 

During  the  two  centuries  of  internal  stress  the 
Roman  Republic  maintained  with  difficulty  its  exist- 
ence as  against  foreign  foes.  With  the  definite 
conclusion  of  the  struggle  between  patricians  and 
plebeians  its  aggressive  career  began.  The  problem 
of  dealing  with  the  peoples  that  fell  one  after  another 
under  Roman  dominion  was,  from  the  legal  and 
political  point  of  view,  well  solved.1  The  development 
began  with  the  subjection  of  the  neighbouring  Latin 
and  Italian  states.  To  such  of  these  as  were  recog- 
nized as  allies  ( socii ),  practically  complete  autonomy 
in  local  government  was  permitted.  Where  this  was 
not  expedient,  local  political  rights  were  vested  in  a 
colony  of  citizens  sent  out  from  Rome,  or  in  a single 
official  called  a prefect.  The  greatest  burden  of  the 
subject  peoples  was  the  obligation  to  military  service 
in  the  armies  of  Rome,  but  this  burden  rested  upon 

1 The  evils  which  distressed  the  conquered  peoples  and  eventually 
revolutionized  Rome  were  due  to  the  reaction  of  conquest  upon  the 
moral  character  of  the  conquerors,  rather  than  to  any  inherent  vicious- 
ness in  the  provincial  system. 


THE  HOMAN  CONSTITUTION 


111 


Roman  citizens  as  well.  Participation  in  the  govern- 
ment at  Rome  was  of  course  limited  to  the  latter ; 
but  a qualified  citizenship  known  as  the  ius  Latii  was 
enjoyed  by  many  of  the  allies,  and,  after  an  agitation 
that  culminated  in  a serious  revolt,  practically  all  the 
peoples  south  of  the  Po  were,  in  90  B.c.,  admitted  to 
full  citizenship.  This  insured  to  the  Italians  certain 
nominal  guarantees  of  rights  of  life  and  property 
from  which  they  had  been  excluded  before,  and 
which,  in  the  progressive  corruption  of  Roman 
administration,  had  become  apparently  very  desirable. 
But  the  demoralization  of  the  assemblies  at  Rome  by 
the  enormous  increase  in  the  number  of  their  mem- 
bers justified  the  reluctance  with  which  the  concession 
of  citizenship  was  made. 

Beyond  the  Italian  peninsula  the  normal  type  of  l 
administration  over  conquered  peoples  was  the  pro- 
vincial. Supreme  civil  and  political  power  in  each 


province  was  vested  in  a magistrate  despatched  from 
Rome  and  known  in  later  times  as  proconsul  or  pro- 
praetor. During  the  Republican  period  Roman  citi- 
zenship was  not  extended  to  the  provincials,  and  the 
only  guarantee  against  maladministration  was  the 
possibility  of  impeaching  the  magistrate  at  Rome  upon 
the  expiration  of  his  term  of  office.  When  abuse  of 
power  in  the  provinces  became  flagrant  and  notori- 
ous, the  social  and  political  conditions  at  Rome  were 
such  as  to  render  this  procedure  wholly  worthless, 
and  until  after  the  Republic  fell  the  condition  of  the 
subject  regions  was  generally  deplorable. 

After  the  work  of  Julius  Caesar  the  Roman  state 


112 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


was  essentially  a military  despotism.  Till  about 
300  a.d.,  however,  a considerable  influence  of  ancient 
forms  persisted  and  the  monarchic  character  of  the 
government  was  more  or  less  disguised  by  the  admin- 
istrative activity  of  the  senate.  The  transformation 
liL  of  the  Republican  constitution  effected  by  Julius  and 
Augustus  consisted  primarily  in  concentrating  in 
a single  individual,  for  his  lifetime,  the  magisterial 
powers  which  had  previously  been  diffused.  The 
tribunician  and  the  proconsular  authority  alone 
were  sufficient  to  make  Augustus  and  his  succes- 
sors  supreme  in  Italy  and  the  provinces  respectively ; 
but  the  functions  of  consul  and  censor  were  also 
assumed  from  time  to  time  by  the  princes,  with  prec- 
edence over  their  colleagues  in  these  offices.  The 
senate,  under  the  new  system,  remained  an  important 
factor  in  the  government,  and  its  resolutions  ( senatus 
consiilta)  became  the  normal  form  of  legislation.  But 
the  imperator,  as  princeps  senatus , exercised  an  impor- 
tant if  not  a decisive  influence  in  determining  its 
membership,  and  his  proposition  ( oratio ) was  the 
usual  source  of  important  projects  of  law.  The 
popular'  assemblies  gradually  ceased  to  have  any 
significance.  The  last  remnants  of  criminal  jurisdic- 
tion were  taken  from  them  by  Augustus ; the  elec- 
tion of  officers  — since  Julius  a mere  form,  carried 
out  at  the  dictation  of  the  prince  — was  transferred 
to  the  senate  by  Tiberius;  and  the  ancient  forms  of 
legislation,  through  which  the  Roman  people  in  the 
tribes  or  centuries  for  a time  registered  the  will  of 
the  prince,  ceased  to  be  regarded  by  100  a.d. 


THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION 


118 


With  the  wide-reaching  administrative  reform 
effected  by  Diocletian  and  Constantine  ( circ . 300 
a.d.)  the  connection  with  ancient  ideas  was  to  a great 
extent  definitely  dropped.  The  fiction  that  the  mon- 
arch received  his  power  from  the  Roman  people, 
which  the  lawyers,  at  least,  always  maintained,  was 
obscured  by  the  theory  that  the  imperial  authority 
descended  from  heaven.  In  pagan  times  this  idea 
had  been  cultivated  by  the  attribution  of  a divine 
character  to  the  monarch,  and  by  his  worship  as  a 


god.  When  Christianity  became  the  state  religion,^, 
this  system  was  modified  by  regarding  only  the 
power  and  not  the  person  of  the  emperor  as  par- 
taking of  divinity.  He  ruled,  it  was  held,  by  virtue 
of  God’s  wrill,  and  from  him  authority  descended  to 
all  the  officials  of  the  state.  Long  before  this  develop- 
ment was  completed  at  the  apex  of  the  system,  the 
gradual  extension  of  Roman  citizenship  to  the  pro- 
vincials (completed  by  Caracalla  at  the  end  of  the 
second  century)  had  dissipated  the  vestiges  of  the 
city-state  at  the  base.  Practically  the  unification  of 
citizenship  throughout  the  state  meant  nothing  at 
this  time  but  uniformity  in  the  manner  of  subjection 
to  the  monarch’s  will.  But  as  a confirmation  of  the 
theories  of  cosmopolitism  and  universal  law,  it  hadr^ 
an  influence  that  has  affected  political  philosophy 
to  the  present  day. 

4.  Polybius 

The  political  sagacity  of  the  Roman  people  is 
abundantly  attested,  not  only  by  the  authentic  his- 


i 


114 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tory,  but  also  by  the  treasured  traditions,  of  their 
institutional  development.  In  perfecting  the  system 
under  which  the  Republic  flourished,  they  manifested 
not  only  an  exceptional  military  genius,  which  pre- 
served their  independence  and  extended  their  domin- 
ion, but  also  a remarkable  sense  of  legal  and  consti- 
tutional expediency,  which  struck  out  a line  of  well- 
regulated  conservative  progress  in  their  internal 
policy.  Of  broad  speculation  on  political  subjects, 
however,  we  have  no  evidence  in  the  early  days. 
No  more  in  political  than  in  other  philosophy  was 
the  Roman  character  adapted  to  make  its  mark, 
and  the  general  attitude  of  the  early  Roman  mind 
toward  the  refinements  of  intellectual  culture  is 
doubtless  very  well  reflected  in  the  procedure  of  Cato 
the  Censor,  when  he  unceremoniously  bundled  the 
Greek  philosophers  out  of  the  city.  Rome  was  the 
strongest  power  in  the  world  before  any  analysis  of 
its  government  was  attempted,  and  the  beginning  in 
this  direction  had  to  be  made  by  a Greek.  Polybius, 
held  in  Italy  as  a hostage  of  the  Achaean  League 
for  sixteen  years  (167-151  v4-i>.),  became  intimately 
acquainted  with  the  Roman  constitution  and  the 
Roman  statesmen  of  the  day,  and  utilized  his  oppor- 
tunities in  writing  the  history  of  the  great  Republic. 
Incidentally  to  his  narrative  he  paused  to  discover 
the  essential  principles  of  the  system  of  government 
at  Rome,  in  order  to  account  thus  for  the  dizzy 
height  of  power  to  which  she  had  risen.1  The  result 

1 This  excursus  constitutes  the  major  part  of  Bk.  VI  of  his  history, 
as  it  has  come  down  to  us. 


POLYBIUS 


115 


* 


of  his  investigation  has  had  an  important  influence 
on  later  political  theory. 

Polybius  premises  the  classification  of  governments 
set  forth  by  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  describes  a 
normal  cycle  in  which  these  different  systems  suc- 
ceed one  another  in  history.  (The  starting-point  is  is 
condition  in  which  the  arts  of  civilization  and  the  N 
habits  of  social  life  are  unknown.  Such  a condi- 
tion, he  thinks,  is  bound  to  recur  from  time  to  time, 
as  the  result  of  flood,  famine,  pestilence  or  other  such 
calamity,  by  which  the  human  race  is  reduced' to  a 
small  and  brutish  remnant.  These  few,  associating 
with  one  another  by  force  of  instinct,  submit  like 
other  animals  to  the  guidance  of  the  strongest  and  ^ 
boldest ; and  thus  originates  the  earliest  form  of  N . 
government  — monarchy  based  on  force.  With  the  " ' 
development  of  reason  and  the  teaching  of  experi- 
ence, the  ideas  of  justice  and  duty  assume  prominence 


K 


and  monarchic  power  comes  to  be  regarded  as  based 
upon  morality.  Thus  the  natural  despotism  is  trans-  } 
formed  into  royalty,  and  the  monarch  is  properly 
called  king.  When  the  king  ceases  to  regard  justice 
and  morality,  he  becomes  a tyrant,  and  is  supplanted 
in  power  by  the  virtuous  leaders  of  the  people,  con-^ 
stituting  aristocracy.  This  form  in  turn  degenerates^ 
into  oligarchy  — the  unjust  and  immoral  rule  of  the 
few.  Out  of  this  arises  democracy,  which  in  its  turn- 
degenerates  into  ochlocracy,  or  mob  rule  pure  and^ 
simple.  The  violence  and  excesses  of  the  mob  lead 
ultimately  to  the  rise  of  a new  despot,  ruling  by 
force,  and  the  cycle  begins  its  course  once  more. 


116 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Each  of  the  three  primary  forms  of  government 
thus  contains  within  itself  the  germs  of  its  decay 
and  ruin.  To  avoid  the  successive  transformations 
which  this  fact  makes  inevitable,  it  is  essential  to 
4^combine  in  a constitution  all  the  various  forms,  that 
each  may  counteract  the  subversive  tendencies  of 
the  others.  This  method  of  insuring  stability  Polyb- 
ius finds  to  have  been  characteristic  of  the  Spartan 
system,  and  this  he  proceeds  to  exhibit  as  the  main- 
spring of  Roman  greatness.  But  in  the  case  of 
Sparta  he  attributes  the  employment  of  the  principle 
to  the  genius  and  foresight  of  Lycurgus,  who  solved 
the  problem  of  stability  by  sheer  force  of  reason. 
The  Romans,  on  the  other  hand,  have  reached,  he 
thinks,  the  same  result  by  gradually  adapting  their 
system  to  the  lessons  taught  them  by  many  difficul- 
ties and  by  great  disasters. 

In  the  Roman  constitution,  he  points  out,  are  to 
* be  found  three  organs,  embodying  respectively  the 
principles  of  monarchy,  aristocracy  and  democracy. 
^'Vsln  the  consuls  is  monarchic  power,  the  senate  is 
essentially  aristocratic,  and  the  popular  assemblies 
are  clearly  democratic.  But  in  the  working  of  the 
governmental  machine  the  check  and  balance  of 
the  various  elements  is  obvious.  The  quintessence 
of  the  consul’s  authority  is  his  absolute  military 
power  without  the  city ; but  the  senate  controls  the 
supplies  for  his  armies,  determines  whether  or  not 
he  shall  retain  command  at  the  expiration  of  his 
term  of  office,  and  decrees  or  withholds  the  triumph, 
which  is  the  utmost  goal  of  his  ambition ; while  the 


POLYBIUS 


117 


comitia  may  hold  him  to  account  for  his  conduct, 
and  may  always,  by  its  control  over  the  questions 
of  peace  and  war,  effectively  obstruct  his  military""* 
career.  / The  senate  has  extensive  administrative 
powers  in  the  finances  and  in  transactions  with 
allies  and  foreign  nations ; but  the  popular  assem- 
blies can  by  lawr  restrict  the  general  authority  of 
the  senate,  and  any  single  resolution,  or  even  the 
very  assembling  of  that  body,  can  be  prevented  by 
the  simple  veto  of  the  people’s  especial  representa- 
tive, the  tribune.  Finally,  the  assemblies  are  sub- 
ject to  a restraint  on  their  activity,  first,  because 
the  senate  controls  all  contracts  for  public  works 
throughout  Italy  in  wrhich  very  large  numbers  off 
the  people  are  interested  financially,  and  from  the 
senators  are  drawn  the  juries  in  most  lawsuits ; and  V 
second,  by  the  fact  that  every  citizen  is  likely  to  j 
come  sooner  or  later,  as  a soldier,  under  the  absolute  \ 
power  of  the  consul.  Hence  arises  an  indisposition 
to  reckless  opposition  to  the  projects  and  authority 
of  the  senate  and  the  consuls,  for  fear  of  reprisals. 

This  analysis  of  the  Roman  system  falls  a little 
short  of  perfect  symmetry,1  and  might  be  questioned 
on  some  points  of  fact.  It  is  interesting  in  the 
history  of  theory  as  the  first  formal  exposition  of 
the  principle  oiLcheck  and— balance  in  constitutional 
organization.  Both  Plato  and  Aristotle  had  ap- 
proved the  combination  in  one  system  of  the  prin- 
ciples peculiar  to  the  various  simple  forms.2  But 

1 No  check  of  the  senate  by  the  consuls  is  mentioned ; but  the  text 
contains  many  gaps.  2 Supra , pp.  39-40,  75,  79. 


118 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


their  suggestions  look  to  the  employment  of  these 
principles  in  the  constitution  and  operation  of  organs 
which  should  express  but  a single  concrete  form? 
Thus  Aristotle’s  polity  is  in  essence  a democracy, 
though  the  part  played  by  the  sovereign  people  is 
regulated  by  aristocratic  methods,  such  as  election 
rather  than  lot  in  the  choice  of  officers.  Polybius, 
on  the  other  hand,  conceives  of  a mixed  constitution 
as  expressed  in  the  existence  of  three  organs,  em- 
bodying each  a distinct  principle  and  acting  through 
self-interest  as  restraints  upon  one  another.  In  the 
earlier  philosophers  the  instability  incident  to  a sim- 
ple form  was  to  be  obviated  by  a blending  of  prin- 
ciples; in  Polybius  the  same  end  was  sought  by  a 
reciprocal  antagonism  of  organs.  Both  devices  have 
been  recognized  in  theory  and  in  practice  in  all  later 
ages,  but  it  is  the  latter,  rather  than  the  former, 
that  has  the  greater  affinity  with  the  modern  notion 
of  check  and  balance  among  the  three  departments 
of  government. 

5.  Cicero 

The  work  was  hardly  finished  wherein  Polybius  so 
wisely  determined  the  principles  which  insured  the 
stability  of  the  Roman  constitution  when  the  agita- 
tion of  the  Gracchi  inaugurated  the  turbulent  era 
which  ended  in  its  destruction.  The  check  and  bal- 
ance system  works  through  deadlock  between  the 
^ different  organs.  In  normal  conditions  the  deadlock 
is  broken  by  mutual  concession  and  compromise ; • 
but  in  times  of  social  tension  it  is  always  likely  to 


CICERO  ON  THE  STATE 


119 


be  broken  by  force.  The  latter  became  the  rule  dur- 
ing the  last  century  of  the  Roman  Republic.  Eco- 
nomic transformation  due  to  the  extension  of  its 
dominion  divided  the  Roman  people  into  two  great 
classes,  the  wealthy  nobles  and  the  pauperized  com- 
mons, as  antithetic  as  in  ancient  days  had  been  the 
patricians  and  the  plebeians.  These  hostile  classes 
found  in  the  senate  and  the  assemblies  their  respec- 
tive representatives,  and  the  recurring  deadlocks  be- 
tween the  organs  were  broken  by  civil  war.  During 
the  period  in  which  the  politics  of  Rome  turned  upon 
the  projects  of  the  Gracchi,  of  Marius  and  Sulla,  of 
Pompey  and  Caesar,  political  speculation  could  not 
be  expected  to  flourish.  Only  in  Cicero  was  found 
enough  of  the  philosophic  temperament  to  seek 
rational  props  for  the  constitution  which  he  saw 
falling  in  ruins.  His  two  works,  Be  Republica 
and  Be  Legibus , were  designed  to  recall  the  Ro- 
mans to  the  old  methods  of  working  their  govern- 
ment. The  effort  was  as  noble  as  it  was  Quixotic ; 
the  works  embodied  all  the  most  admirable  qualities 
of  the  writer’s  thought  and  diction;  but  they  had 
no  effect  at  the  time,  and  while  they  profoundly 

and  early  Christian 
writers,  they  have  come  down  to  the  present  day 
in  so  fragmentary  a condition  as  to  perplex  and  irri- 
tate rather  than  enlighten  the  student  who  seeks  to 
use  them. 

The  practical  purpose  of  Cicero’s  writing  is  not 
disguised.  In  the  Be  Republica  he  seeks  to  set  forth 
the  conception  of  an  ideal  state  as  Plato  had  done  in 


120 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


bis  greatest  work.  The  Platonic  dialogue  is  em- 
ployed as  the  form  of  the  treatise,  with  Scipio  taking 
the  part  of  Socrates  as  the  chief  disputant.  But 
Cicero  makes  no  attempt  to  rival  the  Greek  in  evolv- 
ing a fanciful  polity  that  has  no  relation  to  the 
actual  life  and  nature  of  "man.  On  the  contrary,  he 
avowedly  confines  himself  to  the  consideration  of  the 


^ /Roman  state  and  its  history  as  illustrating  and  em- 
bodying the  ideals  of  political  science.1  He  assumes 
the  essential  idea  of  “ state  ” to  be  “ commonwealth,” 
and  formulates  the  fundamental  conception  of  his 
philosophy  as  follows  : — 

j The  commonwealth  is  the  wealth  of  a people ; understanding 
y/  a people,  not  every  group  of  human  beings  however  brought 
/ together,  but  a multitude  united  by  a common  sense  of  right 
l and  by  a community  of  interest.2 

The  primary  cause  of  union  he  finds  in  the  social 
^instinct  of  men,  rather  than  in  any  consciousness  of 
^weakness  in  isolation;  and  that  same  instinct  leads 
to  the  institution  of  government,  in  order  that  the 
unity  may  be  preserved.  Of  the  three  primary  forms 
of  government,  royalty,  aristocracy  and  democracy, 
he  considers  that  each  possesses  certain  advantages, 
but  embodies  at  the  same  time  the  germ  of  cor- 


1 De  Republican  II,  11.  Cicero  here  congratulates  himself  on  hav- 
ing devised  a method  superior  to  any  exhibited  “ in  Graecorum 
libris.” 

2 “ Est  respublica  res  populi ; populus  autem  non  omnis  hominum 
coetus,  quoquo  modo  congregatus,  sed  coetus  multitudinis  iuris  con- 
sensu et  communione  utilitatis  sociatus.”  De  Republican  I,  25.  In 
the  next  section,  Cicero  apparently  distinguishes  between  “respublica” 
and  “ civitas  ” : “ civitas,  quae  est  constitute  populi  . . . respublica, 
quae  ut  dixi  populi  res  est.  . . .”  But  the  distinction  is  not  adhered^ 
to  in  what  follows,  and  the  two  terms  are  used  interchangeably.. 


CICERO  ON  FOR -IS  OF  STATE 


121 


ruption,  which  produces  a cycle  of  revolutions.1  To 
counteract  this  tendency  a mixed  form  is  necessary, 
combining  the  advantages  of  all  three  simple  forms, 
but  avoiding  their  weaknesses.  This  conclusion,  X 
precisely  that  of  Polybius,  is  followed  by  an  elabo- 
rate exposition  of  the  constitutional  development  of 
Rome,  so  conceived  as  to  emphasize  the  necessity  of 
check  and  balance,  and  to  represent  the  fully  ma- 
tured Republican  system  as  a perfect  example  of  the 
mixed  form.2  Monarchy,  he  shows,  was  discarded  • 
because  the  king  became  the  tyrant;  the  patrician 
aristocracy,  overbearing  in  its  monopoly  of  power, 
was  forced  to  yield  to  the  restraint  of  plebeian 
elements  in  the  system;  and  Cicero  is  too  much  of 
a conservative  politician  not  to  indicate  that  the 
troubles  of  the  state  since  the  Gracchi  have  been 
due  to  an  exaggeration  of  democratic  influences. 

That  the  thought  of  Cicero  follows  very  closely  the 
suggestions  of  Polybius  cannot  be  denied.  But  to 
conclude  that  the  Roman  made  no  contribution  to 
political  science  beyond  that  of  the  Greek,  is  a step 
hardly  warranted  by  the  facts.  The  fragments  of 
the  work  De  Republica  are  altogether  too  scanty  and 
disjointed  to  form  the  basis  for  a just  estimate  of 
Cicero’s  thought.  They  contain  much  to  warrant  the 
judgment  that  his  idea  of  check  and  balance  was  less 
mechanical  than  that  of  Polybius  — that  the  equi- 
poise to  be  sought  was  rather  that  of  force,  influence  V 
and  liberty,  as  principles,  than  of  magistrates,  senate 

1 De  Republica , I,  29. 

2 Ibid.  Bk.  II ; cf  especially  II,  39. 


122 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


and  assemblies  as  organs.1  Whatever  the  precise  truth 
on  this  point  may  be,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in 
the  border  region  where  ethjps,  jurisprudence  and 
politics  meet,  Cicero  performed  a work  which  gives 
him  an  important  place  in  the  history  of  political 
theory.  This  work  was,  the  development  and  prac- 
v Vtical  application  of  the  concept,  natural  law. 

AlTTia3“  already  appeared,  the  doctrine  that  the 
principles  of  right  and  justice  were  eternal  and  im- 
mutable had  been  a cardinal  feature  of  Plato’s  ethics, 
and  had  been  adopted  by  the  Stoics.  In  Plato  the 
doctrine  had  largely  a metaphysical  character  and 
import.  By  the  Stoics  it  was  ^made  a concomitant 
of  their  pantheistic  conception  of  nature  as  supreme 
universal  law.  Cicero,  following  the  trend  of 
Plato’s  later  thought,  found  for  eternal  justice  a 
isource  in  the  providence  of  the  gods,  conceived  not 
as  identical  with,  but  as  the  creators  of,  nature; 
and  on  the  other  hand,  following  the  trend  of  later 
Stoic  thought,  he  brought  the  dictates  of  abstract 
and  universal  reason  and  law  into  immediate  relation 
with  the  activity  of  concrete  human  reason  and  of 
icivil  legislation. 

In  Greek  philosophy  the  distinction  between  right 
($lkouov)  and  law  (ro/xos)  had  been  recognized,  but 
right  had  been  regarded  as  in  source  and  content 
antecedent  to  and  largely  independent  of  law.  In 
the  term  “ right”  were  embodied,  in  fact,  two  dis- 

1 Cf.  II,  33  : Nisi  aequabilis  haec  in  civitate  conpensatio  sit  et 
iuris  et  officii  et  muneris,  ut  et  potestatis  satis  in  magistratibus  et 
auctoritatis  in  principum  consilio  et  libertatis  in  populo  sit,  non  posse 
hunc  incommutabilem  rei  publicae  conservari  statnm. 


CICERO  ON  NATURAL  LAW 


123 

tinct  concepts:  first,  that  of  abstract  goodness  or 
1 ighteousness  j and  second,  that  of  an  aggregate  of  a- . 
privileges  pertaining  to  a definite  individual  or  group 
of  individuals  — a sense  best  expressed  in  English 
by  the  collective  plural,  “ rights.”  Greek  philosophy 
had  busied  itself  chiefly  with  the  first  of  these  con- 
cepts, while  the  tendency  among  the  Komans  was 
toward  primary  interest  in  the  second.  Under  the 
influence  of.  this-ten^ency  Cicero  reversed  the  earlier 
Greek  conception  of  the  relation  between  law  and  sV 
rights,  and  proceeded  to  make  right  (ms)  in  every  4 
sense  subordinate  to  and  dependent  upon  the  idea  of 
law  (lex).  His  argument  is  as  follows : 1 All  nature, 
is  ruled  by  God.2  Man  is  the  highest  of  created  ^ 
things;  through  the  possession  of  reason  he  is  dis- 
tinct from  other  creatures’lmcPilkjr  the  Creator^  1 
By  virtue  of  the  divine  element  in  human  nature,  V 
man  participates  in  the  ultimate  principles  of  right 
and  justice,  which  are  merely  elements  of  the  law  / 
by  which  God  rjiles  the  universe.  Further,  all  men 
possess  by_nature_tlie  consciousness  of_those_prin- ~~ 
ciples  ; for  all  men^rejilik^rational . The  oneness  V 
of  human  nature  is  absolute;  “no  one  is  so  like  to 
himself  as  all  are  like  to  all,”  though  evil  habits  may 
bring  apparent  diversity.  But  “ to  whomsoever  rea- 
son is  given  by  nature,  so  also  is  right  reason  ; hence 
also  law,  which  is  right  reason  in  commanding  and 
forbidding ; and  if  law,  also  right ; but  reason  is 

1 This  argument  is  the  subject  of  De  Legitus,  Bk.  I. 

1 Cicero  used  sometimes  the  plural  (1, 7),  but  generally  the  singular 


124 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


\J  given  to  all ; therefore  right  is  given  to  all.”  1 Thus 
xi  the  law  of  nature  ( lex  naturalis ),  or  law  pure  and 
^.gimple,  is  the  source  and  limit  of  all  rights,  even  the 
natural  rights  ( ius  naturale).  As  against  this  doc- 
trine there  is  no  validity  in  the  contention  that 
/Oilman  rights  are  based  on  shrewd  calculations  of 
interest,  or  that  the  wide  diversity  in  institutions 
jr  and  laws  among  the  nations  of  the  earth  indicates 
a real  diversity  in  right  and  justice.  Law  in_  the 
true  and^nltimate-^i^-^  , wisdom,  ruling 

the  world.  Among  men  it  is  the  rational  dictate  of 
the  sage  ( sapientis ) as  to  what  is  to  be  commanded 
and  what  forbidden.  The  local  and  temporary  enact- 
ments of  the  peoples  are  called  law  {lex)  only  by  cour- 
tesy ; and  enactments  contravening  natural  morality 
have  no  claim  to  the  name.2 

From  the  standpoint  of  exact  logic,  this  demon- 
* stration  leaves  something  to  be  desired ; the  concept 
^ “ nature  ” is  nowhere  closely  defined,  and  the  word 
is  used  in  several  senses ; 3 while  Cicero  manifests  at 
critical  points  the  orator’s  tendency  to  drop  from  rea- 
soning into  rhetoric.4  But  the  circumstances  of  the 
ages  following  his  lifetime  conspired  to  give  to  his 
writings  a wide  influence.  It  was  not,  however,  till 
fifteen  centuries  after  he  wrote  that  a practical  appli- 

1 Quibus  enim  ratio  a natura  data  est,  iisdem  etiam  recta  ratio 
data  est,  ergo  et  lex,  quae  est  recta  ratio  in  jubendo  et  vetando ; si  lex, 
ius  quoque;  et  omnibus  ratio;  ius  igitur  datum  est  omnibus.  — I,  12. 

2 De  Leg.  II,  5. 

3 In  De  Leg.  I,  7-12,  this  term  is  used  to  denote  (1)  the  universe 
as  created ; (2)  the  forces  of  the  physical  world ; (3)  the  creator  of 
man  ; and  (4)  several  concepts  that  defy  concise  definition. 


THE  IMPERIAL  JURISTS 


125 


cation  was  attempted  of  his  doctrine  that  an  enact- 
ment that  contravened  the  law  of  nature  had  no  force  * 
as  law. 

In  his  work  De  Legibus,  the  discussion  outlined  • 
above  is  designed  as  the  prelude  to  a detailed  exposi- 
tion of  a code,  constitutional  and  civil,  that  shall 
conform  to  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nature.  But 
the  three  books1  which  we  have  are  little  more 
than  a commentary  on  certain  religious  and  political 
institutions  of  Rome.  The  eternal  and  universal  law 
of  nature  proves  to  be  thus  simply  the  law  of  Rome* 
with  certain  modifications  designed  to  render  more 
easy  the  triumph  of  Cicero’s  party  in  current  politics. 
The  circumstances  under  which  the  great  orator  lost 


his  life  surround  writh  an  air  of  pathos  his  efforts  to 
find  the  elements  of  rational  perfection  in  the  mori- 
bund institutions  of  the  Republic. 


6.  The  Imperial  Jurists 

It  was  through  the  private  law  of  the  post-republican 
centuries  that  the  juristic  conceptions  which  Cicero 
discussed  first  became  actually  fruitful.  When  polit- 
ical life  was  extinguished  outside  the  palace  of  the 
prince,  the  aptitude  of  the  Roman  character  for  gov- 
ernment found  a field  for  activity  in  the  adjustment 
of  non-political  relations  throughout  the  great  do- 
minion. The  particular  historical  work  of  the  Prin- 
cipate  was  the  welding  of  all  the  heterogeneous 
elements  of  the  civilized  world  into  administrative 
unity.  In  the  course  of  this  work  the  juristic  genius 

1 The  work  is  incomplete ; six  books  were  contemplated  in  the  plan. 


126 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


of  the  Romans  rose  to  the  climax  of  its  brilliancy 
and  evolved  that  body  of  principles  which  consti- 
tutes to-day  the  basis  of  European  law. 

Under  the  Republic  the  private  law  of  Rome  was 
twofold  in  character,  including  the  ius  civile  and  the 
ius  gentium . ^The  ius  civile  was  the  body  of  rules  in 
accordance  with  which  were  determined  the  prop- 
erty and  family  rights  of  Roman  citizens ; the  ius 
gentium  applied  to  non-citizens,  that  is,  to  resident 
aliens  and  to  subjects.  The  ius  civile  was  based  on 
V the  code  of  the  Twelve  Tables,  which,  through  the 
conservatism  of  the  Roman  mind,  was  rarely  sub- 
jected to  legislative  amendment.  In  the  ius  gentium 
on  the  other  hand,  were  embodied  not  only  the 
principles  of  natural  equity  which  developed,  with 
growing  enlightenment,  at  Rome  itself,  but  also  the 
customs  and  legal  ideas  of  foreign  and  subject  peo- 
ples ; and  the  Roman  magistrate  ( prcetor ),  in  apply- 
ing the  law,  was  at  liberty  to  modify  its  doctrines 
with  no  restriction  save  his  own  sense  of  justice. 
The  Twelve  Tables  were  the  product  of  a period 
(450  b.c.)  at  which  Roman  social  development  wTas 
relatively  slight  and  legal  concepts  and  conditions 
were  very  primitive.  As  the  city  grew  and  the 
relations  of  civil  life  became  complex,  the  ius  civile 
tended  to  fall  behind  the  requirements  of  the  times. 
This  was  made  conspicuous  by  comparison  with  the 
ius  gentium;  for  in  the  latter,  especially  after  the 
conquests  east  of  the  Adriatic,  were  incorporated 
the  principles  and  usages  of  a highly  refined  society. 
The  disadvantage  under  which  the  Roman  citizen 


THE  IMPERIAL  JURISTS 


127 


often  found  himself  in  business  enterprises  as  com- 
pared with  the  alien  or  provincial  had  produced, 
before  the  fall  of  the  Republic,  a tendency  toward 
the  fusion  of  the  two  bodies  of  law.  Under  the  Prin-  ~j 
cipate  this  tendency  was  greatly  fostered  by  the  cen- 
tralization of  administration  and  judicature  at  the 
court  of  the  prince.  For  the  determination  of 
appeals  that  came  up  on  points  of  law  from  all  parts 
of  the  dominion  the  rulers  gathered  about  them- 
selves the  best  of  the  jurists  in  which  Rome  was  for 
three  centuries  very  prolific,  and  from  the  opinions 
of  these  men  the  Roman  law  received  the  character 
which  is  expressed  in  the  great  code  of  Justinian. 

The  scientific  work  of  the  jurists  was  to  systema- 
tize and  to  blend  into  harmonious  unity  the  ius  civile  ^ 
and  the  ius  gentium.  Under  the  latter  head  were 
included  all  the  various  systems  which,  by  the  edicts 
of  successive  praetors,  had  developed  in  the  court  for 
aliens  at  Rome  and  in  the  provinces.  Out  of  this 
enormous  mass  of  most  diverse  local  and  racial 
customs  and  ideas,  the  jurists  were  called  upon  to 
determine  which  conformed  to  the  general  principles 
that  should  be  applicable  to  the  whole  Empire.  This 
task  called  for  the  profoundest  consideration  of  the  Y 
ultimate  nature  of  rights  and  justice.  The  greatest 
of  the  jurists  were  of  Stoic  tendencies,  and  hence  we 
find  at  the  basis  of  their  work  the  characteristic  doc- 
trines of  the  Stoic  philosophy.  Dealing,  as  they 
were,  with  the  practical  affairs  of  the  whole  civilized 
world,  the  conception  of  a universal  law  and  of  the  ^ 
brotherhood  of  man  took  on  a character  of  concrete- 


PHHBHLJ 


128  POLITICAL  THEORIES 


4 


ness  that  it  wholly  lacked  in  the  days  of  the  early 
Stoics  and  even  of  Cicero. 

In  the  philosophy  of  the  jurists  rights  (ius)  rather 
than  law  (lex)  was  the  basal  concept,  and  Cicero's  lex 
naturalis  received  scant  consideration  as  compared 
with  the  ius  naturale.  The  latter,  natural  rights, 
assumed  great  prominence,  and  its  character  and 
content  were  elaborately  determined.  Because  the 
ideas  and  usages  of  the  many  peoples  subject  to  Rome 
were  found  to  have  much  in  common,  the  ius  gentium, 
or  totality  of  these  ideas  and  usages,  came  to  be 
regarded  as  identical  with  the  ius  naturale , and  as  an 
actual  embodiment  of  that  natural  reason,  which  was 
the  chief  element  in  natural  right.  When  the  man 
whose  opinion  was  law  for  the  Empire  declared,  in 
treating  of  slavery,  that  “so  far  as  pertains  to  natu- 
ral rights,  all  men  are  equal,"  1 or  that  “ by  natural 
law  all  men  are  born  free," 2 or  that  “ slavery  is  an  in- 
stitution contrary  to  nature," 3 the  practical  tendency 
of  Stoic  doctrine  in  social  matters  was  made  very 
clear.  These  dicta  had,  indeed,  nothing  whatever  of 
the  political  significance  that  long  afterward  became 
attached  to  them.  But  they  gave  great  definiteness 
to  the  idea  of  natural  rights ; and  when  the  formulas 
embodying  this  idea  were  introduced  with  Justinian’s 
code  into  the  jurisprudence  of  modern  Europe,  the 
extension  of  their  application  was  as  normal  a process 
as  that  through  which  they  were  originally  created. 

1 Ulpian  in  Digest,  L,  xvii,  32. 

2 Institutes  of  Justinian,  I,  ii,  2. 

3 Digest,  I,  v,  4 : Servitus  est  constitutio  iuris  gentium  qua  quis  ; 
dominio  alieno  contra  naturam  subiicitur. 


LATER  GREECE  AND  ROME 


129 


How  foreign  to  the  Roman  jurisprudence  was  any 
political  suggestion  in  the  theory  of  natural  rights, 
appears  clear  from  the  doctrine  as  to  the  supreme 
legislator.  Universal  reason  was  the  source  of  rights 
(ius : ius  naturale ),  but  the  will  of  the  prince  made 
law : “ Quidquid  principi  placuit  legis  habet  vigo- 
rem.”  1 In  the  days  of  the  Empire  the  actual  con- 
ditions left  no  doubt  as  to  whether  universal  reason 
or  princely  will  took  precedence  in  practical  affairs. 
The  case  was  not  so  clear  in  the  ages  when  Jus- 
tinian’s code  was  the  common  law  of  Europe,  and 
in  all  controversies  as  to  the  relations  of  prince  and 
people,  the  dictum  touching  the  supremacy  of  the 
monarch  in  law  was  as  diligently  quoted  on  the  one 
side  as  were  those  touching  the  liberty  and  equality 
of  men  by  natural  right  on  the  other. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Dubois,  Les  Ligues  ktolienne  et  acheeune.  Freeman,  Federal 
Government,  I,  chap.  v.  Greenidge,  Greek  Constitutional 

History,  chaps,  vii  and  viii.  Hermann,  Political  Antiquities 
of  Greece,  pp.  371-399.  Scala,  Die  Staatsvertrage  des  Alter- 
tums.  Shuckburgh,  The  Histories  of  Polybius,  Y ol.  I,  Intro., 
§ 3 ; trans.,  pp.  458-508.  Thirlwall,  History  of  Greece,  chaps, 
lxi,  lxiii.  Courtney,  Epicurus,  in  Hellenica,  pp.  223-243. 
Grant,  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  I,  304-371.  Haake,  Die 
Gesellschaftslelire  des  Stoilcer.  Hildenbrand,  p.  503  et  seq . 
Janet,  I,  233-262.  Henkel,  pp.  98^115.  Raumer,  p.  21 
et  seq.  Ritter,  Geschichte  der  Philos.,  Bd.  Ill,  pp.  627-735 ; 
IV,  79-176  (trans.,  Ill,  557-658;  IV,  75-162).  Zeller, 
Philosophie  der  Griechen,  Bd.  Ill,  i,  pp.  26-63,  272-309,  346- 
378,  450-477  (Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics,  trans.,  chaps, 
iii,  xii,  xiv,  xv,  xx,  xxi). 

1 Inst.  I,  ii,  6.  From  Ulpian,  in  Digest,  I,  iv,  1. 

K 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Abbott,  Roman  Political  Institutions.  Arnold,  History 
of  Home ; Roman  Provincial  Administration.  Fowler,  City 
State  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  pp.  74  et  seq.,  105-112, 
188-244,  217  et  seq.  Freeman,  Comparative  Politics.  Fustel 
de  Coulanges,  La  Cit£  antique  (The  Ancient  City,  trans. 
by  Small).  Greenidge,  Roman  Public  Life.  Gibbon,  Decline 
and  Fall,  chaps,  iii,  xiii,  xvii.  Karlowa,  Bomische  Bechts- 
geschichte.  Merivale,  History  of  the  Romans.  Mommsen, 
Bomische  Geschichte,  esp.  Bd.  I (trans.  by  Dickson)  ; Bomische 
JStaatsrecht. 

Davidson,  Polybius,  in  Hellenica,  pp.  353-387.  Scala, 
Die  Studien  des  Polybios.  Ciceronis  scripta  . . . omnia  (Teubner, 
1878),  Part  IV,  Yol.  ii,  pp.  271-450  (De  Bepublica  et  De  Legibus). 

9 Featherstonhaugh,  The  Republic  of  Cicero,  trans. 

Hunter,  Historical  Exposition  of  Roman  Law.  Ihering, 
Geist  des  romischen  Bechts.  Laferriere,  V Influence  du  stoi- 
cisme  sur  la  doctrine  des  jurisconsultes  romains,  in  Acad,  des 
sci.  mor.  et  pol.,  Mem.,  X,  579-685.  Mackenzie,  Studies 
in  Roman  Law.  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  chaps,  ii-iv.  Morey, 
Outlines  of  Roman  Law.  Moyle,  Institutes  of  Justinian, 
text  and  trans.  Muiritead,  Introduction  to  the  Private 
Law  of  Rome;  Gaius  and  Ulpian,  text  and  trans.  Rivier, 
Introduction  historique  au  droit  romain.  Savigny,  Geschichte 
des  romischen  Bechts  im  Mittelalter.  Schulin,  Geschichte  des 
romischen  Bechts.  Sohm,  The  Institutes  of  Roman  Law,  trans. 
by  Ledlie.  Voigt,  Das  jus  naturale,  Bd.  I (for  Cicero,  pp. 
176-212). 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  MEDIEVAL  INSTITUTIONS 

1.  Christianity  in  the  Declining  Roman  Empire 

From  the  standpoint  of  political  philosophy  the 
cardinal  fact  of  medieval  history  is  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Christian  religion  throughout  and  even 
beyond  the  confines  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  the 
development  of  the  Christian  church.  The  govern-  ' 
mental  institutions  of  Rome  were  transformed,  in  the 
East  by  the  subtle  and  slow-working  influence  of  the“^ 
Hellenistic  spirit,  in  the  West  by  the  violent  im- 
pact of  the  Teutonic  nations.  But  in  the  one  region 
as  in  the  other  Christian  doctrine  and  ecclesiastical 
authority  furnished  the  principles  which  dominated"^" 
all  conscious  reflection.  The  astounding  bankruptcy 
of  Grajco-Roman  culture,  manifest  centuries  be- 
fore the  political  extinction  of  Rome,  left  no  intel- 
lectual resource  for  the  times  of  turmoil,  and  Europe 
.relapsed  into  despairing  faith  and  ignoble  supersti- 
twn.  The  Middle  Age  was  unpolitical.  Its  aspira- 
tions and  ideals  centred  about  the  form  and  content 
of  religious  belief.  The  political  institutions  which 
ultimately  developed  out  of  the  wreck  of  the  Roman 
Empire  received  their  characteristic  impress  from 
this  fact.  And  when,  in  the  renascence  of  intellect- 
ual life,  political  speculation  revived,  the  problem 
which  demanded  almost  exclusive  attention  was  that 


132 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


of  disentangling  the  state  from  the  church.  Medi- 
aeval political  philosophy  is  in  fact  exhausted  when 
it  has  propounded  a theory  as  to  the  relation  of 
secular  to  ecclesiastical  authority. 

The  growth  of  Christianity  during  the  first  three 
centuries  of  its  existence  is  from  every  point  of 
view  an  astonishing  phenomenon.  Originating  in 
an  obscure  region  of  the  Empire,  among  a despised 
and  persecuted  people,  the  creed  and  ritual  of 
the  Christians  had  become  by  the  beginning  of  the 
fourth  century  the  religion  of  the  most  influential 
classes  of  the  Roman  world.  Adopted  by  Con- 
stantine as  the  official  creed  of  the  state,  it  easily 
triumphed  over  the  expiring  forces  of  paganism 
within  the  Empire ; and  through  the  zeal  of  its 
adherents  it  won  its  way  to  extensive  authority 
among  the  Teutonic  peoples  who  were  soon  to  rend 
the  imperial  dominion  into  fragments.  Prior  to  the 
conversion  of  Constantine,  the  organization  of  the 
Christian  communities  — the  church  — was  deter-' 
mined  partly  by  the  democratic  conditions  of  the 
^ early  days  of  the  faith,  and  partly  by  the  traditions 
of  the  apostolic  succession.  The  positions  of  over- 
sight and  authority  in  the  management  of  the  affairs 
of  each  community  were  filled  by  the  formal  or  in- 
formal choice  of  the  believers,  while  in  respect  to 
the  general  interests  of  all  particular  deference  was 
paid  to  the  counsels  of  those  churches  which,  either 
through  the  tradition  of  apostolic  foundation  or 
through  the  size  and  importance  of  the  cities  in 
which  they  were  situated,  had  a position  of  marked 


CHRISTIANITY  IN  THE  ROMAN  EMPIRE 


133 


prominence.  On  both  these  grounds  the  Roman 
church  and  its  bishop  enjoyed  from  the  earliest 
times  a distinct  preeminence.  After  Christianity 
became  the  state  religion  many  circumstances  con- 
spired to  hasten  the  complete  and  precise  adjust- 
ment of  the  ecclesiastical  organization.  But  the 
decisive  authority  in  questions  touching  this  matter 
was,  under  the  new  conditions,  the  Emperor.  Coun- 
cils of  the  church  passed  upon  questions  of  creed  and 
of  organization,  but  it  remained  with  the  imperial 
authorities  to  confirm  and  execute  the  anathemas'^ 
against  recurring  heresy  or  the  decisions  as  to  con- 
flicting claims  of  power  and  precedence.  For  good 
or  for  evil  the  church  was  in  politics. 

The  century  and  a half  between  the  reign  of  Con- 
stantine and  the  fall  of  the  Western  Empire  was 
characterized  by  a general  increase  in  the  power  of 
the  ecclesiastical  as  compared  with  the  political  hier-^* 
archy.  To  this  end  conspired  the  weakness  and 
incapacity  of  most  of  the  emperors,  the  commanding 
ability  of  many  of  the  bishops,  the  attractiveness  of 
Christian  hope  in  the  midst  of  universal  social  de- 
cay, and  the  frequent  exemption  of  religious  institu- 
tions, whether  through  reverence  or  contempt,  from 
the  devastating  fury  of  the  barbarian  invaders.1  This 
was  the  age  when  Ambrose,  Bishop  of  Milan,  defied 
the  authority  of  the  weak  Yalentinian  wishing  to 
install  Arianism  in  Milan,2  and  by  exclusion  from 

1 Hodgkin,  Italy  and  her  Invaders,  Vol.  I,  Part  II,  p.  796. 

2 The  practical  worldly  wisdom  of  Ambrose  appears  clearly  from 
an  incident  in  this  affair.  His  refusal  to  deliver  up  a church  of  his 


134 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  eucharist  brought  the  powerful  Theodosius  to 
submission  and  repentance;  when  Augustine,  the 
Bishop  of  Hippo,  gave  to  Christian  doctrine  the 
moulding  force  of  his  able  and  prolific  pen,  and  pro- 
moted his  views  by  the  subtler  methods  of  influence 
at  the  imperial  court ; 1 when  Jerome  propagated  by 
precept  and  example  the  monastic  ideas  which  con- 
tributed so  much  to  the  upbuilding  of  Christianity  in 
a despairing  age  ; and  when  Leo,  Bishop  of  Borne, 
won  for  his  faith  and  for  his  see  the  gratitude  and 
homage  of  civilized  men  by  staying  the  hand  of  the 
dreaded  Hun,  when  it  was  about  to  be  laid  in  wrath 
upon  the  Eternal  City.2 

After  the  extinction  of  imperial  authority  in  the 
West  the  church  remained  the  only  efficient  repre- 
sentative of  Roman  ideas  in  the  barbarian  monarch- 
ies that  grew  up  in  the  ancient  provinces.  Legal 
and  political  institutions  were  subordinated  or 
adapted  to  the  customs  and  traditions  of  the  Teu- 
tons, but  the  forms  and  content  of  ecclesiastical 
authority  were  in  great  measure  left  intact.  Until 
the  fusion  of  the  races  had  made  much  progress,  the 
chief  dignities  of  the  church  were  held  almost  exclu- 


see  to  Auxentius,  the  Arian  appointee  of  the  Emperor /-and  his  vigor- 
ous denunciation  of  the  imperial  policy,  gave  rise  to  serious  popular 
tumults  on  the  part  of  his  adherents  in  the  city.  He  was  urged  by 
the  civil  authorities  to  allay  the  excitement.  This  he  refused  to  do, 
saying : “ in  meo  jure  esse  ut  non  excitarem ; in  Dei  manu  ut  mitiga- 
ret.”  Epist.  xx  of  Classis  I in  Migne,  Patrologia  Latina , Vol.  XVI. 

1 Cf.  Milman,  Latin  Christianity , I,  170  (N.Y.  1862). 

2 That  Attila’s  withdrawal  was  due  exclusively  to  the  action  of 
Pope  Leo,  is  by  no  means  so  clearly  established  as  is  the  fact  that 
such  was  universally  believed  to  be  the  truth. 


CHRISTIANITY  IN  THE  ROMAN  EMPIRE 


135 


sively  by  Romans,  and  the  far-reaching  effects  of  this 
fact  may  be  readily  imagined  when  it  further  appears 

that  from  very  early  times  the  bishops  constituted  a 

recognized  element  in  the  legislative  and  administra- 
tive order  of  the  Teutonic  kingdoms.1  Religious 
conviction  or  emotion  played  a large  if  not  a decisive 
part  in  the  career  not  only  of  the  short-lived  polities""* 
of  the  Vandals,  the  Burgundians  and  the  Ostro- 
goths, but  also  of  the  more  permanent  monarchies  of 
the  Visigoths  and  the  Franks.  From  the  chaos  of 
the  conflicts  in  which  these  peoples  were  involved  the 
Christian  church,  though  barbarized  in  creed  and  in 
practice,  emerged  with  its  organization  strengthened 
and  its  prestige,  if  not  enhanced,  at  least  still  un- 
impaired. 

In  the  East  the  persistence  of  the  Roman  author- 
ity preserved  the  ancient  relation  of  church  and 
state.  The  faith  escaped  the  brutalizing  influence 
of  unintellectual  barbarians,  but  suffered  from  the 
curious  refinements  of  the  super-intellectual  Greeks. 
Heresies  swarmed  forth  from  the  East  and  gave 
hardly  less  occupation  to  the  imperial  authorities 
there  than  the  barbarian  invaders  gave  to  the  rulers 
of  the  West.  But  the  unbroken  continuance  of  the 
power  at  Constantinople  left  no  such  opportunity 
for  the  development  of  ecclesiastical  independence 
as  was  afforded  by  the  fall  of  the  Empire  in  the 
West.  The  Eastern  church  remained  in  the  closest 
connection  with  the  imperial  court  and  suffered  the 
decadence  that  affected  the  imperial  power.  After 

1 Cf.  Milman,  op.  cit.,  I,  524  et  seq. 


136 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Mohammedanism  in  the  seventh  century  all  but  over- 
whelmed Christianity,  the  dependence  of  the  ecclesi- 
astical on  the  secular  arm  was  riveted  by  the  impact 
of  the  common  foe,  and  church  and  state  were  in- 
distinguishably  blended. 

2.  Rise  of  the  Papacy 

The  decline  of  imperial  authority  in  the  West  had 
a great  if  not  the  decisive  influence  in  exalting  the 
Bishop  of  Borne  to  formal  primacy  in  the  church. 
At  the  conversion  of  Constantine  the  Roman  bishop 
became  at  once,  by  virtue  of  his  proximity  to  the 
court,  the  chief  adviser  of  the  Emperor  in  ecclesiasti- 
cal affairs,  and  the  intermediary  through  which  ques- 
tions affecting  the  church  in  all  parts  of  the  Empire 
were  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  sovereign 
ruler.  The  removal  of  the  court  to  the  shores  of  the 
Bosphorus  tended  somewhat  to  relax  the  bonds  which 
held  the  great  Eastern  prelates  at  Antioch,  Alexan- 
dria and  Constantinople  in  submission  to  the  Roman 
pontiff,  but  throughout  the  provinces  of  the  West  — 
Gaul,  Spain  and  Africa  — the  prestige  of  the  popes 
remained  unaffected.  The  chief  theoretical  basis  of 
Roman  precedence  was  the  foundation  of  the  see  by 
Peter,  whose  preeminence  among  the  Apostles  was 
universally  recognized.  To  this  was  added  the  claim 
that  the  provincial  churches  in  the  West  had  been 
established  under  the  auspices  of  Rome  and  therefore 
owed  to  the  Roman  bishop  the  allegiance  due  to 
metropolitan  authority.  At  the  time  when  the  strife 
between  Arianism  and  Orthodoxy  was  convulsing  the 


RISE  OF  THE  PAPACY 


137 


church  and  the  Empire,  the  Council  of  Sardica 
(347  a.d.)  formally  assigned  to  the  Bishop  of  Rome 
appellate  jurisdiction  over  the  decrees  of  other 
bishops.  This  recognition  of  Roman  primacy  by 
ecclesiastical  authority  was  reenforced  in  the  next 
century  by  the  sanction  of  the  supreme  political 
power.  Yalentinian  III,  Emperor  of  the  West,  con- 
stituted the  Bishop  of  Rome  the  legal  court  of  appeal 
for  ecclesiastical  causes  from  all  parts  of  the  domin- 
ion, and  declared  his  supremacy  over  all  other 
bishops. 

But  the  official  sanction  of  papal  authority  was 
more  a symptom  than  a cause  of  Roman  primacy. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  fifth  century  great  pon- 
tiffs, like  Innocent  I and  Leo  I,  asserted  the  authority 
of  Rome  in  ecclesiastical  controversies  with  marked 
ability  and  success;  and  the  effect  of  their  policy 
was  enhanced  by  the  commanding  distinction  of 
the  bishop  in  the  civil  affairs  of  the  city  when  the 
imperial  regime  was  overthrown  by  the  barbarians. 
During  the  Herulian  and  Ostrogothic  dominion  in 
Italy  the  Roman  see  was  the  mainstay  of  Ortho- 
doxy against  the  Arianism  of  the  rulers.  The  wars 
through  which  the  Gothic  power  was  broken,  and 
Italy  made  an  integral  part  of  the  Eastern  Empire, 
wrought  great  havoc  in  the  whole  social  order  of 
the  contested  realm,  and  especially  of  Rome  itself. 
Scarcely  was  the  ruined  land  reduced  to  tolerable 
quiet,  when  the  Lombards  descended  from  the  north 
and  devastated  anew  the  whole  peninsula.  The 
authority  of  the  Emperor  at  Constantinople  was 


138 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


hopelessly  inadequate  to  the  task  of  defending  Italy. 
When  the  Lombards  appeared  before  Rome  Gregory 
the  Great  was  on  the  papal  throne,  and  upon  him 
fell  the  task  of  making  formal  terms  with  the 
besiegers. 

The  pontificate  of  Gregory  (590-604  a.d.)  marks 
fairly  well  the  transition  in  the  character  of  the 
^ Papacy.  From  that  time  the  political  affairs,  at 
first  of  Rome  and  then  of  all  Italy,  became  a defi- 
nite charge  upon  the  attention  of  the  popes.  For 
a time  the  suzerainty  of  Constantinople  and  the 
authority  of  its  Exarch  at  Ravenna  were  sedulously 
recognized.  But  when  to  the  encroachments  of  the 
Lombards  in  Italy  were  added,  in  the  seventh  cen- 
tury, the  triumphant  assaults  of  the  Mohammedans 
in  the  East,  the  interest  and  influence  of  the  imperial 
court  in  the  city  of  Rome  became  infinitesimal. 
Ecclesiastical  causes  also  contributed  to  the  sever- 
ance of  relations  between  the  old  and  the  new  Rome. 
Inspired  by  his  close  connection  with  the  court,  the 
Patriarch  of  Constantinople  laid  claim  from  time  to 
time  to  a preeminence  over  all  other  authorities  in 
the  church.  This  pretension,  which  received  some 
measure  of  imperial  recognition,  was  bitterly  resented 
by  the  popes,  and  confirmed  their  tendency  to  inde- 
pendence in  political  affairs.  Finally  arose  the  great 
controversy  over  image-worship,  through  which  were 
brought  to  a,  crisis  all  the  divergent  tendencies  of 
Greek  and  Rome  n Christianity.  The  church  was 
severed  in  twain  and  the  Roman  pontiff,  followed 
by  all  the  West  which  Mohammedanism  had  not 


RISE  OF  THE  PAPACY 


139 


overrun,  stood  isolated,  ecclesiastically  as  well  as 
politically,  from  the  authority  of  the  East. 

Upon  the  extinction  of  the  Exarchate  of  Ravenna 
by  the  revolt  which  followed  the  iconoclastic  decrees 
of  Leo  the  Isaurian  and  his  successors,  the  city  of 
Rome,  of  whose  interests  the  Pope  appears  as  the 
exclusive  guardian,  was  left  entirely  exposed  to  the 
aggressive  tendencies  of  the  Lombard  kings.  To 
the  attempts  of  these  rulers  to  incorporate  the  city 
within  their  domain  the  popes  opposed  the  most 
resolute  resistance,  and,  in  despair  of  success,  sum- 
moned to  their  aid,  in  the  name  of  St.  Peter,  the^* 
powerful  Franks.  Both  Charles  Martel  and  his  son 
Pippin  responded  to  the  summons,  and  the  latter 
not  only  drove  the  Lombards  from  the  ecclesiastical 
estates  which  they  had  occupied,  but  also  con- 
quered the  remainder  of  the  territory  formerly 
held  by  the  exarchs  and  bestowed  it  upon  the  Pope. 
Thus  the  Papacy  became  formally,  what  it  had  long 
been  in  fact,  the  holder  of  political  power.  Of  equal 
significance  in  respect  to  the  position  of  the  popes 
was  the  act  of  Zacharias  in  sanctioning  the  usur- 
pation by  Pippin  of  the  royal  power  among  the 
Franks,  and  that  of  Stephen  in  performing  the\ 
ceremony  of  coronation  and  unction  through  which 
Pippin’s  usurped  dignity  was  confirmed  (754  a.d.). 
When,  after  half  a century  of  successful  expansion, 
the  Frankish  kingdom  had  been  developed  into  the 
great  dominion  of  Pippin’s  son,  Charlemagne,  the  ^ 
coronation  of  the  latter  as  Emperor  by  Pope  Leo  III 
(800  a.d.)  scarcely  made  more  definite  than  before 


140 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  exalted  position  of  the  Roman  see  in  European 
politics. 

The  weakest  point  in  the  Pope’s  political  position 
was  his  relation  to  the  population  of  Rome.  From 
the  days  of  the  old  Empire  the  choice  of  a new  bishop 
had  frequently  been  the  occasion  of  popular  tumults 
and  bloodshed.  The  transition  to  mediaeval  condi- 
tions brought  the  office  under  the  control  of  the 
powerful  noble  families  who  divided  the  city  among 
Y themselves.  With  the  growth  of  political  influence 
in  the  Papacy,  the  contests  among  these  families  for 
possession  of  the  dignity -became  more  and  more 
intense  and  bitter.  While  all  Western  Europe 
looked  with  reverence  upon  the  Pope,  he  was  him- 
self, in  many  cases,  the  mere  puppet  of  some  un- 
, scrupulous  Roman  noble.  During  the  tenth  century 
the  personal  character  of  the  popes  reached  a very 
low  level  from  this  cause,  and  an  inevitable  reaction 
was  manifest  upon  the  authority  of  the  Papacy. 
This  source  of  weakness  was  in  a measure  removed 
by  the  reform  of  1059,  when,  by  act  of  the  second 
. Lateran  Council,  the  chief  power  in  the  election  of  a 
pope  was  vested  in  the  cardinals  — a definite  body, 
presumably  characterized  by  the  most  eminent  sacer- 
^ dotal  virtues.  This  reform  was  but  one  of  a series 
that  included  the  enforcement  of  celibacy  among  the 
clergy  and  the  stringent  proceedings  against  simony 
which  precipitated  the  struggle  over  investitures. 
The  Hildebrandine  epoch  had  arrived  — the  epoch 
in  which  great  popes,  from  Gregory  VII  to  Inno- 
cent III,  brought  the  dignity  and  power  of  their 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  THE  FRANKS 


141 


office,  from  both  the  secular  and  the  spiritual  point 
of  view,  to  the  utmost  limit  of  exaltation. 

3.  Rise  of  the  Mediaeval  Empire 

The  prestige  of  the  Papacy  was  closely  paralleled 
by  that  of  its  great  secular  rival,  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire.  This  institution,  whose  career  embodies  a 
political  summary  of  the  Middle  Ages,  had  its  origin 
in  the  Frankish  monarchy,  which,  founded  by  Clovis 
on  the  soil  of  Roman  Gaul,  was  expanded  to  truly 
imperial  dimensions  three  centuries  later  by  Charle- 
magne. The  Franks  were  converted  to  Christianity 
in  the  time  of  Clovis,  and  stood  alone  among  the, 
barbarian  invaders  as  Orthodox  instead  of  Arian  in 
faith.  Their  institutions  expressed  most  faithfully 
the  characteristics  of  Christianized  Teutonism.  No- 
where more  strongly  than  in  Gaul,  under  the  Mero- 
vingians, did  the  church  impress  itself  upon  the 
political  and  social  order.  In  both  the  councils  of 
the  royal  court  and  the  humbler  concerns  of  town 
and  provincial  life,  the  bishops  and  abbots  wielded 
a commanding  influence.  Early  in  the  eighth  cen- 
tury the  royal  line  was  supplanted  in 
East-Frankish  family,  later  known  as 
gians.  The  genius  and  valour  of  Charles  Martel  won 
the  applause  of  trembling  Christendom  by  setting  a 
final  bound  to  the  sweep  of  Saracen  conquest  in  the 
West.  To  the  victorious  Frank  it  was  natural  that 
the  Pope  should  turn  for  support  against  the  threaten- 
ing Lombards;  and  a favourable  response  to  the  Pope’s 
appeal  was  clearly  dictated  not  only  by  the  religious 


power  by  the 
the  Caroling 


142 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


sentiment  but  also  by  the  political  aspirations  of  the 
ambitious  ruler.  Hence  arose  that  entente  through 
which  Pippin  became,  with  the  papal  sanction,  King 
of  the  Franks,  and  Charlemagne,  after  adding  the| 
Lombard  domain  to  his  possessions,  received  fromj 
the  Pope  the  insignia  and  title  of  Emperor, 

To  the  chief  participants  in  that  famous  corona- 
tion in  St.  Peter’s  on  Christmas  day,  800  a.d.,  the 
significance  of  the  ceremony  was  quite  destitute  of 
the  subtlety  which  was  ascribed  to  it  by  the  contro- 
versial ingenuity  of  later  days.  That  Charlemagne 
supposed  he  was  receiving  from  the  Pope  a grant  of 
political  authority  of  any  sort  whatever,  is  impossible ; 
that  the  Pope  supposed  that  he  was  granting  such 
power,  is  very  improbable.  By  his  military  and 
administrative  genius  the  Frankish  monarch  had 
extended  his  sway  over  a territory  fairly  commen- 
surate with  that  of  the  ancient  Empire  in  the  West; 
his  conquests  had  consistently  promoted  the  cause  of 
Christianity  against  both  the  Saracen  and  the  pagan ; 
having  become  the  possessor  in  fact  of  imperial  author- 
^ ity,  he  received  from  the  Pope,  through  the  rites  long 
customary  in  Christian  lands,  formal  recognition  as 
successor  of  the  early  emperors.  Through  this  act, 
however  its  significance  may  have  been  misinter- 
preted, the  relation  of  Teutonic  politics  to  Latin 
Christianity  assumed  a public  form  that  was  des- 
tined to  produce  extraordinary  results.  The  embodi- 
ment of  these  results  is  the  history  and  the  theory 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

Charlemagne’s  empire  fell  to  pieces  within  less 


THE  MEDIAEVAL  EMPIRE 


143 


than  half  a century  of  his  death.  The  territory  that 
he  had  ruled  was  divided  into  independent  kingdoms. 
But  throughout  the  anarchy  of  this  process  the  idea 
of  an  empire  and  of  an  emperor  survived,  and  of  an 
emperor  whose  authority  would  be  formally  complete 
only  after  coronation  by  the  Pope  at  Rome.  The 
persistence  of  this  idea  w^as  promoted  not  only  by 
papal  policy,  which  sought  the  support  of  superior 
power  against  the  Italian  princes,  but  also  by  the 
ambition  of  every  ruler  who,  having  succeeded  to 
some  share  of  Charlemagne’s  dominion,  could  hope 
to  claim  the  whole.  In  962  Otto  I,  the  German 
king,  a monarch  whose  character  and  achievements 
justly  won  for  him  the  epithet  of  “ Great,”  added 
Italy  to  his  possessions  and  received  or  extorted  from 
the  Pope  recognition  as  Emperor.  With  the  corona-  y 
tion  of  Otto  begins  definitely  the  history  of  the  Holy'* 
Roman  Empire. 

From  the  purely  secular  point  of  view  this  history 
is  concerned  with  the  long  struggle  of  German  kings 
to  maintain  the  imperial  unity  of  Germany  and 
Italy.1  The  varying  phases  of  the  struggle  turn 
chiefly  on  three  facts : first,  the  thoroughly  feudalizedl 
character  of  the  royal  power  in  both  Germany  and 
Italy ; second,  the  racial  antagonism  between  the  ^ 
Teutonic  and  the  Latin  populations ; and  third,  the 
enormous  development  of  ecclesiastical  and  especially 
of  papal  power.  The  feudal  conception  of  royal 
power  hopelessly  hampered  the  efficiency  of  the 

1 The  western  portion  of  Charlemagne’s  empire  stood  apart  from 
this  struggle,  and  developed  independently  into  the  French  monarchy. 


144 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


monarch’s  action ; the  dislike  of  the  Italians  for 
everything  German,  which  to  them  was  synonymous 
with  barbarian,  was  a constant  stimulus  to  seditions 
and  revolt;  and  the  tortuous  policy  of  the  popes, 
who  ruthlessly  employed  their  power  to  insure  that 
the  Emperor  should  be  their  ally  but  not  their  mas- 
ter, raised  up  in  both  Germany  and  Italy  obstacles 
which  ultimately  proved  fatal  to  the  development  of 
a really  imperial  system.  For  a century  after  the 
great  Otto,  the  German  monarchs  preserved  a fairly 
strong  hold  on  Italy  and  asserted  their  ancient  con- 
trol over  the  Roman  see.  But  then  arose  Hildebrand, 
and  the  era  of  the  great  struggle  was  at  hand  which! 
ended  a century  and  a half  later  in  the  extinction  of 
the  imperial  authority,  if  not  the  imperial  name,  in 
all  the  region  south  of  the  Alps. 

4.  The  Era  of  Conflict  between  the  Secular  and  the 
Spiritual  Power 

The  dramatic  struggle  between  the  Emperor  Henry 
IV  and  Pope  Gregory  VII  focussed  the  controversy 
as  to  the  relation  of  spiritual  to  secular  authority  at 
the  point  where,  in  the  belief  of  the  time,  each  species 
of  authority  had  its  culmination.  In  the  early  days, 
before  the  ecclesiastical  primacy  of  the  Bishop  of 
Rome  had  been  clearly  established,  the  Emperor  had 
been  recognized  as  head  of  both  state  and  church. 
Yet  a sphere  had  always  been  assigned  to  the  ecclesi- 
astical authorities,  which,  though  not  defined  with 
entire  clearness,  included  at  least  the  power  to  in- 
flict purely  spiritual  penalties  for  moral  delinquencies. 


PAPACY  AGAINST  EMPIRE 


145 


This  power  had  been  exercised  by  Ambrose,  the 
energetic  Archbishop  of  Milan,  upon  no  less  a per- 
sonage than  the  Emperor  Theodosius  the  Great,  who 
was  excluded  from  the  communion  for  breaking  faith 
with  and  slaughtering  certain  rebellious  subjects. 
Throughout  the  succeeding  centuries  excommunica- 
tion was  employed  with  ever-increasing  freedom  by— 
the  higher  church  officials  both  against  one  another 
and  against  men  in  other  stations  in  life.  With  the 
centralization  of  ecclesiastical  power  in  the  Pope, 
however,  excommunication  at  his  hands,  recognized 
and  enforced  by  an  obedient  clergy,  could  be  made  to 
assume  a very  serious  aspect.  The  tendency  was  to 
extend  the  consequences  of  the  penalty  more  and 

more  into  the  field  of  temporal  concerns.  Thus  de- . 

veloped  the  doctrine  that  an  excommunicated  prince 
was  no  longer  entitled  to  the  allegiance  of  his  sub- 
jects, and  ceased  ipso  facto  to  reign. 

The  earliest  stage  of  the  conflict  between  Papacy 
and  secular  power  is  exemplified  in  the  case  of  Pope— 
Nicholas  I and  King  Lothaire  of  Lorraine.  The  king, 
with  the  consent  of  an  obsequious  synod  of  prelates 
of  his  own  dominion,  divorced  his  wife  and  espoused 
his  mistress.  Nicholas  intervened,  and  after  a long 
struggle  forced  Lothaire  to  take  back  his  wife. 
Against  the  Pope  were  joined  the  king,  his  brother 
the  Emperor  Louis,  and  all  the  powerful  prelates  who 
had  sanctioned  the  divorce.  But  the  moral  issue  in 
the  case  was  so  obvious  that  the  terrors  of  the  papal 
excommunication  prevailed  against  all.  Though  the 
Emperor,  in  behalf  of  his  brother,  led  an  army  against 


L 


146 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  city  of  Rome,  and  entered  the  walls  without  re- 
sistance, yet  he  was  soon  glad  to  make  his  peace 
with  the  Pope  and  retire  from  the  controversy.  In 
the  course  of  this  struggle  claims  of  power  were ! 
made  on  behalf  of  the  Pope  that  trenched  deeply  on 
the  secular  jurisdiction.  It  was  not,  however,  till 
two  centuries  later  that  these  claims  took  practical 
shape  in  the  conflict  over  investitures. 

Here  the  issue  was  made  up  on  a ground  where 
the  moral  bearings  were  greatly  obscured  by  other 
considerations.  Gregory  VII  (Hildebrand)  decreed 
in  1075  that  no  ecclesiastic  should  thereafter  be 
v.  invested  with  the  symbols  of  his  office  by  a secular 
prince,  under  penalty  of  excommunication  to  both 
parties  to  such  a transaction.  The  avowed  purpose 
of  this  decree  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  simoniacaf 

purchase  and  sale  of  the  dignities  of  the  church a 

practice  that  had  become  universal  and  inveterate. 
But  behind  this  object,  which  would  command  the 
sympathy  of  such  enlightened  public  opinion  as  the 
time  could  boast,  lay  the  larger  idea  which  permeated 
all  Gregory’s  projects  — that  of  a purified  hierarchy, 
headed  by  the  Pope,  guiding  without  responsibility 
to  any  temporal  power  all  the  destinies  of  mankind. 
The  effect  of  his  decree  would  be  to  transfer  to  the 
Roman  see  that  dominant  influence  in  the  filling  of 
bishoprics  and  abbacies  which  had  been  wielded  by 
the  secular  potentates.  To  these  latter,  however,  the 
obvious  consequences  of  the  Pope’s  policy  were  very 
startling.  The  landed  estates  possessed  by  the  epis- 
copal churches  and  monasteries  constituted  in  all 


papacy  against  empire 


147 


Western  Europe  a very  large  proportion  of  the  soil, 
and  the  bishops  and  abbots  were,  as  tenants  of  these 
estates,  the  feudal  vassals  of  the  monarchs.  The 
decree  of  the  Pope  would  practically  deprive  the 
latter  of  all  the  incidents  of  suzerainty  which  were  ^ 
involved  in  the  feudal  tenure,  and  would  reduce  the'' 
royal  power  to  nullity.  In  Germany  and  Italy  the 
ecclesiastical  estates  were  exceptionally  large  and 
the  tendencies  to  revolt  against  the  imperial  author- 
ity exceptionally  strong.  The  Emperor,  moreover, 
was  invested  by  the  sentiment  of  the  times  with  a 
superiority  over  all  other  secular  rulers.  To  Greg- 
ory, aspiring  to  the  summit  of  authority,  the  subjec- 
tion of  the  Emperor  would  go  farthest  toward  the 
attainment  of  his  end.  Hence  it  was  that,  in  the 
eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries,  the  conflict  of  secular 
and  spiritual  powers  was  centred  in  the  conflict  of 
Papacy  and  Empire. 

The  struggle  was  precipitated  by  the  peremptory 
summons  addressed  in  1076  by  Gregory  to  Henry  of 
Germany  to  appear  before  the  papal  court  and  an- 
swer charges  of  disregarding  certain  decrees  of  the 
Pope.  Henry’s  reply  was  the  deposition  of  the  Pope 
by  a council  of  German  prelates.  Gregory  thereupon 
solemnly  asserted  the  utmost  authority  ever  claimed 
by  the  Roman  see,  by  excommunicating  and  deposing 
the  king  and  absolving  his  subjects  from  their  oaths 
of  allegiance.  By  fostering  the  discontent  and  am- 
bitions of  the  great  German  nobles  and  prelates  the 
Pope  was  able  to  bring  the  king  to  the  profound 
humiliation  and  submission  of  Canossa.  This,  how- 


148 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ever,  was  but  the  beginning  of  the  long  struggle. 
Henry  recovered  his  power  for  a time  and  avenged 
himself  on  Gregory,  but  the  principles  at  issue  were 
too  far-reaching  to  admit  of  an  unequivocal  settle- 
ment. On  the  narrow  question  of  investitures,  a 
rational  compromise  was  reached  in  1122.  But 
the  broad  issue  between  papal  and  imperial  power 
continued,  through  a bewildering  multiplicity  of  inci- 
dents, to  form  the  core  of  European  politics  for  i 
' Pearly  two  centuries.  Only  with  the  extinction  of 
the  house  of  Holienstaufen,  in  1254,  was  the  triumph 
of  papal  policy  made  clear.  From  that  date  the  dis- 
integration of  the  Empire  was  a fact  which  the  lin- 
gering veneration  for  the  imperial  title  could  but 
scantily  disguise.  Of  the  constituent  elements  of 
the  dominion  which  Otto  the  Great  had  restored, 
Germany  was  a mere  confederation  of  princes,  and 
Italy  a group  of  city  republics  and  petty  principali- 
ties of  which  the  only  bond  was  the  feud  of  Guelf 
and  Ghibelline. 

What  the  ancient  imperial  ideal  failed  to  achieve 
against  the  extreme  pretensions  of  papal  power  was 
ultimately  accomplished  by  the  national  monarchies 
that  arose  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  Empire.  The 
power  of  the  Pope  to  hold  kings  and  other  princes 
to  account  for  moral  delinquency  was  freely  asserted 
in  extra-imperial  lands  by  Gregory  YII  and  his  suc- 
cessors. Largely  through  the  influence  of  the  Cru- 
sades the  prestige  of  the  popes  expanded  by  leaps 
and  bounds  during  the  twelfth  century  and  culmi- 
nated in  the  reign  (for  reign  it  truly  was)  of  Innocent 


PAPACY  AGAINST  EMPIRE 


149 


III  (1198-1216).  The  records  of  this  pontiff’s  rela- 
tions with  secular  princes  illustrate  fairly  well  the 
status  of  the  Papacy  in  European  politics.  In  the 
Empire  he  openly  claimed  the  right  to  judge  finally 
between  the  rivals  in  a disputed  succession,  and  act- 
ually  determined  the  occupation  of  the  throne  in 
turn  by  Philip,  Otho  IY  and  Frederick  II.  In 
France,  by  putting  the  kingdom  under  an  interdict, 
he  forced  the  truculent  Philip  Augustus  to  take  back 
a discarded  wife  and  cast  off  a noble  mistress.  John 
of  England,  in  a memorable  struggle,  was  obliged  to 
yield  his  kingdom  formally  as  a fief  of  the  Roman 
see  and  to  become  the  vassal  of  the  Pope.  The 
realms  which  the  Christian  princes  of  Spain  and 
Portugal  were  laboriously  wresting  from  the  Moors 
were  treated  by  Innocent  (and  with  slight  opposition) 
as  papal  dependencies,  on  the  theory,  already  gener- 
ally recognized,  that  land  conquered  from  heathen^, 
and  infidels  was  at  the  disposal  of  the  Roman  see.1 
The  King  of  Aragon,  with  full  feudal  ceremony,  as- 
sumed the  status  of  vassal  to  the  Pope.  Throughout 
Christendom,  in  short,  the  spiritual  lordship  of  Rome 
was  recognized  as  involving  in  some  measure  the 
attributes  of  political  sovereignty. 

A century  after  Innocent  III,  the  prestige  of  the 
Papacy  received  a fatal  shock  in  the  memorable  con- 
flict between  Boniface  VIII  and  Philip  the  Fair  of 
France.  The  exalted  position  of  the  popes  in  secular 

1 Henry  n of  England  asked  and  received  from  Rome  author- 
ity to  conquer  Ireland,  though  the  Irish  were  neither  heathen  nor 
infidel,  but  merely  refused  to  conform  to  the  Roman  ritual. 


150 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


affairs  had  been  due  largely  to  the  unsubstantial 
character  of  feudal  lordship  from  the  standpoint  of 
real  power.  Suzerainty  tended  to  become  merely 
nominal  and  ceremonial,  and  for  suzerainty  of  this 
character  the  Papacy,  destitute  of  military  force,  was 
. well  adapted.  The  chief  instrument  by  which  the 
popes  had  asserted  real  power  over  monarchs  had 
always  been  the  rebellious  tendencies  of  the  great 
vassals.  During  the  thirteenth  century,  however, 
the  French  kingship,  largely  through  the  ability  of 
■ Louis  IX,  assumed  a high  degree  of  solidity.  When, 
therefore,  Boniface  VIII  opposed  to  the  policy  of 
Philip  the  Fair  an  energetic  demand  for  the  exemp- 
tion of  ecclesiastical  property  from  taxation,  save 
with  the  papal  consent,  the  king  was  able  to  defy 
the  Pope,  and  to  win  general  support  from  both  lay 
and  ecclesiastical  subjects.  Further,  Philip  found 
opportunity,  in  the  distracted  condition  of  Italian 
politics,  to  carry  the  war  into  the  Pope’s  immediate 
territory.  The  outcome  was  the  so-called  “ Babylon- 
ish Captivity,”  during  which  the  Papacy,  having  re- 
moved its  abode  from  Rome  to  Avignon,  was  little 
more  than  an  adjunct  of  the  French  monarchy. 
From  Avignon  it  waged  another  violent  and  in  some 
measure  successful  contest  with  the  holder  of  the 
imperial  title.  But  its  prestige  had  been  seriously 
impaired,  and  it  suffered  yet  more  severely  in  the 
Great  Schism  (1378-1415).  Though  the  restoration 
of  harmony  and  unity  in  the  church  was  so  effected 
as  to  save  the  appearance  of  papal  independence,  the 
aggressive  attitude  of  the  Pope  toward  temporal 


PAPACY  AGAINST  EMPIRE 


151 


princes  could  no  longer  be  maintained.  The  feudal 
order  of  society  was  waning.  Where  its  influence 
still  persisted  most  strongly — in  the  Empire  — the 
Roman  church  could  still  assume  an  air  of  aggressive 
political  consequence ; but  in  the  rising  national 
states  of  France,  England  and  Spain,  her  power  was 
henceforth  wholly  employed  in  the  defence  of  rapidly 
shrinking  remnants  of  temporal  dignity. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Adams,  Civilization  during  the  Middle  Ages,  chaps,  iii, 
vi  et  seq.y  x,  xvi.  Bryce,  Holy  Roman  Empire,  chaps,  iii-v, 
x and  xiii.  Dill,  Roman  Society  in  the  Last  Century  of  the 
Western  Empire.  Duruy,  Histoire  du  moyen  dge  (History  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  trans.),  chaps,  xvii,  xviii,  xxv.  Emerton, 
Introduction  to  the  Middle  Ages,  chaps,  ix,  xiv;  Mediaeval 
Europe,  chaps,  ii-x,  xii.  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  chaps,  xv, 
xvi,  xx-xxi,  xxviii,  xxxvii,  xlix.  Giesebrecht,  Geschichte  der 
deutschen  Kaiserzeit , Bde.  Ill,  IV.  Gregorovius,  Horn  im 
Mittelalter  (Rome  in  the  Middle  Ages,  trans.  by  Hamilton), 
Buch  III,  cap.  vii.  Hodgkin,  Italy  and  Her  Invaders,  Vol. 
V,  chaps,  vii-x;  VI,  ix,  xiii-xiv;  VII,  vii  et  seq. ; VIII,  v. 
Janssen,  Geschichte  des  deutschen  Folkes , Bd.  I,  S.  427-472 
(History  of  the  German  People,  trans.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  105-160). 
Kaufmann,  Deutsche  Geschichte , Bd.  II,  S.  235  et  seq.  Lan- 
ciani,  Pagan  and  Christian  Rome,  chap.  i.  Lavisse  et  Ram- 
baud,  Vol.  II,  chaps,  ii-iv.  Laurent,  Histoire  de  Vhumanite , 
Toms.  IV,  VI.  Lea,  Studies  in  Church  History,  pp.  112-169, 
288-299.  Merivale,  The  Conversion  of  the  Roman  Empire. 
Milman,  Latin  Christianity,  Vol.  I,  pp.  41-163,  397-402,  542 
et  seq. ; II,  39-49,  73  et  seq. ; III,  361  et  seq.  Rocquain,  La 
Papaute  au  moyen  dge.  Schaff,  History  of  the  Christian 
Church,  Vol.  I,  chaps,  viii,  x ; II,  i,  iv ; III,  iii,  v.  Sheppard, 
The  Fall  of  Rome  and  the  Rise  of  New  Nationalities.  Shulte, 
Deutschen  Reichs-  und  Rechtsgeschichte.  Tout,  The  Empire  and 
the  Papacy,  chaps,  vi,  xi,  xvi. 


CHAPTER  VI 


POLITICAL  THEORY  IN  THE  EARLY  CHURCH 

1.  Jesus  and  the  Apostles 

To  the  founder  of  Christianity  no  idea  or  doctrine 
that  can  be  designated  as  political  seems  to  have  had 
the  slightest  interest.  The  teachings  of  Jesus,  as 
recorded  in  the  Gospels,  embody  a moral  code  of 
marvellous  simplicity  and  completeness  and  the  Jew- 
ish Messianic  theology.  The  Golden  Rule,  which 
sums  up  his  conception  of  the  relations  of  man  to 


portion  as  it  is  lived  up  to,  the  coercive  function  of 
government  loses  significance.1  A like  unpolitical 
influence  springs  from  the  pity  for  the  oppressed  and 
the  suffering  which  pervades  all  his  thought.  In 
bringing  hope  to  the  lowly,  the  powerful  of  the  earth 
are  disparaged  and  counted  for  nought.  But  the 
hope  that  he  holds  out  embodies  no  element  what- 
ever of  revolutionary  suggestion.  The  “ kingdom” 
into  which  his  followers  are  to  enter  is  most  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  realms  of  this  world.  It  is 
the  kingdom  of  Heaven,  mystically  conceived  as  the 
abode  of  God.  From  every  attempt  to  attribute  to 

1 Cf.  Janet,  Histoire  de  la  Science  politique,  I,  281  (ed.  1887). 

152 


JESUS  AND  THE  APOSTLES 


153 


him  the  characteristics  of  temporal  dominion,  he 
turns  with  indifference  or  scorn.  The  efforts  of  his 
adversaries  to  embroil  him  with  the  Roman  authori- 
ties evoke  the  pregnant  injunction,  “ Render  unto 
Caesar  the  things  that  are  Caesar’s  ”; 1 and  at  the  cri- 
sis of  his  life  .he  convinces  Pilate  by  the  disclaimer : 

“ My  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world.”2  The  ingenuity 
of  later  ages,  as  will  appear  in  subsequent  chapters, 
extracted  from  the  text  of  the  gospels  doctrines  that 
stood  in  violent  contrast  to  these;  but  the  indiffer- 
ence to  temporal  power  which  these  express  accords 
with  the  whole  spirit  of  Jesus  himself. 

It  is  this  spirit  which  clearly  animated  the  apostles 
in  spreading  the  faith  among  Jews  and  Gentiles.  The 
soul  of  Paul’s  admirable  epistles  is  exhortation  to  up- 
right living  and  to  saving  faith  in  the  new  Evangel. 
Of  pure  and  uplifting  morality  and  of  subtle  and  pro- 
found theology  his  works  are  full,  but  of  politics  we 
find  only  that  injunction  of  passive  obedience : “ Let 
every  soul  be  subject  unto  the  higher  powers.  For 
there  is  no  power  but  of  God ; the  powers  that  be  are 
ordained  of  God,” 3 etc.  Paul  conceives  of  government 
as  an  instrument  for  the  execution  of  God’s  will.  And 
this  conception  is  even  more  fully  expressed  by  Peter : 

“ Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of  man  for 
the  Lord’s  sake ; whether  it  be  to  the  king,  as  supreme; 
or  unto  governors,  as  unto  them  that  are  sent  by  him  b 
for  the  punishment  of  evil-doers  and  for  the  praise  of 
them  that  do  well.” 4 It  was  in  the  spirit  of  these 

1 Matt,  xxii,  17 ; cf  Matt,  xvi,  24-27. 

2 John  xviii,  36.  3 Rom.  xiii,  1-7.  4 1 Peter  ii,  13-17. 


154 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


texts,  supported  by  the  injunctions  to  meekness  and 
humility  that  pervaded  the  teachings  of  both  Jesus 
and  the  apostles,  that  the  roll  of  Christian  martyrology 
was  made  up ; for  passive  submission  found  its  abso- 
' lute  limit  in  that  world-old  refuge  of  religious  dissent : 
“We  ought  to  obey  God  rather  than  men.” 1 

The  political  indifferentism  of  primitive  Christian- 
ity was  supplemented  by  a social  indifferentism  that 
tended  often  to  aggressiveness.  For  the  humble 
classes  from  which  Jesus  drew  his  followers,  it  was 
^natural  to  interpret  the  Master’s  denunciations  of  the 
rich  in  a communistic  spirit.2  But  the  sober  sense  of 
Paul  and  his  followers  corrected  this  extreme  ten- 
dency,  and  preached  that  no  earthly  condition  was  a 
bar,  as  none  was  a key,  to  entrance  into  the  Christian 
fellowship.  Faith  in  Jesus  constituted  the  sole  test, 
and  in  this  faith  there  was  no  distinction  of  rich  or 
poor,  high  or  low,  slave  or  free.  Thus  in  the  lowly 
classes  at  the  base  of  the  social  structure  in  the 
\ Roman  Empire  developed  a principle  of  equality  and 
brotherhood  analogous  in  its  bearings  to  that  which 
Stoicism  was  propagating  among  the  intellectual 
classes  at  the  social  apex.3  As  Christianity  spread 
upward  among  the  people,  its  way  was  made  easier 
by  the  prevalence  of  Stoic  concepts ; the  oneness  of 
humanity,  which  had  been  conceived  as  centring  in 
, the  Stoic  cosmopolis,  received  a much  more  definite 
and  attractive  realization  in  the  promise  of  the 
Christian  heaven. 

1 The  Acts  v,  29.  2 The  Acts,  ii,  44,  45. 8 Supra,  pp.  105-106. 


AMBROSE  OF  MILAN 


155 


2.  The  Fathers  of  the  Church:  Ambrose , Augustine, 
Gregory  the  Great 

When,  in  the  fourth  century,  Christianity  became 
the  official  creed  of  the  Roman  state,  the  general  tone 
of  the  writers  who  treated  of  doctrinal  matters  was 
that  of  Jesus  and  the  apostles.  Humility,  political 
indifferentism  and  otlier-worldliness  were  dominant. 
But  by  this  time  the  church  had  become  a huge 
social,  quasi-political  institution.  It  possessed  great 
property ; its  relations  wdth  the  imperial  administra- 
tion were  close  and  complicated ; and  it  was  distracted 
by  heresy.  These  conditions  injected  into  ecclesias- 
tical writings  a new  note,  illustrated  by  the  able  and 
vigorous  Ambrose  of  Milan.  The  rights  and  dignity 
of  the  church  began  to  be  set  on  even  terms  with 
those  of  the  Empire,  and  in  relation  to  the  injunction 
of  Jesus  w^as  suggested  the  vital  question:  What  is 
Caesar’s  and  what  is  God’s  ? The  great  Theodosius, 
guilty  of  barbarous  cruelty  toward  his  rebellious  sub- 
jects, was  reproved  and  brought  to  repentance  by 
Ambrose,  and  gave  full  recognition  to  sacerdotal 
sway  over  the  moral  life  of  the  Christians.  When 
Valentinian  ordered  that  the  claim  of  an  Arian  to 
the  see  which  Ambrose  held  should  be  brought  before 
the  imperial  court  for  trial  and  decision,  the  latter 
indignantly  refused  to  comply.  “In  a matter  of 
faith,”  he  boldly  declared,  “ bishops  are  wont  to  judge 
emperors,  not  emperors  bishops.” 1 This  is  pre- 

1 Quis  est  qui  abnuet  in  causa  fidei  . . . episcopos  solere  de  Impe 
ratoribus  christianis,  non  Imperatores  de  Episcopis  judicare.  — Am- 
brosii  Epistola,  xxxii,  in  Goldast,  II,  p.  10. 


156 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


scribed  even  by  imperial  laws,  which  must  not  be 
repealed ; for  “ I would  not  that  thy  law  should  be 
above  the  law  of  God.”  And  when  ordered  to  de- 
liver certain  of  the  churches  of  his  see  to  his  rival, 
Ambrose,  in  his  Oratio  de  Basilicis  Tradendis / gave 
passionate  utterance  to  the  claim  that  there  was  a 
line  within  which  imperial  authority  could  not  in- 
trude. Tribute  the  Emperor  may  take ; the  lands  of 
the  church  he  may  take,  but  the  temple  of  God  not. 
“ Palaces  belong  to  the  Emperor;  churches  to  the 
priest.”  “ That  which  is  divine  is  not  subject  to  the 
imperial  power.”  But  the  decree  of  the  Emperor 
he  would  not  resist  by  violence.  The  prayers  of 
the  faithful  were  the  only  weapons  of  his  defence. 
u Tradere  Basilicam  non  possum,  sed  pugnare  non 
debeo.” 

In  Ambrose  the  growing  self-consciousness  of  the 
Christian  church  is  manifest,  but  the  sphere  claimed 
for  its  independence  is  still  little  more  than  apostolic. 
Things  moral  and  divine,  where  its  authority  is  un- 
disputed, are  understood  as  trenching  very  slightly  on 
the  temporal  sphere,  in  which  the  authority  of  the 
state  is  undisputed  and  even  glorified.  In  Augustine 
there  is  more  manifest  a tendency  to  depreciate  the 
importance  of  the  forms  and  functions  of  political 
authority,  and  to  exalt  by  comparison  the  spiritual 
life  of  the  faithful.  His  most  comprehensive  work, 
De  Civitate  Dei , though  covering  substantially  the 
whole  realm  of  human  history,  theology  and  philoso- 

1 Goldast,  II,  12.  Cf  also  the  letter  to  his  sister,  in  which  Ambrose 
tells  the  story  of  the  whole  affair.  Ibid.  16. 


SAINT  AUGUSTINE 


157 


phy,  has  for  its  central  theme  the  concept  of  God’s 
elect  as  constituting  a commonwealth  of  the  redeemed^ 
in  the  world  to  come  — a commonwealth  of  which 
the  church  is  a symbol  on  earth.  In  developing  this 
idea,  he  works  consciously  on  Plato’s  lines1  and 
formulates  from  the  political  philosophy  of  that  mas- 
ter and  of  Cicero  a system  in  which  the  leading  dog- 
mas of  the  Christian  faith  assume  a controlling  part. 

But  while  dealing  with  law  and  politics,  and  the 
relations  of  men  and  nations  in  this  world,  all  such 
subjects  are  set  forth  as  merely  subsidiary  and  inci- 
dental to  the  divine  scheme  of  salvation  for  the  saints 
and  their  eternal  blessedness.2  The  summum  bonum  — . 
— the  end  of  the  universe  — is  peace,  harmony,  order. 
But  the  pax  terrena , of  which  the  household,  the  city 
and  the  social  world  are  expressions,  is  of  slight  con- 
sequence compared  with  the  pax  ceterna  — the  order 
of  life  immortal.  The  peace  of  the  body  is  as  nought 
compared  with  the  peace  of  the  soul.  The  right  of 
dominion  given  by  God  to  man  over  soulless  things 
illustrates  the  relative  significance  of  the  two.  And 
Augustine  here  incidentally  lays  down  the  Christian^ 
justification  of  slavery.  The  lot  of  .the  slaye_.is  the 
wages  of  sin.3  The  theory  of  the  Roman  jurists  that 
Tfie~  slave  is  he  whom  the  conqueror  in  battle  has 
spared  ( sevvave ) is  adopted,  with  the  additional  con- 
ception of  the  judgment  of  God:  “ Every  victory, 

1 Cf.  for  his  appreciation  of  Plato,  Be  Civ.  Dei , Lib.  VIII,  cap.  5,  6 
et  seq. 

2 De  Civ.  Dei , Lib.  XIX,  esp.  cap.  14  et  seq. 

3 “ Conditio  qnippe  servitutis  jure  intelligitur  imposita  pecca- 
tori.” 


158 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


even  thougli  it  falls  to  the  wicked,  is  a divine  judg- 
ment and  through  the  downfall  of  the  vanquished 
X either  atones  for  or  punishes  sin.”  But  to  the  Chris- 
tian submission  to  an  earthly  master  is  of  little 
moment,  in  the  assurance  that  in  life  immortal  all  is 
equality. 

The  character  of  Augustine’s  thought  is  as  well  as 
anywhere  illustrated  in  his  criticism  of  Cicero’s  concep- 
tion of  commonwealth  and  people.1  Embodying  the 
element  of  justice,  the  definition  will  not  apply,  the 
critic  holds,  to  a people  that  does  not  recognize  God. 
/ For  “ justice  is  that  virtue  which  gives  to  each  his 
* own,”  and  it  cannot  be  predicated  of  the  community 
which  takes  man  himself  away  from  God  and  gives 
him  to  demons.  This  is  not  giving  but  denying  to 
God  his  own.2  Justice  can  exist  only  in  a people  who 
worship  the  true  God.  Augustine  thus  not  only  de- 
preciates the  earthly  state  as  compared  with  the  state 
of  the  future  life,  but  denies  to  non-Christian  earthly 
states  all  social  virtue.  For  he  early  in  his  work 
lays  it  down  that  without  justice  there  is  nothing  to 
distinguish  a state  from  a band  of  brigands.8 

Two  centuries  after  Augustine,  in  the  writings  of 
Gregory  the  Great,  “ the  last  of  the  fathers,”  we  find 
the  same  general  spirit  as  in  Augustine,  with  an 
accentuation  of  the  stress  on  the  church,  the  priest- 
hood  and  the  things  of  the  spiritual  life.  Gregory 
was  thoroughly  monkish  in  temperament ; a seer  of 

1 A nte , p.  120. 

2 Op.  cit.,  Lib.  XIX,  cap.  21 ; cf  23  end,  and  24. 

3 Remota  justitia,  quid  sunt  regna  nisi  magna  latrocinia?  — Lib. 
IV,  cap.  4. 


GREGORY  THE  GREAT 


159 


visions,  a doer  and  discoverer  of  miracles  and  a deviser 
of  fanciful  interpretations  of  the  sacred  writings. /He 
lived  in  a constant  sense  of  besetting  angels  and 
demons,  and  of  the  impending  judgment  of  God. 
Yet  at  the  same  time  he  displayed  a remarkable 
appreciation  of  the  policy  demanded  by  the  actual 
conditions  which  surrounded  him  ; and  thus,  while  on 
the  one  hand  he  greatly  promoted  the  tendency  of 
the  faith  to  ignorance  and  superstition,  on  the  other 
he  maintained  Rome  from  being  overwhelmed  by  the 
Lombards,  and  set  the  Roman  see  fairly  on  the  way 
to  independence  and  exaltation.  To  the  Emperor  at 
Constantinople  Gregory  observed  and  even  emphasized 
the  forms  of  servility  which  were  the  custom  of  the 
day.  He  proclaimed  himself  mere  “dust  and  worm,” 
and  when  the  Emperor  called  him  a simpleton,  merely 
sought  consolation  in  the  Scriptures.1  But  this  pol- 
icy could  find  a cause  in  the  ever-present  danger 
from  the  Lombards,  and  it  in  no  way  altered  the 
writer’s  conviction  that  the  secular  power  was  less 
noble  than  the  spiritual.  In  protesting  against  a law 
that  soldiers  should  not  be  admitted  to  monasteries, 
he  declared  it  to  be  the  end  of  the  imperial  rule  “that 
the  way  to  heaven  may  be  more  accessible  and  that 
the  earthly  may  serve  the  celestial  kingdom.” 2 
Monks  are  the  soldiers  of  God,  and  priests  are  the 
servants  of  God  — are  like  angels  and  to  be  esteemed 
divine.  Finally,  no  one  can  rightly  wield  secular 

1 See  letters  in  Goldast,  II,  21-22. 

2 Ut . . . Coelonim  via  largius  pateat,  et  terrestre  regnum  coelesti 
regno  famuletur. — Ibid. 


160 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


power  who  knows  not  how  to  deal  with  things  divine; 
“ the  peace  of  the  state  depends  on  the  peace  of  the 
universal  church/’ 

After  Gregory  and  largely  through  his  influence 
sacerdotal  literature  — and  other  literature  there  was 
none  — became  destitute  of  political  bearing  till  the 
stirring  ages  of  the  Carolingians.  The  Gregorian 
type  of  thought  definitely  superseded  the  Augustin- 
ian;  the  ancient  pagan  writers  3^re-discard^4--as 
profane,  and  the  sole  recourse  of  the  monkish  scribes 
for  history,  theology  or  law  was  to  the  Bible  or  to 
the  “ fathers.”  This  fact  gave  a peculiar  character 
to  the  controversies  of  the  Middle  Age. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Blakey,  Vol.  I,  chaps,  v and  viii.  Baxmann,  Die  Politik 
der  Papste  von  Gregor  I bis  auf  Gregor  VII,  Buch  I,  cap.  i-iv. 
Bury,  Later  Homan  Empire,  Vol.  I,  chaps,  i-iii ; II,  pp.  149- 
158.  Dill,  Roman  Society,  pp.  59  et  seq.,  387-391.  Gieseler, 
Church  History,  trails.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  66-94,  263-267,  439- 
462.  Janet,  Vol.  I,  pp.  279-325.  Laurent,  Histoire  de 
Vhumanite,  Tome  IV,  pp.  65-234,  495  et  seq.  Milman,  Latin 
Christianity,  Vol.  I,  pp.  120-124;  II,  39-103.  Moeller, 
History  of  the  Christian  Church,  a.d.  1-600,  pp.  49-93,  453 
et  seq.  Nourrisson,  La  Philosophic  de  Saint  Augustin , Tome 
I,  chap,  v;  II,  398  et  seq.  Pingaud,  La  Politique  de  Saint 
Grtyoire  le  Grand.  Schaff,  History  of  the  Christian  Church, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  103,  107-110,  197-205,  739  et  seq.;  Ill,  85-89,  816- 
856,  961-972,  988  et  seq.  Carlyle,  “The  Political  Theory  of 
the  Ante-Nicene  Fathers,”  in  The  Economic  Review,  IX, 
361-371. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THEORIES  DURING  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  ECCLESI- 
ASTICAL HEGEMONY 

1.  Development  and  Method  of  Reasoning 

The  momentary  impulse  given  to  learning  by 
Charlemagne’s  enlightened  policy  did  not  result  in 
any  notable  contribution  to  political  theory  during 
the  Emperor’s  own  lifetime.  But  the  leading  pait 
taken  by  the  higher  clergy  in  the  conflicts  over  the 
partition  of  his  dominion  precipitated  the  debate  on 
what  has  been  said  to  have  constituted  the  core  of 
mediseval  political  thought  — the  relation  of  the^ 
ecclesiastical  to  the  secular  power.  The  general 
trend  of  this  debate,  from  the  ninth  to  the  thir- 
teenth century,  following  closely  the  trend  of  objec- 
tive fact,  was  toward  a well-rounded  theory,  first  of 
ecclesiastical  and  then  of  papal  hegemony  in  world- 
politics.  literature  in  which  this  theory  is 

embodied  is  for  the  most  part  a literature  of  con- 
troversy on  concrete  temporary  issues.  For  our 
purpose  it  is  not  necessary  to  follow  the  varying 
phases  of  the  debate.  We  may  be  content  with  the 
mere  mention  of  the  leading  participants,  and  a 
more  or  less  systematic  account  of  the  doctrine  to 
the  ensemble  of  which  all  of  them  contributed. 


162 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


In  the  ninth  century  the  great  names  are  those  of 
* Agobard,1  Bishop  of  Lyons  (779-840?),  prominent 
in  the  strife  between  Emperor  Louis  the  Pious  and 
his  sons ; Hincmar,2  Archbishop  of  Rheims  (806  ?- 
822),  the  all-powerful  primate  of  the  Gallic  churclT; 
^ and  Pope  Nicholas  I (pontificate  8 5 8-8 6 7). 3 The 

tenth  century  is  practically  a blank  for  our  purpose, 
but  the  next  two  centuries  are  rich  in  powerful 
debaters  of  the  theory  under  discussion.  In  the 
Hildebrandine  age  may  be  named,  besides  Pope 
„ Gregory  YII  himself  (pontificate  1073-1085) 4 and 
his  imperial  adversary,  Henry  IV,5  Manegold  of  Lut- 
terbach,  who  put  forth  an  elaborate  argument  in 
“■*  behalf  of  the  Pope,6  and  the  German  bishops,  The- 
oderic  of  Verdun  and  Waltram  of  Nauinburg,  who 
wrote  in  behalf  of  the  Emperor.  The  twelfth  cen- 
tury produced  on  the  one  side  St.  Bernard,7  John  of 
Salisbury8  and  the  influential  Decretum  of  Gratian,9  in 
which,  by  the  collection,  comparison  and  reconcili- 
ation of  ecclesiastical  authorities,  the  hierarchical 
theory  was  reduced  to  the  form  of  a legal  system ; 
and  on  the  other,  the  supporters  of  the  Emperor 
x*  Frederick  Barbarossa  and  the  jurists  of  the  Civil  Law, 
whose  commentaries  on  Justinian  afforded  the  best 
theoretical  defence  for  the  imperial  jurisdiction.  The 

1 Works,  in  Migne,  Patrologia  Latina , Vol.  104. 

2 Ibid.  Vols.  125,  126. 

8 Ibid.  Vol.  119.  * Ibid.  Vol.  148. 

5 His  official  documents  are  in  Goldast,  Collectio  Constitutionum 
Imperialium.  Also  in  the  Monumenta  Germanice  Historical  Constitu- 
tiones. 

6 In  the  Monumenta. , Libelli  de  Lite , Vol.  I,  p.  308. 

7 Migne,  Vols.  182-185.  8 Ibid.  Vol.  199. 


• Ibid.  Vol.  187. 


METHOD  OF  IIEASONING 


163 


fully  rounded  ecclesiastical  theory,  at  the  climax  of 
actual  ecclesiastical  power,  is  to  be  found  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Pope  Innocent  III  (pontificate  1198— 1216).1  - 
The  method  characteristic  of  all  the  reasoning  of 
these  centuries  was  that  to  which  Gregory  the  Great 
had  given  the  impulse.  A certain  few  precedents 
of  profane  history  were  appealed  to,  but  beyond  this 
the  Bible  and  the  teachings  of  the  church  fathers- 
were  held  to  be  conclusive.  Of  the  latter,  St.  Au- 
gustine was  most  abundantly  drawn  upon,  with 
Gregory  the  Great  in  the  second  place.  Augustine’s 
extensive  ramblings  in  secular  history  were,  how- 
ever, disregarded,  though  the  influence  of  his  appeal 
to  history  was  manifest  in  the  use  made  of  the  Old 
Testament.  The  increasing  resort  to  the  Old  Testar 
ment  as  compared  with  the  New  furnishes,  indeed,  a 
fairly  accurate  measure  of  the  intensifying  of  the 
conflict  between  the  ecclesiastical  and  the  secular 
power.  The  indifferentism  and  submissiveness  of 
Jesus  and  the  apostles  were  feeble  weapons  in  com- 
parison with  the  aggressive  tone  found  in  the  law 
and  the  prophets  of  the  Old  Dispensation.  It  was 
universally  assumed  that  the  history  of  the  children 
of  Israel  was  a direct  prefiguring  of  the  life  of  the 
Christian  church,  and  that  the  canonical  Scriptures 
were  literally  inspired  by  God,  and  hence  were  in- 
fallible guides.  On  these  assumptions,  the  appeal 
to  Israelitish  history  and  institutions  could  not  be 
attacked  by  either  side,  and  had  to  be  made  by 
both.  Hence  it  was  that  the  discussions  of  the 
1 Migne,  Vols.  214-217. 


164 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


period  consisted  very  largely  in  citations  from  the 
Bible,  interpreted  and  commented  upon  in  what  is  to 
the  modern  mind  an  insufferably  blind  and  uncritical 
spirit.  And  thus  it  was  that  human  experience,  out- 
side of  the  one  people  whose  records  were  embodied 
in  the  Scriptures,  had  slight  influence  upon  the 
political  theory  of  the  Middle  Age. 

As  described  in  the  Old  Testament,  the  institu- 
tions of  the  Israelitisli  state  appear  purely  theocratic. 
Government  is  administered  under  laws  and  through 
organs  whose  existence  is  derived  from  the  direct 
manifestation  of  God’s  will.  The  Levitical  priest- 
hood, the  judges  and  the  prophets  perform  the  grav- 
est functions  in  the  state  under  immediate  divine 
mandates.  And  when  royalty  is  established  in 
Israel,  the  kings  are  represented  as  hedged  about 
by  the  ancient  theocratic  traditions,  and  as  com- 
monly determined,  in  both  the  origin  and  the  exer- 
cise of  their  power,  by  priests  and  prophets,  through 
whom  the  will  of  God  is  made  manifest. 

By  this  conception  of  the  Israelitisli  state,  the 
mediaeval  theory  of  politics  was  decisively  influenced. 
No  doubt  was  raised  that  the  priesthood  of  the 
Christian  church  wras  prefigured  by  the  Levites  and 
the  prophets  of  the  old  dispensation,  and  that  the 
relations  of  the  latter  to  the  kings  in  Israel  and  Ju- 
dah were  a divinely  ordained  symbol  of  the  relations 
that  ought  always  to  prevail.  Accordingly,  argu- 
ment took  the  form  of  a citation  of  instances  in 
which  God’s  favour  could  be  construed  as  resting 
decisively  with  royal  or  with  sacerdotal  authority 


OLD  TESTAMENT  PRECEDENT 


165 


respectively.  In  this  sort  of  discussion  the  ecclesias- 
tical debaters  had  a distinct  advantage  in  the  fact 
that  the  ancient  record  almost  invariably  ascribed  — 
the  greatest  prosperity  to  those  monarchs  who  were 
most  subservient  to  the  priests  and  prophets.  It 
seems  clear,  moreover,  that  the  resort  to  the  Old 
Testament  and  the  resulting  advantage  to  the  eccle- 
siastical argument  were  promoted  by  the  mere  fact^ 
that  secular  authority  in  Europe  passed  from  an 
emperor  to  a series  of  kings.  No  such  dignitary 
as  Imperator  or  Augustus  or  Caesar  appears  in  the 
Old  Testament,  while  kings  figure  there  in  great 
numbers.  To  the  mediaeval  mind  a text  embodying 
a reference  to  a “ king  ” by  that  title  was  decisive 
without  further  investigation.  “ Emperor  ” signified 
something  higher,  and  the  claims  of  imperial  au- 
thority had  to  be  met  by  a somewhat  different  line 
of  reasoning.1  Kings  could  be  denounced  in  the 
very  words  of  divine  inspiration;  to  humble  the 
Emperor  resort  was  necessary^  to  the  general  preemi- 
nence of  the  spiritual  authority. 

2.  The  Dogma  of  the  Tivo  Powers 

The  starting-point  in  all  mediaeval  theorizing  on 
politics  was  the  dogma  of  the  two  powers.  The 

1 The  consciousness  of  this  distinction  is  shown  in  the  letter  of 
Gregory  VII  to  Hermann  of  Metz  ( Regis trum,  lib.  iv,  epist.  2)  : 

“ Ambrosius  non  solum  regem  sed  etiam  revera  imperatorem  . . . 
excommunicavit.”  Gregory  never  recognized  Henry  IV  as  Emperor. 
The  earlier  distinction  between  royal  and  imperial  dignity  is  exhibited 
in  a letter  of  Alcuin  quoted  in  Gieseler,  Church  History  (translation, 
N.Y.  1865),  Vol.  II,  p.  38,  note.  For  the  wdiole  letter,  see  Jaffe,  Biblio- 
theca Rerum  Germanicarum , Vol.  VI,  p.  463. 


166 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


accepted  formula  for  the  dogma  was  a dictum  said  to 
have  occurred  in  a letter  of  Pope  Gelasius  to  the 
Emperor  Anastasius  (494  a.d.)  : — 

There  are  two  systems  under  which  chiefly  this  world  is 
governed,  the  sacred  authority  of  the  priests  and  the  royal 
power.  Of  these  the  greater  weight  is  with  the  priests  in  so 
far  as  they  will  answer  to  the  Lord  even  for  kings  in  the  last 
judgment.1 

This  text  recurs  very  frequently  throughout  the  con- 
troversies of  the  times.  To  the  ecclesiastics  the 
second  clause  naturally  rendered  it  especially  attrac- 
tive. Hincmar  cites  it  wherever  he  touches  on  the 
subject-matter;2  Gregory  VII  employs  it  in  defending 
his  proceedings  against  Henry  of  Germany;  and  it 
found  a place  in  the  compilation  of  Gratian.3  Nor 
was  the  fact  of  the  twofold  authority  disputed  by  the 
opponents  of  ecclesiastical  pretensions.  The  actuality 
of  sacerdotal  power  was  too  conspicuous  a feature 
' of  the  period  to  be  disregarded,  however  stoutly  the 
extreme  deductions  of  the  priests  as  to  the  extent 
of  their  sway  might  be  resisted. 

For  the  establishment  and  perpetuation  of  the  dual 
system  of  authority,  proofs  of  divine  sanction  were 

1 Mansi,  Sacrorum  Conciliorum  Collection  VIII,  31 ; cf.  Gieseler,  II, 

49.  “ Duo  quippe  sunt,  imperator  Auguste,  quibus  principaliter 

mundus  hie  regitur,  auctoritas  sacrata  pontificum  et  regalis  potestas. 
In  quibus  tanto  gravius  est  pondus  sacerdotum  quanto  etiam  pro  ipsis 
regibus  Domino  in  divino  reddituri  sunt  examine  rationem.” 

2 E.g.,  Ad  Proceres  Regni pro  institutions  Carlomanni  Regis , cap.  i; 
Ad  Episcopos  Regni  Admonitio , cap.  i;  Capitula  in  Synodo  apud 
S.  Macram , cap.  i ; Epist.  ad  Ludovicum  III , Regem ; De  Divortio 
Lotharii  et  T ether gae. 

3 Decretum , Dist.  96,  can.  10. 


DOGMA  OF  THE  TWO  POWERS 


167 


brought  forward  in  abundance.  Hincmar’s  doctrine 
was  that  Jesus  alone  could  have  become,  like  the 
pagan  rulers,  both  priest  and  king,  but  he  elected  not 
to  unite  the  two  functions ; and  after  his  ascension 
no  king  presumed  to  exercise  priestly,  nor  priest  to 
mingle  in  royal,  powers.1  And  another  dictum  of 
Pope  Gelasius  enjoyed  throughout  the  Middle  Ages 
equal  authority  with  that  referred  to  above : — 

The  Mediator  between  God  and  men,  the  man  Christ  Jesus, 
by  marking  out  the  methods  and  dignities  appropriate  to  each, 
so  distinguished  between  the  duties  of  the  two  powers  . . . 
that  the  Christian  emperors  should  need  the  priests  for  the 
sake  of  eternal  life,  and  the  priests  should  make  use  of  the 
imperial  laws  for  the  course  of  temporal  affairs  only.2 

With  the  resort  to  the  Old  Testament  fully  estab- 
lished, the  authority  of  Jesus  to  separate  the  two 
powers  was  found  prefigured  in  that  of  Melchisedek, 
who  was  both  priest  and  king,  and  of  David,  who  was  w 
prophet  and  king,  and  in  the  fact  that  Jesus  was  of 
both  royal  and  sacerdotal  lineage.3  Even  the  creation 
of  the  sun  and  moon,  which  was  made  by  Innocent  III 
the  basis  of  a rather  striking  simile,4  assumed  the 
character  of  a calculated  symbol  of  the  divine  will  in 
'respect  to  the  two  species  of  authority.  The  distinc- 
tion between  body  and  soul  afforded  another  analogy 
which  was  frequently  appealed  to;  and  the  “two 

1 Capitula  apud  S.  Macram , cap.  i.  Also  Admonitio  ad  Episcopos , 

cap.  i. 

2 Decretum  Gratiani , Dist.  10,  can.  8,  and  Dist.  96,  can.  6.  In  both 
places  the  passage  is  quoted  from  a letter  of  Pope  Nicholas  I. 

8 Innocent  III,  Responsio  Nuntiis  Philippi , Reg.  de  Neg.  Rom. 
Imp.  18.  4 Reg.  lib.  i,  epist.  401. 


168 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


swords”  exhibited  to  Jesus  by  the  disciples1  played 
ultimately  a prominent  part  in  the  thought  of  an  age 
that  was  inordinately  sensitive  to  dualism. 

But  however  fixed  the  idea  of  a distinction  of 
powers,  there  was  theoretically  no  cause  for  conflict 
between  them.  A perfect  harmony  was  conceived 
as  the  divinely  ordained  relation.  Things  temporal 
were  the  domain  of  royalty,  things  spiritual  that  of 
the  priesthood.  The  sphere  of  each  was  decreed  by 
God  for  the  exclusive  administration  of  each.  As  the 
emperors  and  kings  claimed  no  authority  in  spiritual 
affairs,  so  the  bishops  and  popes  claimed  no  authority 
in  secular  affairs.  The  purpose  of  the  distinction 
between  the  'twc*  powers  was  clearly  laid  down  in 
the  continuation  of  the  passage  last  quoted  from 
Gelasius : — 

In  order  that  spiritual  action  may  be  free  from  carnal  inter- 
ruptions, and  thus  that  “ no  man  who  warreth  for  God  should 
entangle  himself  in  the  affairs  of  this  world  ” (2  Tim.  ii,  4)  ; 
and  in  turn  that  he  who  has  been  involved  in  secular  business 
should  not  be  seen  directing  what  is  divine. 

Theoretically,  thus,  there  would  appear  to  have  been 
no  basis  for  the  age-long  conflict  of  the  powers.  But 
the  difficulty  arose  from  the  lack  of  any  clear  defi- 
^ nition  as  to  what  was  secular  and  what  was  spiritual. 
The  ground  on  which  the  great  churchmen  attacked 
princes  was  that  the  latter  were  encroaching  upon 
the  spiritual  domain,  and  the  plea  of  the  princes 
always  was  that  the  churchmen  were  mingling  in 


1 Luke  xxii,  38.  See  St.  Bernard,  De  Consideratione,  lib.  iv. 


SACERDOTAL  PREEMINENCE 


169 


secular  affairs.1  In  the  nature  of  the  things  the 
dispute  could  never  be  definitely  decided  by  theory. 
As  in  all  similar  matters  of  wide  human  concern 
there  was  a broad  field  in  which  no  precise  and  per- 
manent line  of  demarcation  could  be  drawn,  and  in 
wThich  the  assignment  of  specific  cases  to  the  one  or 
the  other  category  must  vary  with  social  conditions 
and  with  the  general  spirit  of  the  age. 

3.  The  Argument  for  Sacerdotal  Preeminence 

In  the  centuries  during  wThich  the  clash  of  the 
powers  was  most  intense,  the  social  and  intellectual 
conditions  were  wholly  favourable  to  the  ecclesi- 
astical cause,  and  a theory  of  general  sacerdotal 
preeminence  was  matured  which  appealed  very 
effectively  to  the  sentiment  of  the  times.  The 
development  of  this  theory  stood  in  close  relation 
to  the  doctrines  upon  wdiich  was  erected  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  Roman  see  in  the  church.  But  since  the 
latter  lie  without  the  field  of  political  theory,  they 
will  be  passed  over.  The  only  effect  of  the  so-called 
Petrine  dogma  upon  the  general  argument  was  to 
shift  somewhat  the  emphasis  placed  upon  the  par- 
ticular items. 

This  argument,  broadly  considered,  followed  two 
lines : first,  that  from  the  essential  character  of  the 

1 1 have  found  no  case  in  the  period  with  which  we  are  concerned 
of  a claim  by  laymen  to  spiritual  power  as  such ; and  no  claim  by  the 
clergy  to  direct  control  in  temporal  affairs,  except  that  Innocent  III 
asserted  for  the  Papacy  in  certain  cases  an  incidental  jurisdiction : 
“ certis  causis  inspectis,  temporalem  jurisdictionem  casualiter  exerce- 
mus.”  — Reg.  lib.  v,  epist.  128. 


170 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


two  species  of  authority  the  greater  dignity  pertained 
to  the  spiritual  and  hence  gave  precedence  to  those 
in  whom  its  exercise  was  vested ; second,  that  God 
had  directly  conferred  upon  the  church  such  power 
of  inspection  and  correction  in  reference  to  the  char- 
acter  and  motives  of  secular  rulers  as  carried  neces- 
sarily, though  indirectly,  a control  over  their  acts 
wherever  a question  of  sin  or  morals  was  involved. 

The  first  idea  was  an  immediate  consequence  of 
the  views  of  the  early  church  as  to  the  relative  im- 
portance of  the  earthly  life  and  the  life  to  come.1 

^-As  the  saving  of  souls  was  infinitely  more  important 
than  the  regulation  of  mere  physical  life,  so  the 
savers  of  souls  were  infinitely  more  worthy  of  honour 
than  the  regulators  of  physical  life.  Ambrose  had 
said  that  the  glory  of  princes  was  to  the  glory  of 
bishops  as  the  brightness  of  lead  to  the  brightness  of 
gold ; and  this  saying  was  a feature  of  all  the  sacer- 
dotal arguments  of  the  later  age.  Kings  and  princes, 
said  Gregory  VII,  in  that  letter  to  Hermann  of 
Metz2  in  which  the  professions  of  humility  are  in 
such  striking  contrast  to  the  manifestations  of  arro- 
gance, cannot  cast  out  devils,  cannot  rescue  from 
perdition  the  soul  of  a dying  sinner,  nay,  must  them- 
selves come  humbly  to  the  priests  for  baptism  and 
absolution.  No  king  or  emperor  has  raised  the  dead 
to  life,  has  healed  the  lepers,  or  has  made  the  blind 
to  see.  “ From  which  is  gathered  how  far  the  sacer- 
dotal dignity  exceeds  the  princely.,,  This  conclusion 
was  also  supported  by  the  analogy  of  the  body  and 
1 Supra , pp.  155,  157.  2 Reg.  lib.  viii,  epist.  22. 


SACERDOTAL  PREEMINENCE 


171 


the  soul  — as  the  soul  is  more  noble  than  the  body, 
so  is  the  priesthood  than  royalty  — and  by  that  of  — 
the  sun  and  moon,  symbolizing  sacerdotium  and  reg- 
nuTYi  respectively.  And  finally,  a characteristic  in- 
terpretation of  Old  Testament  history  derived  a proof 
of  greater  dignity  from  the  greater  antiquity  of  the 
sacerdotal  office.  Innocent  III  saw  in  Noah,  as  cap- 
tain of  the  ark  (rector  arcce),  a symbol  of  the  priest 
of  the  church  ( quasi  sacerdos  ecclesice ),  but  was  able 
to  get  even  nearer  the  beginning  of  things  by  point- 
ing to  the  sacerdotal  act  of  Abel,  who  “ brought  of^ 
the  firstlings  of  his  flock  and  of  the  fat  thereof ; and 
the  Lord  had  respect  unto  Abel  and  his  offering.” 1 

The  second  line  of  argument  in  the  theory  of  cleri- 
cal supremacy  developed  its  peculiar  strength  out  of 
the  distinction  which  early  became  so  clearly  marked 
between  the  clerical  and  the  lay  elements  in  the'-'* 
church  and  the  elimination  of  the  latter  element 
from  all  authority  in  ecclesiastical  functions,  whether 
spiritual  or  merely  administrative.  Secular  princes 
were  laymen.  To  the  sacerdotal  mind  they  were  of 
all  laymen  the  class  most  prone  to  sin,  and  therefore  ' 
most  in  need  of  clerical  censure.  No  fault  can  pos- 
sibly be  found  with  the  ideal  of  character  and  conduct 
which  the  mediaeval  clergy  set  up  for  princes.2  But 

1 Innocent  III,  Reg.  de  Neg.  Rom.  Imp.  xviii.  This  argument  was 
used  as  early  as  Agobard.  Cf.  his  Epist.  ad  Bernardum : De  Priv.  et 
Jure  Sacerdotii.  In  the  above  cited  decretal  of  Innocent  is  contained 
an  elaborate  and  formal  argument  for  the  superior  dignity  of  the 
priesthood,  including  the  citation  of  many  other  texts  of  Scripture 
whose  connection  with  the  subject  cannot  to-day  be  detected ; e.g.  the 
vision  of  Peter  recorded  in  Acts  x. 

2 C/.  IIincmar,  Ad.  Episcopos  Admonitio  pro  Carolomanno,  cap.  3,  4. 


172 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


just  in  proportion  as  the  requirements  were  more 
exacting  the  occasions  for  priestly  reproof  were  more 
numerous.  Among  the  duties  of  kings  that  were 
most  imperatively  insisted  upon  were  respect  for 
and  protection  of  the  church  and  its  ministers. 
Upon  the  form  and  manner  of  fulfilling  this  duty 
there  were  naturally  wide  divergences  of  opinion 
between  churchmen  and  secular  rulers,  and  out  of 
these  differences  arose  the  most  critical  of  the 
mediaeval  controversies. 

The  case  for  sacerdotal  jurisdiction  was  effectively 
presented  by  Hincmar  in  his  discussion  of  the  divorce 
of  Lothaire.1  The  contention  of  the  king’s  defenders 
that  the  king’s  acts  are  independent  of  episcopal 
judgment  and  subject  only  to  that  of  God,  is  con- 
cisely declared  to  be  blasphemous  and  diabolical. 
This  contention  may  be  true,  Hincmar  admits,  of  the 
good  king;  but  the  unjust  or  tyrannical  ruler,  like 
all  sinners,  must  be  judged  by  the  priests,2  “ who  are 
the  thrones  of  God,  in  whom  he  has  his  seat  and 
through  whom  he  decrees  his  judgments.”  From 
the  Scriptures  Hincmar  gathers  all  the  texts  which 
were  most  relied  upon  throughout  the  period.  Jesus 
himself  directly  conferred  on  the  church  the  final 
authority  in  disputes  between  brethren,  adding  this 


1 De  Divortio  Lotharii  et  Tether  gee,  Qusestio  VI,  of  the  seven  supple- 
mentary questions  at  the  end  of  the  work.  Cf  supra , p.  145. 

2 “ Yel  secrete  vel  publice”;  that  is,  in  the  confessional  or  in  the 
synod.  The  extension  of  the  power  of  absolution  of  penitents  after 
confession,  to  cover  the  claim  to  the  right  of  publicly  absolving  or 
condemning  a king  for  his  official  acts,  was  characteristic  of  the 
period  under  consideration. 


SACERDOTAL  PREEMINENCE 


173 


plenary  grant  of  power  to  the  disciples : “ What- 
soever ye  shall  bind  on  earth  shall  be  bound  in 
heaven ; and  whatsoever  ye  shall  loose  on  earth  shall 
be  loosed  in  heaven.”  1 The  Old  Testament  record^ 
shows  God  continually  employing  the  prophets  as 
messengers  of  his  wrath  or  mercy  to  kings.  Samuel 
announced  the  divine  judgment  to  Saul,  Nathan  to 
David,  Ahijali  to  Jeroboam.2  And  in  the  law  of 
Moses  the  symbol  of  sacerdotal  jurisdiction  is  found 
embodied  in  the  formal  establishment  of  a court  of 
Levites  for  last  resort  in  difficult  and  doubtful  cases^. 
Later  protagonists  of  the  ecclesiastical  cause  dis- 
covered or  emphasized  other  texts  from  the  word 
of  God.  Gregory  YII  and  all  the  adherents  of  the 
advanced  Petrine  theory,  laid  especial  stress  on  the 
injunction  of  Jesus  to  Peter,  “Feed  my  sheep,” 4 
which  was  construed  as  a charge  of  universal  pas-^ 
toral  authority  from  which  kings  were  not  ex- 
empted.5 And  Innocent  III,  whose  ingenuity  in 
defending  his  claims  to  jurisdiction  was  quite  com- 
mensurate with  his  boldness  in  asserting  them,  fail  ly 
exhausted  the  possibilities  of  tnis  species  of  reason- 
ing. He  even  derived  from  an  interpretation  of 
Deuteronomy  xvii,  8-12,  the  conclusion  that  difficult 
and  doubtful  questions  of  all  kinds,  both  ecclesiasti- 
cal and  civil,  might  properly  be  referred  to  the  papal 
see  for  adjudication.6 

1 Matt,  xviii,  15-18.  Cf  Luke,  x,  16. 

2 1 Sam.  xiii  and  xv ; 2 Sam.  xii ; 1 Kings  xi.  3 Deut.  xvii,  8-13. 

4 John  xxi,  15-17.  5 Gregory  VII,  Reg.  lib.  iv,  epist.  2. 

6 Lib.  v,  epist.  128.  This  is  a “ leading  case  ” in  the  medieval 

« conflict  of  the  laws.”  It  contains  the  papal  decision  on  an  applica- 


174 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


After  the  time  of  Gregory  VII,  however,  the  crux 
of  the  claim  to  superior  authority  by  the  ecclesias- 
^ tical  power  lay  in  the  method  of  enforcing  its  judg- 
ments, especially  against  the  bearers  of  ultimate 
political  power.  The  final  penalty  of  the  church 
was  excommunication  and  anathema.  This,  it  was 
consistently  held,  corresponded  to  the  death  penalty 
in  the  Mosaic  law : for  the  church  of  the  New  Dis- 
pensation did  not  wield  the  sword  of  blood;  its 
weapon  was  the  sword  of  the  spirit.  But  when  the 
terrors  of  excommunication  ceased  to  make  rulers  re- 
spect the  church,  the  power  to  depose  a monarch  wras 
J asserted,  and  was  made  effective  through  the  power 
to  release  subjects  from  the  oath  of  allegiance.  Under 
the  feudal  organization  of  society  the  political  signifi- 
cance of  this  oath  was  very  great.  But  the  relation 
to  God  that  was  created  by  the  oath  easily  brought 
the  matter  within  the  domain  of  things  spiritual.1 

A specific  grant  of  control  over  the  bond  between 
ruler  and  subjects  was  found  in  the  authority  to  “ bind 
and  loose  ” conferred  by  Jesus  on  the  disciples  in  the 
text  of  Matthew  quoted  above.  But  the  Old  Testa- 
ment yielded  a host  of  confirmatory  texts.  Most  far- 

tion  for  the  legitimation  of  the  natural  children  of  William,  Lord  of 
Montpellier.  The  decision  is  that  legitimating  is  a secular  act,  and 
the  petition  is  denied.  But  the  Pope  argues  at  length  that  the  papal 
jurisdiction  might  cover  it;  for  the  adultery  from  which  the  children 
sprang  was  a sin,  and  subject  to  sacerdotal  judgment.  The  whole 
document  is  characteristic  of  the  times ; and  the  interpretation  of  the 
text  of  Deuteronomy  is  particularly  noteworthy.  Cf  Janet,  op.  cit ., 
I,  352. 

1 The  right  to  absolve  is  defended  at  length  in  a letter  of  Gebhard 
of  Salzburg  to  Hermann  of  Metz,  in  Migne,  Patrologia , Vol.  148, 
p.  817. 


SACERDOTAL  PREEMINENCE 


175 


reaching  was  God’s  commission  to  the  prophet  Jere- 
miah : “ See,  I have  this  day  set  thee  over  the 
nations  and  over  the  kingdoms,  to  root  out,  and 
to  pull  down,  and  to  destroy,  and  to  throw  down, 
to  build,  and  to  plant.” 1 In  addition,  appeal  was 
made  to  the  whole  series  of  incidents  in  which  tyran-v 
nic  kings  in  Israel  had  been  denounced,  and  their 
doom  foretold,  by  prophets.  And  finally  a number 
of  precedents  in  the  history  of  Christian  times  were 
always  cited,  to  show  that  practice  had  conformed  to 
this  theory  of  ecclesiastical  control.  Theodosius,  it  was 
said,  was  deprived  by  Ambrose  of  the  exercise  of  his 
imperial  powers  till  he  should  have  repented  of  his  sin.2  ^ 
Chilperic,  the  last  of  the  Merovingians,  was  deposed 
and  his  subjects  were  released  from  their  oath  by 
Pope  Zacharias,  and  this  not  because  of  sin  on  the 
part  of  the  king,  but  merely  because  of  incompetency. 
The  coropation  of  Charlemagne  by  Pope  Leo  came 
to  be  habitually  treated  as  a transfer  of  imperial^ 
authority  from  the  East  to  the  West,  and  as  a grant 
of  such  authority  to  the  Frankish  monarch,  with  the 
corollary  that  he  who  bestowed  could  deny  or  with- 
draw it.  In  the  greatest  heat  of  controversy,  further- 
more, much  stress  was  laid  by  some  defenders  of  the 
papal  cause  on  the  fable  known  as  the  “ Donation  of 
Constantine.”  This  story,  which  became  especially’' 
prominent  through  its  incorporation  in  the  Decretum 

1 Jer.  i,  11.  Cf.  an  elaborate  comparison  of  this  with  the  commis- 
sion of  Jesus  to  the  disciples,  by  Innocent  III,  in  Reg.  de  Neg.  Rom. 
Imp.  xviii. 

2 This  exaggerated  version  of  the  incident  (supra,  p.  145)  is  given  by 
John  of  Salisbury,  Polycraticus , Bk.  IV,  ch.  iii. 


176 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


of  Gratian,1  narrated  with  much  detail  how  Constan- 
tine the  Great,  upon  his  removal  to  Constantinople, 
had  conferred  all  his  imperial  authority  in  the  West 
upon  Pope  Sylvester,  thus  giving  to  the  latter  the 
priority  as  a secular  ruler  over  all  the  kings  in  that 
v region.  But  the  most  clear-sighted  supporters  of  the 
Papacy  disregarded  this  argument,  as  implying  that 
some  portion  of  the  papal  power  was  derived  from  man 
rather  than  from  God  direct,  and  found  a much  more 
secure  basis  for  their  position  in  the  general  character  of 
the  sacerdotal  function  as  compared  with  the  political. 

With  a wide  basis  in  custom  and  public  sentiment 
for  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  over  many  classes  of 
legal  controversies ; with  an  exclusive  control  of 
such  as  could  be  shown  to  be  spiritual  in  character ; 
with  the  facility  for  extending  this  control  that 
inhered  in  the  doctrine  that  it  embraced  whatever 
actions  were  in  any  way  tainted  with  sin  ; and  with 
the  power  to  enforce  its  interpretation  of  its  author- 
ity by  the  deposition  of  secular  rulers  from  power,  — 
the  mediaeval  church  was  in  fact,  if  not  in  theory,  a 
most  potent  -political  institution. 

4.  The  Argument  for  Princely  Independence 

The  ground  taken  by  the  secular  rulers  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  claims  of  the  ecclesiastical  power  was  in 
general  that  which  is  known  at  the  present  time  as 

1 Dist.  96,  can.  13  and  14.  The  other  famous  work  of  forgery 
in  the  mediaeval  conflict,  the  pseudo-Isidorian  Decretals,  have  no 
direct  interest  in  this  place,  as  they  were  designed  and  employed 
almost  exclusively  in  the  purely  ecclesiastical  struggle  which  estab- 
lished the  primacy  of  the  Roman  see. 


PRINCELY  INDEPENDENCE 


177 


the  doctrine  of  the  divine  right  of  kings.  Conceding 
the  distinction  of  the  two  powers  by  Jesus,  it  held 
that  the  prince’s  function  was  as  much  divine  in 
origin  and  character  as  the  priest’s,  and  that  the 
final  responsibility  for  princely  acts  was  to  £rod 
alone.1  That  kings  ought  to  rule  with  justice,  to 
protect  and  promote  the  welfare  of  the  church  and 
its  priesthood,  and  to  be  benefactors  of  their  people, 
was  freely  admitted.  But  failure  in  any  of  these 
respects  did  not  divest  them  of  the  royal  character 
or  subject  them  to  other  than  purely  spiritual  pen- 
alties. Their  punishment  would  ensue,  not  in  this, 
but  in  the  future  life.  The  king,  whether  good  or^ 
bad,  is,  so  the  argument  ran,  the  instrument  of  a 
divine  purpose.  His  beneficence  betokens  God’s 
mercy,  his  cruelty,  God’s  wrath  toward  the  subject 
people.  The  duty  of  all  is  submission  to  his  will, 
and  the  only  recourse  against  the  evils  of  tyranny  is 
repentance  for  ^in  and  prayer  to  God.2 

This  whole  doctrine,  with  its  conclusion  of  passive 
obedience,  was  made  to  rest,  in  the  resort  to  Scripture 
texts,  mainly  on  the  disclaimer  by  Jesus  of  secular 
authority  and  on  the  injunctions  of  Paul  and  Peter.^ 

1 This  doctrine  is  concisely  stated,  for  the  purpose  of  refutation, 
in  Ilincmar’s  essay,  De  Div.  Lothar.  et  Tet. : Dicnnt  alii  Sapientes  quia 
iste  princeps  rex  est,  et  nullorum  legibns  vel  judiciis  subjacet  nisi 
solins  Dei  . . . et  sicut  a suis  episcopis,  quidquid  egerit,  non  debet 
excommunicari,  ita  ab  aliis  episcopis  non  potest  judicari,  quoniam 
solius  Dei  principatui  debet  subjici,  a quo  solo  in  principatu  consti- 
tuit,  et  quod  facit  et  qualis  est  in  regimine,  divino  sit  nutu. 

2 For  a temperate  exposition  of  this  doctrine,  see  Hugo  Floriacen- 

sis,  Tractatus  de  Regia  Potestate  et  Sacerdotali  Dignitate,  in  Monumenta 
Germanics  Historica,  Libelli  de  Lite , II,  465 ; esp.  lib.  i,  cap.  9,  and 
lib.  ii,  cap.  6.  8 Rom.  xiii,  1-7 ; 1 Peter  ii,  15-17. 


x 


178 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


The  apostolic  commands  were  indeed  so  direct  and 
explicit  that  it  gave  the  ecclesiastics  no  little  trouble 
to  escape  the  force  of  their  literal  application.1  Paul 
declares : — 

The  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of  God.  Whosoever  there- 
fore resisteth  the  power  resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God.  . . . 
He  is  the  minister  of  God,  a revenger  to  execute  wrath  upon 
him  that  doeth  evil.  Wherefore  ye  must  needs  be  subject,  not 
only  for  wrath,  but  also  for  conscience’  sake. 

And  Peter  enjoins  obedience  “ to  every  ordinance  of 
man  for  the  Lord’s  sake”  — to  the  king  and  to  his 
subordinates ; “ for  so  is  the  will  of  God,  that  with 
well  doing  ye  may  put  to  silence  the  ignorance  of 
foolish  men.”  The  sacerdotal  debaters  sought  to  evade 
N.the  issue  here  presented  by  distinguishing  between 
the  king  and  the  tyrant,2  claiming  that  the  apostolic 
teaching  applied  only  to  the  former,  and  also  by 
asserting  that  these  injunctions  were  only  for  the 
laity  and  not  for  the  clergy,  who  were,  like  the 
apostles,  the  teachers  of  the  masses.3  Such  interpre- 
tations were,  however,  obviously  felt  to  be  somewhat 
strained  and  illogical  and  were  much  less  promi- 
nent in  the  sacerdotal  argument  than  the  Old  Testa- 
ment texts,  where  a special  disclaimer  of  God’s 
responsibility  for  all  kings  was  found  in  the  often 


1 The  command  of  Jesus,  “ Render  unto  Caesar,”  etc.,  was  less 
cogent,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  it  embodied  no  criterion  as  to 
what  was  Caesar’s,  and  what  was  God’s. 

2 This  distinction  is  common  from  Hincmar  throughout  the  period. 

8 Cf  Innocent  III,  in  a letter  to  Alexius,  Emperor  at  Constanti- 
nople. Prima  Collectio  Decretalium , tit.  ii,  2;  in  Migne,  Vol.  216, 
col.  1182. 


PRINCELY  INDEPENDENCE 


179 


cited  passage,  “ They  have  set  up  kings,  but  not  by 
me ; they  have  made  princes,  and  I knew  it  not.”  1 
The  supporters  of  secular  independence  readily  fol- 
lowed their  adversaries  to  the  Old  Testament  and 
drew  from  it  a notable  array  of  doctrines  favourable 
to  their  cause.  From  Saul  down  kings  were  shown 
to  have  enjoyed  the  direct  sanction  and  conspicuous 
favour  of  God,  and  to  have  been  instruments  of  the 
divine  purpose.2  But  the  princely  cause  was  on  the 
whole  at  a disadvantage  here ; for  on  the  assumption 
that  the  Levites  and  the  prophets  symbolized  the  Chris- 
tian priesthood,  the  chronicles  of  Israel,  transmitted  as 
they  were  by  the  ancient  sacerdotal  class,  were  of  a 
distinctly  anti-royal  character.  A similar  reason  gave 
to  the  hierarchical  cause  an  advantage  in  the  appeal 
to  precedents  of  Christian  times.  The  accessible 
historical  records  were  very  largely  the  work  of  the 
priests  and  monks,  and  embodied  the  legends  and 
traditions  peculiar  to  these  classes.  It  was  very  diffi- 
cult, therefore,  to  derive  from  current  conceptions  of 
history  any  correctives  for  the  distorted  versions  of 
the  attitude  of  even  such  noted  rulers  as  Constantine, 
Theodosius  and  Charlemagne. 

With  the  revival  of  the  study  of  Justinian’s  code 
at  Bologna,  the  lawyers,  under  the  encouragement 
of  Frederick  Barbarossa  in  the  twelfth  century, 
began  to  make  some  influential  contributions  to  the 
theory  of  the  relations  of  the  Empire  to  the  Papacy. 

1 Hosea  viii,  4. 

2 For  a battle  royal  of  the  texts,  see  the  correspondence  of  Waltram 
of  Naumburg  and  Stephen  of  Halberstadt,  for  and  against  Henry  I\ 
of  Germany,  in  Migne,  Patrologia,  Vol.  148,  col.  1442. 


180 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


The  legislative  absolutism  of  the  prince  was,  as  has  ap-  j 
> peared  above,1  the  foundation  of  the  Roman  system.] 
To  emphasize  this  principle  was  to  set  an  impassable 
limit  to  the  extension  of  papal  jurisdiction.  It 
stood  in  perfect  contradiction  to  the  principle  of 
Gratian  in  his  Beeretum:  “The  decrees  of  princes  ^ 
do  not  take  precedence  over,  but  follow,  the  decrees \ 
of  the  church.”2  The  encouragement  given  by 
Frederick  to  the  Roman  law  was  incidental  to  the 
general  policy  of  the  Hohenstaufen  emperors,  to 
identify  their  dignity  with  that  of  the  ancient  Ro-  • 
man  rulers.  To  the  papal  theory  that  the  German  , 
emperors  owed  their  authority  to  the  “ translation  of 
imperial  power  ” ( translatio  imperii)  by  Pope  Leo  to 
Charlemagne,  was  thus  opposed  the  jurists’  theory 
of  “ unbroken  imperial  power”  ( imperium  continuum). 
The  one  doctrine  had  at  least  as  good  a foundation 
in  fact  as  the  other.  And  the  imperialistic  theory 
admirably  supplemented  and  confirmed  the  idea  of  j 
^ a universal  monarchy  as  the  normal  type  of  political 
organization.  Innocent  III  employed  as  an  argu- 
ment in  demonstrating  the  superior  dignity  of  the 
spiritual  power,  the  fact  that  the  authority  of  a 
prince  was  over  only  a limited  region,  while  that 
of  the  church  was  universal.3  To  such  an  argument 
there  was  a cogent  reply  in  the  doctrine  that  the 
sway  of  the  Emperor  extended  de  jure  over  all  the 
ancient  Roman  world,  as  well  as  over  the  German 
territory  that  had  been  added  to  this  dominion. 
This  universal  jurisdiction  was  easily  sustained  by 

1 Supra,  p.  129.  2 Dist.  x.  3 Reg.  de  Neg.  Rom.  Imp.  xviii. 


ST.  BERNARD 


181 


both  the  general  spirit  and  the  literal  expressions 
of  the  Corpus  Juris  Civilis ; and  the  theory  of  im- 
perial independence  of  ecclesiastical  authority  re-L 
ceived  strong  support  from  the  jurists.  But  this 
particular  form  of  argument  for  the  secular  power 
naturally  found  little  favour  outside  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire ; for  the  English,  French  and  Span- 
ish kings  and  their  supporters  could  gain  little  from 
a doctrine  which  might  save  them  from  a Pope  only 
to  subject  them  to  an  Emperor. 

5.  St  Bernard  and  John  of  Salisbury 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  account  of  the  syste- 
matic contentions  in  behalf  of  the  two  powers,  an 
account  of  the  political  theory  of  this  part  of  the 
Middle  Age  requires  some  notice  of  two  men  of 
great  prominence  in  the  twelfth  century,  whose  ideas, 
however,  presented  certain  marked  contrasts  with 
those  that  have  just  been  considered.  The  two 
men  were  St.  Bernard  and  John  of  Salisbury.  Both 
were  ecclesiastics,  and  both  were  thoroughly  imbued 
with  the  spirit  of  their  order  in  respect  to  secular 
authority.  But  in  other  respects  they  stood  widely 
apart.  Bernard  was  a reforming  monk,  striving  to 
instil  into  the  practice  of  religion  the  ascetic  and>^ 
mystical  spirit  of  the  Fathers.  John  of  Salisbury 
was  a man  of  letters  and  a man  of  the  world,  the 
pupil  of  Abelard,  from  whom  he  imbibed  that  taste  \ 
for  good  literature  of  all  kinds  that  made  him  one 
of  the  most  learned  persons  of  his  day.  Bernard  de- 
spised secular  learning  as  he  despised  all  things  of 


182 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


this  world ; and  from  the  standpoint  of  his  pure 
spiritualism  he  assailed  what  he  conceived  to  be 
the  temporal  tendencies  in  the  development  of  the 
church  and  the  Papacy.  John,  on  the  other  hand, 
accepting  and  sustaining  the  common  dogmas  of 
ecclesiastical  theory,  enriched  the  argument  by  jjx- 
— tensive  recourse  to  the  ideas  of  classic  paganism.  He 
was  the  precursor  of  the  greatest  scholastics.  While 
Bernard  strove  to  recall  into  control  the  spirit  of 
Gregory  the  Great,  John  systematically  contravened 
that  spirit  by  finding  and  stimulating  delight  in 
the  literature  which_ Gregory  had  banned.  Bernard 
represented  a type  which  was  to  have  little  influ- 
\ ence  in  the  church  before  the  reforming  movement 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  while  John’s  methods  were 
to  become  within  a short  time  characteristic  of  all 
philosophy. 

The  attitude  of  St.  Bernard  is  fully  expressed  in 
his  short  but  remarkable  work,  On  Reflection,1  ad- 
dressed to  Pope  Eugenius  III  (1145-1153).  This  is 
in  substance  an  energetic  protesfragainst  the  growing 
absorption  of  the  papal  interest  and  energy  in  the  ad- 
ministrative and  non-spiritual  concerns  of  the  church. 
The  maintenance,  not  to  speak  of  the  extension,  of 
the  Homan  church’s  territorial  possessions  in  Central 
Italy,  as  well  as  the  world-wide  business  of  organiz- 
ing the  second  Crusade,  made  the  papal  court  a centre 
of  great  activity  in  politics,  with  all  the  incidents  of 
intrigue,  ambition  and  avarice  that  are  associated 

1 De  Consider atione  Libri  V.  Printed  in  Goldast,  Monorchia , etc., 
II,  68.  Also  in  Migne. 


ST.  BERNARD 


183 


V 

with  such  conditions.  That  the  time  and  attention 
of  the  Pope  should  be  taken  up  with  worldly  matters 
was  to  the  lofty  soul  of  Bernard  unendurable.  __ 
“What,”  he  asks,  "is  more  slavish  and  unworthy, 
especially  in  the  chief  pontiff,  than  to  sweat  every 
day  and  almost  every  hour  over  such  things  ? ” It 
may  be  said  that  this  is  necessary  in  order  to  build 
up  the  church  and  meditate  in  the  law.  “And  in- 
deed,” Bernard  remarks,  “law  resounds  every  day 
through  the  palace;  but  it  is  the  law  of  Justinian, 
not  the  law  of  the  Lord.”  Jesus  declined^vitlu scorn 
to  degida-a  dispute- over, property,  though  he  decides 
the  eternal  fate  of  souls ; and  it  is  a false  logic  which 
declares  thabThe  successors  of  the  apostles  must  take 
jurisdiction  over  temporal  concerns  merely  because^* 
they  have  authority, over  what  is  greater.  Between 
the  power  and  dignity  of  absolving  from  sin  and  that 
of  dividing  estates,  there  is  no  comparison.  These 
grovelling  things  of  the  earth  are  to  be  passed  upon 
by  kings  and  princes.  "Why  do  you  rush  into 
another’s  field?  Why  do  you  set  your  sickle  to 
another’s  crop  ? ” 

The  exaltation  of  the  papal  dignity  is  put  by  Ber- 
nard in  the  most  unqualified  terms.1  But  the  func- 
tion of  the  Pope  is  pastoral,  not  princely.  “Lordship” 
(Dominatio)  is  denied  to  him  in  emphatic  and  reiterated  — 
expressions.  Christ  alone  is  dominus , and  the  Pope 

1 “ Tu  princeps  episcoporum,  tu  haeres  apostolum,  tu  primatu 
Abel,  gubernatu  Noe,  patriarchatu  Abraham,  ordine  Melchizedek, 
dignitate  Aaron,  auctoritate  Moyses,  judicatu  Samuel,  potestate 
Petrus,  unctione  Christus.” 


184 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


is  his  steward  for  all  the  world.  The  duty  of  this 
stewardship  is  to  nourish,  not  to  govern  ( ut  dispenses , 
non  imperes).  And  the  abuses  consequent  upon  the 
policy  of  continually  extending  the  appellate  juris- 
diction of  the  papal  see  are  denounced  in  glowing 
language.  The  venality  of  the  court  never  received 
a more  direct  and  cutting  rebuke  than  from  Ber- 
nard,1 and  the  same  is  true  of  the  ostentation, 
frivolity  and  extravagance  that  ruled  there.  And 
referring  to  a recent  attempt  of  the  Pope  to  maintain 
his  territorial  interests  by  force,  Bernard  points  out 
that  when  a sword  was  drawn  to  defend  Jesus  at  his 
betrayal,  the  Master  commanded  that  it  be  returned 
to  its  scabbard.  But,  he  continues,  in  a passage 
which  became  a commonplace  in  later  controversy, 
the  two  swords  of  which  Jesus  said,  “ It  is  enough/’ 
both  belong  to  the  church,2  the  spiritual  and  the 
material;  “ but  the  latter  must  be  used  for  the 
church,  the  former  also  by  the  church;  the  former 
by  the  hand  of  the  priest,  the  latter  by  the  hand  of 
the  soldier,  though  at  the  suggestion  (ad  nutum)  of 
the  priest  and  the  command  of  the  Emperor.” 

This  passage  strikingly  illustrates  the  whole  trend 
of  Bernard’s  thought.  Secular  affairs  are  to  be  let 
alone  by  the  priesthood  not  so  much  because  they  are 
outside  of  its  sphere  as  because  they  are  beneath  its 
dignity  and  degrading  in  their  nature.  Political 

1 “ Quae  dabis  mihi  . . . pretio  seu  spe  pretii  non  interveniente  ? ” 
Cf.  the  Goliardic  line,  “ Curia  Romana  non  quaerit  ovem  sine  lana.” 
Emerton,  Mediaeval  Europe , p.  475. 

2 If  this  were  not  true,  Jesus  would  have  said,  not  “ satis  est,”  but 
nimis  est.”  The  text  is  Luke  xxii,  35-38. 


JOHN  OF  SALISBURY 


185 


authority,  in  short,  has  its  function  in  the  perform- 
ance of  the  menial  duties  essential  to  the  mainte- 
nance and  protection  of  the  church.  This  idea  is 
baldly  and  uncompromisingly  set  forth  by  John  of 
Salisbury  in  dealing  with  the  symbol  of  the  two 
swords.1  The  prince,  he  says,  receives  the  sword  of 
blood  from  the  church,  who  employs  it  by  the  hand 
of  the  prince,  reserving  the  spiritual  sword  for  the 
priests. 

The  prince,  therefore,  is  indeed  the  servant  ( minister ) of  the 
priesthood,  and  perfornis  the  part  of  the  sacred  duties  which 
seems  unworthy  of  the  hands  of  the  priesthood.  For  while 
every  duty  of  the  divine  laws  is  religious  and  holy,  neverthe- 
less that  of  punishing  crimes  is  inferior  and  seems  in  a way  to 
represent  that  of  the  executioner. 

So  unflattering  a conception  of  political  authority 
is  only  set  forth,  however,  when  this  species  of  power 
is  brought  into  comparison  with  the  sacerdotal.  The 
Polycraticus ,2  the  chief  work  of  John  of  Salisbury, 
embodies  a somewhat  ambitious  attempt  at  a broad 
philosophy  of  politics,  in  which  the  elements  of 
princely  rule  receive  in  many  respects  a just  and 
impartial  consideration.  His  method  of  treatment , 
is  diffuse,  and  though  it  combines  the  appeal  to 
ecclesiastical  authority  with  copious  references  to 
pagan  literature3  and  to  pagan  philosophy,  it  exhib- 

1 Polycraticus , lib.  iv,  cap.  3. 

2 The  meaning  of  this  title  is  unknown.  For  a conjecture  as  to 
the  title  and  an  analysis  of  the  work,  see  Poole,  Illustrations  of  Medice- 
val  Thought  (London,  1884),  p.  216  et  seq. 

3 The  author  frequently  apologizes  for  such  references,  excusing 
himself  on  various  grounds,  e.g.  that  St.  Paul  drew  illustrations  from 


186 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


its  in  only  a rudimentary  way  the  harmonizing  of 
the  two  systems  of  thought  that  is  characteristic 

^ of  the  next  century.  The  substance  of  his  politics  is 
ethical  rather  than  legal  or  constitutional.  That  is, 
he  has  no  doctrine  to  present  as  to  the  organization 
of  government,  the  distribution  and  inter-relationship 
of  functions,  or  even  as  to  the  various  forms  of  state 
and  government.  Monarchy  is  the  only  form  of 
which  he  takes  cognizance ; and  the  administrative 
organization  of  monarchy  is  considered  only  so  far 
as  that  of  the  old  Roman  Empire  is  known  to  him. 
The  general  view  of  the  state  embodied  in  the  work, 
thus,  is  that  suggested  by  the  Roman  Empire  and 
modified  by  the  Jewish  monarchies  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment. Assuming  that  the  state  is  incarnate  in  the 
prince,1  the  author  dilates  on  the  duties  of  the  mon- 
arch toward  those  who  are  over  him  — the  priests.2 
The  most  significant  points  of  the  work  in  the  his- 
tory of  political  theory  are  those  touching  (1)  the 
relation  of  the  prince  to  law  and  (2)  the  distinction 
between  prince  and  tyrant. 

K As  to  the  first,  the  doctrine  is  repeated  again  and 
again  that  the  prince  is  subject  to  law  ; not,  however, 
to  his  own  statutes,  but  to  the  divine  law  of  eternal 
justice,  whose  rule  is  equity.  Equity  is  that  general 

profane  history  when  he  spoke  to  the  Athenians  (lib.  iv,  cap.  3)  ; 
and  that  in  the  case  of  Plutarch,  any  divergence  from  the  true  faith 
and  morals  “tempori  potius  quam  viro  ascribatur”  (lib.  v,  prol.). 

1 He  must  bear  in  mind  that  “ universitatis  subjectorum  se  perso- 
nam gerere,  et  se  non  sibi  suam  vitam  sed  aliis  debere.” — Lib.  iv,  cap.  3. 

2 The  order  of  obligation  is  as  follows : “ Totum  se  Deo  debet,  plu- 
rimum  suae  patriae,  multum  parentibus,  propinquis,  extraneis  mini- 
mum, nonnihil  tamen.” — Ibid . 


JOHN  OF  SALISBURY 


187 


harmony  in  things  through  which  a just  proportion  ^ 
is  preserved,  and  each  receives  his  own.1  This  doc- 
trine, enforced  by  obvious  allusions  to  the  Roman 
law,  is  gradually  worked  around  into  a basis  for  the 
subjection  of  the  prince  to  the  priesthood,  as  the 
guardians  of  divine  justice.2 

The  distinction  between  prince  and  tyrant  receives 
from  John  a sharper  definition  than  had  been  formu- 
lated during  all  the  centuries  throughout  which  the 
ecclesiastics  had  denounced  hostile  rulers  as  tyrants. 
He  takes  up  the  classical  conception  on  this  point 
and  in  substance,  though  not  in  precise  terms,  makes 
the  distinction  turn  on  the  conformity  of  the  ruler6- 
to  law.2  More  broadly,  however,  any  abuse  of  power 
constitutes  its  author  a tyrant,  and  in  this  sense  there 
m&y  be  tyrant  priests,  as  described  in  Ezekiel  xxxiv. 
As  to  tyrannicide,  he  holds  it  to  be  entirely  permis-N 
sible  and  just,  and  in  support  of  the  righteousness  of 
such  action  adds  to  the  familiar  examples  from  pagan 
history  the  instances  of  E^lon,  Holof ernes  and  others 
from  the  Old  Testament.  His  respect  for  authority, 
however,  leads  him  to  make  a curious  distinction  as 
to  the  means  of  removing  the  tyrant.  The  deed 
must  be  done  without  offence  to  religion  and  de- 
cency ; and  the  use  of  poison  is  to  be  avoided,  as 
having  no  precedent  in  the  Scriptures. 

This  approval  of  tyrannicide  on  principle  by  an 

1 The  text  for  this  argument  is  found  in  Deut.  xvii,  14-20.  Note 
the  ingenious  way  in  which  the  author  draws  from  the  words,  “ aijd 
he  shall  read  therein  all  the  days  of  his  life,”  the  conclusion,  “ quam 
necessaria  sit  principibus  peritio  litterarum.” 

2 Lib.  viii,  cap.  17-21. 


188 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ecclesiastic  has  been  made  the  basis  of  severe  re- 
proach against  John  of  Salisbury.  It  is  due  to  him 
to  point  out,  however,  that  he  declared  that  the 
safest  and  most  useful  method  of  getting  rid  of  the 
tyrant  is  by  prayer  and  by  averting  the  wrath  of 
God  of  which  tyrants  are  the  instrument.  His  re- 
currence to  the  primitive  Christian  idea  after  fully 
committing  himself  to  the  pagan  principle  is  quite 
characteristic  of  all  his  thought.1 


Baxmann,  Die  Politik  der  Pdpste  von  Gregor  I bis  auf 
Gregor  VII.  Blakey,  Yol.  I,  pp.  162-183,  225-226,  313-342, 
469  et  seq.  Bryce,  Holy  Boman  Empire,  chap  vii.  Eried- 
berg,  Die  mittelalterlichen  Leliren  iiber  das  Verhaltniss  von 
Staat  und  Kirche.  Gierke,  Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsreckt, 
Bd.  Ill,  S.  502-644 : Die  publicistischen  Leliren  des  Mittel- 

alters  (Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Ages,  trans.  by  Mait- 
land). Gieseler,  Church  History,  trans.,  Third  Period, 
§§  20-23,  47-63.  Janet,  Yol.  I,  p.  320  et  seq.  Laurent, 
Histoire  de  Vhumaniti , Tome  YI,  pp.  56  et  seq.,  100  et  seq.  Ma- 
billon,  Life  and  Works  of  St.  Bernard,  Abbot  of  Clairvaux, 
trans.  Mathews,  Select  Mediaeval  Documents,  esp.  (Sec.)  III. 
Mirbt,  Publizistik  im  Zeitalter  Gregors  VII  (an  excellent  in- 
troduction to  the  controversial  literature  of  this  period). 
Monumenta  Germanioe  Historica , Libelli  de  Lite.  Poole,  Illus- 
trations of  Mediaeval  Thought,  esp.  pp.  161-166,  183-197, 
216-225, 233-239.  Stores,  Bernard  of  Clairvaux,  pp.  509-583. 


1 Lib.  viii,  cap.  20. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


ST.  THOMAS  AQUINAS  AND  HIS  SCHOOL 

1.  General  Character  of  the  System 

The  culmination  of  papal  influence  in  European 
politics  was  synchronous  with  a widespread  revival 
of  speculative  philosophy.  During  the  twelfth  cen- 
tury a very  marked  activity  in  all  forms  of  intellec- 
tual life  was  manifest.  The  philosophical  expression 
of  this  activity  was  the  extensive  literature  in  which 
was  embodied  the  doctrines  of  scholasticism.  In  its 
most  general  aspect,  scholasticism  was  a system  of 
thought  in  which  philosophy,  in  the  purely  rational 
sense,  was  so  subordinated  to  established  theological 
doctrines  “that  where  philosophy  and  theology  trod- 
on  common  ground,  the  latter  was  received  as  the 
absolute  norm  and  criterion  of  truth.  1 Because 
the  mediaeval  mind  was  essentially  dependent  upon 
authority  for  the  bases  of  its  speculative  activity, 
the  rational  element  in  scholasticism  was  furnished 
by  the  philosophy  of  the  ancients  and  the  theological 
element  by  the  church  fathers.  The  earlier  scho- 
lastics, from  the  ninth  to  the  twelfth  centuries,  were 
obliged,  in  the  absence  of  fuller  sources,  to  follow  in 
their  systems  the  scanty  outlines  of  Stoic  and  Pla- 

1 Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy  (translation,  New  York,  1871), 
I,  355. 


189 


190 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tonic  doctrine  that  had  been  transmitted  through  the 
Dark  Ages  in  more  or  less  accurate  compends.  Of 
Aristotle,  but  few  works  were  known,  and  these,  as 
Symonds  says,  through  “ Latin  translations  made  by 
Jews  from  Arabic  commentaries  on  Greek  texts.” 
The  Aristotelian  logic,  however,  imperfectly  as  it 
was  understood,  constituted  the  chief  source  of  the 
rigid  syllogistic  method  that  is  so  common  in  scho- 
lastic reasoning. 

In  the  latter  half  of  the  twelfth  century  the  com- 
plete works  of  Aristotle  began  to  enter  Western 
Europe  by  way  of  Spain,  where  Latin  translations  of 
them  had  long  been  used  in  the  Moorish  universities. 
A little  later  Greek  texts  were  brought  from  the 
East  by  the  Crusaders,  so  that  by  the  middle  of 
the  thirteenth  century  the  greatest  work  which  the 
human  reason  had  yet  produced  was  before  the  phi- 
losophers of  the  time.  The  result  was  the  shaping 
of  scholasticism  into  its  later  and  most  perfect  form. 
Through  the  systematizing  industry  of  compilers  and 
commentators  the  doctrines  of  the  church  fathers 
and  the  dogmas  of  the  church  itself  had  by  this  time 
been  digested  into  compact  and  intelligible  form. 
Aristotle’s  works  embodied  a complete  system  of 
rational  philosophy.  From  the  two  bodies  of  doc- 
trine it  was  now  the  task  of  the  schoolmen  to  fors:e 
out  a single  system  of  ultimate  science  which  should 
blend,  in  final  harmony,  the  products  of  reason  and 
of  revelation. 

This  purpose  is  the  key  to  the  philosophy  of  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas.  He  is  the  greatest  of  the  later 


POLITICAL  WORKS  OF  AQUINAS 


191 


scholastics,  and  perhaps  of  all  scholastics.  Through 
him  politics  enters  once  more  into  the  circle  of  the 
sciences,  and  assumes  a position  like  that  assigned 
to  it  by  Aristotle,  always  subject,  however,  to  that 
principle  which  permeates  all  mediaeval  thought  — 
that  the  dogma  of  the  saint  takes  precedence  over 
the  reasoned  conclusion  of  the  philosopher.  Because 
Augustine  had  been  the  most  prolific  and  the  most 
respected  of  the  fathers  of  the  church,  and  had 
touched  most  of  all  on  political  questions,  the  politi- 
cal doctrine  of  Aquinas  presents,  even  more  strik- 
ingly than  many  other  branches  of  his  system,  the 
characteristic  which  applies  to  scholasticism  as  a 
whole  — the  reconciliation  of  St.  Augustine  and 
Aristotle. 

St.  Thomas  was  a very  prolific  writer,  and  though 
he  died  at  the  early  age  of  forty-seven,  the  works 
that  he  left  are  of  enormous  volume.  On  the  politi- 
cal side,  these  include  Commentaries  on  the  Politics 
of  Aristotle  and  the  Rule  of  Princes  (Be  Pegimine 
Principum).  The  former  work  is  almost  wholly 
expository,  and  contains  little  of  Thomas’s  own 
philosophy.  The  latter  was  designed  as  a syste- 
matic treatment  of  political  science,  but  was  unfin- 
ished at  the  death  of  St.  Thomas.  Of  its  four  books, 
only  the  first  and  part  of  the  second  were  written 
by  him.  The  rest  are  by  another  hand,  and,  while 
maintaining  with  much  fidelity  the  master’s  general 
principles  and  point  of  view,  are  noticeably  deficient 
in  the  clearness  and  coherency  which  are  peculiar 
to  him.  Thomas’s  greatest  philosophical  work,  the 


192 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Summa  Theologica , was  also  unfinished  at  his  death; 
but  the  completed  part  of  this  masterpiece  included 
the  treatment  of  those  ethical  and  juristic  concepts 
L which  lie  at  the  basis  of  politics;  and  it  is  with 
these  concepts,  which  he  developed  with  extraordi- 
nary acuteness,  that  the  study  of  his  political 
philosophy  must  begin.1 


2.  Theory  of  Law  and  Justice 

l 

St.  Thomas’s  theory  of  law  and  justice  is  the 
channel  through  which  the  doctrines  of  Aristotle, 
the  Stoics,  Cicero,  the  Roman  Imperial  Jurists  and 
St.  Augustine,  blended  into  a rounded  whole,  were 
transmitted  to  modern  times.  His  analysis  and 
definitions  of  the  two  concepts  gave  much  pre- 
cision to  the  vague  and  ill-formulated  ideas  in 
which  they  had  long  been  enveloped.  Like  Cicero, 
he  started  from  the  notion  of  law  (lex).  Law  he 
defined  as  “ an  ordinance  of  reason  for  the  com- 
r.  mon  good,  promulgated  by  him  wEohas  the  care 
of  a community.”  2 The  full  scope  of  this  definition 
is  best  revealed  in  the  fourfold  classification  of  the 
species  of  law  ;^gmel^  eternal,  natural,  human  and 
divine.  The  lex_wferna  is  the  controlling  plan  of  the 
universe,  existing  in  the  mind  of  God.  Natural  law 
(lex  naturalis)  is  that  participation  of  man,  as  a 


j 


1 A useful  compilation  of  St.  Thomas’s  political  ideas  is  contained 
in  the  little  work  of  Baumann,  Die  Staatslehre  der  li.  Thomas  von 
Aquino  (Leipzig,  1873). 

2 Quaedam  rationis  ordinatio  ad  bonum  commune,  et  ab  eo  qui 
curam  communitatis  habet  promulgata.  — Summa  Theologica , II,  1, 


AQUINAS  ON  LAW 


193 


rational  creature,  in  the  eternal  law  (or  the  divine  ^ 
reason),  through  which  he  distinguishes  between 
o-ood  and  evil  and  seeks  his  true  end.  Human  law 

0 

is  the  application,  by  human  reason,  of  the  precepts 
of  natural  law  to  particular  earthly  conditions.  The 
divine  law  in  the  special  sense  is  that  through  which 
the  limitations  and  imperfections  of  human  reason 
are  supplemented,  and  man  is  infallibly  directed  to 
his  supramundane  end  — eternal  blessedness;  it  is 
the  law  of  Revelation. 

St.  Thomas’s  definition  of  law  marks stage  in  the 
development  of  the  concept.  Greek  philosophy  had 
regarded  law  as  impersonal  in  origin  — as  a conclu- 
sion of  reason  and  not  as  an  expression  of  will. 
Roman  jurisprudence  had  ascribed  the  character  of 
law  to  either  a conclusion  of  reason  or  an  expression 
of  will.  St.  Thomas  defined  law  as  at  once  a con- 
clusion of  reason  and  an  expression  of  will.  This 
progressive  enhancing  of  the  volitional  element  finds 
its  explanation  in  the  importance  respectively  of  the 
Roman  Emperor  and  the  Christian  God,  as  concepts 
dominating  human  reflection.  Just  in  proportion  as 
the  agency  of  a well-defined  personality  was  recog- 
nized as  a determining  factor  in  men’s  affairs,  the  con- 
ception of  law  as  the  will  of  this  personality  assumed 
greater  prominence.  St.  Thomas  does  indeed  declare 
that  law  is  rather  a rule  and  measure  ( regula  et  men- ■ 
sura)  of  action  than  a command ; but  the  latter  idea 
is  clearly  involved  in  his  ascription  of  the  origin  of 
law  to  a superior,  and  in  his  elaborate  contention  that 

1 promulgation  is  of  the  essence  of  the  concept.  The 


194 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


importance  which  he  attaches  to  the  imperative  element 
appears  also  in  the  argument  that  law  cannot  spring 
from  the  rational  impulse  of  any  one  at  random,  but, 
s llaving  for  lts  end  the  common  good,  must  have  its 
source  either  in  the  society  as  a whole  or  in  the  public 
person  who  has  the  care  of  the  society.1  Moreover, 
' ^aw  must  have  a sanction  in  order  to  be  effective ; but 
the  private  individual  can  only  advise,  not  punish, 

and  hence  his  rational  injunction  lacks  the  character 
of  law. 

Of  the  four  classes  of  law  which  are  so  ingeniously 
distinguished,  the  first  and  the  last  embody  character- 
istic conclusions  of  Christian  theology.  The  eternal 
law  is  the  design  of  the  universe,  conceived  as  the 
supreme  reason  of  God  the  creator;  the  divine  law, 
with  its  two  subdivisions  of  old  and  newTiiTthe  will 
of  God  as  revealed  in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments. 
Thomas’s  exposition  of  eternal  and  divine  law  has 
been  of  high  significance  in  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy and  theology.  In  political  theory  his  treatment 
of  natural  law  and  of  human  law,  especially  the 
former,  has  had  most  important  results. 

The  lex  naturalis  he  sums  up,  so  far  as  its  pre- 
cepts are  concerned,  in  the  generaljrule,  pursue  the< 
goodjmd  avoid  the_evil.  The  particular  rules  are 
merely  rational  means  to  this  end.  All  men,  as 
rational  beings,  share  in  or  are  subject  to  this  law. 
For  all  men  it  is  the  same  as  to  its  first  principles, 

1 Condere  legem  vel  pertinet  ad  totam  multitudinem  vel  pertinefc 
ad  personam  publicam  quae  totius  multitudinis  curam  habet.— 
Summa  Theol.  II,  1,  90,3. 


AQUINAS  ON  NATURAL  LAW 


195 


though  in  some  deductions  made  from  these  prin- 
ciples there  is  divergence  among  different  peoples. 
Thus  the  Germans  in  Caesar’s  time  did  not  regard 
robbery  as  wrong,  though  it  is  directly  contrary  to 
natural  law.  Being  universal  and  essentially  uniform 
among  men,  the  lex  naturalis  might  be  supposed  to 
be  immutable.  Not  so,  according  to  St.  Thomas ; it 
may  be  enlarged  in  content  by  the  addition  of  what 
contributes  to  human  welfare.  Such  extensions  are 
to  be  found,  for  example,  in  the  institutions  of 
private  property  and  slavery.  The  original  law 
was  community  of  goods  and  general  freedom ; but 
distinction  of  property  and  slavery,  though  not  pri- 
mary inclinations  of  man’s  nature,  were  neverthe- 
less developed  by  reason  for  the  utility  of  human  . 
life.1  In  the  same  manner  the  law  of  nature  may 
be  changed  when  a change  of  human  conditions  i 
renders  the  observance  of  any  of  its  derivative  pre- 
cepts no  longer  possible.  St.  Thomas  nowhere  gives 
a list  of  the  specific  rules  which  make  up  the  lex 
naturalis.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  form  an  idea 
as  to  what  the  proportion  might  have  been  between 
those  which  he  regarded  as  immutable  and  the  others. 

Human  law,  working  through  fear  of  penalties,  is 
essential  to  a peaceful  social  existence.  It  is  derived 
from  natural  law  and  may  be  either  a deduction  from,  C 
or  an  application  of,  some  principle  of  the  latter.  So 
indispensable  is  the  connection  of  the  two  that  any 
provision  of  the  human  that  is  at  variance  with  natu- 
ral law  is  not  law  at  all,  but  a corruption  of  law.2 

2 Ibid.  II,  1,  95,  2. 


1 Summa , II,  1,  91,  5. 


196 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Justice  St^  Thomas,  following  substantially  the 
Roman  jurists,  defines  as  the  fixed  and  perpetual 
will  to  give  to  every  one  his  own  rights.1  But 
the  Aristotelian  doctrine  is  also  closely  followed,  ,! 
in  explaining  the  fundamental  principle  of  justice 
to  be  that  of  equality.  Equality, ~St.  Thomas  then 
shows,  may  be  based  either  upon  nature  itself, 
“as  when  one  gives  so  much  that  he  may  receive 
back  precisely  the  same,”  or  upon  human  determi- 
nation, as  when  popular  custom  or  princely  decrees 
require  that  two  things  shall  be  regarded  as  equal. 
This  distinction  differentiates  natural  right  ( ius  na- 
turale)  from  positivejight  (ius  positivum ),  the  latter 
resting  upon  the  lex  liumana.  Written  human  laws 
are  thus  fully  recognized  us  a source  of  rights  and 
justice.  But  Thomas  insists  that  they  derive  their 
force,  not  from  being  written,  but  from  nature  itself. 
Accordingly,  written  law  is  vitiated  and  loses  binding 
force  whenever  and  so  far  as  it  deviates  from  natural  | 
justice.2 

In  general,  Thomas’s  treatment  of  law  and  justice  ! 
exhibits  well  the  salient  characteristics  of  his  philos- 
ophy. Some  of  his  most  acute  distinctions  and  con- 
ciliations appear  here,  where  he  must  bring  into 
harmony  the  Aristotelian,  the  Roman  Stoic  and  the 
Christian  conceptions  as  to  the  basis  of  social  order. 
The  most  original  contribution  that  he  makes  to  the 
subject  is  that  definition  and  analysis  of  law  through 
which  he  displaces  at  the  ultimate  source  of  authority 

1 Constans  et  perpetua  voluntas  ius  suum  cuique  tribuere.  — 
Summa  Theol.  II,  2,  58,  1.  2 Ibidm  jj*  9 60,  5. 


NATURE  OF  POLITICAL  AUTHORITY  197 

the  impersonal  forces  of  nature  and  reason,  and  sub- 
ordinates them  to  the  personal  Christian  God.  It 
is  in  accomplishing  this  that  he  emphasizes  the 
importance  of  volition,  in  comparison  with  mere 
ratiocination,  as  an  element  in  the  definition  of  law. 

3.  The  Nature  and  Forms  of  Political  Authority 

In  St.  Thomas’s  discussion  of  politics  proper,  Aris- 
totelian doctrine  furnishes  the  basis  both  as  to  method 
and  as  to  content.  But  for  the  first  time  in  mediaeval 
thought  appears  at  some  points  a very  distinct  influ- 
ence of  contemporary  political,  as  distinct  from  eccle- 
siastical, institutions.  Unlike  John  of  Salisbury,  who 
illustrated  his  philosophy  almost  exclusively  by  insti- 
tutions that  had  ceased  to  exist  centuries  before,  St. 
Thomas,  in  the  full  spirit  of  Aristotle,  amplified  the 
system  of  the  Greek  by  reflection  on  the  things  about 
him.  The  Thomist  political  theory  exhibits  also  very 
conspicuously  the  historical  spirit,  though  the  sources 
depended  upon  are  almost  entirely  the  Old  Testament 
and  Augustine’s  version  of  Roman  history. 

* In  the  De  Pegimine  Principum , Aristotle’s  funda- 
mental principle  is  adopted,  that  man  is  by  nature  a 
social  being  ( animal  sociale  et  politicum ),  that  social 
existence  makes  government  (aliquod  regitivum)  nec-  V 
essary  for  the  common  welfare,  and  that  the  city 
(civitas)  is  the  self-sufficing  and  perfect  association. 
But  here  Thomas  feels  that  Aristotle  did  not  go  far 
enough,  and  accordingly  declares  that  a “ province,” 
including  a number  of  city-states,  has  a higher  degree 
of  self-sufficiency  because  of  the  greater  resources 


198 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


for  defence  against  enemies.1  The  province,  or  as 
it  is  also  called,  the  kingdom  ( regnum ),  which  Aris- 
totle regarded  as  beyond  the  purview  of  rational! 
ideals,  is  thus  introduced  fully  into  the  system 
of  political  philosophy.  It  is  treated  throughout 
Thomas’s  works  as  a “ natural”  organization,  and 
as  embodying  the  rational  principle  of  that  larger 
and  more  characteristic  mediseval  entity,  the  Empire. 
The  formal  treatment  of  the  latter  institution  is  not  ! 
found,  however,  in  the  authentic  part  of  the  Rule  of 
Princes ? 

While  government  is  thus  traceable,  on  Aristotle’s 
theory,  to  the  nature  of  man,  political  authority  is 
also  explained,  like  all  other  authority  ( dominium ) , j 
Xas  traceable  to  God.  The  dictum  of  St.  Paul, 
u There  is  no  power  but  of  God,”  and  numerous 
other  texts  of  the  Bible,3  are  cited  as  conclusive  of 
this;  but  the  thesis  is  defended  also  by  Aristotle’s 
metaphysical  doctrines  of  final  cause  and  first  mover 
(. primum  mobile ),  and  by  Augustine’s  interpretation 
of  Roman  history  as  exemplifying  God’s  bestowal  ! 
of  authority  on  a deserving  people.4  Dominion  of 
man  over  man  is  divisible  into  two  distinct  classes : 
that  which  takes  the  form  of  slavery  was  introduced 
into  the  world  on  account  of  sin,  as  St.  Augustine 

1 Be  Reg.  Princ.  I,  1 ; cf.  13  end. 

2 The  nature  of  imperial  dominion  is  discussed  in  Lib.  Ill,  cap. 
12-19. 

8 E.g.,  “ The  king’s  heart  is  in  the  hand  of  the  Lord  . . . : he 
turneth  it  whithersoever  he  will.”  — Prov.  xxi,  1. 

4 Be  Reg.  Princ.  Ill,  2-6.  This  view  of  Roman  history  appeared 
prominently  later  in  Dante’s  work.  Cf.  infra , p.  232. 

■■■■■■■ 


AQUINAS  ON  SLAVERY 


199 


holds;  while  that  which  imports  the  duty  of  coun- 
selling and  directing  would  prevail  in  a state  of" 
innocence,  and  is  incidental  to  the  social  instinct 
implanted  by  God  in  man.  Society  requires  order, 
order  implies  inequality;  and  therefore  directive 
authority  rests  upon  divine  sanction. 

As  to  slavery,  there  is  presented  in  the  Rule  of 
Princes  a rather  striking  addition  to  the  justifying 
principles  adduced  by  Aristotle  and  Augustine.  The 
former  based  the  institution  on  differences  in  intel- 
lectual endowment ; the  latter  regarded  it  as  a 
divine  system  for  the  punishment  of  sin;  but  St. 
Thomas  looks  upon  it  as  also  designed  to  stimulate 
bravery  in  soldiers.  That  the  vanquished  will  be 
enslaved  is  an  effective  inducement  not  to  be  van- 
quished; and  for  this  view  he  cites  not  only  the 
practice  of  the  Romans,  but  also  the  precepts  of 
God  in  Deuteronomy.1 

As  to  the  forms  of  political  authority,  St.  Thomas 
follows  the  Aristotelian  classification,  based  upon  the 
distinction  between  those  that  aim  at  the  good  of 
all  and  those  that  aim  at  the  good  of  the  ruler 
alone.  The  former  only  are  just.  As  between  the 
monarchic  and  the  democratic  form  his  preference  V- 
is  as  fluctuating  as  that  of  Aristotle,  but  leans,  on 
the  whole,  about  as  distinctly  toward  monarchy  as 
the  Greek  leans  toward  democracy.  St.  Thomas 
rests  for  his  preference  chiefly  upon  the  abstract 
argument  that  unity  is  the  end  of  society,  and  hence 
is  the  essential  principle  in  governmental  organiza- 

1 De  Reg.  Princ.  II,  10. 


200 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tion.  The  chief  good  of  a society  is  “ that  its  unity 
be  preserved,  which  is  called  peace  ” ; 1 and  this  is 
best  promoted  by  “that  which  is  in  itself  a unit.” 
This  is  supported  by  analogies  throughout  the  uni- 
verse— the  heart  in  man  “ ruling”  all  the  other 
members,  the  king  (rex)  in  every  swarm  of  bees, 
and  God  himself  in  what  he  has  created.  Experi- 
ence also  demonstrates,  St.  Thomas  believes,  that 
monarchic  government  has  been  the  best  — that 
cities  and  provinces  under  democratic  rule  have 
been  filled  with  dissension,  while  monarchies  have 
rejoiced  in  peace  and  prosperity.  The  most  serious 
danger  in  monarchy  is  that  it  may  take  the  form 
of  tyranny  — the  worst  species  of  government.  But 
still,  Thomas  believes  that  tyranny  springs  from 
democratic  even  more  than  from  monarchic  rule. 
His  general  discussion  of  the  subject  is  characterized 
by  great  moderation  and  good  sense.2  In  respect  to  | 
individual  action  in  slaying  tyrants,  he!  observes  that 
it  is  more  often  bad  men  than  good  that  undertake 
such  an  enterprise,  and  that,  since  bad  men  find 
the  rule  of  kings  no  less  burdensome  than  that  of 
tyrants,  the  recognition  of  the  right  of  private  citi- 
zens to  kill  tyrants  involves  rather  more  chance  of 
losing  a king  than  of  being  relieved  of  a tyrant. 
The  anarchic  character  of  the  argument  for  tyran- 
nicide has  never  been  more  clearly  exposed,  or  its 
conclusions  more  concisely  refuted,  than  by  St. 
Thomas  in  this  passage. 

The  last  two  (and  therefore  unauthentic)  books 
1 De  Reg.  Princ.  I,  2.  2 Ibid.  cap.  3-6. 


KINDS  OF  POLITICAL  AUTHORITY 


201 


of  the  Rule  of  Princes  contain  a discussion  of  various 
kinds  of  political  authority  based  on  the  classification 
into  (1)  sacerdotal  and  royal,  (2)  royal,  (3)  political 
and  (4)  economic.  The  first  class  is  exemplified 
solely  in  the  Papacy,  and  this  will  be  examined 
later;  the  fourth  class  is  not  taken  up  at  all.  As 
to  the  royal  and  the  political  species,  the  distinction 
is  primarily  that  of  Aristotle  between  government 
without  law  and  government  subject  to  law.  The 
writer  of  the  work  manifests  much  vacillation  and 
unclearness,  however,  in  this  respect,  and  at  times 
confuses  royal  with  despotic  government,  and  politi- 
cal authority  with  that  which  characterizes  the  Aris- 
totelian “ polity.”  Of  some  interest,  however,  is 
the  attempt  to  distinguish  and  set  in  its  proper 
category  that  most  prominent  fact  of  mediaeval  poli- 
tics— imperial  authority  ( dominium  imperiale)}  The 
nature  of  this  species  is  explained  first  through  a long 
historical  narrative,  in  which  the  Empire  of  Christ 
appears  as  the  fifth  world-monarchy,  following  those 
of  the  Assyrians,  the  Medes  and  Persians,  the  Greeks 
and  the  Romans.  It  is  then  set  forth  that  Christ, 
though  Lord  of  the  world,  lived  a lowly  and  secret 
life  on  earth ; but  afterwards,  at  the  Donation  of  Con- 
stantine, assumed  openly  his  due  authority  through 
the  church,  and  exercised  it  by  transferring  the 
imperial  power  to  the  West,  in  the  person  of  Charle- 
magne, and  by  taking  control  of  the  choice  of 
emperors.  Imperial  authority  thus  has,  from  its 
origin,  a character  that  clearly  distinguishes  it  from 
1 Lib.  Ill,  cap.  12-19. 


202 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  other  species.  At  the  same  time,  apart  from 
this  peculiarity,  it  is,  in  operation,  substantially  iden- 
tical with  royal  power,  and  is  therefore,  in  general, 
to  be  regarded  as  a special  form  of  this  class.  Its 
relation  to  subjects  and  to  the  law  is  the  same. 

4.  The  Functions  of  Government 

( 

The  general  function  of  the  political  ruler  is, 
through  his  supreme  control  of  secular  matters,  to 
establish,  maintain  and  promote  right  living  among 
r his  subjects.  This  Aristotelian  principle  is  fully 
^ accepted  by  Thomas,  as  are  also,  in  large  measure, 
the  details  of  its  application.  The  most  important 
instrumentality  in  the  attainment  of  this  end  is 
“ that  unity  which  is  called  peace.”  No  feature  of 
the  Greek  theory  was  more  elaborately  developed  by 
• the  scholastics  than  that  which  set  up  unity  and  per- 
manence as  the  prime  criteria  of  excellence  in  politi- 
cal organization.  This  fact  expressed  in  medieeval 
as  in  ancient  times  a philosophical  reaction  against 
widespread  turbulence  and  anarchy.1  For  the  regu-  ] 
lation  of  the  life  of  his  dominion,  then,  the  prince 
was  bound,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  to  see  that  the 
population  was  properly  kept  up,  to  provide  rewards 
and  penalties  through  which  to  secure  obedience  to  his 
laws,  and  to  defend  his  people  against  external  foes. 
In  the  elaboration  of  these  duties  the  Buie  of  Princes 
follows  Aristotle  closely  enough.  But  contemporary 
conditions  suggest,  and  the  Bible  is  made  to  confirm, 


1 Cf.  supra , p.  85. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  203 

a number  of  other  functions  on  which  the  Greek  did 
not  dwell.  For  example,  it  is  laid  down1  that  the 
prince  must  keep  the  roads  in  his  dominion  safe  and 
free.  This  is  purely  a Roman  conception,  and  is 
illustrated  by  the  Roman  practice ; but  in  addition, 
an  indication  of  divine  sanction  is  extorted  from  the 
Old  Testament  in  the  fact  that  the  Amorites  were 
devoted  to  destruction  for  refusing  a free  road  through 
their  territory  to  the  Israelites.2 

Again,  the  prince  must  provide  a special  coinage 
for  his  realm,  and  also  a system  of  weights  and 
measures.  The  latter  duty  is  sustained  in  character- 
istic mediaeval  style.3  The  argument  from  expediency 
is  effectively  put  — that  a governmental  standard 
diminishes  quarrels  and  litigation  — but  more  stress 
is  laid  on  the  Bible.  It  is  declared  in  the  Book  of 
Wisdom,  ch.  xi,  that  “ God  has  ordered  all  things  by 
number,  weight  and  measure.”  This  proves  that 
weight  and  measure  are  of  the  nature  of  things. 
But  what  originates  in  nature  is  most  necessary  in  a 
state,  because  the  laws  of  a state  have  their  source 
in  natural  right.  Therefore  a system  of  weights  and 
measures  is  necessary  and  must  be  established  in  every 
state. 

But  the  Thomist  theory  is  most  distinctly  differ- 
entiated from  that  of  the  ancients  by  ascribing  to  the 
ruler  of  the  state  the  duty  of  providing  for  the  poor. 
In  this  we  are  on  purely  Christian  ground,  though 
Aristotle  is  laboriously  dragged  into  the  argument.4 


1 De  Reg.  Princ.  II,  12. 
» Ibid.  II,  14. 


2 Ibid.  cap.  12. 
4 Ibid.  II,  15. 


204 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Two  philosophical  dicta  of  the  Gr&ek  seem  to  have 
struck  an  especially  responsive  chord  in  the  mediaeval 
mind.  They  were  these  : “ Nature  is  never  wanting 
in  necessaries,”  and  “Art  imitates  nature.”  It  was 
difficult  to  conceive  a logical  dilemma  from  which  the 
scholastic  dialectician  could  not  extricate  himself  by 
means  of  one  or  the  other  of  these.  In  proving 
that  the  state  should  provide  for  the  poor  the  Rule 
Princes  uses  both  the  favourite  phrases.  Thus : 
7nature  is  never  wanting  in  necessaries;  the  same 
must  be  true  of  art,  which  imitates  nature ; but  of  all 
arts  that  of  governing  is  the  highest ; therefore  those 
who  exercise  this  art  must  not  be  wanting  in  neces- 
saries to  those  who  lack  them.  Moreover,  the  author 
gravely  demonstrates  that  in  alms-giving  ( eleemosyna ) 
princes,  who  through  their  human  weakness  must  go 
astray  from  time  to  time,  have  a sort  of  currency  by 
which  their  debt  of  sin  may  be  discharged.  This 
argumentation,  like  so  much  that  fills  the  volumes  of 
scholastic  lore,  shocks  the  modern  mind  by  the  lack 
of  relation  between  premises  and  conclusion;  but 
nevertheless  the  conclusion  itself  as  to  the  function 
of  the  state  in  charity  is  a most  significant  fact  in 
the  history  of  political  theory.  Though  ancient  prac- 
tice in  respect  to  the  needy  and  suffering  had  not 
differed  so  widely  from  that  of  the  Christian  era,  the 
ancient  theory  had  embodied  an  idea  of  governmental 
responsibility  for  these  classes  that  was  at  the  farthest 
possible  remove  from  that  of  St.  Thomas.  The  enor- 
mous modern  apparatus  of  public  charity  finds  its 
first  justification  in  political  science  in  the  bizarre 


SPIRITUAL  PREEMINENCE 


205 


argument  but  humane  conclusion  of  the  passage  which 
has  just  been  summarized. 

5.  The  Secular  and  the  Spiritual  Power 

On  the  great  question  of  the  Middle  Ages,  that  of 
the  relation  between  secular  and  spiritual  power, 
Thomas,  a churchman  of  the  straitest  sect,  could  add 
nothing  to  the  solution  that  had  long  since  been  elab- 
orated by  the  great  men  of  the  institution  of  which 
he  was  a part.  His  contribution  to  the  discussion 
was  merely  to  clothe  in  the  formulas  of  his  method 
and  to  distribute  accurately  among  the  niches  of 
his  philosophical  system  the  doctrines  that  had  been 
moulded  into  definite  form  by  his  predecessors.  The 
initial  assumption  of  his  whole  philosophy  was  that 
certain  truths,  and  those  of  the  highest  importance  to 
man,  were  not  demonstrable  by  reason  but  must  entey_ 
human  cognition  through  faith  and  immediate  divine 
revelation.  Such  were  the  concepts  of  original  sin, 
the  incarnation  and  the  sacraments.  The  depository 
of  judgment  and  authority  in  respect  to  all  matters^ 
concerned  with  this  reserved  field  was  the  church, 
whose  voice  was  final  and  was  the  voice  of  God  him- 
self. This  primary  dogma  of  St.  Thomas  necessarily 
gave  to  the  ecclesiastical  organization  an  overwhelm- 
ing preeminence  in  relation  to  any  form  of  merely 
human  authority.  But  such  preeminence  was  also 
demonstrable,  he  conceived,  by  purely  rational  meth- 
ods. By  Aristotelian  doctrine,  to  govern  is  to  bring 
the  thing  governed  to  its  true  end.  But  what  is  the 
true  end  of  man?  Not,  as  the  ancients  supposed,  to 


206 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


live  according  to  virtue,  but  rather,  through  a virtu- 
ous life,  to  attain  to  the  eternal  enjoyment  of  God 
(ad  fruitionem  divinam).  If  this  end  could  be  obtained 
through  merely  human  virtue,  the  function  of  the 
king  — of  the  highest  political  power  — would  be 
sufficient.  But  since  the  end  transcends  mundane 
life,  the  government  through  which  it  is  reached  must 
be  of  a higher,  that  is,  the  sacerdotal,  kind.  Hence, 
while  the  king  is  supreme  in  temporal  affairs,  these 
must  be  directed  to  the  higher  end,  and  to  this  extent 
he  is  subject  to  the  priest  under  the  law  of  Christ.1 

This  is  of  course  the  long  familiar  case  for  ecclesi- 
astical hegemony,  thinly  veneered  with  Aristotle.  In 
the  unauthentic  part  of  the  Rule  of  Princes 2 * this 
general  doctrine  is  carried  out  in  a formal,  but  not 
novel,  argument  for  the  supremacy  of  the  Pope. 
Noticeable,  however,  and  in  the  full  spirit  of  Thomas, 
is  the  careful  and  explicit  limitation  of  papal  jurisdic- 
tion to  cases  which  involve  a matter  of  sin.8  This 
limitation  was  tending,  in  the  height  of  the  spiritual 
hegemony,  to  be  more  and  more  neglected. 

In  the-  Summa  Theologica 4 the  attitude  of  the 
Christian  state  toward  infidels,  including  heretics  and 
apostates,  is  concisely  defined.  A sharp  line  is  drawn 
between  those  who  have  never  received  the  faith,  like 
Jews  and  pagans,  and  those  who  have  lapsed  from  it 
into  heresy  or  apostasy.  The  former  are  in  general 

1 De  Reg.  Princ.  I,  end.  2 Ibid.  Ill,  10. 

8 Quamvis  in  omnibus  istis  summi  Pontifices  non  extenderunt 

manum  nisi  ratione  delicti.  — Ibid. 

4 IT,  2,  qusest.  10-12. 


TIIE  CHURCH  AND  INFIDEL  PRINCES 


207 


to  be  tolerated ; the  latter,  not.  But  especially  im- 
portant is  the  question  whether  infidels  may  justly 
exercise  political  authority  over  the  faithful.  Thomas 
distinguishes  here.  Setting  up  a new  control  of  this 
kind  the  church  cannot  permit.  As  to  an  already 
established  dominion  the  case  is  different.  The  rela- 
tion of  sovereign  and  subject  is  a matter  of  human 
law ; the  distinction  between  believers  and  unbelie veij^^ 
is  a matter  of  divine  law.  But  the  divine  law,  which 
springs  from  the  grace  of  God,  does  not  destroy  hu- 
man law,  which  is  based  on  natural  reason.  Hence, 
authority  over  Christians  is  not  destroyed  by  the  mere 
fact  that  the  ruler  is  an  infidel.  But,  Thomas  hastens 
to  add,  if  the  church,  in  the  plenitude  of  her  power 
under  divine  law,  decrees  that  the  authority  of  the 
infidel  shall  cease,  her  word  is  conclusive.  So  also  as 
to  an  apostate  prince.  The  instant  that  the  church 
declares  him  excommunicated  for  apostasy,  his  sub- 
jects are  ipso  facto  released  from  his  authority,  and 
their  oaths  of  allegiance  lose  all  binding  force. 

6.  St.  Thomas's  Doctrine  as  Formulated  by  TEgidius 

Romanus 

if 

The  general  character  of  .Sf.  Thomas’s  political 
philosophy  is  sufficiently  indicated  by  what  has  already 
been  said.  Owing,  however,  to  the  fact  that  his 
De  Regimine  Principum  was  not  finished  by  his 
own  hand,  the  detailed  development  of  his  system 
was  in  many  respects  unsatisfactory,  and  was  put 
in  a much  more  worthy  shape  in  a work  of  the 
same  name  by  his  devoted  disciple,  iEgidius  Ro- 


208 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


manus.1  Both  the  master’s  treatise  and  the  disci- 
ple’s were  designed  as  books  of  instruction  for  scions 
of  royal  houses,  and  doubtless  owe  some  of  their  not- 
able characteristics  to  that  fact.  A special  interest 
attaches  to  the  work  of  iEgidius  in  that  the  young, 
prince  for  whose  instruction  the  book  was  written  was' 
none  other  than  he  who,  as  King  Philip  the  Fair,  gave 
so  severe  a blow  to  papal  dignity  and  prestige. 

The  plan  of  -ZEgidius’s  treatise  involves  a three-- 
fold  division,  comprising  a system  of  ethics,  a system  i 
of  economics  and  a system  of  politics.  That  is  to 
say,  the  character  of  a prince  is  determined  by  his 
personal  morality,  his  domestic  relations  and  his 
governmental  activity,  and  each  of  these  demands 
particular  consideration.  As  to  method,  iEgidius  is 
in  the  highest  degree  systematic  and  precise.  Eachi 
of  his  books  is  a clearly  distinguished  division  of  the 
whole  subject;  each  of  his  chapters  is  a precisely 
defined  topic  of  the  book ; and  in  each  chapter  the 1 
doctrine  enunciated  is  sustained  by  a series  of  argu- 
ments carefully  propounded  and  numbered  in  advance. 
The  result  of  this  method,  pursued  as  it  is  with  un- 
varying consistency,  is  to  give  great  clearness  to  the 
theory  which  the  author  is  seeking  to  inculcate.  As 
to  the  content  of  this  theory,  so  far  as  politics  is  con- 
cerned, it  may  fairly  be  described  as  exclusively  that 
of  Aristotle  and  St.  Thomas.  Some  writers  have 

1 Known  also  as  iEgidius  Colonna,  from  the  name  of  his  family. 

A thirteenth-century  French  version  of  his  work  has  been  recently 
published  by  the  Columbia  University  Press  under  the  title  Li  livres 
du  gouvernement  des  rois,  edited  by  Dr.  S.  P.  Molenaer  (New  York, 
Macmillan,  1899). 


JEG1D1US  ROMAN  US 


200 


claimed  a degree  of  originality  for  iEgidius,1  but 
such  a claim  is  very  difficult  to  substantiate.  That 
he  put  in  a more  intelligible  form  some  of  the  doc- 
trines of  his  master,  is  probably  the  utmost  that  can 
be  said.  A marked  peculiarity  of  his  treatise  is 
that  the  church  fathers  are  very  rarely  referred  to. 
The  same,  indeed,  is  true  as  to  St.  Thomas.  Aris- 
totle, “the  philosopher,' ” furnishes  the  premises  for 
perhaps  nine-tenths  of  iEgidius’s  demonstrations ; 
and  for  the  remainder  the  argument  follows,  though 
without  citation  of  the  authority,  the  line  already 
indicated  by  Aquinas.  It  will  be  useful,  however, 
to  dwell  briefly  on  some  features  of  iEgidius’s 
work.2 

St.  Thomas’s  justification  of  the  kingdom  as  a use- 
ful and  “ natural  ” form  of  association  is  amplified 
somewhat  by  iEgidius.3  He  demonstrates  on  Aris- 
totle’s own  principles  that  an  aggregation  of  cities 
(civitates)  has  a higher  degree  of  self-sufficiency  than 
a. single  one,  both  in  respect  to  the  material  means 
of  existence  and  in  respect  to  the  incentives  to  virtu- 
ous living.  These  are  in  addition  to  the  advantage 
of  a greater  force  for  defence  against  outer  foes, 
which  is  the  consideration  on  which  the  chief  stress 
is  laid  by  St.  Thomas. 

In  laying  out  the  plan  of  his  discussion  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  a state  in  time  of  peace,  ^Egidius  adopts 
a rather  striking  analysis  of  royal  government  into 

1 Cf.  Molenaer,  Introduction,  p.  xx. 

2 The  political  doctrines  proper  are  contained  chiefly  in  the  third 

book.  References  are  to  the  edition  of  1482.  For  list  of  printed 
editions,  see  Molenaer,  p.  457.  3 Lib.  Ill,  pars,  ii,  cap.  5. 


210 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


its  elements.1  The  state  must  be  ruled  according  to 
just  laws;  and  these  the  prince  enacts,  the  senate 
( consilium ) devises,  the  judiciary  ( pretorium ) applies 
to  concrete  cases,  and  the  people  observe.  It  is  the 
function  of  the  senate  to  seek  for  what  is  useful 
(conf evens)  and  avoid  the  harmful  (i nocivum ) ; of  the 
judiciary  to  seek  the  just  and  avoid  the  unjust;  of 
the  people  to  seek  the  praiseworthy  (« laudabilia ) and 
avoid  the  blameworthy  ( vituperabilia ).  Royal  gov- 
ernment, as  thus  constituted,  is  .ZEgidius  s idea  of  the 
best  form  of  political  organization.  His  reasons  for 
this  conclusion  are  those  of  St.  Thomas,  but  he  adds 
a temperate  argument  for  hereditary  succession  by 
primogeniture  as  the  best  rule  by  which  to  regulate 
the  transmission  of  authority.2 

In  discussing  the  judiciary  ( pretorium ),  iEgidius 
sets  forth  his  notions  of  law  and  rights,  in  which 
at  several  points  are  found  very  clearly  stated  ideas 
which  were  indicated  but  not  so  distinctly  formulated 
by  St.  Thomas.  Laws  (i leges ) and  rights  (ms)  are 
declared  to  be  subject  to  precisely  the  same  classifi- 
cation ; for  laws  are  merely  “ certain  rules  of  right 
(ius)  through  which  we  determine  what  is  just  and 
what  unjust  in  our  actions.” 3 And  after  pointing 
out  the  various  kinds  of  right  that  have  been  distin- 
guished by  Aristotle  and  the  jurists  — written  and 
unwritten,  general  {commune)  and  particular  (pro- 
prium),  natural  and  positive,  ius  gentium  and  ius 
civile , — he  declares  that  all  are  practically  reducible 
Ho  two  classes,  — ius  naturale  and  ius  positivum. 

1 Lib.  Ill,  pars,  ii,  cap.  1.  2 Ibid.  cap.  5.  3 Ibid.  cap.  24. 


jEGIDIUS  ROMANUS 


211 


Law,  therefore,  is  reducible  to  the  same  categories ; 
for  example,  the  lex  humana  corresponds  to  the  ius 
humanum  positivum.1  But  like  St.  Thomas,  and 
much  more  distinctly,  JEgidius  sets  forth  the  impor- 
tance of  the  element  of  personal  volition  and  com- 
mand in  the  conception  of  law.  “ Nothing  is  law 
unless  proclaimed  by  him  whose  function  is  to  direct 
to  the  common  good  ; for  if  a law  is  divine  and 
natural,  it  is  enacted  ( condita ) by  God.”  And 
again : — 

Any  one  of  the  people  can  induce  and  persuade  another  to 
act  rightly;  but  advice  and  persuasion  of  this  kind  are  not 
called  laws,  because  they  have  no  coactive  element  (nihil  coacti- 
\ vum).  Only  by  an  extension  of  the  term  law  can  all  kinds  of 
direction  and  advice  be  called  laws.2 

^Egidius’s  discussion  of  the  subject  of  lex  and  ius 
\ reveals  the  completion  of  a movement  that  appeared x 
first  in  the  thought  of  Cicero,  when  he  put  forth  his 
doctrine  of  the  law  of  nature  ( lex  naturale ).3  This 
movement  was  toward  the  idea  that  all  rights  have  C 
their  source  in  law.  To  the  Homan  jurists  nature 
and  reason  were  sources  of  rights  even  more  than 
was  law  (lex).  But  to  the  mediaeval  mind  nature 
and  reason  were  identified  in  last  analysis  with  the 
personal  Christian  God,  and  natural  rights  flowed 
from  his  will  and  were  guaranteed  by  his  coactive 
power.  Natural  law  was  in  the  fullest  sense  law ; it  ^ 
! possessed  the  same  imperative  and  coactive  elements 
as  the  legislative  enactments  of  man.  This  concep- 
tion was  destined  to  long  sway  in  jurisprudence  and 

1 Lib.  Ill,  pars,  li,  cap.  26.  2 Ibid.  pars,  ii,  cap.  27.  3 Supra,  p.  123. 


212 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


politics.  ily  when,  after  the  Reformation,  the  gen- 
eral respect  for  authority  gave  way,  were  philoso-j 
phers  able  again  to  detach  natural  law  from  God  and 
transfer  it  to  impersonal  human  reason,  and  then  to 
deny  to  it  altogether  the  volitional  quality  which 
w'ould  give  it  the  character  of  law. 

7.  Summary 

In  the  perspective  of  history  the  Thomist  political 
theory  marks  the  end  of  an  era.  It  is  the  calm  dis- 
passionate expression  of  a habit  of  thought  and  feel-  j 
ing  which  had  received  its  character  through  centu-  j 
ries  of  strenuous  conflict.  The  thirteenth  century  is ! 
less  controversial  than  its  predecessors ; it  manifests  , 
the  distinctly  philosophical  quality  of  seeking  rather  | 
to  coordinate  than  to  achieve.  Ecclesiastical  hege^l 
mony  in  social  life  is  assumed  and  explained  rather  t| 
than  debated.  Monarchic  government  receives  the 
theoretical  justification  which  its  general  prevalence  | 
suggests.  The  kingdom,  as  the  typical  form  of  state,  j 
supplants  the  city,  though  the  ancient  idea  on  this  ' 
point  still  remains  influential  and  finds  support  not 
only  in  the  theories  of  the  omnipotent  Aristotle,  but 
also  in  the  facts  which  the  decline  of  imperial  au- 
thority is  making  significant  in  the  position  and 
aspirations  of  Venice,  Genoa,  Pisa  and  other  com- 
mercial centres  of  the  Italian  peninsula.  Law,  right 
and  justice  are  cast  in  the  mould  and  fixed  upon 
the  foundation  which  the  religious  and  ecclesiastical 
development  of  past  centuries  had  wrought  out  of 
Roman  jurisprudence.  All  the  fundamental  concepts 


CONTROVERSIES  AFTER  AQUINAS  213 

of  political  theory  are  impressed  by  Aquinas  with  the 
character  of  dogmatic  finality  that  springs  from  a 
conviction  that  controversy  is  past  and  that  the  emo- 
tions are  under  the  permanent  sway  of  pure  reason. 

But  twrenty  years  after  St.  Thomas  passed  away, 
Boniface  VIII  ascended  the  papal  throne  (1294). 
Promptly  arose  the  conflict  with  Philip  the  Fair,  and 
the  fourteenth  century  opened  with  the  age-long  con- 
troversy of  ecclesiastical  and  secular  powers  absorb- 
ing all  the  thought  and  energy  of  both.  Philosophic 
calm  disappeared  at  once  under  the  flood  of  polemic 
passion.  The  quarrel  of  Boniface  and  Philip  was  fol- 
lowed soon  by  that  of  John  XXII  and  Lewis  of 
Bavaria,  and  this  in  turn  by  the  sundering  of  the 
church  in  the  Great  Schism.  So  far  from  the  settled 
and  placid  progress  of  Christendom  under  the  princi- 
ples which  the  Thomist  philosophy  had  proclaimed 
as  final,  the  fourteenth  century  presented,  in  both., 
theory  and  practice,  a condition  of  profound  and 
widespread  unsettlement.  The  trend  of  political 
speculation  in  the  conflicts  of  this  period  was  toward 
the  rejection  or  radical  transformation  of  what  was 
most  fundamental  in  the  preceding  century.  A 
wholly  novel  spirit  was  manifested  by  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  papal  hierarchy.  Aristotle  and  St. 
Augustine  were  re-read  and  re-interpreted.  The 
Bible  itself  was  turned  with  energy  if  not  with  skill 
against  the  ecclesiastical  hegemony.  Within  fifty 
years,  in  short,  of  St.  Thomas’s  death,  political  theory 
abounded  in  heraldings  of  the  Reformation  and  the 
Revolution. 


214 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


SELECT  REFERENCES 

Thomas  Aquinas,  Opera  Omnia  (Paris,  1871-80)  : Summa 
Theologica , in  Yols.  I-VI;  on  Law  and  Justice,  see  especially 
Vols.  II  and  III;  for  De  Regimine  Principum , Yol.  XXYII, 
opusc.  16.  ^Egidius  Romanus,  De  Hegimine  Principum , Roma, 
1482.  Baumann,  Die  Staatslehre  des  h.  Thomas  von  Aquino. 
Burri,  Le  Teorie  politiche  di  San  Tommaso  e il  moderno  diritto 
pubblico.  Feugueray,  Essai  sur  les  doctrines  politiques  de 
Saint  Thomas  d’Aquin,  pp.  15-216.  Franck,  R&formateurs  et 
publicistes , moyen  dge,  pp.  39-102.  Janet,  Yol.  I,  pp.  360-413. 
Jourdain,  La  Philosophic  de  St.  Thomas  d’Aquin,  Tom.  I, 
pp.  141-149,  363-434;  II,  9-29,  450  et  seq.  Molenaer,  Li 
livres  du  gouvernement  des  rois.  Poole,  Mediaeval  Thought, 
pp.  239-246. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THEORIES  DURING  THE  DECLINE  OF  THE  PAPAL 
HEGEMONY 

1.  Pro-papal  Doctrine 

The  quarrel  between  Pope  Boniface  and  King 
Philip  has  a special  significance  in  the  history  of 
political  thought  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place 
it  presented  clearly  the  question  as  to  the  general 
relation  oi  spiritual  to  temporal  power,  apart  from  the 
complications  due  to  the  peculiar  history  and  tradi- 
tions of  the  Empire.  The  French  king  made  no  pre- 
tentions to  universal  dominion,  and  his  case  against 
the  Pope  was  just  to" that  extent  stronger.  In  the 
second_place  the  matter  of  taxation,  out  of  which 
chiefly  the  quarrel  arose,  involved  the  whole  question 
of  property  rights,  and  so  sharpened  the  issue  to  a 
point  at  which  the  purely  temporal  character  of 
the  interests  concerned  was  undeniable.  These  two 
particular  features  of  the  controversy  account  in 
some  measure  for  the  fact  that  the  arguments  put 
forth  in  behalf  of  Boniface  embody  the  most  ex- 
treme claims  ever  made  in  respect  to  ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction.  By  this  time  the  title  of  the  Papacy 
to  all  the  power  of  the  church  had  passed  practi- 
cally beyond  the  field  of  controversy.  The  Pope 
was,  so  far  as  authority  was  concerned,  the  church. 


215 


216 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


And  liis  power  was  now,  by  his  most  zealous  sup- 
porters, asserted  distinctly  to  include  things  tem- 
poral as  well  as  things  spiritual,  and  to  extend 
over  all  the  princes  of  the  earth. 

That  Boniface  himself  officially  committed  him- 
self to  this  position  is  not  clear.  He  was  a man 
of  violent  temper  and  corresponding  speech,  and 
may  have  used  expressions  privately,  or  even  pub- 
licly, that  he  would  not  deliberately  have  put  on 
record.  He  passionately  denounced  as  false  the 
allegation  that  he  had  asserted  that  Philip  was  sub-  1 
ject  to  him  in  respect  to  the  French  kingdom  and 
was  bound  to  recognize  his  suzerainty.  But  he  with  j 
equal  explicitness  declared  that  the  king  was  subject 
to  him  on  the  ground  of  sin,  and  in  a very  peremp- 
tory letter  ascribed  to  the  Pope  it  is  said  without 
qualification  : “We  wish  you  to  understand  that  you 
are  subject  to  us  in  spirituals  and  in  temporals.”  1 
There  is  some  question  as  to  the  authenticity  of 
this  latter  expression.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  qualification,  ratione  peccati,  was  not  regarded 
in  papal  circles  as  of  more  than  theoretical  sig- 
nificance, and  that  no  practical  limit  excluded  from 
ecclesiastical  interference  whatever  business  the 
church  regarded  as  of  interest  to  itself.  The 
famous  bull  Unam  Sanctam  (1302),  which  was  the 
official  embodiment  of  the  papal  position,  recited 


1 In  a contemptuous  reply  Philip  retorted  : “ Let  your  most  distin- 
guished Fatuousness  be  assured  that  in  temporals  we  are  subject  to 
no  one.”  The  leading  documents  in  this  famous  case  are  in  Gieseler, 
Vol.  II,  p.  348,  note  21. 


THE  POPE  AND  PROPERTY  RIGHTS 


217 


the  familiar  doctrine  of  the  two  swords,  the  com- 
mission of  Jeremiah  and  the  other  hackneyed  texts, 
and  ended  with  the  formal  declaration  that  “for 
every  human  being  submission  to  the  Roman  Pon- 
tiff is  indispensable  to  salvation.”  1 

But  if  Boniface  himself  was  careful  not  to  carry 
the  papal  theory  beyond  the  point  reached  by  Inno- 
cent III,  the  less  exalted  debaters  of  the  time  very 
openly  passed  that  point.  In  an  unpublished  tract  of 
iEgidius JBomanus,1  who  seems  to  have  abandoned 
his  royal  pupil  in  the  time  of  the  quarrel  with  the 
Pope,  the  thesis  is  sustained  that  the  ultimate  own- 
ership of  temporal  goods  is  in  the  church  and 
hence  is  subject  to  the  determination  of  the  Pope. 
The  reasoning  in  support  of  this  view  is  cogent : 
The  end  of  temporal  things  is  the  support  of  the 
body ; the  body  is  subordinate  to  the  soul,  which  in 
turn  is  subject  to  the  guidance  of  the  Pope ; 
therefore,  the  art  of  governing  a people,  the  treat- 
ise holds,  consists  essentially  in  bringing  them  into 
proper  relations  with  the  laws  of  the  church.  No 
possessor  of  a piece  of  property  by  law  of  the  state 
holds  it  justly  save  by  authority  of  the  church.  The 
child  who  inherits  property  owes  it  less  to  his  father 
than  to  the  church;  the  father  has  begotten  him 
according  to  the  flesh,  but  the  church  has  regenerated 
him  according  to  the  spirit,  which  is  more  than  the 
flesh.;  ' And  finally,  infidels  and,  indeed,  all  who  obsti- 

i « porro  subesse  Romano  Pontifici  omni  humanae  creaturae  decla- 
ramus,  dicimus,  definimus  et  pronuntiamus  omnino  esse  de  necessitate 

salutis.”  2 Summarized  in  Janet,  I,  411. 


218 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


nately  remain  without  the  fold  of  the  church,  have 
no  just  title  to  property. 

This  position  was  well  calculated  to  sustain  the 
cause  of  Boniface.  After  the  death  of  the  latter,  his 
successors,  Clement  V and  John  XXII,  made  their 
peace  with  the  French  monarchy  and,  domiciled  at 
Avignon  under  its  influence  and  protection,  engaged  I 
in  hot  conflicts  with  the  Emperors  Henry  VII  and 
Lewis  of  Bavaria.  The  issues  here  turned  on  the  old 
contention  as  to  the  relation  of  the  Pope  to  the  Em- 
pire, and  for  the  most  part  the  pro-papal  argument  fol- 
lowed precisely  the  lines  that  we  have  already  noticed 
in  connection  with  Gregory  VII  and  Innocent  III. 
But  in  some  particulars  the  protagonists  of  the  Pope' 
pushed  the  exaltation  of  the  Papacy  to  a more  extreme 
point  than  had  ever  before  been  reached.  The  friar 
Augustinus  Triumphus  seems  entitled  to  the  greatest 
distinction  in  this  respect.  In  his  work,  Summa  de 
Potestate  Ecclesiastica , he  ascribes  to  the  Popey-as  the 
vicar  of  God,  many  of  the  divine  attributes.1  “ His 
jurisdiction  is  greater  than  that  of  any  angel.”  Lay- 
men are  bound  to  obey  him  rather  than  any  king  or 
emperor.  Even  pagans  are  subject  to  him.  Besides 
the  plenary  power  (plenitiido  potestatis)  which  he  en- 
joys over  the  Emperor,  to  set  up,  depose  or  control,  he 
can  depose  or  set  up  any  king  whatever,  though  in 
respect  to  kings  Augustinus  still  qualifies  — “when 
there  is  reasonable  cause.”  That  is,  the  old  qualifi- 

1 A full  analysis  of  the  work  is  given  in  Friedberg,  Die  mittelalter- 
lichen  Lehren  iiber  das  Verhdltniss  von  Staat  und  Kirche.  Cf.  also  Poole, 
Illustrations  of  Mediaeval  Thought , p.  253 ; also  Gieseler,  III,  33. 


AUGUSTINUS  TRIUMPHUS 


219 


cation,  “ ratione  peccati”  which  was  vague  and  elastic 
enough,  gives  way  to  the  infinitely  less  determinate 
u causa  rationalis  ” ; and  it  is  carefully  explained  that 
any  delinquency  of  either  people  or  king  is  good 
ground  for  papal  action  in  either  deposing  or  institut- 
ing a king.  Nor  will  Augustinus  permit  the  lord  of 
all  the  world  to  refrain  from  using  his  authority. 
“ The  Pope  cannot  exempt  any  one  from  his  power  in 
temporals,”  for  this  would  be  to  deny  that  he  is  the 
vicar  of  God.  And  finally,  the  plenary  power  of  the 
Pope  in  the  matter  of  tithes  is  defended  in  this  far- 
reaching  argument : “ Private  property  ceases  to  be 
such  by  natural  law  in  case  of  necessity,  by  divine 
law,  for  the  sake  of  charity,  and  by  the  civil  law,  for 
the  benefit  ( utilitas ) of  the  state”  : but  the  Pope,  as 
the  vicar  of  God,  is  the  interpreter  and  ordainer  of 
all  law ; therefore  he  can  at  his  discretion,  on  either 
of  the  grounds,  take  the  property  of  private  citizens, 
and  even  of  kings  and  other  potentates. 

This  magnificent  conception  of  the  papal  power 
found  very  little  support  in  the  actual  conditions 
which  prevailed  when  it  was  formulated.  Indeed, 
the  exaggeration  of  the  ecclesiastical  pretensions  in 
theory  proceeded  pari  passu  with  the  decline  of  the 
papal  prestige.  The  policy  of  the  curia  at  Avignon 
was  pretty  generally  recognized  as  guided  from  Paris, 
and  because  of  this  even  the  German  princes  who  had 
so  often  been  the  mainstay  of  the  popes  against  the 
Emperor  now  stood  by  Lewis  of  Bavaria.  In  Italy 
also  the  respect  for  papal  authority,  whether  spiritual 
or  temporal,  steadily  declined.  And  while  the  exter- 


220 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


nal  conditions  were  shaping  themselves  thus,  in  the 
field  of  speculation  and  debate  a corresponding  move- 
ment was  revealed  by  the  volume  and  the  spirit  of 
that  literature  in  which  the  papal  pretensions^ were 
assailed  and  confuted. 

2.  New  Elements  in  the  Anti-papal  Theory 

The  fourteenth-century  adversaries  of  the  Papacy 
manifested  in  every  instance  a more  confident  and 
aggressive  spirit  than  that  found  in  the  earlier  advo- 
cates of  princely  independence.  The  latter  were  at 
the  best  feeble  and  halting  in  their  argument  and  were 
obviously  conscious  that  they  were  on  the  defensive 
and  that  the  spirit  of  the  age  was  against  them.  Not 
so  the  men  of  the  fourteenth  century.  Their  works 
abound  in  revelations  of  new  forces  working  in  the 
thought  of  the  time  — forces  which  were  all  on  the 
side  of  the  secular  authority.  In  form  and  method 
the  philosophic  literature  of  the  fourteenth  century 
retains  and  intensifies  the  characteristics  impressed  1 
upon  it  by  the  preceding  scholastics.  The  dogmas  of 
authority  are  cited  and  are  refuted  by  opposing  dog- 
mas ; all  literature,  sacred  and  profane,  is  ransacked  j 
for  fables  that  can  be  exploited  to  sustain  a cause ; | 
syllogistic  deductions  are  elaborately  demonstrated  to 
contain  the  formal  fallacies  of  the  syllogism ; distinc- 
tions that  cannot  be  seen  by  the  modern  mind  to 
distinguish  are  triumphantly  brought  to  the  determi- 
nation of  every  conflict  of  great  authorities  ; and  “ the 
subtle  manipulation  of  unverified  words,”  as  John 
Morley  calls  it,  reaches  its  climax  in  the  monstrous 


THE  FOURTEENTII-CENTURY  JURISTS 


221 


verbal  output  of  the  Doctor  Subtilissimus,  William  of 
Ockam.1  But  the  tiresome  method  and  form  of  the 
literature  do  not  conceal  the  new  elements  in  the 
thought  of  the  writers.  While  the  ancient  argu- 
ments from  the  texts  of  the  Scriptures  and  the 
church  fathers  are  always  dealt  with  at  length,  there 
appear  in  addition,  and  often  with  even  greater 
emphasis,  an  appeal  to  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle  and 
an  extensive  recourse  to  the  canon  and  the  civil  law. 

St.  Thomas  had,  as  we  have  seen,  ingeniously 
applied  the  philosophy  of  the  Greek  to  the  purposes 
of  his  own  system.  But  it  was  quite  open  to  the 
opponents  of  Thomas’s  political  doctrine  to  avail 
themselves  also  of  the  Aristotelian  principles.  In- 
deed, no  speculation  of  any  sort  was  now  formally 
complete  without  some  basis  in  those  principles. 
Hence  we- find  the  antagonists  of  the  popes  drawing 
freely  from  “the  philosopher.”  And  it  is  easily 
conceivable  that  the  innermost  spirit  of  the  Greek’s 
thought,  alien  as  it  was  to  the~  ecclesiastical  spirit 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  gave  most  stimulus  to  those 
who  were  at  war,  though  unconsciously,  with  what 
was  characteristically  mediaeval. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  legal  and  juristic  influence 
which  wrought  so  powerfully  in  the  controversies 
of  the  fourteenth  century  contributed  to  the  cause 
of  the  secular  power  less  through  theory  than  in- 
directly through  fact.  All  the  set  arguments  in 
behalf  of  princes  against  the  Papacy  included  ex- 

1 For  an  amusing  judgment  on  Ockam,  and  a frank  non  possumus 
as  to  understanding  him,  see  J anet,  I,  446. 


222  POLITICAL  THEORIES 

hau stive  discussions  (^Canm^and-£lvil  law.1  The 
Canon  law  had  by  this  time  become  a large  body 
of  principles  and  rules  derived  from  the  decretals 
of  popes  and  commentaries  ( glossce ) thereon;  the 
Civil  law  consisted  of  Justinian’s  Digest  and  the 
commentaries  that  had  accumulated  since  the  revival 
of  legal  studies  in  the  twelfth  century.  Through 
the  development  of  the  Canon  law  into  a system, 
universally  applied  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  the 
advantage  derived  by  the  secular  rulers  from  the 
Roman  law2  had  been  neutralized.  In  the  vary- 
ing phases  of  the  controversy  over  jurisdiction,  the 
jurists  of  the  Civil  law  — the  Civilians  — were  con- 
fronted by  an  equally  well-trained  body  of  Canonists. 
Each  strove  to  demonstrate  the  supremacy  of  his 
own  system  of  authority.  From  the  standpoint  of 
pure  theory  the  controversy  was  indecisive.  But 
the  keenness  of  the  discussions  and  the  activity 
of  the  lawyers  had  a practical  result  when  Philip 
the  Fair  and  other  princes  began  systematically  to 
extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the  royal  courts  at  the 
expense  of  both  lay  vassals  and  the  church.  In 
this  policy  the  lawyers  were  always  ready  with  plau- 
sible grounds  in  both  Civil  and  Canon  law  for  the 
extension  in  view,  and  with  this  support  in  theory 
the  physical  force  of  the  secular  ruler  could  always 

1 Cf.  the  treatise  entitled  Qucestio  de  Utraque  Potentate , in  Goldast, 

Monorchia  Sancti  Romani  Imperii , II,  106.  The  author  proclaims 
his  purpose  to  prove  that  the  Pope  has  no  dominium  in  temporals  bty 
four  arguments,  viz. : “ Per  rationes  physicas  ” (Aristotle)  ; “per  rati- 
ones  theologicas  ” (the  texts  of  Scripture  and  the  fathers)  ; “ per  jura 
canonica  and  “ per  jura  civilia.”  2 Cf.  supra,  p.  180. 


THE  FOURTEENTH-CENTURY  JURISTS  223 

be  depended  upon  in  last  resort  to  make  his  claim 
of  right  prevail.  With  every  successful  assertion  ofA 
the  royal  power  the  influence  of  its  juristic  advisers 
became  more  noteworthy,  and  thus  the  lawyers  and 
their  methods  of  thought  assumed  a leading  place 
in  the  consolidation  of  national  monarchies  which 
was  just  beginning. 

Besides  the  Aristotelian  and  juristic  doctrine  that 
gave  a new  tone  to  fourteenth-century  theory,  the 
singular  prominence  assumed  by  the  French  monar-^~ 
chy  profoundly  modified  the  trend  of  speculation. 
The  relative  insignificance  of  imperial  power  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  Philip  the  Fair  could  not  be  dis- 
guised, and  accordingly  the  universal  dominion  of  the 
Emperor — so  long  a postulate  of  mediaeval  theory 
— began  to  lose  its  hold  along  with  the  temporal 
pretensions  of  the  Pope.  Its  strongest  supporters,^, 
indeed,  were  now  to  be  found  among  the  advocates 
of  the  papal  pretensions.  Boniface  VIII  himself, 
in  memorable  words,  relegated  the  French  king  and 
his  people  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  Emperor.  “ Let 
not  the  Gauls  say  in  their  arrogance  that  they  recog- 
nize no  superior.  They  lie;  for  of  right  they  are 
and  ought  to  be  subject  to  the  King  of  Rome  and 
the  Emperor.”  1 The  motive  for  this  suggestion  is 
obvious.  At  this  time  the  power  of  the  Pope  over 
the  Emperor  was  notorious,  and  Boniface  was  argu- 
ing primarily  his  own  case,  not  that  of  the  Emperor. 

1 “ Nee  insurgat  hie  superbia  Gallicana  quae  dicit  quod  non  recog- 
noscit  superiorem.  Mentiuntur ; quia  de  jure  sunt  et  esse  debent  sub 
rege  Romano  et  Imperatore.” 


224 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


What  small  influence  the  claim  had  in  France  ap- 
pears from  the  projects  that  were  openly  put  forth 
^by  Philip’s  advocates,  looking  to  the  extension  of  the 
king’s  power  over  all  Europe  in  the  interest  of  peace.1 
The  Empire  had  become,  in  fact,  a mere  thing  to 
conjure  with,  but  without  serious  significance.  Not 
only  did  the  French  lawyers  cast  aside  with  disdain 
the  idea  of  universal  temporal  dominion  and  set 
forth  in  elaborate  arguments  the  claim  that  it  was 
irrational,  but  even  the  ablest  and  clearest  headed 
of  imperialistic  writers  evaded  committing  himself  to 
its  assertion  and  defence.2 

3.  The  Supporters  of  Philip  the  Fair 

Underlying  all  the  reasoning  by  which  the  case 
of  Philip  against  Boniface  was  sustained  was  the 
*>  more  or  less  conscious  sentiment  of  French  nation- 
ality. The  ethnic  and  geographical  elements  of  this 
thought  appear  in  the  designation  of  the  king  some- 
times as  Rex  Francice  and  sometimes  as  Rex  Fran - 
corum , while  the  most  conclusive  manifestation  of 
the  thought  was  the  practically  unanimous  support 
given  to  the  king  by  all  orders  of  his  subjects. 

In  the  controversial  literature  of  the  time  the 
independence  of  the  French  monarchy  is  sustained 
by  earnest,  if  somewhat  uncritical,  appeals  to  history. 
Philip’s  reply  to  one  of  the  Pope’s  fulminations 
asserts  concisely  the  argument  from  antiquity : J 
“ Before  there  were  any  priests,  the  King  of  France 


1 See  next  section. 


2 Marsiglio,  Defensor  Pads,  I,  17. 


FRENCH  MONARCHY  AGAINST  FAPACY  225 

had  the  care  of  his  kingdom  and  could  make  laws 
for  it.,,  1 The  details  of  this  contention  are  found 
in  a short  treatise  entitled  De  Utraciue  Potestate ? 

It  is  set  forth  that  after  the  fall  of  Troy  twelve 
thousand  Trojans  settled  in  Pannonia,  where  they 
remained  until  the  Emperor  Valentinian  expelled 
them  for  their  persistent  refusal  to  pay  tribute  to 
Rome.  They  moved  to  Germany  near  the  Rhine, 
took  the  name  of  Franks  on  account  of  their  in-  L 
vincible  courage  in  resisting  Rome,  and  ultimately 
occupied  Gaul.  Thus,  the  writer  says,  they  were 
never  subject  to  either  the  Emperor  or  anybody 
else.  But,  he  continues,  with  a characteristic  change 
of  base  from  history  to  law,  even  if  ever  at  any 
time  they  were  subject  to  any  emperor  or  pope, 
it  must  have  been  very  long  ago,  and  their  indepen- 
dence rests  securely  enough  on  prescription ; for  by 
the  Canon  law  itself  a prescription  of  one  hundred 
years  runs  against  the  Roman  church.1 2 3  From  the 
standpoint  of  either  fact  or  law,  thus,  the  king  is 
free  from  responsibility  to  the  Pope.  His  right  is 
divine  right.  u He  holds  and  possesses  his  kingdom  L/ 
immediately  of  God  alone ; ” and  the  sacred  source 
of  his  power  is  testified,  the  writer  declares,  by 
the  miracles  which  the  French  monarchs  have 
wrought. 


1 “ Antequam  essent  clerici,  Rex  Franciae  habebat  custodiam  regni 
et  poterat  statuta  facere.”  Cf.  John  of  Paris  in  the  work  treated  be- 
low : “ Prius  fuerunt  reges  Franciae  in  Francia  quam  Christiani.’ 

2 In  Goldast,  op.  cit.  II,  106. 

3 “ Nam  etiam  contra  Romanam  Ecclesiam  currit  praescriptio  cen- 


tenaria.” 


226 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


In  a more  elaborate  work 1 in  behalf  of  Philip  by 
s John  of  Paris,  the  philosophic  basis  of  the  kingdom 
(: regnum ),  as  distinct  from  the  Empire  and  the  ecclesi- 
astical hierarchy,  is  effectively  laid  down.  Conceding 
that  the  organization  of  the  clergy  under  a single 
monarchic  head  is  altogether  desirable,  he  argues 
that  the  same  is  not  true  as  to  temporal  rulers.2 
The  reasons  he  sets  forth  are  noteworthy,  as  indi- 
cating the  reaction  from  the  idea  of  universal  em- 
pire. The  faith  necessary  to  salvation,  he  declares, 
is  one  and  the  same  everywhere,  and  hence  requires 
^ unity  in  ecclesiastical  control./^  But  in  their  non- 
spiritual aspects  and  relations  Christians  are  most 
diverse  and  require  leadership  corresponding  to  this 
diversity.^  Moreover,  for  one  man  to  rule  the  whole 
world  is  possible  in  spirituals,  but  not  in  temporals. 

> The  former  government  works  through  mere  words, 
while  the  latter  works  through  force ; and  it  is  easy 
enough  to  send  words  everywhere,  but  impossible  to 
exercise  force  effectively  at  long  ranged  And  finally, 
the  property  of  laymen  in  their  temporal  relations 
is  individual,  while  that  held  by  the  clergy  belongs 
to  the  whole  body  of  the  church ; therefore  a single 
steward  ( dispensator ) is  not  necessary  in  the  former 
case  as  in  the  latter. 

That  the  Pope  is  steward,  rather  than  owner 
( dominus ),  of  the  property  pertaining  to  the  church, 


1 De  Potestate  Regia  et  Papali.  In  Goldast,  II,  108. 

2 The  title  of  his  third  chapter  is : “ De  ordine  ministrorum  ad 
unum  summum;  quod  non  est  necesse  omnes  principes  ad  unum 
reduci,  sicut  ministros  Ecclesiae  ad  unum  supremum.” 


JOHN  OF  PARIS 


227 


is  the  very  backbone  of  the  royal  defence.  And 
in  sustaining  this  thesis  great  ingenuity  is  employed 
on  purely  legal  concepts.  The  whole  subject  of  j 
property  rights  is  exhaustively  investigated.  John 
of  Paris  contends,  for  example,  that  the  Pope,  even 
if  he  had  ownership  as  to  the  possessions  of  lay- 
men, would  not  on  that  account  have  jurisdiction 
over  them ; for  jurisdiction  is  quite  a different 
concept  from  ownership,  and  pertains  to  the  prince. 
Furthermore  the  Pope,  in  exercising  the  supreme 
stewardship  which  he  enjoys  in  respect  to  ecclesi- 
astical goods,  is  bound  to  be  guided  himself  by 
the  good  of  the  faith.  Failing  this  he  may  be  ^ 
deposed. 

The  deposition  of  the  Pope  was  at  this  time  a com- 
mon topic  with  the  supporters  of  Philip.  John  of 
Paris  held  that  such  action  would  justly  follow  per- 
sistent hostility  to  the  French  king.  But  the  right 
to  depose  was  not  ascribed  to  the  king;  in  this  re- 
spect his  purely  national  authority  left  no  room  for 
such  claim  to  regulate  the  Papacy  as  was  set  up  for 
the  Emperor  in  the  character  of  divinely  established 
universal  monarch.  The  instrumentality  to  which 
Philip’s  lawyers  made  resort  in  their  projects  of  depo-C-^ 
sition  was  the  general  council  of  the  church.  The 
bearings  of  this  idea,  that  a general  council,  rather 
than  the  Pope,  was  the  depository  of  ultimate  eccle- 
siastical sovereignty,  will  appear  more  particularly 
in  later  pages. 

Of  all  the  writings  in  behalf  of  Philip  the  Fair 
the  most  noteworthy  and  original  are  those  of  Peter 


228 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Dubois,1  a jurist  high  in  the  councils  of  the  king. 
Dubois  presents  no  set  scholastic  argument  for  the 
royal  cause,  but,  for  the  realization  of  certain  medise- 
val  ideals,  proposes  methods  that  frankly  ignore  all ! 
the  broad  political  conceptions  that  are  character- 
istically mediaeval,  and  rest  on  a view  of  existing: 
conditions  that  is  almost  brutally  practical.  His 
two  chief  works  embody  respectively  a project  for 
the  speedy  and  successful  termination  of  the  wars^ 
and  controversies  in  which  the  French  monarchy  is 
engaged,  and  a scheme  for  the  recovery  of  the  HofjK 
Land  from  the  infidels.  The  basal  thought  in  each 
work  is  that  the  French  king  is,  regardless  of  all 
the  traditional  theories  as  to  imperial  and  papal 
supremacy,  the  only  possessor  of  actual  political 
power  sufficient  for  the  highest  welfare  of  Christen- 
dom. V Theoretically  the  Pope,  as  a political  ruler,  is 
above  the  Emperor  by  the  Donation  of  Constantine. 
But  it  requires  force  to  assert  this  power,  and  suffi- 
cient force  the  Pope  of  himself  can  never  possess. 
Dubois  sets  forth,  with  a calm  cynicism  that  suggests 
Machiavelli,  the  emptiness  of  right  without  might. 
The  Pope  is  no  warrior,  and  ought  not  to  be;  his  busi- 
ness is  to  save  souls,  while  by  meddling  in  politics 
he  has  sent  many  to  hell.  Moreover,  the  men  who  are 
elected  popes  are  generally  decrepit  old  men,  without 
that  family  influence  and  connection  which  are  essen- 


1 For  a full  account  of  his  life  and  works,  see  Renan,  iZtudes  sur 
la  politique  religieuse  de  Philippe  le  Bel.  The  text  of  the  De  Recupe- 
ratione  Terre  Sancte , edited  by  Langlois,  is  in  the  Collection  de  textes 
pour  servir  a V etude  de  I’histoire,  Paris,  1891.  Cf.  also  Poole,  Mediaeval 
Thought , p.  256  et  seq. 


PETER  DUBOIS 


229 


tial  to  wide  power  in  temporal  affairs.  They  should 
confine  themselves  therefore  to  their  spiritual  minis- 
trations. Meanwhile,  their  temporal  functions  and 
their  temporal  revenues  should  be  committed  to  the 
administration  of  some  one  competent  to  perform 
the  task  well.  No  one  is  better  qualified  for  this 
task  than  the  French  monarch ; and  thus  the  essence 
of  the  writer’s  project  is  revealed  to  be,  that  the 
King  of  France  shall  appropriate  to  his  own  use  the 
territories  of  the  Pope  and  employ  them  in  asserting 
a leadership  over  Christendom. 

The  same  underlying  idea  is  manifest  in  the  scheme 
for  the  recovery  of  the  Holy  Land.  The  disastrous 
failure  of  all  efforts  in  this  direction  has  been  due  to 
the  disunity  of  Christendom,  a condition  for  which 
the  feebleness  of  the  Papacy  has  been  largely  respon- 
sible. But  with  papal  influence  confined  to  spirituals, 
and  with  temporals  under  French  hegemony,  success 
will  be  assured.  Dubois  dwells  with  especial  itera- 
tion on  the  demoralizing  effects  of  the  free  use  by 
the  Popes  of  excommunication ; it  brings,  he  holds, 
damnation  to  many  souls,  without  exercising  upon 
the  actions  of  men  so  much  positive  influence  as  do 
temporal  penalties.  His  project  involves,  in  addition 
to  the  special  points  just  noted,  suggestions  of  very 
wide  social  and  political  reforms  in  Christian  Europe  ° 
as  preliminary  to  the  great  enterprise  against  the 
infidels.  Though  many  of  his  notions  are  hopelessly 
unpractical  and  visionary,  the  spirit  in  which  he 
presents  them  is  remarkable,  and  foreshadows  the 
approaching  philosophy  of  the  Renaissance. 


230 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


4.  The  Be  Monarchia  of  Bante. 

Of  the  thinkers  who  contributed  to  the  anti-papal 
doctrine  from  the  standpoint  of  the  imperial  interest, 
Dante  Alighieri  is  noteworthy  rather  for  triteness 
than  for  novelty  in  the  substance  of  his  thought. 
While  the  French  writers  and  his  own  associates  in 
the  imperial  cause  were  propounding  doctrines  that 
breathed  forth  the  spirit  of  a new  age,  Dante  brooded 
over  the  past.  His  Latin  work,  Be  Monarchia / is  in 
^ | substance  a plea  for  that  secularjworld-empire  which 
' had  had  aJaasis  of  reality  in  the  days  of  the  Hohen- 
staufen,  but  had  since  become  the  shadow  of  a name. 
Dante’s  genius  gave  to  his  treatise  a form,  however, 
which  makes  it  logically  the  most  complete  and  per- 
fect system  that  we  have  of  imperialistic  philosophy. 
The  manifold  and  confused  argumentation  by  which 
the  cause  of  the  emperors  had  been  for,  centuries 
upheld  is  so  condensed,  and  its  elements  are  So  corre- 
lated, as  to  present  a clearly  defined  and  impressive 
ideal  of  the  system.  To  this  end  are  made  to  con- 
tribute the  Aristotelian  metaphysics  and  politics, 
Roman  and  Jewish  history  and  the  Civil  and 
Canon  law,  as  well  as  the  myths  and  the  texts  of 
Scripture  which  were  still  on  every  tongue. 

By  “ monarchy”  Dante  means  universal  dominion 
over  all  things  temporal,2  and  monarchy  in  this  sense 

1 The  date  of  the  work  is  uncertain.  It  is  held  by  many  to  have 
been  suggested  by  the  expedition  of  Henry  VII  of  Germany  to  Rome 
in  pursuit  of  the  imperial  crown,  and  to  have  been  written  about  the  , 
time  of  that  event,  1310-13. 

2 Unus  principatus  et  super  omnes  in  tempore  vel  in  iis  et  super 
iis  quae  tempore  mensurantur.  — Bk.  I,  c.  2. 


DANTE 


231 


is  the  theme  of  his  work.  The  three  books  into\ 
which  the  work  is  divided  deal  respectively  withj 
three  questions  : (1)  whether  such  monarchy  is  essen- 
tial to  the  well-being  of  the  world;  (2)  whether  the^ 
Roman  people  rightfully  acquired  the  monarchic 
office ; and  (3)  whether  the  monarchic  authority  is 
derived  immediately  from  God,  or  rather  from  some  \ 
servant  or  vicar  of  God.  The  answer  to  the  first 
question  takes  the  form  of  a set  plea  for  universal  l 
empire  as  a condition  of  human  welfare.  By  re- 
course to  Aristotle,  Dante  demonstrates  that  the  , 
indispensable  prerequisite  of  man’s  perfect  existence^ 
is  general  peace,  and  then  proceeds  to  show  that  this 
condition  is  attainable  only  by  a unified  governmental 
system  under  a single  head.  Only  in  such  a system 
is  the  unity  of  human  nature  and  human  destiny 
duly  expressed,  and  the  unity  of  the  Creator  rightly 
imitated.1  Only  in  the  world-monarch  can  be  found 
a final  court  of  appeal  for  the  decision  of  princely 
controversies.2  And  in  the  government  of  such  a 
ruler  must  be  the  maximum  of  justice:  for  justice 
depends  upon  power  and  will;  and  the  world-mon- 
arch, by  the  nature  of  his  position,  possesses  both  th£^ 
absolute  power  and,  because  envy  and  desire  cannot 
exist  in  one  so  perfectly  situated,  also  the  immovable 
will  to  do  justice.3  By  like  reasoning,  Dante  demon- 
strates that  real  liberty  is  most  to  be  found  in  the 
universal  monarchy,  and  that  the  concord  of  wills 
that  is  essential  to  peace  and  happiness  is  insured  in 
the  dominance  of  the  one  imperial  will.  He  does 


3 Ibid.  c.  13,  15. 


1 Bk.  I,  c.  5. 


2 Ibid.  c.  12. 


232 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


4 


not  intend,  however,  that  the  local  authorities  of 
earth  shall  all  be  obliterated  by  the  one  supreme 
government.  The  particular  characteristics  of  differ- 
ent peoples  must  be  regulated  by  different  systems  of 
ilaw,1  while  the  monarch  coordinates  all  the  various 
communities  to  the  ultimate  end  of  peace. 

Assuming,  then,  that  world-monarchy,  or  empire, 
is  the  ideal  system  of  government,  Dante’s  next 
thesis  is  that  the  Roman  people  acquired  the  impe- 
rial authority  of  right  ( de  iure ) and  by  the  will  of 
bod.  This  he  sustains  first  by  an  interpretation  of 
early  Roman  history  on  Yirgilian  lines,  showing  that 
the  heroes  of  royal  and  republican  ages  wrere  embodi- 
ments of  supreme  virtue  and  true  nobility,  and  that 
the  conquests  of  the  Romans  were  always  consciously 
directed  to  the  public  good.2  And  in  the  very  fact  of 
their  unprecedented  success  he  sees  conclusive  evi- 
dence of  divine  sanction.  “ The  people  which  tri- 
umphed over  all  the  other  peoples  that  contended 
for  the  empire  of  the  world,  triumphed  by  the  judg- 
ment of  God.”  3 For  the  ordeal  by  battle  is  the  final 
| test  of  justice.  “ What  is  acquired  by  duel  is  acquired 
by  right.” 4 Combat  ( collisio ),  Dante  explains,  whether 
iby  force  of  mind  or  force  of  body,  must  always  deter- 
vmine  in  last  instance  where  justice  lies,  in  the  affairs 


1 Habent  namque  nationes,  regna  et  civitates  inter  se  proprietates 
quas  legibus  differentibus  regulari  oportet.  — Ibid.  c.  16. 

2 Declaranda  igitur  duo  sunt : quorum  unum  est  quod  quicunque 

bonum  reipublicae  intendit  finem  iuris  intendit ; aliud  est  quod  Ro- 
manus  populus,  subiiciendo  sibi  orbem  bonum  publicum  intendit. 
— Bk.  II,  c.  6.  * Ibid.  c.  9. 

4 Quod  per  duellam  acquiritur  de  iure  acquiritur.  — Ibid.  c.  10. 


DANTE 


233 


either  of  individuals  or  of  peoples ; and  he  sets  forth 
in  some  detail  the  theory  of  the  ordeal  by  battle,  com- 
bining the  purely  mediaeval  conceptions  on  this  point 
with  something  vaguely  suggestive  of  the  modern 
u struggle  for  existence.5'  Finally,  the  rightfulness 
of  Roman  world-rule  is  deducible,  he  holds,  from  the 
principles  of  the  Christian  faith  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  atonement.  For  Christ,  bearing  the  sins  of  the 
whole  human  race,  could  have  truly  expiated  them 
only  through  a penalty  imposed  by  an  authority 
having  jurisdiction  over  the  whole  race.  Hence,  the 
very  fact  that  he  suffered  under  Pilate,  the  vicar  of 
Tiberius,  proves  that  the  Roman  dominion  was 
universal  de  iure.1 2 

That  the  Empire  of  his  own  day  is  the  direct  succes- 
sor of  the  old  Roman  Empire,  embodying  all  the  right- 
ful authority  of  the  latter,  is  tacitly  assumed  by  Dante, 
and  the  concluding  book  of  the  De  Monarcliia  is  de- 
voted to  a somewhat  acrimonious  attack  on  those  who 
hold  that  the  imperial  title  and  authority  are  derived 
from  the  Pope,  and  to  a systematic  refutation  of  their 
arguments.  Toward  “ those  who  call  themselves 
Decretalists  55  2 he  is  especially  severe,  and  their  asser- 
tion that  tradition  is  the  foundation  of  the  church  is 
the  text  of  a destructive  criticism.3  “ The  traditions 
which  are  called  Decretals 55  are  indeed,  he  says,  to  be 
venerated ; but  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  they  must  \ 


1 For  this  very  curious  argument,  couched  in  the  precise  forms  of 
the  syllogism,  see  Bk.  II,  c.  11. 

2 Those,  that  is,  who  argue  chiefly  from  the  Canon  law.  \ 

3 Bk.  Ill,  c.  3. 


234 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Wield  precedence  to  the  Scriptures  as  the  true  founda- 
tion of  the  church.  In  this  more  than  in  any  other 
passage  of  his  work,  Dante  speaks  with  the  voice 
of  the  fourteenth  century,  foreshadowing  the  great 
* reform.  When,  however,  he  proceeds  to  combat 
seriatim  the  arguments  for  ecclesiastical  supremacy, 
he  gets  but  little  beyond  the  anti-papal  writers  of  the 
preceding  two  centuries.  He  depends  more  on  the 
Aristotelian  formal  logic  and  the  concepts  of  juris- 
prudence than  on  Scriptural  texts,  and  in  this  consists 
the  chief  distinction  from  his  predecessors.  With 
analysis  that  is  often  acute  and  ingenious  but  also 
often  puerile,  he  takes  up  the  familiar  arguments  — 
the  sun  and  moon,  the  two  swords,  Saul  and  Samuel, 
the  commission  to  bind  and  loose  — and  proves  them 
fallacious  either  formally  or  in  substance.  To  the 
Donation  of  Constantine  he  devotes  especially  earnest 
consideration,1  elaborately  contending,  not  that  the 
alleged  gift  was  never  made,  but  that  the  Emperor  had 
no  right  to  make  it  — that  unity  was  the  essence  of 
the  Empire  and  a division  was  in  the  power  of  no  man. 
And  the  “ translation  ” of  imperial  power  to  Charle- 
magne is  dismissed  with  the  curt  comment : “ Usur- 
pation of  right  makes  no  right.” 2 Dante’s  final 
conclusion  on  the  whole  matter  is  that  the  Pope  has 
not  received  either  from  God,  or  from  any  emperor,  or 
from  the  whole  or  a majority  of  the  human  race,  any 
share  in  the  imperial  authority,  and  hence  cannot 
bestow  it  on  the  Emperor.  On  the  contrary,  God  has 
pirectly  created  the  two  distinct  species  of  authority 


1 Bk.  Ill,  c.  3. 


2 Usurpatio  iuris  non  facit  ius. 


EMPIRE  AGAINST  PAPACY 


235 


that  are  essential  to  man’s  welfare,  and  has  directly 
bestowed  one  species  on  the  temporal  world-monarch. 

5.  The  Conflict  between  Lewis  of  Bavaria  and  Pope 
John  XXII 

Dante’s  formulation  of  a rationalistic  theory  of  the 
Empire  was  clearly  prompted  by  the  anarchic  condi- 
tions in  Italian  politics.  The  De  Monarchia  was  a 
Ghibelline  manifesto  against  the  pro-papal  Guelfs. 
During  the  last  years  of  Dante’s  life 1 Germany  also 
suffered  from  the  demoralization  of  a desperate  civil 
war,  on  the  question  of  succession  to  the  crown. 
Pending  the  outcome  the  Pope,  John  XXII,  asserted^ 
and  enlarged  the  old  papal  claim  of  a right  to  exer- 
cise imperial  powers  in  case  of  vacancy  in  the  impe- 
rial office.  Refusing  to  recognize  either  of  the  rivals 
in  Germany,  he  strengthened  in  every  way  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Guelfs  in  Italy  and  prepared  to  wield, 
like  Innocent  III,  a decisive,  direct  influence  in^ 
German  affairs.  The  civil  war  ended  in  the  triumph 
of  Lewis  of  Bavaria,2  who  assumed  the  dignity  of 
German  king,  and  at  once  manifested  a purpose  to 
assert  his  rights  as  Emperor  in  Italy.  This  brought 
forth  from  the  papal  court  at  Avignon  a series  of 
decrees  which,  by  excommunication  of  Lewis  and 
his  supporters  and  interdict  upon  the  regions  that 
recognized  him,  reproduced  the  conspicuous  phases  of 
the  famous  conflict  over  investitures.  The  struggle 
thus  begun  continued,  through  many  fluctuations  of 

1 He  died  in  1321. 

2 By  the  victory  at  Miihldorf,  1322,  over  Frederick  of  Austria. 


236 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


advantage,  to  the  end  of  the  monarch’s  life,  in  1347, 
and  was  the  occasion  of  an  enormous  controversial 
literature.  But  though  the  lines  of  the  formal 
debate  were  the  old  lines  of  antithesis  of  universal 
secular  and  universal  spiritual  power,  the  unsubstan- 
tial character  of  the  actual  Empire  was  clearly 
in  the  consciousness  of  the  age;  and  it  was  recog- 
nized that  the  essence  of  the  complex  situation  was 
the  national  rivalries  of  France  and  Germany  and 
Italy.1  Behind  the  Papacy  the  policy  of  the  French 
kings  was  not  hard  to  detect,  and  the  aspirations  of 
the  Italian  princes  and  cities  to  independence  were 
hardly  disguised  by  their  affiliations  with  papal  or 
with  imperial  policy.  In  a general  way  the  dogma 
of  the  world-sway  of  the  Emperor  had  for  its  prac- 
tical end  the  maintenance  of  German  ascendency 
^in  Italy?  and  the  dogma  of  papal  suzerainty,  for 
its  end  the  extension  of  French  dominion  at  the 
expense  of  Germany. 

Under  such  circumstances  political  philosophy  would 
probably  not  have  been  greatly  enriched  during  this 
period  had  not  a doctrinal  controversy  within  the 
church  itself  alienated  from  the  Pope  some  of  the 
keenest  and  best-trained  minds  of  the  time,  and 
driven  them  to  the  support  of  the  imperial  cause. 
In  1322  John  XXII  formally  condemned,  as  hereti- 
cal, the  tenet  of  evangelical  poverty  which  was  held 
by  the  powerful  Franciscan  order,  and  summarily 
ended  the  practice  through  which  the  friars  became 

1 Cf  Riezler,  Die  literarischen  Wider  packer  der  Papste  zur  Zeit 
Ludwig  des  Baiers , p.  9 et  seq. 


ANTI-PA FAL  DOCTRINE 


237 


wealthy  in  spite  of  their  vows.1  This  action  brought 
upon  the  Pope  the  most  violent  denunciations  from 
a group  of  ecclesiastics,  Franciscans  and  their  sym- 
pathizers, including  Marsiglio  of  Padua,  John  of 
Jandun,  Michael  of  Cesena  and  William  of  Ockam. 
Theological  learning  and  dialectic  skill  were  con- 
spicuous in  this  group,  and  the  treatises  that  they 
poured  forth  brought  John  XXII  under  imputation 
of  heresy,  with  which,  indeed,  his  assailants  openly 
charged  him.  For  men  engaged  as  they  were  in 
attacking  the  Pope,  Italy  and  France  at  this  time 
furnished  no  safe  place  of  abode ; hence,  when  the 
conflict  of  the  German  king  with  the  Pope  devel- 
oped, they  betook  themselves  to  Germany,  and  con- 
tinued at  the  court  of  Lewis  to  wage  strenuous  L 
literary  warfare  on  the  Papacy  and  all  its  works. 

The  concurrence  of  a theological  with  a more 
purely  political  issue  accounts  for  many  of  the  promi- 
nent characteristics  of  the  pro-imperial  literature  andC 
doctrine.  It  was,  in  the  first  place,  much  more 
strongly  anti-papal  than  pro-imperial.  It  nowhere 
sets  out  in  so  clear  and  well-defined  a form  as  we 
see  in  Dante  the  conception  of  universal  monarchy. 

It  dwells  more  on  the  shortcomings  of  the  Pope  and 
the  existing  evils  in  the  church  than  on  the  inherent^ 
power  and  excellency  of  the  state.  And  it  is  essen- 
tially in  the  search  for  ways  and  means  of  purify- 

1 The  ownership  ( dominium ) of  things  by  Christ  and  the  apostles 
was  denied  by  the  Franciscans,  and  only  the  use  ( usus ) admitted.  So 
the  ownership  of  things  donated  to  the  order  had  been  ascribed  to  the 
Roman  church,  while  the  use  was  retained  by  the  friars.  Cf  Giese- 
ler,  op.  cit.  Ill,  p.  121  et  seq. 


238 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ing  the  church  from  heresy  and  maladministration 
that  the  most  striking  Contributions  to  the  theory 
of  the  state  are  made.  From  an  heretical  or  a 
tyrannical  Pope  the  church,  it  was  declared,  can 
only  be  saved  by  recourse  to  the  whole  body  of 
believers.  Hence,  we  find  the  supporters  of  the 
^ Empire  reviving  the  idea  which  had  had  such 
vogue  twenty  years  before  in  France  — that  the 
ultimate  authority  in  the  church  must  be  found  in 
the  general  council.  For  such  a theory  the  Empire 
formed  a much  more  secure  foundation  than  any 
kingdom;  for  the  traditions  of  conciliar  action  in 
the  early  church  all  showed  the  Emperor  as  the 
mainspring  of  power. 

6.  Marsiglio  of  Padua 

Of  the  numerous  works  put  forth  by  the  writers 
named  above  the  most  noteworthy  for  our  present 
purpose  is  that  entitled  Defensor  Pads , the  joint 
production  of  Marsiglio  of  Padua  and  John  of  Jan- 
dun,  but  generally  ascribed  exclusively  to  the  former.1 
This  treatise,  not  voluminous  according  to  the  stand- 
ard of  the  times,  presents  a theory  of  state  and  of 
church  that  is  in  many  respects  out  of  all  relation  to 
the  current  of  mediaeval  thought  and  accords  with 
the  full  spirit  of  the  Reformation  and  the  Revolu- 
tion ; and  the  vigour  of  the  writer’s  dialectic  is  quite 
equal  to  the  radicalism  of  his  views.  In  the  title, 

1 The  work  is  printed  in  Goldast,  II,  154,  and  in  seyeral  separate 
editions.  Cf.  Riezler,  op.  cit,  193.  See  also  Sullivan,  “ Marsiglio  and 
Ockam,”  in  American  Historical  Review , Vol.  II,  pp.  409,  593.  I have 
used  the  edition  of  Frankfort,  1612. 


MAIiSIGLIO  ON  SOVEREIGNTY 


239 


The  Defender  of  the  Peace , is  suggested  the  same 
basis  which  Dante  had  used  in  supporting  the 
Emperor  — the  necessity  of  some  authority  capable 
of  maintaining  order.  Marsiglio  duly  laments  the 
turbulence  and  disorders  of  the  times,  and  duly 
defends  the  imperial  power.  On  the  other  hand,  he 
dwells  at  great  length  on  the  luxury  and  extrav- 
agance that  prevail  and  the  corrupting  pursuit 
wealth,  maintaining  as  the  corrective  for  this  the 
righteousness  of  Franciscan  poverty.  His  doctrines 
on  these  two  points  are  not  distinguishable  from  those 
of  the  other  anti-papal  writers.  But  in^  his  theory 
as  to  the  organization  arid-throwers  of  jpolitical  and  l 
ecclesiastical  societies,  he  strikes  out  a new  path.1 

The  substance  of  his  doctrine  as  to  the  origin  and 
end  of  political  life  is  taken  from  Aristotle.  Associ- 
ation springs  from  the  nature  of  mam  andlgovernment 
is  a necessity  of  social  existence.  The  working  force 
in  rational  government  is  law,  and  in  the  law-maker 
is  the  essence  of  the  state.  On  this  point  Marsiglio 
dwells  with  the  utmost  particularity,  and  he  develops 
from  it  with  great  precision  the  principle  of  popular  i 
sovereignty : — 

According  to  truth  and  the  opinion  of  Aristotle  the  legis- 
lator ...  is  the  people,  or  a majority  of  them  . . . command- 
ing or  determining  that  something  be  done  or  refrained  from 
in  the  field  of  social  human  action,  under  pain  of  some  temporal 
punishment.2 

1 The  Defensor  is  divided  into  three  parts,  of  which  the  first  deals 
chiefly  with  the  state,  the  second  with  the  church,  while  the  third  is 
a concise  statement  of  forty-three  “ conclusions  ” which  embody  the 
substance  of  his  doctrine.  2 Defensor , Bk.  I,  c.  12. 


240 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


The  legislator’s  will  may  be  expressed  either  byf 
the  assembly  of  the  citizens  acting  directly,  or  by  I 
some  individual  or  group  to  whom  the  authority  has| 
been  delegated.  But  in  the  latter  case  the  “legis-l 
lator,”  in  the  strict  sense,  is  still  the  people ; the  I 
delegate  is  but  the  agent.  Adhering  rigidly  to  this  ! 
^ distinction,  Marsiglio  draws  a clear  line  between  the  | 
legislative  and  the  executive  functions  in  government.  I 
The  executive  organ  he  calls  the  pars  principans , and  | 
in  this  category  he  includes  monarchs. 

The  concept  of  popular  sovereignty  had  been,  as  I 
we  have  seen,  thoroughly  incorporated  in  the  Roman  ] 
^ law,  and  it  was  a commonplace  of  the  legists  that  the  I 
Emperor  was  the  representative  of  the  people.  But 
Marsiglio’s  exposition  of  the  concept  exhibits  much 
more  conspicuously  the  spirit  of  the  Greek  republics, 
where  the  application  was  practical,  than  that  of  the 
Roman  Empire,  where  the  application  was  purely 
theoretical.  He  dwells  at  length,  for  example,  on  the 
duty  of  the  “ legislator  ” to  punish  the  “ principans  ” 
for  violations  of  the  law 1 — a doctrine  that  has  little  in  j 
common  with  the  jurists’  maxim,  princeps  legibus  so- 
lutus.  There  does  not  appear  in  the  Defensor  any 
conception  of  the  Emperor  as  the  omnipotent  ruler  of 
the  world.  Marsiglio,  despite  the  circumstances  under  ' 
which  he  wrote,  is  far  more  faithful  than  Dante  to 
the  actualities  of  the  fourteenth  century.  The  im- 
perial office  per  se  does  not  appear  at  all,  in  fact, 
among  the  features  of  Marsiglio’s  purely  political  sys- 
tem. Inferentially  it  might  be  included  in  the  cate- 

1 Bk.  I,  c.  is. 


SUPREMACY  OF  THE  GENERAL  COUNCIL 


241 


Tory  of  elective  monarchy,  to  which  some  attention 
s devoted,  and  for  which,  as  compared  with  heredi- 
tary monarchy,  a scientific  preference  is  indicated.1 
But  that  in  a work  designed  to  sustain  the  cause  of 
the  Empire,  so  slight  regard  is  paid  to  the  traditional 
significance  of  the  Emperor,  proves  that  Marsiglio 
?vas  as  well  endowed  with  audacity  as  with  insight. 

The  full  import  of  Marsiglio’s  theory  of  the  state 
)nly  appears  when  he  presents  his  theory  of  the 
diurch,  which  is  really  the  chief  topic  of  the  book, 
rhe  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty  is  carried  bodily  L 
)ver  into  the  ecclesiastical  field  and  is  made  the  basis 
)f  his  whole  treatment.  In  the  first  place  the  church 
is  conceived  as  a social  aggregate  existing  by  virtue4 
}f  God’s  plan  of  human  life.  The  essence  of  the 
ihurch,  therefore,  is  not  at  all  the  priesthood  alone, 
out  the  general  body  of  believers.2  As  in  any  other 
aggregate  of  individuals,  then,  the  ultimate  authority, 
under  God,  is  in  the  whole,  not  in  any  part.  The 
organ  for  the  expression  of  this  authority  is  the  gen- 
eral council  — the  assembly  of  all  Christians  or  of 
their  delegates,  so  chosen  that  every  important  prov- 
lince  or  community  of  the  earth  shall  have  a represen- 
itation  proportioned  to  the  number  and  character  of  its 
inhabitants.3  The  laity  as  well  as  the  clergy  must  have 

1 Bk.  I,  c.  16. 

2 After  discriminating  between  the  different  senses  in  which  the 
word  ecclesia  is  used,  he  declares  this  to  be  “ verissimam  et  propriissi- 
mam : universitas  fidelium  credentium  et  invocantium  nomen  Christi.” 

-11,2. 

8 Secundum  proportionem  in  quantitate  ac  qualitate  persona- 
rum — II,  19  (in  Goldast,  c.  20,  on  account  of  an  error  in  numbering 
that  begins  with  c.  7). 


H 


242 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


a part  in  the  assembly,  though  the  latter  element  i, 
especially  desirable  on  account  of  their  training  in  th 
divine  law.  In  this  general  council,  acting  by  mi 
jority  vote,  lies,  according  to  Marsiglio,  the  power  t 
fix  definitively  the  interpretation  of  the  Scripture; 
^ to  pass  the  sentence  of  excommunication,  to  regulat 
the  ceremonial  of  Christian  worship  and  to  fill  th 
offices  of  church  government.  Whatever  correspond, 
in  spiritual  life  to  legislation  in  temporal  is  i 
the  competence  of  this  supreme  assembly,  and  th 
officials  of  the  ecclesiastical  hierarchy,  from  the  Pop 
down  to  the  humblest  acolyte,  are  subject  to  it 
determinations. 

But  it  is  as  far  as  possible  from  Marsiglio’ s though 
to  recognize  anything  more  than  a mere  analogy  i: 
the  comparison  of  ecclesiastical  with  civil  organize 
tion  and  functions.  Between  the  two  he  makes 
distinction  in  kind  that  is  as  radical  as  has  ever  bee: 
made  even  in  the  heyday  of  Protestantism.  Ther 
is  not  in  the  church,  he  holds,  any  element  of  juris 
diction  or  coactive  power  in  the  true  sense  of  thes 
terms.  Its  function  is  purely  to  promote  in  me] 
the  faith  that  leads  to  salvation  in  the  future  life 
J>  Its  method  is  to  teach  men  the  true  way  and  t< 
persuade  them  to  enter  it,  but  compulsion  in  an; 
sense  is  beyond  its  sphere.  Hence,  the  genera 
council  itself,  much  less  any  particular  ecclesiastic 
cannot  enforce  its  conclusions.  This  body,  indeed 
finds  the  ultimate  cause  of  its  assembling  in  th 
importance  of  avoiding  scandal  and  disorder  in  th 
temporal  life  of  Christian  peoples.  Hence  the  powei 


MAIISIGLIO  ON  SPIRITUAL  POWER 


243 


o convoke  a council,  to  pass  upon  its  membership, 

,nd  to  enforce  its  opinions  upon  both  clergy  and 
aymen  is  in  the  supreme  human  legislator,  or  sov- 
ereign. Not  even  the  purely  ecclesiastical  penalties 
>f  interdict  and  excommunication  can  be  employed 
lave  by  the  authority  of  the  legislator ; for  their 
ipplication  by  irresponsible  persons  interferes  with 
die  peace  and  quiet  of  the  faithful,  which  it  is  the 
‘unction  of  the  secular  ruler  to  defend.1 

The  minute  analysis  to  which  Marsiglio  subjects 
ill  the  conflicting  claims  of  the  secular  and  the 
spiritual  authorities  results  in  reducing  the  role  of 
the  latter  to  as  humble  proportions  as  those  assigned 
to  the  former  by  the  extremest  pro-papal  debaters. 
His  attack  on  the  hierarchy  is  as  keen  on  the  side 
of  doctrine  as  on  that  of  external  history.  The 
^ower  of  the  keys  and  the  power  to  bind  igad  loose, 
which  summed  up  the  largest  pretensions  of  the 
priesthood,  are  shattered  by  his  powerful  attack. 
Not  only  does  the  authority  implied  in  these  terms 
include  nothing  of  temporal  import,  it  does  not  even 
signify  real  power  in  the  spiritual  sense.  It  is  not 
the  priest  that  forgives  the  sin  and  remits  the  pen- 
alty to  the  sinner.  God  alone  judges  in  these  mat- ^ 
ters,  and  the  function  of  the  priest  is  merely  to 
certify  to  the  divine  act.  The  priest  is  mdeed  the 
bearer  of  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  but 
he  bears  them  in  the  capacity  merely  of  turnkey 
(claviger) — no  wielder  of  jurisdiction,  but  a humble 
servitor.2  This  dictum  of  Marsiglio  furnishes  the 


c 


Defensor , II,  20. 


II,  6,  end. 


244 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


obverse  of  that  concept  noticed  above,  in  which  th 
secular  ruler  figures  as  the  hangman.1 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Defensor  Pad 
embodies  the  most  radical  antagonism  to  the  Petrini 
dogma  in  all  its  bearings.  The  Bishop  of  Rome  i 
emphatically  placed  on  a plane  of  precise  equality 
with  every  other  bishop  so  far  as  the  possession  o 
jurisdiction  is  concerned.  As  to  dignity,  Marsiglio 
concedes  that  some  gradation  is  expedient  for  the 
convenience  of  administration  and  direction  in  spirit 
ual  life,  and  that  in  such  gradation  a preeminence 
may  properly  be  assigned  to  the  Roman  see.  But 
in  general,  his  whole  attitude  toward  the  historical 
development  and  the  dogmatic  supports  of  the  Ro^ 
man  church  is  precisely  that  which  was  assumed 
by  the  Protestants  after  the  Lutheran  revolt. 

7.  William  of  Ockam 

Far  more  prolific  than  Marsiglio  in  literary  product, 
but  distinctly  less  influential  on  the  side  of  political 
theory,  was  the  celebrated  Englishman,  William  of 
Ockam.2  The  method  adopted  by  Ockam  in  his 
principal  works  makes  it  impossible  for  the  most 
careful  reader  to  ascertain  the  writer’s  opinion  on 
more  than  a very  few  of  the  subjects  discussed.  On 
the  ground  that  truth  would  gain  nothing  by  the 

1 Supra,  p.  185. 

2 See  his  biography  in  the  Dictionary  of  National  Biography.  His 
life  and  works  are  also  treated  at  length  by  Riezler,  op.  cit.,  and  a valu- 
able study  of  his  relations  with  Marsiglio  and  the  relative  influence 
of  the  two  is  made  by  Sullivan,  American  Historical  Review , loc.  cit. 


WILLIAM  OF  OCKAM 


245 


.revelation  of  his  personal  belief,  and  that  scandal  to 
the  faith  might  be  caused  by  dogmatizing  on  either 
side  of  the  great  controversies  of  the  time,  he  deliber- 
I ately  cast  his  works  in  the  form  of  academic  disputa- 
tion, in  which  both  sides  are  stated  with  the  utmost 
fulness,  but  no  decision  is  allowed  to  appear.1  More- 
over, every  question  proposed  is  analyzed  into  its  ele- 
ments with  extraordinary  subtlety,  and  the  pros  and 
cons  of  each  element  are  fully  given,  with  the  result 
that  the  general  trend  of  the  discussion  is  at  times 
wholly  lost  sight  of.  Under  such  circumstances  it 
is  only  possible  to  assume  the  general  hostility  of 
Ockam  to  current  papal  pretensions,  and  to  regard 
his  writings  as  a storehouse  of  reasoning  in  that 
sense.  Every  form  of  argument  that  had  ever  been  i 
adduced  against  ecclesiastical  and  papal  predomi- 
nance is  to  be  found  in  Ockam,  together  with  many 
which  his  own  subtle  intellect  evolved.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  positive  claims  of  the  Empire  receive  anal- 
ogous treatment,  and,  in  his  exposition  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  secular  power  in  general  and  of  the 
Empire  in  particular,  the  writer  furnishes  abundant 
evidence  that  he  is  conscious  of  the  influences  that 
moved  Dante  and  Marsiglio. 

The  two  works  of  Ockam  in  which  the  doctrines 
of  political  philosophy  are  extensively  discussed  are 
the  Eight  Questions  concerning  the  Power  and  Dignity  h 
of  the  Pope  and  the  Dialogue ,2  the  former  a short  and  V 
the  other,  even  in  the  incomplete  state  in  which  we 

1 Cf.  the  peroration  of  the  Octo  Qucestiones  and  the  prologue  of  the 
Dialogus.  Goldast,  II,  391,  398.  2 Both  in  Goldast,  II. 


246 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


know  it,  an  enormously  long  treatise.  His  general 
point  of  view  seems  to  be  rather  more  that  of  Dante 
than  that  of  Marsiglio.  That  is  to  say,  the  universal  ] 
Empire  rather  than  any  less  mediaeval  conception  is 
most  conspicuous  in  his  thinking.  He  gives  much 
attention  to  the  Aristotelian  Politics ,J  but  he  does; 
not  push  its  principles  to  the  extremes  reached  by 
Marsiglio.  Monarchy  seems  to  be  his  preference  for 
governmental  organization,  though  the  purely  execu- 
tive character  of  the  monarch’s  office  is  not  dilated  I 
upon.  His  interpretation  of  Aristotle’s  classification  i 
of  monarchies  dwells  particularly  on  the  distinction 
between  the  despotism,  the  tyranny  and  the  royal 
monarchy  (principatus  regalis),  with  a noteworthy 
emphasis  on  the  last,  of  which  he  declares  it  to  be  the 
characteristic  mark,  that  the  ruler,  while  free  from 
all  restraint  of  human  law,  is  nevertheless  subject  to 
the  law  of  nature.2  This  particular  idea  was  destined! 
to  have,  as  we  shall  see,  a distinguished  career  in  the 
annals  of  absolute  monarchy.  In  applying  Aristotle’s 
doctrines  to  contemporaneous  conditions,  Ockam  fol- 
lows St.  Thomas  and  iEgidius  Romanus3  in  regard- 
ing the  kingdom  as  subject  to  the  same  fundamental 
principles  as  the  city-state.  Each  is  a form  of  asso- 
ciation ( communitas ),  the  one  of  persons  dwelling 
together,  the  other  of  those  who,  while  dwelling  inn 
places  that  are  distant  from  one  another,  neverthe- 
less have  many  things  in  common  and  are  gov- 
erned by  the  same  prince.  Hence^  much  that  is 

1 Cf.  Dialogus,  Pt.  Ill,  Treatise  I,  Bk.  2,  at  large. 

2 Ibid.  c.  6.  3 Supra,  pp.  197,  209. 


WILLIAM  OF  OCKAM 


247 


true  of  the  city-state  must,  he  holds,  be  understood 
is  applicable  proportionately  to  the  kingdom.1 

As  functions  of  the  state  in  general,  Ockam  enu- 
merates legislation,  the  maintenance  of  justice  and 
the  promotion  of  virtue ; but  the  chief  function  is,  as 
[Marsiglio  had  insisted,  the  punishment  of  offenders.2 
This  last  is  indeed  the  characteristic  function;  the 
(others  may,  without  derogating  from  the  excellence 
pf  the  state,  be  omitted,  but  the  coercive  authority 
must  always  be  in  the  prince.  On  the  supreme  ques- 
tion as  to  the  justification  of  universal  secular  em- 
pire, the  arguments  in  favour  of  the  idea  are  so 
(strongly  presented  as  almost  to  warrant  a conclusion 
that  they  expressed  Ockam’s  personal  opinions.3  But 
ithe  Emperor  is  not  conceived  as  unlimited  in  author- 
ity, even  in  temporals.4  Like  every  other  monarch,^ 
he  is  subject  to  the  requirements  that  his  govern- 
ment be  just  and  be  useful  to  the  people.  Ockam’s 
'detailed  study  of  the  limitations  presents,  in  addition 
to  the  rules  of  divine  law,  substantially  the  same 
conceptions  that  came  later  to  be  embodied  in  the 
formula  “the  law  of  nature  and  of  nations.”5  Thus, 
private  property  is  secure  against  the  monarch  save 
so  far  as  the  general  welfare  necessitates  its  applica- 

1 Dialogus , III,  i,  2,  5 ; Goldast,  II,  794.  Ockam  speaks  of  “ reg- 
!num  vel  ducatus,”  as  Aquinas  of  “ regnum  vel  provincial’ 

2 Ad  hoc  videtur  esse  principalissime  constitutus,  ut  corrigat  et 
puniat  delinquentes.  — Octo  Qucestiones,  III,  6. 

3 This  question  is  the  topic  of  Dialogus,  Pt.  Ill,  Treatise  ii,  Bk.  1, 

I Goldast,  II,  870. 

4 The  rights  ( iura ) of  the  Emperor  in  temporals  is  the  subject  of 

in,  n,  2. 

5 “Ius  naturale  et  gentium.” 


248 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tion  to  public  purposes ; and  he  is  bound  to  conform 
to  the  laws  common  to  all  nations,1  such,  for  example, 
as  those  touching  Avar,  embassies,  the  treatment  of 
prisoners,  postliminy,  etc.  As  to  the  laws  which  he  j 
himself  makes,  neither  the  Emperor  nor  any  othei 
monarch  is  bound  by  them  of  necessity,  though  pro- 
priety requires  that  he  respect  them.  Such  is  the  com 
struction  to  be  put  upon  the  phrase,  Imperator  legibm 
solutus.  This  dictum  has  reference  only  to  legislation 
enacted  by  a particular  human  authority,  and  the 
supreme  power  of  every  legislator  must  be  regarded 
as  qualified  by  the  ins  gentium  and  the  ius  naturaleM 

8.  Marsiglio  and  Ockam  on  Sovereignty  and  J^epm 

sentation 

In  this  last  doctrine  of  Ockam  there  is  found  his 
attitude  toward  the  theory  which  was  elaborately  de- 
bated  by  both  him  and  Marsiglio  under  the  head  oi 
plenary  power  ( plenitudo  potestatis).  This  term  is 
shown  by  the  discussions  to  which  it  was  subjected 
to  have  had  practically  the  same  meaning  that 
has  for  the  last  three  centuries  been  expressed 
by  the  word  sovereignty.2  Plenary  power  was  firsi 
predicated  of  the  Pope,  and  was  interpreted  by  the 
^ papal  protagonists  (especially,  as  we  have  seen,  b} 
Augustinus  Triumplius)3  to  include  the  absolutelj 
unrestricted  authority,  both  temporal  and  spiritual 


1 Save  when  they  infringe  upon  the  general  welfare  (utilitas  com 
munis),  III,  ii,  2,  28.  Goldast,  II,  924. 

2 Cf  Gierke,  Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Ages  (translated  b} 

Maitland),  p.  35,  and  notes.  8 Supra,  p.  218. 


THEORY  OF  SOVEREIGNTY 


249 


which  must  by  the  nature  of  things  pertain  to  the 
representative  of  God.  Against  this  extreme  view 
Marsiglio  and  Ockam  proceeded  first,  as  was  their 
custom,  by  discriminating  the  various  senses  in  which  ^ 
the  term  is  used.1  Marsiglio  enumerates  eight  and  / 
Ockam  five  different  shades  of  meaning,  and  both  / 
deny  to  the  Pope  and  to  the  church  in  any  of  its  f 
organs  the  jurisdiction  that  is  implied  in  the  far- 
reaching  definitions  of  the  term.  Ockam,  moreover, 
carries  the  concept  over  into  the  discussion  of  tempo- 
ral rule,  and  questions  whether  the  prince  has  in  this  < 
field  authority  corresponding  to  the  plenary  power 
claimed  for  the  Pope  in  spirituals.  His  conclusion 
is  clearly  in  the  negative.  He  lays  it  down,  for  ex- 
ample, following  Aristotle,  that  ruling  slaves  is  no 
mark  of  the  best  state,  and  in  like  manner  the  exer- 
cise of  power  that  is  equivalent  to  that  over  slaves  is 
not  to  be  recognized  as  pertaining  to  the  ideal  ruler.2 
Moreover,  he  so  qualifies  the  conception  of  the  purely 
legal  sovereign 3 as  to  exhibit  the  real  nature  of  his 
thought.  His  definition  of  plenary  power,  formu- 
lated for  general  use,  shows  this  same  characteristic. 

It  is,  he  says,  the  power  by  virtue  of  which  the  ruler  ^ 
can  do  anything  that  is  not  expressly  contrary  to  the 
law  of  God  and  of  nature.4  He  thinks,  thus,  of  sov- 
ereignty only  as  limited.  Marsiglio  also  defines  the 
absolute  sense  of  the  term  only  to  set  it  quickly  aside ; 


1 Defensor  Pads,  II,  22 ; Dialogus,  I,  i,  1,  1. 

2 Octo  Qucestiones,  III,  5.  3 Cf.  last  section. 

4 “ . . . ut  omnia  possit  quae  non  sunt  expresse  contra  legem  Dei 

neque  ius  naturae.” 


250 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


> 


> 


V 


and  the  attitude  of  these  writers  is  the  general  attitude 
of  the  time.1  Indeed,  throughout  all  the  centuries 
down  to  the  eighteenth,  limitation  was  presumed  in 
all  the  thinking  about  an  ultimate  fount  of  authority 
in  the  state,  and  was  lost  sight  of  by  certain  theorists 
only  through  an  irrational  striving  after  mathemati- 
cal exactness  in  a science  which  is  not  exact. 

/ In  addition  to  this  impulse  to  the  discussion  and 
definition  of  sovereignty,  Marsiglio’s  contribution  to 
the  history  of  political  theory  includes  also  the  detec- 
tion of  a distinction  between  state  and  government. 
For  this  is  the  essence  of  his  thought  in  marking  off 
so  clearly  the  “ legislator  ” from  the  executive,  or 
pars  principans.2  His  “ legislator  ” is  not  necessarily 
identical  with  the  formulator  and  promulgator  of 
ordinary  laws.  He  conceives  that  the  legislative 
authority  in  this  latter  sense  may  be  vested  in  the 
prince  or  in  some  other  organ  of  government ; but 
behind  such  organ,  and  superior  to  it,  always  stands1 
the  people  as  a whole,  in  whose  collective  will  consists 
the  essence  of  law  in  the  broadest  sense,  and  in  whose 
aggregate  life  is  the  essence  of  the  state.  In  the 
democratic  city-state  the  manifestation  of  this  essen- 
tial force  is  most  direct  and  immediate,  but  in  aristo- 
cratic government  the  force  is  no  less^eterminative ; 
for  the  consent  of  the  majority3  of  the  citizens,  he 


1 Cf.  Gierke,  loc.  cit.  2 Supra , p.  240. 

3 “ Valentior  pars.”  Whether  this  expression  ever  in  Marsiglio’s 
usage  signifies  anything  different  from  mere  numerical  majority  is 
doubtful.  In  many  places  there  seems  to  be  a suggestion  of  capacity 

rather  than  number  in  “ valentior.”  Cf  especially  Defensor  Pads , I, 


MARSIGLIO  ON  REPRESENTATION 


251 


holds,  is  the  absolute  condition  of  the  persistence  of 
any  state  whatever.  This  is  the  fourteenth-century 
version  of  the  dogma  that  all  governments  rest  upon 
the  consent  of  the  governed. 

In  his  discussion  of  political  organization  Marsiglio 
is  too  close  to  Aristotle  to  free  himself  entirely  from 
the  conception  that  the  popular  sovereign  must  either 
act  directly  in  all  governmental  affairs  or  make  a 
general  delegation  of  its  authority.  But  in  discours- 
ing of  the  church,  he  resorts  to  a plan  which  is  sub- 
stantially a system  of  representative  government.  ^ 
The  constitution  which  he  sketches  for  the  general 
council1  is  a remarkable  project  for  the  fourteenth 
century,  and  suggests  that  the  history  of  the  influ- 
ences that  worked  in  the  development  of  parlia- 
mentary government  must  for  accuracy  explore  a 
somewhat  wider  field  than  that  of  the  English  consti- 
tution. The  idea  of  representation  which  is  embodied 
in  the  dogma  that  the  Emperor  represented  the  Roman 
people  or  that  the  electoral  princes  of  Germany  repre- 
sented the  people  of  the  whole  world,2  was  common- 
place for  centuries.  But  this  differs  toto  ccelo  from 
the  thought  of  Marsiglio’ s pregnant  phrase  suggesting 
that  the  world  of  Christian  believers  be  so  represented 
that  each  province  or  community  have  delegates  ac- 
cording to  the  “ number  and  quality”  of  its  inhab- 
itants. No  explanatory  comment  is  added  to  this 
proposition,  and  the  succeeding  paragraphs  of  the 
chapter  reveal  merely  that  Marsiglio’s  ideas  were 
influenced  largely  by  the  history  of  the  great  coun- 

1 Supra,  p.  241.  2 Cf.  Ockam,  Octo  Qucestiones,  VIII,  3. 


252 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


cils  of  the  early  Christian  church.  But  nothing  in 
this  history  suggests  proportionate  representation  of ' 
the  various  provinces  and  communities  of  the  Empire. 
Marsiglio  seems  to  have  thrown  out  a wholly  novel 
suggestion  when  he  proposed  an  apportionment  of  : 
membership  on  the  basis  of  numbers.  The  associated 
basis  of  “ quality  of  persons  ” has  an  obvious  source 
in  the  social  and  ecclesiastical  class  distinctions  that 
were  so  characteristic  of  the  time ; but  for  the  basis  \ 
of  numbers  the  only  probable  source  in  actual  institu- 
tions was  the  municipal  organization  of  some  of  the 
cities  with  which  as  an  Italian  Marsiglio  was  familiar. 

It  was  left  for  Ockam,  with  his  accustomed  thor- 
oughness, to  work  out  in  detail  the  project  of  a rep- 
^ resentative  general  council.1  Assuming  the  right  of 
every  people,  every  community  and  every  corpora- 
tion ( corpus ) to  legislate  under  certain  circumstances 
for  itself,  and  citing  St.  Paul  as  authority  for  the  con- 
ception that  the  church  universal  is  a corporation,  he 
points  out  that  the  legislative  body  could  be  consti- 
tuted as  follows : a primary  assembly  of  all  believers 
in  each  parish  or  other  small  community  could  choose 
delegates  to  an  electoral  assembly  for  the  diocese  or 
kingdom  or  other  political  division,  and  by  these, 
assemblies  the  delegates  to  the  council  could  be 
chosen ; and  such  a council  would  truly  represent  the 
church,  even  though  there  should  be  no  Pope  to 
summon  or  to  preside  over  it. 

These  ideas  of  Marsiglio  and  Ockam  on  sovereignty 
and  representation  in  the  church  are  of  the  highest 

1 Dialogus,  I,  vi,  84. 


FOURTEENTH-CENTURY  DOCTRINES  >253 

significance  in  the  history  of  political  theories  in  its 
modern  phases.  For  a hundred  years  they  were  the 
:core  of  violent  debate  in  the  ecclesiastical  field,  and 
their  application  and  influence  in  issues  of  purely 
political  significance  grew  apace.  The  jurists  of  both 
the  Civil  and  the  Canon  law  wrought  them  into  the 
fabric  of  their  respective  systems,  and  contributed 
greatly  to  give  them  a precise  and  practical  form.1 
These  doctrines,  in  fact,  constitute  the  leading  lines 
along  which  it  is  necessary  to  penetrate  the  tangle 
of  theories  which  characterizes  the  age  of  the  great 
pre-Reformation  councils. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Dubois,  De  Recuperations  Terre  Sancte  (ed.  Langlois).  Du 
Puy,  Histoire  du  differ  end  entre  le  Pape  Boniface  VIII  et 
Philippe-le-Bel,  Roy  de  France . Baillet,  Histoire  des  demelez 
du  Pape  Boniface  VIII  avec  Philippe-le-Bel  (additions  aux 
preuves  do  Dupuy).  Franck,  Reformateurs  et  publicistes  de 
V Europe,  moyen  dge,  pp.  103-285.  Friedberg,  Die  mittelalter- 
lichen  Lehren  iiber  das  Verhaltniss  von  Staat  und  Kirclie. 
Gierke,  Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Ages,  trans. 
Gieseler,  Church  History,  Third  Period,  §§  59—66.  Janet, 
Yol.  I,  pp.  416-461.  Laurent,  Histoire  de  Vhumanite,  Tom. 
YI,  pp.  318  et  seq .,  353  et  seq.,  378-394.  Muller,  Her  Kampf 
Ludwigs  des  Bayern  mit  der  romischen  Kurie.  P oole,  Illustra- 
tions of  Mediaeval  Thought,  pp.  249-281 ; also  art.  Ockham 


1 It  is  the  chief  thesis  of  Gierke  that  the  Roman  law  of  the  corpo- 
ration ( universitas ) was  the  main  source  of  the  characteristic  dogmas 
of  Marsiglio  and  Ockam.  See  his  Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Ages 
(trans.  by  Maitland),  pp.  37-67.  This  passage  is  a marvellous  exhi- 
bition of  accurate  and  exhaustive  scholarship.  Vet  I think  that 
Marsiglio  is  credited  with  a rather  more  complete  and  precise  theory 
of  representation  than  the  text  of  the  Defensor  Pads  justifies. 


254 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


or  Occam,  in  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  Yol.  XLI, 
pp.  357-362  (Bibliography,  p.  362).  Ben  an,  Etudes  sur  la 
politique  religieuse  du  rtyne  de  Philippe-le-Bel.  Biezler,  Die 
literarischen  Widersacher  der  Pdpste  zur  Zeit  Ludwig  des  Baiers. 

Blakey,  Yol.  I,  pp.  377  et  seq.  (Dante).  Bryce,  Holy 
Boman  Empire,  pp.  265-269.  Church,  The  De  Monarchia  of 
Dante,  trans.  Moore,  Studies  in  Dante,  2d  Series,  pp.  12-34, 
Goldast,  Monarchia,  Yol.  II,  154  et  seq.  (Ockam’s  Works  and 
the  Defensor  Pads).  Jourdain,  La  Philosophie  de  St.  Thomas 
d’Aquin , Tom.  II,  pp.  174-207  (Ockam).  Labanca,  Marsilio 
di  Padova.  Sullivan,  Marsiglio  of  Padua  and  William  of 
Ockam,  in  American  Historical  Review , Yol.  II,  pp.  409-426, 
593-610. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  PASSING  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGE 

1.  Political  and  Ecclesiastical  Tendencies 

The  century  and  a half  that  followed  the  death  of 
Ockam1  witnessed  the  transformations  which  mark 
the  advent  of  the  modern  era.  Politically  the  changes 
appeared,  as  is  commonly  the  case,  rather  in  institu- 
tions than  in  speculation  about  them.  Theorizing 
about  politics  was  but  sparingly  indulged  in,  but  the 
progress  of  events  exhibited  clearly  enough  the  prin- 
ciples that  were  unconsciously  in  men’s  minds.  In  ^ 
the  first  place  the  national,  as  distinct  from  the  impe- 
rial idea,  became  increasingly  potent.  It  was  this  that 
gave  character  to  the  Hundred  Years’  War  between 
France  and  England  and  saved  the  former  from  dis- 
memberment by  the  latter ; it  was  this  that  drew  to- 
gether the  Spanish  kingdoms  into  a single  monarchy; 
and  it  was  this  that  widened  beyond  hope  of  repair  the 
breach  between  the  cisalpine  and  transalpine  fractions 
of  the  old  Empire,  and  inspired  the  vague  early  con- 
ceptions of  German  and  of  Italian  unity.  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  within  each  of  the  regions  in  which  the^ 
nationalizing  tendency  was  most  pronounced,  this 
period  witnessed  first  an  exaggeration  and  then  a great 
decline  in  the  political  power  of  the  feudal  aristocracy. 

1 The  most  probable  date  of  his  death  is  1349. 

255 


256 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


The  English  Parliament  and  the  French  Estates-general 
played  in  the  fourteenth  century  a large  part  in  fixing 
the  financial  and  military  conditions  under  which  the 
monarchs  must  conduct  their  wars ; but  before  the  end 
of  the  fifteenth  century  the  great  nobles  who  con- 
trolled these  assemblies  had  been  crushed,  in  England 
through  the  Wars  of  the  Roses  and  the  cold-blooded 
energy  of  Henry  VII,  in  France  through  the  Hundred 
Years’  War  and  the  subtile  policy  of  Louis  XI.  And 
as  the  Spanish  kingdoms  assumed  prominence  in 
European  affairs,  the  tendencies  of  the  times  received 
conspicuous  illustration  in  the  large  power  enjoyed 
by  the  nobles  of  Castile  and  especially  of  Aragon, 
and  in  the  strenuous  efforts  of  the  monarchs,  both 
before  and  after  the  union  of  the  two  kingdoms,  to 
escape  the  restrictions  which  the  ancient  systems 
imposed  upon  the  royal  power.  In  Germany,  finally, 
the  realization  of  the  aristocratic  ideal  was  most 
complete  and,  for  the  period  with  which  we  are 
now  concerned,  was  permanent.  Royal  power  here 
became  almost  nominal,  and  the  great  feudal  princes 
appropriated  to  themselves,  at  first  jointly  and 
then  by  degrees  in  severalty,  all  the  substance  of 
sovereignty. 

A third  element  in  the  general  trend  of  events 
was  the  increased  political  significance  of  the  towns, 
manifesting  the  influence  of  commercial  and  indus- 
■v  trial  development.  The  normal  antagonism  between 
the  towns  and  the  territorial  aristocracy  produced 
now  its  perfect  result.  In  England,  in  France  and 
in  Spain,  the  burghers,  after  suffering  greatly  in  the 


INFLUENCE  OF  THE  TOWNS 


257 


period  of  aristocratic  predominance,  became  the  main- 
stay of  the  crown  in  overthrowing  the  nobility. 
Thus  in  these  three  lands  the  burgher  element 
assumed  substantial  importance  in  the  monarchic 
national  governments ; while  in  Germany  the  towns 
became,  in  the  decline  of  royal  authority,  practically 
independent,  and  in  Italy  they  assumed  wholly  the 
character  of  the  city-states  of  antiquity.  There  is 
evident  in  such  events  as  the  struggles  between  the 
towns  of  Flanders  and  Charles  the  Bold,  and  between 
the  Swabian  League  and  the  South  German  princes, 
the  existence  of  an  aggressive  political  consciousness 
in  parts  of  the  population  that  had  for  centuries  been 
devoid  of  significance,  and  to  this  extent  the  tendency 
was  democratic;  but  it  is  not  at  all  necessary  to 
exaggerate  the  prevalence  of  the  tendency  by  refer- 
ence to  the  insurrection  of  Wat  Tyler  in  England 
or  the  French  Jacquerie.  These  latter  movements 
expressed  essentially  mere  local  reactions  against 
oppressive  economic  conditions  caused  chiefly  by  the 
plague. 

While  the  various  tendencies  just  noticed  unques- 
tionably produced  some  influence  on  political  philoso- 
phy, it  was  to  the  course  of  ecclesiastical  affairs  that  we 
must  look  for  the  most  positive  and  direct  impression 
upon  systematic  thinking.  In  1378  the  long  French 
ascendency  in  the  papal  court  at  Avignon  produced 
its  perfect  result  in  the  election  of  an  antipope.1  The 

1 The  cardinals  first  elected  an  Italian,  Urban  VI,  at  Rome,  but 
a few  months  later  declared  his  election  invalid,  on  the  ground  that 
they  had  been  put  under  duress  by  the  Romans.  Thereupon,  at 
Fondi,  they  elected  Clement  VII,  who  betook  himself  to  Avignon 


s 


258 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


schism  thus  begun  was  perpetuated  by  successive 
papal  elections,  and  its  results  affected  not  only  eccle- 
siastical, but  also  political,  conditions  throughout  the 
Christian  world.  In  the  presence  of  two  popes  en- 
gaged in  reciprocal  excommunications  and  anathemas, 
and  supported  by  various  governments  on  grounds 
that  were  obviously  of  a purely  political  character, 
the  unity  of  the  church,  and  the  necessarily  monar- 
chic character  of  its  government,  faded  rapidly  out 
of  men’s  minds.  Good  men  who  shuddered  at  the 
scandal  to  the  faith  laboured  earnestly  to  heal  the 
breach,  but  in  the  presence  of  the  countless  obstacles 
that  lay  in  their  way  if  they  should  adhere  to  the  I 
theory  of  papal  autocracy,  resort  was  had  with  ever-  j 
increasing  fervour  to  the  idea  of  a general  council  as  I 
the  true  source  of  ultimate  authority  in  the  church. 
The  actual  assembling  of  such  a body  at  Pisa  in  1409 
hardly  fulfilled  the  high  purposes  of  the  conciliar 
theorists ; for  the  immediate  result  was  a third  pope 
and  all  the  complications  of  a threefold  schism.  But 
the  Council  of  Constance,  in  1414-1418,  at  last  suc- 
ceeded in  installing  a pope  whom  all  the  church 
recognized.  This  result  'was  attended,  however,  by 
the  institution  of  reforms  in  the  government  of  the 
church,  that  in  a large  measure  substituted  conciliar 
for  papal  authority.  The  general  council  was  made 
a permanent  element  in  the  constitution  of  the 
church,  and  a resolute  purpose  was  manifested  to 
convert  autocracy  into  limited  monarchy.  But 

and  was  recognized  and  supported  by  France.  Castile,  Aragon  and 
Navarre  recognized  Clement;  Germany  and  England,  Urban. 


FIFTEENTH-CENTURY  TENDENCIES 


259 


(against  this  purpose  the  Pope  and  his  supporters 
made  a strong  and  successful  resistance.  The  con- 
gest lasted,  in  a variety  of  phases,  through  the  period 
of  the  Council  of  Basel  (1431-1443),  and  ended  in 
the  practical  disappearance  of  the  conciliar  system. 
But  though  the  Papacy  nominally  triumphed,  its 
prestige  and  its  real  power  were  enormously  dimin- 
ished after  the  councils.  Its  victory  was  only  achieved 
through  means  that  brought  into  the  clearest  relief 
its  weakness  as  a political  institution. 

The  controversies  of  the  conciliar  period  absorbed 
the  attention  of  jurists  and  philosophers,  and  stimu- 
lated a radical  overhauling  of  accepted  canons  of 
history  and  right.  Not  only  the  acute  scholastic 
spirit  of  Marsiglio  and  Ockam,  but  also  the  free  criti- 
cal methods  of  the  rising  Italian  Renaissance  were 
discernible  in  the  doctrines  of  the  time.  Thus,  at 
the  suggestion  of  Nicholas  of  Cues,  and  by  the  demon- 
stration of  Yalla  in  1440,  the  Donation  of  Constan- 
tine was  definitively  relegated  to  the  domain  of  myth. 
Moreover,  in  the  very  organization  and  procedure  of 
the  councils  there  were  presented  in  unmistakable 
form  the  same  tendencies  which  appeared  in  the  con- 
cerns of  external  politics.  The  grouping  of  the  peo- 
ples of  Europe  received  definite  recognition  in  the 
method  of  voting  by  “ nations,”  which  was  adopted 
at  Constance ; 1 the  antithesis  of  aristocracy  and  mon- 
archy was  as  clearly  expressed  in  the  deposition  of 
popes  at  Pisa  and  Constance  by  assemblies  of  the  pre- 

1 There  were  five  “ nations  ” : the  Italian,  French,  German,  Eng- 
lish and  Spanish. 


260 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


lates  as  it  was  in  the  deposition  of  Richard  II  of  Eng- 
land by  the  Parliament;  and  finally,  the  rising  political 
influence  of  the  townsmen,  as  against  the  feudal  aris-? 
tocracy,  finds  its  parallel  in  the  prominence  at  Basel 
of  the  lesser  clergy,  as  compared  with  the  prelates,! 
and  in  the  aggressive  policy  of  the  former,  which 
ultimately  brought  the  council  to  a futile  end. 

2.  Wy cliff e and  Huss 

Prior  to  the  complete  realization  of  the  con- 
ciliar idea,  the  movements  in  England  and  Bohemia ! 
that  are  associated,  respectively,  with  the  names  of 
Wy  cliff  e and  Huss  faithfully  reflected  the  character-1 
istic  tendencies  of  the  times.  Both  movements  were 
national  and  anti-papal  in  spirit  and  more  or  less' 
democratic  in  manifestation.  Their  doctrinal  appa- 
ratus shows  very  clearly  the  influence  of  Marsiglio 
and  Ockam.  But  Wy  cliff  e to  a great  extent,  | 
and  Huss  almost  exclusively,  devoted  themselves! 
to  purely  theological  and  ecclesiastical  questions.) 
Where  they  verge  on  politics  their  teaching  is 
that  of  the  early  church  — the  recognition  of  earthly 
power  only  to  depreciate  it.  Incidentally,  however, 
Wycliffe  developed  a theory  of  authority  in  general 
which  is  not  without  interest  and  significance  in  a 
history  of  political  thought.  This  theory  is  embodied 
in  his  works  on  Lordship  ( Dominium ),  Divine  and 
Civil.1 

By  lordship  Wycliffe  means  the  abstract  relation 

1 The  works  of  Wycliffe  are  in  course  of  publication,  with  full 
critical  apparatus,  by  the  Wycliffe  Society. 


WYCLIFFE  ON  LORDSHIP 


261 


of  the  being  that  is  served  to  the  being  that  serves.1 
Thus  the  term  designates  the  relation  of  God  to  the* 
universe,  of  the  king  to  his  subjects,  and  of  the  pro- 
prietor to  his  slaves  or  other  property.  But  these 
various  manifestations  of  the  principle  do  not  all 
stand  on  the  same  plane.  The  lordship  of  God  is 
the  highest  and  greatest  of  all.  He  may  be  called 
lord-in-chief  ( capitalis  dominus ),2  and  his  authority  is 
not,  like  that  of  other  monarchs,  distributed  through 
various  grades  of  vassals,  but  is  exercised  immedi- 
ately upon  everything  that  is  subject  to  it.  This  is 
divine  lordship.  Of  the  lower  species  there  are  two 
classes,  natural  and  civil.  The  dominium  naturale , 
or  evangelicum , is  that  which  is  shared  under  the 
law  of  the  Evangel  by  all  who  are  in  the  state  of 
grace  — the  righteous,  the  universitas  predestinate - 
rum.  Dominium  civile  is  of  human  institution,  was 
occasioned  by  sin,  and  is  in  all  respects  inferior  to 
the  other  species.  Rights,  in  the  true  sense,  are 
possessed  only  by  those  who  share  in  evangelical 
lordship  — who  have  in  truth  all  the  goods  of  God. 
Civil  wealth  and  power  are  but  the  shadows  of  the 
lordship  which  pertains  in  reality  to  the  redeemed. 
All  the  familiar  incidents  of  what  is  called  property 
management  — all  transfers,  bequests,  etc.  — char- 
acterize merely  the  administration  of  that  of  which 
the  essential  right  is  in  God  and,  under  his  law,  in 
his  elect. 

1 His  definition  is:  Habitudo  naturae  rationalis  secundum  quam 
denominatur  suo  praefici  servienti.  De  Dominio  Divino,  Bk.  I,  c.  1. 

2 De  Dom.  Div.  I,  5. 


262 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


It  is  entirely  characteristic  of  all  Wy elite’s 
thought  that  property  rights  and  political  authority 
are  blended  indistinguishably  in  the  conception  of 
lordship.  His  point  of  view  is  feudal,  and  the  rela- 
•i*  tion  of  divine  to  civil  lordship  is  repeatedly  illus- 
trated by  that  of  feudal  lord  and  vassal.1  As  to 
human  government,  he  devotes  some  attention  to 
the  relative  merits  of  monarchy  and  aristocracy. 
The  latter  he  conceives  to  be  the  true  form  in  the 
state  of  innocence  under  divine  law,2  but  the  former 
is  required  by  the  conditions  of  the  state  of  sin. 
The  kingly  power,  however,  depends  not  really  on 
human  law,  but  on  grace ; neither  hereditary  succes- 
sion nor  election,  therefore,  gives  true  royal  authority. 
^ An  unbaptized  heir,  being  in  mortal  sin,  can  have  no 
lordship  till  the  defect  be  removed.  Every  Christian 
king,  knight  or  other  civil  lord  is  held  more  to  his 
spiritual  than  to  his  carnal  father  — a doctrine  which 
recalls  that  already  used  by  the  pro-papal  party  in 
building  up  the  dogma  of  papal  supremacy.3  Simi- 
larly, in  respect  to  slavery,  he  presents  almost  pre- 
^ cisely  the  doctrine  of  St.  Augustine:  that  it  is  a 
human  institution  resulting  from  sin,  and  that  to 
God’s  elect  the  earthly  condition  of  servitude  is  a 
matter  of  indifference,  since  in  essence  they  are  all 
equally  free  and  noble.  “ Servitude,”  he  says,  “ is  of 
three  kinds : as  it  denotes  subjection  to  God,  to  man 


1 E.g .,  De  Dom.  Civ.  I,  18  passim. 

2 Wycliffe’s  aristocracy  exhibits  a blending  in  thought  of  Plato’s 

“guardians,”  Aristotle’s  aristocracy  of  virtue,  and  the  “judges”  of 
the  Israelites.  De  Dom.  Civ.  I,  27.  3 Supra , p.  217. 


WYCL1FFE  ON  LOkDSHl'P  ' 


263 


or  to  sin.  Of  these  the  first  is  excellent,  the  second 
a matter  of  indifference,  and  the  last  the  worst 
possible.”  1 

Wycliffe’s  application  of  his  theory  to  questions 
touching  temporal  property,  in  the  ordinary  sense, 
and  the  relation  of  the  church  thereto,  was  what 
brought  him  most  distinctly  under  imputation  of 
heresy.  From  the  secondary  and  subordinate  char- 
acter of  human  lordship,  he  drew  the  conclusion  j 
that  a grant  of  perpetual  civil  property  right  could  * 
be  made  neither  by  any  individual  man,  nor  by  the 
whole  human  race,  nor  by  God  himself.  A corol- 
lary of  this  — and  the  application  which  had  imme- 
diate practical  significance  in  consequence  of  the 
refusal  of  the  English  Parliament  to  continue  pay- 
ment of  the  tribute  promised  by  King  John  to  Pope 
Innocent  III  — was  that  ecclesiastical  persons  or( 
corporations  had  no  indefeasible  right  to  temporal- 
ties,  which  might  be  taken  away  in  case  of  misuse. 
Wycliffe  derived  from  his  principal  thesis  support 
also  for  the  view  of  absolution  and  excommunication  / 
that  had  been  strongly  upheld  by  Marsiglio  and 
Ockam.  The  function  of  the  priest  in  these,  as  in 
all  other  human  acts,  was  held  to  be  conditioned  by 
conformity  to  the  law  of  Christ;  so  that  the  judg- 
ment in  any  case,  no  matter  how  strongly  fortified 
by  bulls  or  other  documents,  had  real  and  essential 
validity  only  so  far  as  confirmed  by  the  will  of  God. 

1 Triplex  est  servitus,  scilicet  Dei,  hominum  et  peccati ; quorum 
prima  est  optima,  media  neutra  et  tercia  pessima. — De  Bom.  Civ. 


264 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


The  pardon  of  sin  or  exclusion  from  the  church  may 
be  testified  to  by  human  acts,  but  really  takes 
place  without  them;1  just  as  the  formalities  and 
documents  purporting  to  determine  the  title  to  civil 
lordship  do  not  affect  the  actual  lordship  as  deter- 
mined in  the  forum  of  God.  From  these  doctrines 
is  drawn  finally  the  very  important  deduction  that 
tithes  and  other  contributions  of  temporal  property 
to  the  church  cannot  be  exacted  by  excommunication. 

In  a general  way  Wycliffe’s  doctrine  is  one  which 
is  common  to  all  the  Christian  ages,  namely,  of 
the  supremacy  of  divine  or  natural  over  positive 
human  law.  His  most  characteristic  peculiarity  is 
the  importance  which  he  attaches  to  the  analogy  of 
feudal  relationships.  The  suzerainty  of  God  and  his 
law  is  sustained  and  explained,  not  only  by  the 
principles  of  Platonic  idealism,  but  also  by  those  of 
the  social  system  of  Europe.  Feudal  overlordship 
had  become  by  Wycliffe’s  time  so  dissociated  from 
immediate  and  manifest  connection  with  the  con- 
cerns of  daily  life,  that  it  afforded  an  obvious  ana- 
logue for  that  divine  suzerainty  whose  essence  lay 
in  the  domain  of  spirituality  and  faith. 

Huss  added  nothing  to  the  doctrines  of  political 
import  which  he  took  freely  from  Wycliffe.2  His 
work,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned  with  it,  was  to 


1 “ Non  est  possibile  hominem  excommunicari  nisi  excommunicetur 
primo  et  principaliter  a se  ipso.” 

2 Cf.  his  Determinatio  de  Ablatione  Temporalium  a Clericis , in  Gold- 
ast,  I,  232.  Huss  here  defends  at  length  the  right  of  secular  rulers  to 
deprive  ecclesiastics  of  property  on  the  ground  of  abuse,  and  the  argu- 
ment is  taken  in  places  verbatim  from  Wycliffe. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  CONSTANCE 


265 


carry  forward  by  a generation  the  movement  of 
reaction  against  the  extremest  pretensions  of  cleri- 
cal omnipotence,  and  to  strengthen  again  in  Central 
Europe  the  dogmas  which  had  been  propounded  by 
Marsiglio  and  Ockam,  namely,  that  the  temporal  pos- 
sessions of  the  church  were  no  essential  element  of 
its  constitution,  that  the  papal  monarchy  was  no 
divinely  ordered  institution,  and  that  the  whole 
b(5dy  of  the  faithful,  rather  than  any  individual  or 
group  of  individuals,  was  the  real  church.1 

3.  Gerson  and  the  Council  of  Constance 

The  Council  of  Constance  was  in  no  small  meas- 
ure a result  of  the  causes  which  worked  in  produc- 
ing the  doctrines  of  Wycliife  and  Huss.  But  to 
the  radicalism  of  these  doctrines  the  council  mani- 
fested the  sternest  opposition.  Huss  was  burned  at 
the  stake,  and  Wy  cliff  e suffered  posthumous  mar- 
tyrdom. To  the  men  who  laboured  so  strenuously 
to  heal  the  schism  that  was  destroying  the  church, 
it  was  not  through  innovations  in  creed  but  through 
reform  in  organization  and  administration  that  the 
way  to  a restoration  of  peace  and  order  appeared 
feasible.  Conscious  of  the  revolutionary  tendency 
of  their  purpose  to  subject  the  Pope  to  the  general 
council,  they  stood  firmly  opposed  to  any  modifica- 
tion of  the  old  order  beyond  what  they  regarded 


1 Huss  maintained  as  fully  as  Wycliffe  that  the  church  consisted 
essentially  in  the  whole  body  of  the  predestinated  (universitas  pre- 
destinatorum) . See  Gieseler,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  423,  note  18. 


266 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


as  absolutely  indispensable.  They  were  in  a real 
sense  reformers  and  not  revolutionists. 

The  leading  spirits  in  the  whole  conciliar  move- 
ment  were  John  Gerson,  the  learned  and  eloquent 
chancellor  of  the  University  of  Paris,  and  his  revered 
preceptor,  the  Cardinal  Peter  of  Ailly.  For  years 
these  men  laboured  strenuously  to  bring  about  an 
effective  general  council,  and  in  the  fruition  of  their 
efforts  at  Constance  they  were  looked  to  by  all 
parties  for  guidance  in  the  tortuous  way  of  successful 
reform.  Gerson’ s writings,1  both  before  and  during 
the  sessions  of  the  council,  presented  a well-rounded 
theory  of  limited  monarchy  as  the  true  form  of 
ecclesiastical  organization.  This  theory  involves  a 
systematic  repudiation  of  the  long-triumphant  Pe- 
trine dogma,  and  it  embodies  many  features  of  the 
doctrine  of  Marsiglio.  But  Gerson  is  less  radical 
than  his  predecessor.  He  will  hear  nothing  of  the 
Marsiglian  democracy.  His  church,  governmental^ 
considered,  is  the  hierarchy,  not  the  general  body 
of  believers.  He  is,  in  short,  aristocratic  in  his 
conception  of  ecclesiastical  politics. 

The  conservatism,  and  at  the  same  time  the  revo- 
lutionary character,  of  the  conciliar  movement  are 
particularly  illustrated  by  the  care  with  which  “ ne- 
cessity ” and  the  “ general  welfare  ” ( utilitas  omnium ) 
are  made  the  basis  of  the  most  far-reaching  reforms. 
Resistance  to  a Pope,  for  example,  or  refusal  to  obey 
him,  while  conceivably  at  times  a right  and  a duty 

1 The  most  important  of  those  which  are  of  interest  to  us  are 
printed  in  Goldast,  Monarchia,  II,  1384  et  seq. 


GERSON’S  CONCILIAR  THEORY 


267 


of  Christians,  must  spring  from  some  pious  necessity 
(pia  quaedam  necessitas)  and  from  the  pressure  of 
overwhelming  circumstances  ( manifestis  cansis  urgen- 
tibus)}  In  fact,  the  most  essential  steps  in  the 
process  of  terminating  the  schism  were  frankly  based 
on  this  confession  of  illegality.  The  frequent  recur- 
rence of  this  idea  of  necessity  strongly  suggests  the 
theories  of  the  Whig  revolution  in  England,1 2  and  the  ^ 
parallel  becomes  very  pronounced  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  Gerson  and  the  Whigs  were  both  striving 
to  justify  the  termination  of  autocracy  without  fur- 
nishing a basis  for  the  exaltation  of  democracy.  The 
absolute  authority  which  was  to  be  transferred  from 
the  Pope  and  the  king  to  the  council  and  the  Parlia- 
ment respectively  on  the  plea  of  overruling  necessity, 
had  to  be  prevented  at  any  sacrifice  of  consistency 
from  passing  on  under  a like  plea  to  the  general 
body  of  subjects. 

Gerson’ s doctrine  of  supreme  power  in  the  church 
( plenitudo  potestatis  ecclesiastics)  is  skilfully  framed 
so  as  to  give  substantial  supremacy  to  the  council  while 
doing  as  little  violence  as  possible  to  the  traditional 
authority  of  the  Pope.  Formally  the  plenary  power  ^ 
is  in  the  Roman  Pontiff;  but  behind  this  and  sup-~ 
plementary  to  it  is  the  plenary  power  of  the  church, 
as  organized  in  and  represented  by  the  general  coun- 
cil. To  the  latter  belongs  the  function  of  caring  for 
the  unity  of  the  church,3  of  assigning  the  exercise 

1 De  Auferibilitate  Papce,  13. 

2 Cf.  Burke,  in  his  Appeal  from  the  New  to  the  Old  Whigs. 

3 “ Claves  datae  sunt  non  uni  sed  unitati.” 


268 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


of  power  to  this  or  that  person,  and  of  regulating 
by  law  the  manner  in  which  the  papal  power  shall 
be  used.1  The  Pope  becomes,  in  fact,  an  adminis- 
. ' trative  agent  of  the  church,  with  discretionary  power 
in  important  matters  only  because  the  council  is  not 
permanently  in  session  and  cannot  be  readily  sum- 
moned.2 This  substantial  extinction  of  papal  sover- 
eignty is  disguised,  indeed,  by  Gerson  through  frequent 
recurrence  to  the  familiar  formulas  of  pontifical  exalta- 
tion, and  through  the  no  less  frequent  suggestion  that 
the  assertion  of  conciliar  supremacy  is  mainly  to  be 
justified  by  the  scandals  of  the  schism  and  the  mortal 
peril  of  the  church.  Yet  the  trend  of  the  system 
which  is  set  forth  is  clearly  manifest,  and  the  con- 
sciousness that  doctrines  subversive  of  the  ancient 
ecclesiastical  order  are  in  the  air  is  unmistakable. 

That  these  doctrines  of  limitation  upon  monarchy 
were  applicable  to  the  political  as  well  as  to  the 
ecclesiastical  order,  was  well  understood  at  the 
time.  The  debate  over  the  power  and  activity  of 
the  council  was  for  half  a century  the  central  topic 
of  interest  in  the  intellectual  circles  of  Western 
Europe,  and  political  speculation,  though  quite  over- 
shadowed by  the  magnitude  of  the  ecclesiastical 
issues,  received  a most  significant  impress  from  the 
controversies  of  the  churchmen.  Gerson  manifests 
throughout  his  works  the  clearest  consciousness  that 
* his  fundamental  principles  are  those  of  political  as 
well  as  of  ecclesiastical  government.  Retaining  the 

1 Tract,  de  Pot  estate  Ecclesiastica , 11. 

2 Ibid.  10. 


GERSON’S  CONCfLIAR  THEORY 


269 


familiar  distinction  between  the  universality  of  the 
law  given  by  Christ  to  the  church  and  the  diversity 
of  purely  secular  law  according  to  place  and  time,1 
he  finds,  nevertheless,  that  the  relation  of  the  ad- 
ministrator  to  the  law  and  the  general  adjustment 
of  the  governmental  organization  are  determined  on 
principles  that  are  identical  in  church  and  state. 

His  general  argument  demands,  of  course,  the 
most  explicit  denial  to  the  Pope  of  that  superiority 
to  law  which  was  ascribed  to  the  Emperor.  The 
dicta  quidquid  principi  placuit  and  princeps  legibus 
solutus , whatever  their  validity  in  secular  law,  have  no 
application,  he  holds,  in  the  church.  To  say  that  the 
Pope  is  supra  ius  is  u smooth,  deceitful  and  treacher- 
ous flattery.” 2 So  far  as  any  authority  is  above  the 
law  of  the  church,  it  is  the  general  council,  in  which 
is  vested  power  to  interpret,  modify  or  repeal  what 
has  been  enacted  by  popes  or  previous  councils.  The 
Aristotelian  classification  of  governments  furnishes 
the  suggestion  of  that  which  should  prevail  in  the 
church ; namely,  the  mixed  form,  composed  of  royal, 
aristocratic ..  and_timocratic  elements.3  France,  Gerson 
thinks,  has  carried  out  the  principle  of  the  mixed 
form  so  far  as  to  embody  the  royal  and  aristocratic 
elements  in  the  king  and  the  parlement , but  falls 
short  of  the  complete  blending  that  would  be  best. 
This  is  to  be  found  historically  in  the  organiza- 

1 De  Auferibilitate  Papaz,  10;  Tract,  de  Pot.  Peel.  13. 

2 Blanda,  fallax  et  subdola  adulatio.  — Sermo  j actus  xxii  Julii, 
1415.  Goldast,  II,  1407. 

3 Sermo  f actus  xxii  Julii.  Goldast,  II,  p.  1410.  Gerson  gives  the 
name  timocratia  to  the  popular  form  which  Aristotle  calls  polity. 


>270  y , , POLITICAL  THEORIES 

tion  of  the  Israelitish  commonwealth  under  Moses, 
wherein  Moses  himself  constituted  the  royal  ele- 
ment, the  seventy-two  elders  the  aristocratic,  and 
the  lesser  magistrates  the  timocratic  or  popular.1 

The  clean-cut  and  acute,  but  never  intemperate, 
ple^s  of  Gerson  and  his  allies  in  behalf  of  limited 
government,  the  reign  of  law,  and  the  subordination 
of  strict  law  and  tradition  to  the  requirements  of 
equity 2 and  the  general  welfare,  received  the  complet- 
est  ratification  in  the  decrees  of  the  Council  of  Con- 
stance, and  thus  became  merged  in  the  intellectual 
consciousness  of  the  time.  In  view  of  this  fact,  there 
is  a justification  for  the  suggestions  put  forth  by  a 
recent  writer,  that  this  council 

first  exhibited  the  conflicts  of  pure  politics  on  the  grand  scale ; 
that  in  it  the  notions  of  constitutionalism  gained  the  hall-mark 
of  European  acceptance;  . . . that  it  set  forth  a system  of 
politics  which  was  consistent  yet  scarcely  doctrinaire,  which 
saved  the  rights  of  the  crown  while  it  secured  the  liberties  of 
the  people ; . . . that  it  paved  the  way  for  the  constitutional 
reformers  of  future  generations.3 

4.  Nicholas  of  Cues  and  the  Council  of  Basel 

The  Counqil  of  Basel,  in  which  the  system  of  eccle- 
siastical government  ordained  at  Constance  found  its 
fullest  realization  and  later  its  destruction,  gave  occa- 
sion for  much  more  radical  theories  than  those  just 
considered.  The  reactionary  attitude  of  the  papal 
court  toward  the  council  called  the  left  wing  of 

, 1 Tract,  de  Pot.  Eccl.  8. 

2 See  especially  his  treatise  De  Unitate  Ecclesiastica,  Pars  II. 

8 J.  Neville  Figgis,  “ Politics  at  the  Council  of  Constance,”  in  the 
Transactions  of  the  Royal  Historical  Society , 1899,  p.  103. 


NICHOLAS  OF  CUES 


271 


the  reforming  party  to  the  front  and  stimulated  the 
extension  of  the  antimonarchic  argument  from  the 
aristocratic  ground  at  which  Gerson  had  stopped,  full 
into  the  territory  of  democracy.  Nicholas  of  Cues 
(Nicolaus  Cusanus),  a German  of  wide  learning,  of 
scientific  spirit  in  the  modern  sense,  and  of  logical 
acumen  equal  to  that  of  the  best  of  the  scholastics, 
furnished  the  council  with  a theory  adapted  to  its 
needs  in  his  treatise,  De  Concordantia  Catholica } 
This  very  noteworthy  work  presents  a doctrine  that 
is  distinguished  by  originality  and  exceptional  force, 
and  is  as  clearly  unique  as  was,  a century  earlier, 
that  of  Marsiglio,  which  it  in  some  respects  resembles. 
Two  points  in  the  doctrine  demand  our  special  atten- 
tion in  their  bearing  upon  the  transition  of  political 
theory  from  the  mediaeval  to  the  modern  type.  The 
first  point  is  the  theory  of  harmony  or  unity  (con- 
cordantia) ; the  second,  the  theory  of  popular  consent 
as  the  basis  of  government. 

In  the  theory  of  harmony  Cusanus  lays  down  the 
substantial  unity  of  all  phenomena  — material  and 
spiritual  — and  the  essentialness  of  all  parts,  even 
the  least,  to  the  nicely  correlated  scheme  of  the 
whole.  God’s  universe  is  conceived  as  an  organism 
in  which  every  element  has  its  vital  part  to  play. 
So  in  human  affairs  each  element  of  the  general 
providential  scheme  consists  of  a congeries  of  lesser 
elements,  working  in  harmony  for  the  perfect  end 
of  the  whole.  The  church  and  the  Empire  are  the 
two  great  institutions  in  which  human  affairs  are 
1 In  his  Opera  (Basel,  1565),  Tom.  II,  p.  692. 


272 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


organized,  and  each  of  these  embodies  a series  of 
parts  whose  relations  to  the  whole  are  one  and  the 
same.  Thus  it  is  of  the  essence  of  the  thought  of 
Cusanus  that  the  principles  which  determine  the 
interrelationship  of  ecclesiastical  organs  are  precisely 
the  same  as  those  which  prevail  in  secular  govern- 
ment. Having  laid  down  the  theory  of  the  council 
as  the  central  organ  of  church  government,  he  con- 
sistently maintains  that  a council  must  hold  the 
central  place  in  political  organization.1  The  parallel 
between  the  two  appears  to  him,  not  as  a matter  of 
mere  analogy  or  convenience,  but  as  a fact  rooted  in 
the  foundations  of  existence.  By  the  emphasis  placed 
by  Cusanus  on  this  thought,  the  close  connection 
and  reciprocal  influence  of  ecclesiastical  and  political 
theory  receives  the  most  impressive  illustration.2 

Having  in  mind,  then,  this  conscious  association 
of  the  two  species  of  governmental  power,  we  may 
readily  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  doctrine 
which  he  presents  as  to  the  source  of  legislative  and 
other  authority  in  the  general  council.  Proving  his- 
torically, by  an  examination  of  the  early  church 
councils,  that  the  formal  pronouncements  ( canones ) 
of  those  bodies  received  their  force  from  the  consent 
of  those  present,  he  proceeds  to  the  broad  doctrine 

1 De  Concord.  Cath.  Ill,  12. 

2 In  seeking  to  work  out  the  parallel  between  the  church  and  the 
Empire,  Cusanus  finds  himself  in  great  difficulties,  owing  to  the  dis- 
integrated condition  of  the  latter,  which  he  is  too  sure  an  observer 
not  to  realize.  “ Mortalis  morbus  imperium  Germanicum  invasit : cui 
nisi  subito  salutari  antidoto  subveniatur,  mors  indubie  sequetur,  et 
quaeretur  imperium  in  Germania  et  non  invenietur  ibi.” — De  Con- 
cord. Cath.  Ill,  32. 


CONSENT  AS  THE  SOURCE  OF  LAW 


273 


that  the  acceptance  _ or  consent  of  those  to  whom  it  4 
applies  is  tfiejiaak ..for  the  validity  of  every  law.1 
(The  acceptance  may  be  indicated  by  use  or  custom, 
and  it  is  in  this  sense  only  that  the  decretals  of  the 
popes  may  be  regarded  as  law.  That  general  consent 
is  the  sole  source  of  obligation  is  a principle  of  divine 
and  natural  right.2  The  demonstration  of  this  truth* 
by  Cusanus  has  precisely  the  form  that  became  com-  ^ 
monplace  in  the  eighteenth  century.  Since  all  men, 
he  says,  are  by  nature  free,  all  government,  whether 
in  the  form  of  written  law  or  of  a ruler’s  will,  springs 
solely  from  the  consent  of  the  subjects.  And  since  all 
men  are  by  nature  equally  endowed  with  power,  the 
superior  position  of  any  one  can  be  due  only  to  the 
choice  and  consent  of  the  rest.3  Thus  the  source  of 
personal  dominion  as  well  as  the  source  of  law  is  to 
be  found  in  the  people. 

This  argumentation  of  Cusanus,  destined  to  so 
famous  a career  in  the  history  of  political  thought 
and  action,  bears  on  its  face  the  impress  of  novelty. 
The  general  phrases  on  which  it  rests  were  familiar 
and  had  frequently  appeared  in  discussions  of  natu- 
J ral  rights  ever  since  the  days  of  the  Roman  imperial 

1 Vigor  legis  ex  concordantia  subjectionali  eorum  qui  per  earn 
ligantur  subsistit.  — De  Concord.  Cath.  II,  12. 

2 Contra  hanc  conclusionem  nulla  prescriptio  vel  consuetudo 
valere  potest,  sicut  nec  contra  jus  divinum  et  naturale  a quo  ista 
conclusio  dependet.  — Ibid. 

3 Ibid.  14.  Cum  natura  omnes  sunt  liberi,  tunc  omnis  principa- 
tus,  sive  consistat  in  lege  scripta  sive  viva  apud  principem  . . . est 
a sola  concordantia  et  consensu  subjectivo.  Nam  si  natura  aeque 
potentes  et  aeque  liberi  homines  sunt,  vera  et  ordinata  potestas  unius 
. . . non  nisi  electione  et  consensu  aliorum  constitui  potest,  sicut  etiam 
lex  ex  consensu  constituitur. 


274 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


jurists ; but  the  application  of  the  principles  had  been 
confined  to  questions  of  morality  and  of  private  law.1 
In  carrying  them  over  into  politics  proper  and  mak- 
ing them  the  basis  of  a theory  of  public  law,  Cusanus 
manifests  the  insight  and  boldness  of  a daring  inno- 
vator. That  he  was  entirely  conscious  of  the  signifi- 
cance of  his  doctrine  is  indicated  by  his  remark  at 
the  opening  of  the  chapter,  that  the  considerations  he 
is  about  to  advance  require  a much  fuller  treatment 
than  he  is  able  under  the  circumstances  to  give  them.2 

On  the  basis  of  the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty 
he  erects  the  more  familiar  theory  that  the  personal  i 
ruler  is  in  fact  merely  the  chosen  executor  of  the 
law.  He  is  the  symbol  and  representative  of  the 
body  from  which  his  authority  is  derived,  and  his 
function  as  guiding  and  directing  representative  is  j 
more  perfect  and  precise  in  proportion  as  he  is  in  j 
immediate  touch  with  his  constituency.  Thus  the  j 
bishop  (and  the  episcopal  dignity  is,  like  all  other,  I 
elective  and  representative)  more  exactly  symbolizes  j 
(figured)  the  church  than  does  the  Pope.  Cusanus  i 
will  in  nowise  depreciate  the  importance  and  neces- 
sity of  the  executive  function  (cur a praesidentialis)  ; 
it  is  essential  to  the  universal  principle  of  harmony  1 
(concordantia) ; and  executive  and  subjects  together, 
organized  through  consent,  constitute  the  rational 
corporation  (corpus). 

The  principle  that  authority  emanates  from  the 


1 See  supra , p.  128. 

2 Annecto  aliam  considerationem  quae  licet  diffusius  desideraret 
explicari,  brevitati  studens  . . . distincte  perstringam  eandem. 


CUSANUS  ON  REPRESENTATION 


275 


people  seems  irreconcilable  with  the  apostolic  dictum 
that  all  power  is  from  God.  But  Cusanus  finds  the  , 
conflict  only  superficial.  The  power  of  God  works 
in  and  through  the  people,  and  the  manner  of  this 
working  he  elucidates  by  analogies  based  on  the 
quaint  conceptions  of  his  time  in  respect  to  physical 
phenomena.  It  is  a beautiful  reflection,  he  concludes, 
how  all  powers,  spiritual,  temporal  and  physical,  are 
latent  in  the  people,  while  for  the  manifestation  of 
the  executive  force  in  action  the  stimulating  influ- 
ence must  come  from  above.1 

When  he  seeks  to  formulate  the  practical  organi- 
zation through  which  the  principles  of  popular  sover- 
eignty are  to  be  applied  in  the  secular  state,  Cusanus 
is  less  acute  and  original  than  in  his  fundamental 
theory.  He  gets  little  beyond  the  institutions  of  the 
Empire.  The  voice  of  the  people  in  the  choice  of  the 
monarch  is  the  voice  of  the  Imperial  Electors,  and  in 
the  making  of  law  the  council  which  expresses  the 
popular  consent  is  the  assembly  of  the  kings,  dukes, 
landgraves,  etc.,  who  collectively  represent  the  whole 
Empire.2  Insistent  as  he  is  on  the  principle  that  the 
source  of  power  is  the  people,  his  idea  of  representa- 
tion is  that  ancient  one  in  which  the  magnates,  by 
virtue  of  their  eminence,  stand  for  the  lesser  men. 
Cusanus  makes  no  such  suggestion  as  that  found  in 
Marsiglio  and  Ockam,  that  representatives  shall  be 
chosen  by  the  people  in  specific  constituencies  and 
according  to  numbers.  Yet  these  would  seem  to  be 
the  most  obvious  consequences  of  that  doctrine  on 
1 De  Concord.  Cath.  II,  19.  2 Ibid.  Ill,  4,  25. 


276 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


which  he  lays  such  stress,  that  the  social  organism 
involves  the  correlated  activity  of  all  its  elements, 
from  the  greatest  to  the  least.1 

The  speculations  of  Cusanus,  even  more  than  the 
theories  of  Gerson  and  his  associates,  express  a ten- 
dency in  thought  rather  than  in  practice.  The  time 
was  not  ripe  for  institutions  that  would  demand  the 
complete  and  aggressive  development  of  the  doctrine 
of  popular  sovereignty  for  their  justification.  At 
Basel  the  reforming  element  in  the  council  fought 
a long  and  violent,  but  losing,  fight  against  the 
monarchic  policy  of  the  papal  court.  Gradually  the  I 
influences  which  centred  at  Rome  proved  themselves 
the  more  powerful.  The  strong  men  of  the  conciliar 
party  took  alarm  at  the  disintegrating  and  schismatic  i 
tendencies  of  the  majority  at  Basel.  Nicholas  of  Cues 
himself  passed  over  to  the  papal  side  and,  as  a cardi- 
nal, became  a protagonist  of  the  Roman  cause  in 
Germany.  With  the  dissolution  of  the  council  in  \ 
1443  the  ancient  constitution  of  the  church  was 
restored,  but  the  doctrines  that  the  conciliar  move- 
ment had  called  into  prominence  remained  a signifi-  | 
cant  element  in  the  philosophy  of  the  time. 

5.  The  Jurists  and  the  Theory  of  the  Corporation 

It  was  in  the  consummation  of  the  conciliar  move- 
ment in  the  fifteenth  century  that  legal  doctrine  had 

1 An  interesting  example  of  the  ramblings  of  h's  curious  and  eager 
mind  is  his  ingenious  scheme  for  securing  secrecy  in  the  voting  for 
Emperor  and  in  the  enactment  of  measures  of  taxation.  He  is  im- 
pressed with  the  importance  of  preserving  freedom  of  opinion  ( libertas 
iudicii).  Ill,  36,  37. 


THEORY  OF  THE  CORPORATION 


277 


its  greatest  influence  in  giving  form  and  precision  to 
political  ideas.  That  the  power  of  the  Emperor  was 
delegated  originally  by  the  people  was  a concept  that 
necessarily  directed  the  thought  of  such  minds  as 
those  of  Marsiglio  and  Cusanus  to  speculations  on 
the  nature  of  “ the  people  ” as  a general  idea.  In 
like  manner  the  collective  entities  known  as  church 
and  council  demanded  definition  and  analysis.  The 
corporation  ( universitas , corpus)  was  a familiar  and 
greatly  exploited  concept  in  the  Roman  law,  and  the 
principles  on  which  it  was  expounded  were  freely 
drawn  upon  to  explain  the  character  and  operation 
of  political  and  ecclesiastical  organizations.  As  the 
church  and  the  council  assumed  the  leading  place 
in  the  controversial  thought  of  the  times,  it  was  to 
the  form  and  activity  of  these  aggregates  that  the 
juristic  doctrines  were  most  fully  applied. 

As  has  already  appeared,  the  whole  movement  of 
the  conciliar  party  in  the  church  had  been  based 
upon  the  idea  of  extraordinary  conditions  and 
extraordinary  remedies.  An  imperative  and  over- 
ruling necessity  was  asserted  as  the  conclusive  rea- 
son for  resort  to  a general  council,  even  regardless 
of  the  Pope’s  consent.  The  juristic  doctrine  of  the 
validity  of  acts  based  on  necessity  played  a part  in 
this  contention.1  Much  more  distinct  was  the  influ- 
ence of  legal  ideas  in  the  conception  of  the  church  as  <L 
a corporation  (universitas  fidelium)  consisting  of  all 
believers  and  endowed  with  ultimate  and  residuary 
powers.  This  was  the  thesis  of  the  radicals  who 

1 Gierke,  op.  cit.  p.  51. 


278 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


followed  Marsiglio  and  the  extremest  speculations 
of  Ockam.  But  most  explicit  was  the  application  of 
corporation  law  to  the  organization  and  action  of  the 
general  council.  This  body  was  conceived  by  the 
school  of  Gerson  to  be  in  itself  the  corporate  repre-  j 
^ sentative  of  the  church.  In  it  the  church  had  form 
and  the  power  of  action.1  There  was  no  need,  on 
this  theory,  for  particular  examination  of  the  ecclesi- 
astical body  as  a whole,  but  the  organization,  powers ; 
and  procedure  of  the  representative  assembly  required  I 
the  most  exhaustive  consideration.  Thus  the  doctors 
of  law  applied  the  whole  paraphernalia  of  juristic 
argumentation  — precedent,  authority  and  the  most 
refined  rules  of  interpretation  — to  the  task  of  solv- 
ing all  the  problems  of  conciliar  action  by  the  princi- 
ples embodied  in  Justinian’s  Digest  and  the  Corpus 
Iuris  Canonici.  The  relation  of  the  Pope  to  the 
council  was  assimilated  to  that  of  the  presiding 
-^officer  {rector)  of  the  corporation  ( universitas ).  The 
mode  of  summons  was  derived  from  that  prescribed 
in  the  Digest,  and  from  the  same  source  was  drawn 
the  vital  conclusion  that  if  the  Pope  refused  or  was 
unable  to  issue  the  summons,  the  council  could  assem- 
ble spontaneously.2  Likewise  were  determined  the 
questions  of  quorum  and  of  majority.  Whether  two- 

1 Videtur  quod  ecclesia,  ut  sparsim  considerata,  non  habet  illam 
potestatem  [ecclesiasticam]  nisi  in  quodam  materiali  seu  potentiali 
[.sc.  sensu  ?],  sed  congregatio  sua  et  unitio,  quae  sit  in  concilio  generali, 
dat  ei  formam,  sicut  in  aliis  communitatibus  exemplum  dari  potest. 
— Gerson,  Tract,  de  Pot.  Eccles.  4. 

2 Cf.  Antonius  de  Rosellis,  Monarchia,  II,  23,  24  (in  Goldast,  I,  252 
et  seq.). 


THEORY  OF  THE  CORPORATION 


279 


thirds  of  those  summoned  should  be  necessary  to  a 
quorum,  as  was  prescribed  in  case  of  the  universitcis , 
was  answered  affirmatively  or  negatively  accord- 
ing to  the  predilections  of  the  various  debaters; 
but  the  grounds  for  either  answer  were  strictly  legal. 
The  same  was  the  case  in  the  discussion  as  to  the 
i relations  of  minority  and  majority,  and  in  answering 
the  question  whether  unanimity  was  essential  to  valid 
action. 

The  necessary  tendency  of  this  manner  of  thought 
was  to  give  a high  degree  of  precision  to  the  concep- 
; tion  of  collective  unity  in  bodies  of  men.  From  the 
clearly  formulated  notion  of  such  smaller  aggregates 
as  synods  and  councils  it  was  an  easy  step  to  a work- 
ing concept  of  the  larger  aggregates  like  the  church 
and  the  Empire.  Marsiglio  and  Ockam  and  Cusanus 
took  the  step  and  presented  fairly  well  defined  theo- 
ries of  great  multitudes  of  individuals  so  organized  as 
to  express  a unity  without  reference  to  that  subordi- 
nation to  a single  man  ( ordinatio  ad  unum)  which  was 
the  common  thought  of  the  earlier  Middle  Age.  The 
legal  theory  of  the  corporation  combined  with  the 
Hellenic  idea  of  the  city-state  to  draw  men’s  thoughts 
away  from  the  one  and  to  the  many.  Not  the  head 
of  the  church,  but  the  church,  became  the  centre  of 
theory.  The  idea  of  representation  which  became  so 
significant  during  the  conciliar  era  made  quite  easy  < 
to  grasp  the  distinction  between  the  administrator 
and  the  source  of  power.  The  application  of  this  dis- 
tinction to  the  demand  for  popular  sovereignty  in 
political  life  was  not  fully  made  till  well  into  the 


280 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


sixteenth  century ; but  the  ground  for  the  application  j: 
was  laid  in  the  conciliar  controversy  in  the  fifteenth,  f 
The  Roman  law  of  corporations  played  only  a slightly 
lesser  part  in  leading  up  to  the  theory  of  the  revolu- 
tion time  than  the  Roman  law  of  contract  played  in 
the  revolutionary  theory  itself. 

6.  Summary 

The  fifteenth  century  was  the  last  in  which  the] 
general  lines  of  political  philosophy  were  essentially 
mediaeval.  It  was  the  last  in  which  the  functions 
and  relations  of  Papacy  and  Empire  were  even  nomi- 
nally the  central  point  of  theory.  The  whole  trend 
of  thought  was  toward  limitation  and  qualification  in 
that  conception  of  plenary  authority  in  the  monarch 
which  had  been  prevalent  in  the  preceding  centuries. 
The  idea  of  unity  through  organization  and  adjust- 
ment in  the  elements  of  the  body  supplanted  that  of 
unity  through  the  oneness  of  the  head.  But  this 
notion  of  the  corporate  group  was  not  applied  at  this 
time  to  aggregations  of  individuals  into  nations ; it 
received  its  character  chiefly  from  the  working  of  the 
estates  in  the  various  political  divisions,  the  synods 
and  councils  in  the  church,  and,  where  it  approached 
most  nearly  to  the  modern  conception  of  an  organ- 
ized people,  from  the  free  municipal  states  of 
Germany  and  Italy  and  the  half  autonomous  com- 
munes of  France.  The  general  prosperity  and 
power  of  these  organizations  afforded  an  impressive 
illustration  of  collective  efficiency  and  representative 
administration. 


OWNERSHIP  AND  SOVEREIGNTY 


281 


In  addition  to  the  development  of  the  conciliar  idea 
and  its  corollaries,  which  was  the  chief  characteristic 
of  the  fifteenth  century,  the  philosophy  of  the  period 
in  its  general  aspects  exhibited  a progressive  trans- 
formation of  mediaeval  concepts  along  the  line  which 
led  to  the  modern  era.  The  effort  of  Wycliffe  and 
his  followers  to  incorporate  the  basal  principle  of 
feudalism  in  political  theory  by  a systematic  identi- 
fication of  ownership  and  sovereignty,  was  rendered 
unavailing  by  the  unanimous  rejection  of  the  idea 
by  the  leading  thinkers  of  the  time.1  Dominium 
(ownership)  and  iurisdictio  (jurisdiction)  were  care- 
fully distinguished,  and  the  sanctity  of  private  prop- 
erty as  against  the  wielder  of  political  authority 
was  generally  maintained,  especially  by  the  jurists. 
The  limitation  of  the  supreme  power  was  not  con- 
ceived, however,  as  due  to  any  substantial  and  inher- 
ent right  of  the  individual,  but  as  embodied  in  the 
ius  naturale , which  continued  to  be  regarded  as  abso- 
lutely conditioning  the  exercise  of  every  kind  of 
human  authority  and  the  enactment  of  all  positive 
law.2  Natural  right  was  in  fact  the  starting-point 
of  all  theory,  and  was  as  conscientiously  employed  by 
Cusanus  in  his  exposition  of  popular  and  representa- 


1 Cf.  Gerson,  De  Pot . Peel.  13 ; Almain,  Expositio  de  Sup.  Pot. 
Eccl.  et  Laica,  II,  1 (in  Goldast,  I,  588  et  seq.). 

2 See  Antonius  de  Rosellis,  IV,  8,  for  a characteristic  discussion 
of  the  question  as  to  the  power  of  Pope  or  Emperor  to  deprive  indi- 
viduals of  their  property.  The  conclusion  is  that  deprivation  can  be 
effected  only  cum  causa  legitima.  Cf.  in  general  the  preceding  chap- 
ter, on  the  question : “ Pontifex  vel  Imperator  an  contra  iura  natura- 
lia  possunt  dispensare  ? ” 


282 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tive  government 1 as  by  Rosellinus  in  his  expo 
of  monarchy. 

It  was  from  the  assumption  of  natural  rights  . 
basis  of  theory  that  depended  the  whole  doctr 
general  welfare  ( bonum  commune  ; utilitas  omniv 
church  and  state  which  was  the  mainspring  c 
conciliar  movement.  For  from  the  time  of  Ac 
it  had  been  accepted  doctrine  that  utility  was  « 
principle  of  the  ius  naturale , and  that  the  inter 
the  whole  took  precedence  over  the  interest  o 
part.2  This  principle  and  the  use  made  of  it  i 
fifteenth  century  pointed  straight  to  the  theory  c 
revolution  time.  For  it  established  the  tender 
regard  ecclesiastical  and  political  institutions 
as  unchangeable  embodiments  of  the  divine  wil 
X as  instruments  of  human  advantage,  subje 
modifications  dictated  by  reason  and  experiem 

The  conciliar  period  witnessed  also  some  c* 
erable  development  of  the  notion  that  politica 
social  institutions  originated  historically  in  the  ( 
erate  and  rationally  planned  action  of  men.  Cus; 
as  has  appeared,  laid  great  stress  on  the  consei 
and  contractual  foundation  of  authority.  Bi 
addition  to  this  we  have  the  conception  of  an  hi 
v^cal  condition  preceding  the  manifestation  of 
consent  — a condition  which  later  assumed 
definiteness  of  character  under  the  name,  the  s 
of  nature.  This  idea  in  its  fifteenth-century  f 

1 De  Concord.  Cath.  II,  14.  Omnis  constitutio  radicatur  it 
naturali,  et  si  ei  contradicit,  constitutio  valida  esse  nequit. 

2 C.f  supra,  Chap.  VIII,  sec.  2;  and  see  Gerson,  De  Stalibus  L 
asticis , I. 


no 


DOCTRINE  OF  A STATE  OF  NATURE 


283 


eceived  the  most  perfect  literary  expression  in  the 
short  work  of  ^Eneas  Sylvius  on  The  Rise  and  Power 
i f the  Roman  Empire.1  Here  the  Biblical  account  of 
aradise  is  blended  with  the  fancies  of  Plato  and 
Polybius.  After  the  expulsion  of  the  first  parents 
rom  Eden,  men,  it  is  narrated,  lived  in  the  woods 
ike  beasts,  till  reason  taught  them  to  come  together 
n communities,  and  for  their  common  welfare  to 
build  cities  and  develop  the  arts  of  civilized  life, 
fustice  and  equity  guided  all  actions,  and  government 
yas  by  the  most  virtuous.  Kingly  government  by 
orce  became  necessary  only  when  injustice  and 
jppression  gained  vogue,  and  the  Roman  Empire  was 
ultimately  established  to  maintain  universal  peace. 
The  treatise  is  in  its  purpose  a panegyric  of  the 
Empire ; its  interest  for  us  lies  in  the  presentation 
of  one  phase  in  the  evolution  of  a concept  which, 
combined  with  that  of  the  law  of  nature,  for  a time 
lominated  all  political  philosophy. 

In  general  the  closing  century  of  the  Middle  Age 
embodied  in  its  philosophy  ideas  as  to  sovereignty, 
the  popular  basis  of  government,  natural  law  and 
rights,  and  the  social  contract  which,  under  the 
impulse  of  changed  conditions  in  objective  life,  were 
to  characterize  the  modern  age.  But  those  who 
devoted  themselves  to  systematic  thought  remained 
still  too  much  under  the  influence  of  the  old  ideals  of 
Papacy  and  Empire  to  free  themselves  in  either  the 
method  or  the  content  of  their  philosophy  from  the 

1 Tractcitus  de  Ortu  et  Autoritate  Imperii  Romani , in  Goldast,  II, 
1558. 


284 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


standards  of  the  preceding  ages.  The  signal  for  a 
change  in  the  whole  spirit  of  political  theory  was 
sounded  just  after  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  centu 
by  the  genius  of  Machiavelli. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Brockhaus,  Nicolai  Cusani  de  Concilii  Universalis  Potest  ite 
Sententia.  Creighton,  History  of  the  Papacy,  Books  I— III 
(Vols.  I and  II).  Duruy,  History  of  Modern  Times,  cha  ps. 
i-iv.  Gierke,  Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsrecht , Bd.  Ill  (Die 
Staats-  und  Corporationslehre  des  Alterthums  und  des  Mit 
telalters ),  pp.  247-261,  322-330,  351-362,  466-476,  502-510 
(list  of  authorities  on  the  period  from  the  eleventh  to  the  six- 
teenth century) ; pp.  502-644  cover  the  part  translated  by 
Maitland.  Maitland’s  Gierke,  pp.  70-77  (an  extensive 
list  of  authorities  on  the  period  from  the  ninth  to  the  six- 
teenth century,  Gierke’s  list  with  additions)  and  pass 
Gieseler,  Church  History,  Third  Period,  §§  124-125,  131 
et  seq.  Hubler,  Die  constanzer  Reformation  und  die  Konh . 
date  von  1J/.18.  Huss,  Determination  etc.,  in  Goldast,  De 
Monarchia , I,  232.  Gerson,  Opera  (1703);  cf.  Gold  r 
Monarcliia,  II,  1384  et  seq.  Janet,  Vol.  I,  pp.  463-' 
Lechler,  Johann  von  Wiclif  und  die  Vorgeschichte  der  Ri 
mation ; translated  in  abridged  form  by  Lorimer  under  the 
title,  John  Wiclif  and  his  English  Precursors ; see  esp.  Vol. 
pp.  47-65.  Nicolaus  C us  anus,  Opera  Omnia,  Vol.  II,  p.  61  ? 
{De  Concordantia  Catholica).  Pastor,  History  of  the  Pc 
from  the  Close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  ed.  by  Antrobus,  Vol 
Poole,  Mediaeval  Thought,  chap.  x.  Wyckliffe,  De  Do  ni- 
nio  Divino;  De  Oivili  Dominio  (Poole’s  editions).  ^Enf 
Sylvius,  Tractatus  de  Ortu  et  Autoritate  Imperii  Romani,  i 
Goldast,  II,  1558  et  seq. 


CHAPTER  XI 
machiavelli 


1.  His  Life  and  Times 

In  no  system  of  political  philosophy  is  the  influ- 
e ce  of  environment  more  manifest  than  in  that  01 
achiavelli.  The  brilliant  Florentine  was  m the 
illest  sense  the  child  of  his  times.  Born  m 1469 
: e entered  public  life  twenty-nine  years  later,  and 
ied  in  1527.  The  period  of  his  maturity  thus  com- 
ided  with  the  first  quarter  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
Vhat,  then,  were  the  political  and  intellectual  con- 
ations and  tendencies  of  this  period  that  would  be 
likely  co  impress  themselves  upon  a mind  of  so  fine 
a texture  as  that  of  Machiavelli? 

In  the  first  place,  at  the  opening  of  the  sixteenth 
century  the  movement  for  limited  government  m 
church  and  state  that  attained  such  considerable 
headwav  in  the  conciliar  period  had  entirely  disap- 
peared/ A monarchic  reaction  had^  swept  away 
almost  all  vestiges  of  the  aristocratic  regime.  In  t e 
- church  the  popes  had  successfully  evaded  the  require- 
ment of  periodical  councils  that  had  been  decreed 
at  Constance,  and  though  the  Lateran  Council  of 
1511-1517  was  called  together,  after  long  delay,  m 
response  to  the  demands  of  the  discontented,  it  became 
merely  an  instrument  for  materially  strengthening 


286 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  position  of  the  Roman  See.1  The  great  secular 
states  of  Europe  exhibited  the  full  establishment 
of  absolute  monarchy.  Henry  VII  in  England 
Louis  XI,  Charles  VIII  and  Louis  XII  in  France’ 
and  Ferdinand  in  Spain  had  relegated  the  feudal' 
assemblies  of  their  respective  dominions  to  a position 
of  obscurity  and  impotence.  Even  Maximilian  of  Ger- 
many endeavoured  in  his  feeble  way  to  impress  him- 
self upon  the  administration  of  his  disjointed  real  . 
\Ihe  era  was  that  of  the  strong  man,  in  both  secular 
and  ecclesiastical  politics,  and  Machiavelli’s  writing 
give  copious  evidence  that  he  realized  this  fact. 

But  he  was  conscious  also  of  the  fact  that  the  ten- 
dency of  the  times  was  toward  the  expression  of 
nationality  as  well  as  of  monarchy  in  political  organ- 
ization. The  distinctions  between  English,  Frenci 
Germans,  Italians  and  Spanish  had  now  btcome 
commonplace  of  political  observation,  and  llad  ti  - 
ttered extensively  into  the  policy  of  statesmen..  As 
against  this  fact  the  ancient  notion  of  an  empire 
coextensive  with  Christian  Europe  lost  all  its  signifi 
cance.  Not  even  the  peril  of  a Mohaminedan°con - 
cpiest  and  the  exhortations  to  a crusade  against  the 
Turk  could  reawaken  the  notion  that  the  Emperc 
was  the  secular  head  of  Christendom.  The  nations 
■ monarchy  was  the  political  type  which  alone  inspire 
interest  and  respect.  Of  all  the  groups  of  province- 


Through  this  council  Leo  X secured  a concordat  with  Francis 

• u °.h^b°h®hed  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  of  1438,  and  greatly  dimi 
is  led  the  privileges  of  the  French  prelates  as  against  the  Papacy.  0 
the  little  interest  in  this  council  felt  by  Europe  in  general,  s, 
Creighton,  History  of  the  Papacy , IV,  234. 


UNIFYING  TENDENCIES  IN  ITALY  287 

ind  cities  that  were  tending  toward  consolidation, 
baly  had  made  the  least  progress.  For  about  three 
dundred  years  the  Italian  peninsula  had  been  the 
Rode  of  numerous  city-states  whose  history  had  been 
ingularly  prolific  in  analogies  with  that  of  the  Hel- 
mic  world.  By  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
ury  a process  of  consolidation  and  of  internal  trans- 
Armation  had  resulted  in  the  division  of  practically 
he  whole  peninsula  among  five  states : the  Kingdom 
f Naples,  the  territory  of  the  Roman  Church,  the 
Duchy  of  Milan,  and  the  Republics  of  Venice  and 
tlorence.  Further  consolidation  was  an  obvious  pos- 
sibility; and  the  unification  of  the  whole  country 
ider  a national  monarch,  on  the  model  of  France  or 
pain,  was  an  ideal  that  particularly  inspired  Machia- 
velli.  In  the  way  of  realizing  this,  however,  stood 
)t  only  the  reciprocal  jealousies  of  the  existing  secu- 
r states  and  the  fact  that  there  was  no  one  prince 
hose  moral  influence  and  material  resources  assured 
m such  recognition  of  leadership  in  Italy  as  Ferdi- 
md,  for  example,  had  acquired  in  Spain,  but  also 
tl  e peculiar  position  and  policy  of  the  Papacy. 

Largely  as  a result  of  the  removal  to  Avignon  and 
e disorganization  of  the  schism,  the  region  in  cen- 
il  Italy  immediately  subject  to  the  Roman  See  had 
len  into  anarchy.  Upon  the  resumption  of  their 
ode  at  Rome  the  popes  were  practically  without 
y control  over  the  petty  lords  who  had  established 
eir  sway  outside  of  the  city.  These  conditions 
ade  it  natural  that  progress  toward  further  consoli- 
i/tion  of  Italy  should  proceed  primarily  through  the 


288 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


incorporation  by  the  stronger  states  of  the  disorder 
little  territories  whose  nominal  superior  was  tl  e 
Pope.  But  to  the  steps  in  this  direction  taken  1 
Naples  and  Venice  the  wielders  of  the  papal  pow€  \ 
when  once  the  danger  of  the  conciliar  moveme: ' 
was  past,  opposed  the  most  vehement  resistanc 
From  the  time  of  Nicholas  V (1447-1453)  the  poll  . 
of  maintaining  and  enhancing  the  secular  digni 
and  power  of  the  Papacy  was  pushed  by  the  aid 
every  resource  which  the  curia  could  command.  Th 
policy,  in  one  or  another  of  its  phases,  is  the  k< 
to  the  career  of  Sixtus  IV  and  Alexander  A 
(Borgia),  whose  methods  gave  such  scandal  to  Chr: 
tendom,  and  it  attained  its  final  success  under  Ji 
ius  II  (1503-1513),  whose  energetic  procedure 
diplomacy  and  on  the  battlefield  confirmed  for  thr* 
hundred  and  fifty  years  the  hold  of  the  Papacy  c n 
the  government  of  central  Italy.  It  was  claimed  1 y 
the  popes,  and  there  was  much  reason  in  the  claii  , 
that  an  independent  position  politically  was  the  on 
security  against  the  recurrence  of  such  a conditic  i 
of  subservience  to  some  temporal  ruler  as  characte 
ized  the  “ Babylonish  captivity  ” at  Avignon  ; but  tl 
methods  by  which  independence  was  realized  ar 
maintained  afforded  only  too  good  grounds  for  the 
cynical  judgment  of  Machiavelli  and  others  that  tbe 
Papacy  had  become  primarily  a secular  institutio  . 
all  the  more  to  be  feared  because  of  the  traditior 
of  spirituality  which  afforded  so  convenient  a mas 
for  its  designs. 

In  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  States  of  tl. 


MACHIAVELLI’S  PUBLIC  LIFE 


289 


arch  the  popes  contributed  largely  if  not  decisively 
prevent  the  consolidation  of  Italy.  But  just  as 
, ichiavelli  attained  manhood,  in  1494,  the  invasion 
the  peninsula  by  Charles  VIII  of  France  inaugu- 
ted  that  practice  which  turned  Italy  into  the 
.ttlefield  of  the  great  monarchies.  In  the  con- 
ict  of  France  and  Spain  and  Germany  the  little 
alian  states  had  scant  hope  of  preserving  their 
(dependence  by  material  force  ; but,  like  other  weak 
owers  under  similar  circumstances,  they  developed 
oundless  resources  of  craft  and  diplomacy.  Italian 
>olitics  was  the  field  of  a most  complex  activity,  and 
Vlachiavelli,  who  during  fourteen  years  (1498-1512) 
xeld  an  important  office  in  the  Florentine  adminis- 
tration, was  in  the  midst  of  it.  Practical  experience 
thus  combined  with  his  philosophical  temperament 
to  give  character  to  his  speculations.  The  missions 
on  which  he  was  sent  by  his  government  gave  him 
personal  knowledge  and  experience  not  only  of 
Italian  men  and  affairs,  but  also  of  the  greater 
nations  of  Europe.1  His  extensive  and  acute  obser- 
vation of  government  in  its  actual  working  left  a 
most  vivid  impress  on  his  thought  and  writings. 

But  with  all  the  influence  of  contemporary  politi- 
cal conditions,  Machiavelli’s  philosophy  was  to  an 
even  greater  extent  the  product  of  that  admiration 
for  pagan  antiquity  which  was  the  hall-mark  of  the 
Renaissance.  It  was  in  his  time  that  this  culture- 
movement  was  producing  in  Italy  its  most  perfect 
results.  Art  and  literature  had  thrown  off  entirely 

1 He  visited  France  and  Germany* 


290 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


the  forms  of  medievalism  and  looked  for  all  the  r 
inspiration  to  the  models  of  the  ancient  world.  Ph 
losophy  and  science  were  following  in  the  same  path 
and  the  paganizing  of  morals  and  even  of  religio 
was  only  too  clearly  manifest  in  the  life  of  the  time* 
The  dominant  intellectual  note  of  the  age  was  free 
dom  freedom  from  the  limitations  and  restraint; 
which  had  been  imposed  upon  men’s  thought  anc 
j acfi°n  by  the  methods  and  dogmas  of  scholasticism 
■ and  freedom  to  revel  in  every  species  of  activity 
j which  the  untrammelled  spirit  of  the  ancients  had 
suggested.  Florence  was  the  acknowledged  centre 
of  Italian  culture  during  the  Renaissance,  and 
Machiavelli  was  to  the  core  of  his  being  a Floren- 
tine. His  intellectual  training  and  equipment  corre- 
sponded to  the  characteristics  of  his  environment. 
The  literature  of  antiquity,  particularly  the  histo- 
rians, was  the  staple  of  his  diet,  and  in  it  he  satis- 
fied all  the  cravings  of  his  nature.  With  the  best 
writers  of  ancient  Rome  he  was  thoroughly  familiar, 
and  his  acquaintance  with  those  of  Greece  was  fairly 
extensive,  though  there  is  no  conclusive  evidence 
that  he  understood  their  language.1  It  was  under 
the  stimulus  of  the  spirit  embodied  in  this  literature 
that  his  naturally  acute  intelligence  attacked  the 
problems  of  politics  and  propounded  solutions  which, 
in  both  method  and  results,  were  as  distinct  from 
those  of  the  preceding  twelve  centuries  as  if  those 
centuries  had  never  existed. 

1 On  this  point  see  Villari,  Niccolo  Machiavelli,  translation,  II,  11 
et  seq.  (London,  Kegan  Paul,  1878). 


MACHIAVELLI 


291 


2.  Method  of  his  Philosophy  and  his  Point  of  View 

The  form  and  method  of  Machiavelli’ s philosophy 
|had  no  prototype  later  than  Aristotle  — and  the  Aris- 
totle of  Hellas,  not  of  Christian  Europe.  All  the 
paraphernalia  of  the  scholastics  and  of  the  jurists  were 
simply  ignored  in  his  speculation.  A comparison  of 
the  chapter  heads  of.  The  Prince  with  those,  for  exam- 
ple, of  the  Monarchia  of  Rosellinus,  who  wrote  only 
fifty  years  earlier,  would  hardly  suggest  that  the  two 
writers  lived  in  the  same  world.  The  dogma  of  the 
two  powers,  the  relations  of  Pope  and  Emperor,  the 
conflict  of  spiritual  and  secular  jurisdiction,  the  doc- 
trine of  imperium  continuum , the  Donation  of  Con- 
stantine and  all  the  rest  of  the  long  familiar  captions 
receive  scarcely  an  allusion  from  Machiavelli.  To 
the  opinions  of  the  church  fathers  and  the  mediaeval 
doctors  he  makes  no  reference,  and  he  never  cites  a 
text  of  the  Canon  or  of  the  Civil  law.  His  work 
was  as  completely  dissevered  from  the  long  accepted 
system  of  political  theory  as  the  contemporary  work- 
of  Columbus  was  from  the  long  accepted  system  of 
geography. 

The  true  method  in  the  science  of  politics  was,  in 
Machiavelli’s  opinion,  the  historical  method.  Men 
bad  been,  he  believed,  in  all  ages  and  places  the  same 
is  at  present,  had  been  influenced  by  the  same  motives, 
ind  had  been  called  upon  to  solve  the  same  problems 
vith  the  same  means.  A study  of  tl^past^-therefore, 
vould  throw  the  fullesTTigHt^on  the  needs  of  the 
)resent  and  would  even,  he  thought,  make  prediction 


292 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


of  the  future  an  easy  matter.1  He  felicitated  himself 
on  being  the  first  to  perceive  the  true  relation  of 
history  to  politics,  and  on  entering  upon  a new  and 
untried  path  in  political  speculation.  But  the  past 
which  Machiavelli  studied  in  his  own  works,  and 
from  which  he  supposed  himself  to  be  drawing  his 
conclusions,  was  almost  exclusively  the  past  of  classi- 
cal antiquity.  It  was  Greece  and  particularly  Rome' 
that  furnished  him  with  political  truth.  This  manner 
of  applying  the  historical  method  corrected,  of  course, 
and  most  usefully,  that  of  the  scholastic  philosophy, 
which  tended  to  teach  that  a deep  gulf  divided  Chris- 
tians from  pagans,  and  that  the  experience  of  the 
latter,  as  a source  of  lessons  for  mankind,  was  prac- 
tically worthless,  owing  to  their  lack  of  participation 
in  the  divine  revelation.  Yet  Machiavelli,  in  restor- 
ing the  history  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  to  its 
proper  place  in  the  edification  of  the  human  race, 
himself  erred  on  the  other  side  in  leaving  almost 
entirely  out  of  account  the  history  of  the  peoples  in 
whose  development  Christianity  played  so  large  a 
part.  The  work  which  was  avowedly  an  application 
of  his  new  method,  the  Discourses  on  the  First  Decade 
of  Titus  Livius ,2  dealt  with  the  Romans  almost  ex- 

1 Discourses  on  Livy , I,  Introduction.  Si  cognosce  facilmente  come 

in  tutte  le  cittk  e in  tutti  i popoli  sono  quelli  medesimi  desideri  e 
quelli  medesimi  umori,  e come  vi  furono  sempre ; in  modo  che  egli  e 
facil  cosa  . . . prevedere  in  ogni  Repubblica  le  future  ("cose].  — I, 
39.  J 

2 Discorsi  sopra  la  Prima  Deca  di  T.  Livio . In  Works  (Milano,  1804), 
Vols.  II  and  IIT.  Translated  in  Detmold,  The  Historical , Political 
and  Diplomatic  Writings  of  Niccolo  Machiavelli.  Boston,  Osgood  & Co 
1882. 


MACIIIAVELLI’S  METHOD 


293 


rely ; and  in  The  Prince  Machiavelli’s  interest 
dearly  determined  by  contemporary  conditions, 
i viomparative  method,  which  is  essential  ,to  fruit- 
ful*, jss  in  the  historical,  was  employed  only  to  a 
sli  o extent  and  mostly  in  a rudimentary  form.1 
,i  fact,  Machiavelli’s  method  was  historical  rather 
pearance  than  in  reality.  The  actual  source  of 
! peculations  was  the  interest  he  felt  in  the  men 
conditions  of  his  own  time.  In  the  history  of 
ncients  he  found  parallels  that  appealed  strongly 
m by  their  relation  to  existing  conditions,  and 
he  ized  upon  them  as  revelations  of  essential  truth. 
0 le  circumstances  of  his  own  time  he  was  a most 
•ate  observer  and  a most  acute  analyst.  This 
mined  the  method  which  he  really  depended 
His  conclusions  were  reached  empirically, 
were  tlien  reenforced  by  appeals  to  history.  He 
Livy,  in  the  Discourses , rather  for  the  purpose 
istaining,  than  for  the  purpose  of  discovering, 
iples.  The  haec  fabula  docet  often  adorned  a 
that  from  the  standpoint  of  serious  history  was 
;*d ; yet  Machiavelli’s  teaching,  like  iEsop’s,  was 
rally  sound  even  when  the  story  was  weakest, 
lese  characteristics  of  method  are  closely  related 
i e point  of  view  from  which  he  regards  politics, 
philosophy  is  a study  of  the  art  of  government, 
*,r  than  a theory  of  the  state.  " Machiavelli’s  field 
olitik,  not  Staatslehre.  He  is  interested  in  the 
>lishment  and  operation  of  the  machinery  of  gav- 

'or  ail  admirable  use  of  the  comparative  method  in  answering  a 
. definite  question,  see  Discourses,  I,  5. 


294 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


ernment  — in  the  forces  through  which  governm* 
power  is  generated  and  applied.  He  views  ti  g$ 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  governing,  not  of  the, go  d 
erned  classd.„  .The  spirit  and  motives  of  the  latter  ire 
treated  merely  as  incidental  to  the  activity  of 
former.  This  is  notoriously  true  of  The  Prince,  wl 
has  given  so  bad  a reputation  to  its  author;  bu  it 
is  also  true,  in  a hardly  less  degree,  of  the  Discourses J 
If  the  former  work  analyzes  the  political  system  of 
the  strong  monarch,  the  latter  analyzes  that  of  he 
strong  republic.  In  one,  the  main  theme  is  the  sue 
cessful  creation  of  a principality  by  an  individual; 
in  the  other  it  is  the  creation  of  an  empire  t , 1 
free  city.  But  in  both  the  centre  of  his  though  is 
the  methods  of  those  who  wield  the  power  of  he  I 
state,  rather  than  the  fundamental  relationship!-  m I 
which  the  essence  of  the  state  consists. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  while  the  affinity  I 
tween  Machiavelli  and  Aristotle  is,  from  the  p<  f j 
of  view  of  method,  very  marked,  in  substance  16 
Italian  covers  a much  narrower  field  than  that  < | 

ered  by  the  Greek.  Aristotle  does  indeed  de^  • |j 
much  attention  to  the  workings  of  government  to  f 
the  practical  questions  of  policy  and  administrati 
but  he  subordinates  this  phase  of  his  work  to  j 
investigation  of  the  broader  aspects  of  organ: 
social  and  political  life,  He  has  a theory  of 
state  in  the  wide  sense,  and  he  sets  forth 

1 Of.  Villari : “ Lo  scopo  finale  delle  sue  ricerche  e della  sua  sc: 
e pur  sempre  il  dar  precetti  sulla  condotta  politiea  che  debbono  U 
gli  uomini  di  stato  Op.  cit.  (Firenze,  1881),  II,  320.  The  En 

version  of  Villari  includes  only  the  first  of  the  three  Italian  voln 


AN  EXPANDING  STATE  THE  IDEAL 


295 


v >ry  at  length.  Machiavelli,  while  conscious  of 
oad  philosophical  basis  for  his  views,  gives  only 
unctory  attention  to  this,  and  hastens  to  take  up 
questions  of  immediate  practical  concern.  Here 
doctrine  as  well  as  his  method  approaches  very 
ly  at  many  points  to  that  of  Aristotle.  He  is 
less  systematic ; he  makes  scarcely  any  attempt 
logical  presentation  of  the  science  or  art  of 
ernment;  but  the  principles  of  practical  policy 
given  conditions  are  substantially  identical  in 
minds  of  the  two  philosophers. ^Running  all 
•ugh,  however,  may  be  discerned  the  influence  of 
distinction  that,  while  the  ideal  of  Aristotle,  pretty 
sistently  adhered  to,  was  a state  in  which  immo- 
ty  and  philosophic  calm  constituted  the  supreme 
to  be  kf  pt  in  view,  the  ideal  of  Machiavelli  was 
ate  whose  end  was  expansion  and  the  attainment 
widespread  dominion.  The  Italian  recognized  the 
^tract  excellence  of  the  Greek’s  ideal,  but  regarded 
s too  far  removed  from  attainability  to  be  worthy 
serious  consideration.  Doubtless,  he  says,  a per- 
tly  balanced  state,  free  from  internal  party  con- 
ts,  would  be  the  true  political  existence.  “ But  all 
oan  affairs  are  in  motion  and  it  is  impossible  to 
id  still ; they  must  progress  or  decline  ; and  where 
son  does  not  lead,  necessity  often  drives.”  Hence  a 
te  organized  with  a view  to  mere  existence  without 
>ansion  is  likely  to  be  forced  into  the  latter  policy, 
1 thus  to  be  brought  the  more  quickly  to  ruin.1 


Senza  dubbio  credo  che  potendosi  tenere  la  cosa  bilanciata  in 
sto  modo,  che  e’  sarebbe  il  vero  vivere  politico  e la  vera  quieta 

V 


296 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


It  is  this  ideal  of  successful  expansion  that  accounts 
for  Machiavelli’s  generally  low  estimate  of  the  Greek 
states,  and  his  particular  interest  in  Rome.  To  him 
Athens  and  Sparta  seemed  to  lack  the  chief  elements  / 
of  political  wisdom.  Measured  by  his  standard,  the| 
were  failures.  Rome,  on  the  other  hand,  achieved 
empire,  and  was  therefore  a success.  If  Aristotle 
had  witnessed  the  career  of  Rome,  he  might  have 
'been  inspired  in  his  philosophy  by  an  ideal  analogous 
to  that  of  Machiavelli.  The  Greek  had  a sufficient 
appreciation  of  power  — of  the  capacity  to  cope  with 
circumstances  and  with  men ; and  when  he  treated 
of  the  strong  man  in  his  philosophy,  his  conclusions 
[were  very  similar  to  those  of  the  Italian.1  But  Aris- 
totle lived  after  the  age  of  the  Hellenic  despots,  and 
when  little  of  them  survived  save  a name  of  great 
odium.  Machiavelli,  on  the  other  hand,  lived  when 
the  Italian  despot  and  the  absolute  monarch  were  in 
the  full  tide  of  their  success,  and  when  much  of  what 
men  call  prosperity  was  flourishing  under  their  sway. 

'"''His  environment,  therefore,  as  well  as  his  tempera- 
iment,  operated  to  prevent  any  such  depreciation  of 
the  tyrant's  art  as  was  involved  in  the  system  of 
Aristotle. 

d’  una  citta.  Ma  sendo  tutte  le  cose  degli  uomini  in  moto,  e non 
potendo  stare  salde,  conviene  che  le  saglino  o che  le  scendino ; e a 
molte  cose  che  la  ragione  non  t’  induce,  t’  induce  la  necessity,  tal- 
mente  che,  avendo  ordinata  una  Repubblica  atta  a mantenersi  nc 
ampliando,  e la  necessitk  la  conducesse  ad  ampliare,  si  verrebbe  a 
torre  via  i fondamenti  suoi  ed  a farla  rovinare  piu  presto.  — Dis- 
corsiy  I,  6.  1 Supra,  p.  91  et  seq. 


MACHIAVELLI 


297 


3.  His  Attitude  toivard  Morality  and  Religion 

Not  less  important,  scientifically,  than  his  adoption 
of  the  historical  method,  and  far  more  influential  in 
establishing  the  reputation  of  Machiavelli,  was  his 
^attitude  toward  morality - and  jreligion.  It  is  this  by 
which  Machiavelli  is  best  known,  and  it  is  this  that 
contributes  most  to  make  him  the  expression  of  a 
definite  break  with  the  Middle  Ages.  Mediaeval 
political  theory  did  take  some  account  of  history, 
and  the  jurists  in  particular  supported  their  a priori 
doctrines  by  more  or  less  reference  to  the  past.  But 
in  no  philosopher  of  either  ancient  or  mediaeval  times, 
were  the  dictates  of  religion  and  morality  so  frankly 
relegated  to  a subordinate,  and  even  insignificant, 
position  in  relation  to  the  theory  and  practice  of 
politics.  That  law  of  nature  in  which  both  ancient 
and  mediaeval  philosophy  had  placed-  the  source  and 
limits  of  political  science  received  from  Machiavelli 
scarcely  the  recognition  of  a passing  allusion  ; and 
the  law  of  God,  so  far  as  it  was  manifested  to  man 
through  direct  revelation,  was  considered  to  be  ipso 
facto  removed  from  the  field  of  his  speculation.1 

This  wholly  unprecedented  position  in  political 
theory  is  presented  in  several  different  aspects  in 
Machiavelli’s  thought.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  recognize  in  his  philosophy  the  first  formal 

1 Thus  in  The  Prince , chap.  6,  Moses,  whom  Machiavelli  seemed 
disposed  to  regard  as  one  of  the  strong  men  of  history,  is  dropped  out 
of  the  discussion  because  he  merely  executed  the  policy  dictated  by 
God.  The  reason  that  would  have  made  Moses  the  chief  theme  of 
iiscussion  in  the  philosophy  of  another,  excludes  him  from  considera- 
'on  in  that  of  Machiavelli. 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


and  conscious  separation  of  politics  as  a science  from 
the  science  of  ethics.  We  have  seen  that  this  sepa- 
ration was  practically  involved  in  the  work  of  Aris- 
totle/ though  it  was  rather  an  incident  than  an  essen- 
tial in  his  system.  He  never  flatly  proclaimed  the 
independence  of  political  from  moral  doctrine,  but 
systematically  maintained  that  the  latter  conditioned 
the  former.  Machiavelli,  on  the  other  hand,  as  syste- 
matically sought  to  isolate  the  phenomena  of  politics 
and  to  study  them  wholly  without  reference  to  the 
scientific  priority  of  the  facts  of  a moral  existence. 
He  did  not  at  all  deny  the  excellence  of  the  moral 
virtues,  but  he  refused  to  consider  them  as  essential^ 
to,  or  conditions  of,  the  political  virtues.  Machia 
velli’s  political  man  is  as  entirely  dissociated  from  all 
standards  of  conduct  save  success  in  the  establish- 
ment and  extension  of  governmental  power  as  is  the 
i “ economic  man  ” of  the  orthodox  school  from  all 
save  success  in  the  creation  of  wealth. 

The  employment  of  violence,  cruelty,  bad  faith 
and  all  the  other  vices  is  discussed,  in  both  The 
Prince  and  The  Discourses , with  only  the  most  per- 
functory expressions  of  moral  disapproval,2  and  the 
employment  of  virtue  and  religion  with  as  little  evi- 
dence of  moral  appreciation.  A scientific  indifference 
' so  thoroughgoing  as  that  of  Machiavelli  could  hardly 
have  failed  to  subject  him  to  the  reproach  of  sympa- 
thy with  evil.  He  lays  it  down,  for  example,  that 
while  it  is  most  praiseworthy  for  a prince  to  be  good, 

1 Supra,  p.  51  et  seq. 

2 Cf.  the  comparison  of  cruelty  “ badly  used  ” with  cruelty  “ well 
used,”  “ se  del  male  e lecito  dire  bene.”  — The  Prince,  c.  8. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICS  AND  MORALITY 

nevertheless  one  who  wishes  to  maintain  his  authority 
must  be  ready  to  lay  aside  his  goodness  at  any 


to  circumstances.  Moreover,  since  no  man  can  be 
expected  to  possess  all  the  virtues,  the  discreet  ruler 
will  particularly  avoid  the  infamy  of  those  vices 
which  endanger  the  state,  and  will  thus  be  relieved 
of  concern  about  those  which  are  necessary  to  pre- 
serve it.1  And  again,  in  perhaps  the  most  famous 
/passage  in  his  works,  he  refers  to  the  common  impres- 
( sion  that  the  keeping  of  faith  is  praiseworthy,  and 
I then  proceeds  to  demonstrate  that,  for  the  sake  of 
maintaining  political  power,  deceit  and  hypocrisy  are 
e.2  “ The  prince  must  appear  all  sin- 

cerity, all  uprightness,  all  humanity,  all  religion ; ” 
but  he  must  have  his  mind  so  disciplined  that,  when 
it  is  necessary  to  save  the  state,  he  can  act  regardless 
of  these.  “ Let  the  prince,  then,  look  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  state ; the  means  will  always  be  deemed 


And  when  Machiavelli  is  treating  of  republics,  his 
conclusions  are  the  same : “ I believe  that  when 
there  is  fear  for  the  life  of  the  state,  both  monarchs 
and  republics,  to  preserve  it,  will  break  faith  and 
display  ingratitude.”  3 

Moral  judgments,  thus,  are  wholly  subordinate,  in 
'Machiavelli’s  philosophy,  to  the  exigencies  of  political 


1 The  Prince , c.  15.  2 Ibid.  c.  18.  3 Discourses^ Bk.  I,  c.  59. 


^ moment,  and  in  general  to  employ  it  or  not  accordin 


g 


^honourable  and  will  receive  general  approbation.” 


\ 


existence  and  welfare.  He  is  not  immoral,  but  un- 


in relation  to  religion.  He  is  not  irreligious,  but 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


A 


\i 


onreligious.  So  far  as  religious  practices  involve  the 
operation  of  forces  above  the  influence  of  human 
reason,  they  are  entirely  out  of  his  sphere ; but  so  far 
as  religion  is  operative  in  determining  relations  to  the 
state  and  the  trend  of  political  development,  it  is  sub- 
jected to  the  same  cold-blooded  analysis  as  appears 
in  his  treatment  of  morality.  Religious  sentiment  is 
viewed  as  an  important  instrument  of  state  policy, 
and  as  such  it  must  be  taken  account  of  by  statesmen 
always.  Not  at  all,  however,  because  of  any  profound 
truth  to  which  the  sentiment  corresponds,  but  because 
the  decline  of  respect  for  religion  is  the  surest  sign 
'of  approaching  ruin  for  the  state,  and  because  wise 
statesmen  are  able,  through  appeal  to  this  sentiment, 
^to  achieve  reforms  which  otherwise  would  be  beyond 
their  power.1 

y/  Always,  thus,  Machiavelli  has  in  mind  the  neces- 
sity of  the  existence  of  the  state  as  the  first  principle 
of  his  philosophy.  The  whole  effect  of  this  point  of 
view  is  summed  up  in  the  dictates  of  unscrupulous 
patriotism  : “ Where  the  safety  of  one’s  country  is  at 
stake  there  must  be  no  consideration  of  what  is  just 
or  unjust,  merciful  or  cruel,  glorious  or  shameful ; on 
the  contrary,  everything  must  be  disregarded  save 
1 that  course  which  will  save  her  life  and  maintain  her 
i independence.” 2 


1 Sono  molti  beni,  conosciuti  da  uno  prudente,  i quali  non  hanno 
in  se  ragioni  evidenti  da  poterli  persuadere  ad  altri.  Pero  gli  uomini 
savi  ricorrono  a Dio.  Cosi  fece  Licurgo,  cosi  Solone.  — Disc  or  si, 
I,  11. 

2 Dove  si  delibera  al  tutto  della  salute  della  patria,  non  vi  debbe 
cadere  alcuna  considerazione  ne  di  giusto  ne  d’  ingiusto,  ne  de  pietoso 
no  di  crudele,  ne  di  laudabile  ne  d’  ignominioso ; anzi,  posposto  ogni 


EFFICIENCY  VERSUS  MORALITY 


301 


A second  influence  which  was  obviously  at  work  in 
determining  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  the  relation 
y/of  politics  to  morality  and  religion  was  his  admiration 
/ for  power  and  efficiency  in  man.  This  feeling  was 
temperamental  and  largely  unconscious.  The  philoso- 
pher could  not  avoid  a sense  of  pleasure  in  any  mani- 
festation of  the  ability  to  reach  a desired  end  with 
clear-cut  and  indisputable  success.  He  had  in  him 
the  stuff  that  the  hero-worshipper  is  made  of.  The 
strong  man  and  his  art  constituted  a theme  to 
which  Machiavelli’s  genius  inevitably  returned.  His 
intimate  familiarity  with  the  workings  of  government 
in  the  weak  Florentine  republic,  where  divided  coun- 
sels, temporizing  and  vacillation  were  so  conspicuous, 
strongly  confirmed  the  natural  disposition  to  minute 
analysis  of  the  elements  which  combined  to  make  the 
policy  of  a state  fixed,  definite  and  coherent.  Hence 
his  rather  unfortunate  favourable  judgment  upon 
v Caesar  Borgia,1  which  involves  approval,  not  of  either 
the  end  or  the  means  of  that  tyrant’s  policy,  but 
^merely  of  the  relation  between  end  and  means.  And 
hence,  too,  the  reproach  visited  upon  the  Baglioni  for 
not  slaying  Pope  Julius  II  when  the  opportunity  was 
given ; 2 without  passing  any  judgment  upon  the 
morality  of  the  policy  which  the  tyrant  should  have 
pursued,  Machiavelli  merely  points  out  the  utter 
inconsistency  of  an  ill-timed  scruple  with  the  policy 
in  question.  And  the  same  characteristic  of  the 

altro  rispetto,  seguire  al  tutto  quel  partito  che  le  salvi  la  vita  e man- 
tenghile  la  liberta.  — Discorsi,  III,  41. 

1 The  Prince , c.  7. 


2 Discourses , I,  27. 


802 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


philosopher’s  thought  is  seen  in  his  reiterated  dis- 
paragement of  a middle  course  in  affairs  of  state.1 

Finally,  the  separation  of  politics  from  ethics  and 
i religion  is  maintained  by  Machiavelli  consciously 
as  a result  of  the  conviction  that  this  corresponds 
most  closely  to  the  facts  of  human  existence.  He  is 
in  the  fullest  sense  a student  of  practical  politics,  and 
h§  seeks  to  determine  the  workings  of  a real,  not  of 
an  ideal,  political  life.  Imaginary  and  impossible 
I states  have  for  him  no  interest  whatever.  His  pur- 
I pose  is  “ to  get  back  to  the  actual  truth  of  things.” 2 
( There  is,  he  says,  the  greatest  difference  between  the 
way  in  which  men  live  and  that  in  which  they  ought 
to  live ; and  the  former,  not  the  latter,  is  deliberately 
chosen  as  the  subject  of  his  investigations. 

This  point  of  view  was,  of  course,  most  useful. 
It  corrected  the  tendency  to  make  of  political  science 
a mere  congeries  of  moral  and  religious  precepts.  At 
the  same  time  it  involved  the  interpretation  of  his- 
tory and  the  formulation  of  political  philosophy  in 
terms  of  the  most  advanced  rationalism  of  the  pagan 
Renaissance.  In  the  intellectual  classes  of  Mach^a- 
velli’s  day  moral  and  religious  emotion  was  practi- 
cally extinct.  A calculating  self-interest  served  for 
a practical  standard  of  conduct,  and  a perfunctory 
observance  of  the  forms  of  the  Christian  religion  did 
not  disguise  a widespread  rejection  of  its  substance. 
It  was  easy,  therefore,  in  such  an  environment  for 
Machiavelli  to  formulate  his  political  philosophy 

1 Discourses,  I,  26  and  30. 

2 ...  mi  & parso  piu  conveniente  andare  dietro  alia  veritk  effettu- 
ale  della  cosa.  — II  Principe,  cap.  15. 


MACHIAVELLI 


303 


independently  of  ethical  and  theological  influences. 

It  was  easy  for  him,  also,  in  the  presence  of  such 
careers  as  those  of  the  Borgias,  to  present  “the 
actual  truth  of  things  ” as  expressed  in  the  disso- 
ciation of  political  from  moral  and  religious  prin- 
ciples and  practices.  And  it  was  very  natural  for 
him  to  heap  invective  upon  the  Roman  Church,  not 
so  much  for  having  abandoned  its  religion,  as  for 
having  violated  all  the  scientific  proprieties  by 
assuming  a leading  place  in  politics.1 

On  the  whole  it  must  be  said  that  while  Machia- 
velli’s  attitude  toward  morality  and  religion  was 
scientifically  justifiable,  and  contributed  greatly  to 
the  clarification  of  the  problems  of  politics,  the  lack 
of  feeling  which  characterized  the  expression  of  his 
views  afforded  considerable  ground  for  the  suspicion 
^that  he  was  no^rnly  scientifically  unmoral,  but  also 
practically  immoral,  and  for  the  criticism  to  which 
he  has  been  subjected  throughout  succeeding  cen- 
turies. Yet  it  may  be  doubted  whether,  with  all 
the  reproach  that  is  due  him,  he  has  not  been  too 
severely  punished  by  having  to  bear  the  odium  that 
is  concentrated  in  the  term  “ Machiavellian.” 

4.  Theory  of  Political  Motives 

So  far  as  Machiavelli’s  method  requires  generaliza- 
tions or  assumptions  as  to  the  motives  by  which  men 
are  guided  in  social  and  political  life,  his  doctrine  is  \ 
essentially  identical  with  that  to  which  Hobbes  later 
gave  a very  precise  scientific  form.  Men  are  looked 

1 The  Prince , c.  11  ; Discourses , I,  11. 


304 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


/> 


upon  as  purely  selfish,  and  as  actuated  always  by 
impulses  in  which  the  so-called  social  virtues  have 
no  part.  A narrow  self-interest  affords  for  Machia- 
velli  a sufficient  explanation  of  all  political  phe- 
nomena. His  cynical  judgments  on  this  subject  are 
even  more  repulsive  than  those  of  Hobbes,  for  the 
reason  that  they  lack  the  broad  psychological  foun- 


dation on  which  the  latter  carefully  placed  them. 


^ Particularly  frank  are  Machiavelli’s  opinions  as 
expressed  in  The  Prince.  Generally  speaking,  he 


J says,  men  are  “ ungrateful,  fickle,  deceitful,  cow- 


> 


ardly  and  avaricious.”  From  this  is  drawn  the 
conclusion  that  a monarch  should  aim  rather  to  be 
' 1 i feared  than  to  be  loved.  Love,  he  argues,  implies 
a bond  of  obligation  which  men,  being  essentially 
selfish,  break  on  every  occasion  where  their  own 
interest  demands  it*;  while  fear,  fJBme  same  reason, 
holds  them  indefinitely.1  Again,  the  simple-minded- 
ness of  men  and  their  readiness  ever  to  submit  to 
the  necessity  of  the  moment  make  them  an  easy 
prey  to  an  unscrupulous  leader.  “He  who  wishes 
to  deceive  will  always  find  some  one  to  be  deceived.”2 
Men  judge  altogether  by  appearances,  and  this  gives 
opportunity  to  the  crafty  ruler.  But  further,  men 
are  not  only  in  general  weak  and  ignorant,  they 
/ are  naturally  vicious,  and  are  made  good  only  by 
i necessity.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  wise  prince 
can  never  trust  to  counsellors,  but  must  depend  upon 
his  own  judgment.3 

1 The  Prince,  c.  17.  2 Ibid.  c.  18. 

3 “ . . . gli  uomini  sempre  ti  riusciranno  tristi,  se  da  una  neces- 


sity non  sono  fatti  buoni.  Pero  si  conchiude  che  li  buoni  consigli,  da 


MATERIALISTIC  END  OF  THE  STATE 


305 


These  pessimistic  conceptions  of  human  nature 
appear  abundantly  also  in  the  Discourses , where  they 
, receive  a somewhat  fuller  psychological  setting.  Mach- 
iavelli  brings  over  bodily  from  Polybius  the  latter’s 
theory  as  to  the  origin  and  cycle  of  governments  and 
the  foundation  of  social  institutions.  This  theory 
puts  into  the  background  the  Aristotelian  view  of  the 
social  nature  of  man  and  is  readily  adaptable  to  the 
view  that  society  has  its  origin  in  a calculating^ 
self-interest  on  the  part  of  the  individual.1  Machia- 
velli  gives  to  this  general  line  of  thought  a distinctly 
materialistic  turn  in  his  comments  on  the  Agrarian 
laws  at  Rome.  Here,  in  a thoroughly  Hobbesian 
manner,  he  sets  forth  that  men  have  by  nature  end-  ^ 
^less  desires,  and  that  the  craving  for  additional  satis- 
faction of  them  h^he  mainspring  of  all  human  action. 
One  of  the  mos^Ptent  of  these  desires  is  that  which 
1 finds  satisfaction  in  private  property.  In  The  Prince 2 
Machiavelli  declares  that  “men  more  readily  forget  the 
death  of  a father  thanth^loss~ofr  a patrimony/7  and 
bases  on  this  the  injunction  that  executions  should 
be  reasonably  few,  but  confiscations  none  at  all.  In 
the  Discourses  this  same  idea  receives  fuller  develop- 
ment, and  a materialistic  individualism  is  made  the 
explanation  of  the  love  of  independence  and  self- 
government.  To  a small  extent  these  ends  are 

sought  from  the  desire  to  exercise  power,  but  it  is 
only  a few  individuals  who  are  actuated  by  this 

qualunque  venghino,  conviene  naschino  dalla  prudenza  del  Principe, 
e non  la  prudenza  del  Principe  da’  bnoni  consigli.”  — II  Principe,^ 
cap.  23. 

1 Discourses,  I,  2.  Cf.  supra,  p.  115.  2 c.  17. 


306 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


motive;  the  masses  seek  only  security  for  person 
and  property.1  Republican  government  is  desired 
because  it  gives  a chance  of  material  gain  to  a 
majority  of  the  people ; under  monarchy  the  prince 
absorbs  all  the  profit  himself.  And  independence 
is  desired  because  wealth  multiplies  most  in  states 
that  are  not  subject  to  others.2 

^ » Material  prosperity  is,  in  short,  Machiavelli’s  idea 
y i of  the  chief  conscious  basis  of  political  life  among: 
men.  How  far  this  conception  is  from  that  of  the 
ancient  philosophers,  that  the  state  is  an  institution 
devoted  to  the  moral  and  intellectual  uplifting  of  a 
community,  and  from  the  mediaeval  notion,  that  the 
end  of  the  state  is  primarily  to  smooth  men’s  way 
to  eternal  salvation,  it  is  not  necessary  further  to 
demonstrate. 

5.  The  Forms  of  Government 

Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  the  classification  of  gov- 
ernments starts  with  a perfunctory  adoption  of  the  | 
Aristotelian  system,  namely,  monarchy,  aristocracy 
and  constitutional  democracy,  with  the  three  corre- 
sponding corruptions  — tyranny,  oligarchy  and  democ- 
racy ; and  the  same  conclusion  is  reached  with  that  of 
Polybius  and  Cicero,  that  a mixed  form  is  the  best  and 
most  stable.3  This  line  of  thought  is  not  followed 

1 Una  piccola  parte  di  loro  desidera  d’  essere  libera  per  comandare; 
ma  tutti  gli  altri,  che  sono  infiniti,  desiderano  la  liberty  per  vivere 
sicuri.  — Discorsi,  I,  16. 

2 Discourses,  II,  2.  The  rule  of  a conquering  republic  is  in  Machi- 

avelli’s opinion  far  more  destructive  to  the  prosperity  of  subject  states 
than  that  of  a conquering  prince.  3 Discourses,  I,  2. 


COMMONWEALTH  VERSUS  MONARCHY 


30'i 


[oat  to  any  extent,  however,  and  serious  attention  is 
concentrated  on  the  characteristics  and  relative  ad- 
vantages of  monarchies,  or  principalities,  and  popu- 
lar governments,  or  republics.  The  blending  of  the 
ideas  of  antiquity  with  the  influence  of  contemporary  - 
conditions  is  obvious  at  every  step  in  the  progress 
of  his  reflection.  The  isolated  and  non-expandin — 
Hellenic  city-state,  republican  or  despotic,  with  its  <_ 
analogue  in  the  Italian  city-state;  the  expanding  city- 
^Stale  'grTtome.  witlfTts  impeml'flcyeiopment ; and 


the  recent  1 ynjunT^^  gffiohal  monarchy, — all 

combine  in  determining  his  conclusiaaa^  The  Prince 
is  essentially  a study  of  monarchy  in  relation  to  the 
extension  of  political  dominion,  and  The  Discourses 
is  in  like  manner  a study  of  popular  government  in 
relation  to  the  same  end. 

As  between  the  princely  and  the  popular  form 
Machiavelli  is  very  far  from  being  the  thorough- 
going advocate  of  despotism  that  an  unfortunate 
reputation  has  tended  to  make  him.  His  apprecia- 
tion of  republican  government  is  no  less  pronounced 
than  that  of  Aristotle  himself,  and  in  respect  to  this 
form  the  judgments  of  the  Italian,  making  allowance 
for  the  difference  in  ideals,  are  in  substantial  agree- . 
ment  with  those  of  the  Greek.  For  a community  in 
which  a general  economic  equality  prevails,  Machia-  — 
velli  holds  that  the  commonwealth  is  the  best  and, 
indeed,  the  only  possible  form  of  government.1  The 
people  as  a whole  is,  he  thinks,  wiser  and  no  more 


1 . . . dove  e equalita,  non  si  puo  fare  Principato ; e dove  la  non 
e,  non  si  puo  far  Repubblica.  — Disc  or  si,  I,  55. 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


vacillating  than  a prince.  The  ingratitude  of  repub- 
lics is  no  greater  than  that  displayed  by  princes.1 
The  judgment  of  the  people,  especially  in  such 
matters  as  the  choice  of  officers  and  the  assignment 
of  honours,  is  in  general  sound  and  unimpeachable.1 
Granting  that  a prince  is  best  suited  to  the  original 
establishment  of  political  or  legal  institutions,  a popu- 
lar government  is  best  qualified  to  maintain  them.' 
Again,  republics  keep  faith  better  than  princes,  it 
not  by  choice,  at  least  through  the  slower  working; 
of  their  organs.4  And  finally,  in  respect  to  that 
adaptation  to  times  and  circumstances  which  is  essen- 
tial to  the  success  of  any  policy,  the  republic  has  ar 
advantage  over  the  monarchy,  in  that  the  charactei 
of  the  prince  will  not  change  with  conditions,  while 
among  the  many  characters  which  participate  in 
the  service  of  a republic,  one  may  always  be  founc 
that  is  just  suited  to  the  particular  needs  of  a giver 
time.5 

Machiavelli  thus  manifests  no  irrational  preference 
for  monarchy ; and  his  judgments  in  respect  to  aristo 
cratic  power  are  almost  wholly  unfavourable.  The  an 
V tithesis  of  the  great  ( i grandi ) and  the  masses  (i 
popolo)  he  considers  a prime  factor  in  the  life  of  ever} 
city-state  (< citta ),  and  his  feeling  is  frankly  with  the 
latter.  The  mass  of  the  people  he  believes  to  be  the 

1 Discoursesy  I,  58.  2 Ibid.  I,  47-48.  Cf.  Ill,  34. 

a Ibid.  I,  58.  4 Ibid.  I,  59. 

5 Ibid.  Ill,  9.  He  illustrates  by  the  rise  of  Fabius  and  Scipio  a 
different  stages  of  the  Punic  wars,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  thi 
career  of  Pope  Julius  II,  whose  fiery  impetuosity  never  varied  what 
ever  the  circumstances. 


I 

i 


MACHIAVELLI  ON  ARISTOCRACY 


309 


best  support  for  an  elective  monarch,1  to  be  the  most 
effective  instrument  for  the  maintenance  of  inde- 
pendence, and  to  be  far  less  productive  of  internal 
! disturbance  than  the  aristocracy.2  The  leading 
motive  of  the  upper  class  he  conceives  to  be  in  all 
I cases  the  passion  for  the  exercise  of  authority,  while 
the  masses  desire  only  peace  and  order.3  A landed 
aristocracy  ( gentiluomini ),  in  particular,  renders  free 
government  impossible.4  This  class,  indeed,  when 
possessing  castles  and  subjects  of  their  own,  he  con- 
siders fatal  to  all  social  order  ( nimici  dJ  ogni  civilta). 
Where  such  conditions  exist,  as  is  the  case  in  many 
parts  of  Italy,  not  only  is  the  establishment  of  re- 
publican government  impossible,  but  even  monarchy 
can  be  set  up  only  through  the  extinction  or  syste- 
matic transformation  of  the  “ gentlemen.” 

A high  degree  of  appreciation  for  the  common- 
wealth based  on  the  mass  of  equal  citizens,  is  thus 
a distinguishing  feature  of  Machiavelli’s  philosophy. 
But  he  fully  recognizes  that  circumstances  require 
different  forms  of  organization  at  different  times  and 
in  different  places,  and  he  is  particularly  attracted  by 
the  problem  as  to  what  system  of  organization  and 
action  is  best  adapted  to  the  establishment  of  far- 
reaching  dominion.  Thus  what  Plato  and  Aristotle 
regarded  as  unworthy  of  consideration  by  either 
statesman  or  philosopher,  becomes  with  Machiavelli 
the  central  point  of  interest. 

1 The  Prince , c.  9.  2 Discourses , I,  5.  3 Ibid.  I,  16. 

4 Dove  sono  gentiluomini,  non  si  possa  ordinare  repubblica.  — 
Discorsi , I,  55. 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


6.  On  the  Extension  of  Dominion 

The  theory  and  practice  of  extending  monarchic 
dominion  is  chiefly  to  be  found  in  The  Prince , while 
the  expansion  of  republics  is  the  theme  of  The  Dis- 
courses. The  process  in  each  case  is  regarded  by 
Machiavelli  not  as  involving  the  blending  of  two 
or  more  social  or  political  organisms,  but  as  con- 1 
sisting  in  the  subjection  of  a number  of  states  to 
the  rule  of  a single  prince  or  commonwealth.  The 
French  and  Spanish  monarchies,  in  whose  constitu-j 
tions  Machiavelli  finds  much  to  admire,  are  regarded 
as  groups  of  states  rather  than  as  single  organiza- 
tions, and  in  his  plea  for  a united  Italy  he  clearly  has 
in  mind  a similar  union.  “ No  province,”  he  says  I 
“was  ever  united  or  happy  save  by  becoming  sub  ; 
ject  in  its  entirety  to  a single  commonwealth  or  a 
single  prince,  as  has  happened  in  France  and  in 
Spain.” 1 This  conception  of  unity  has  little  ir 
common  with  that  which  inspired  the  heroic  national 
politics  of  the  nineteenth  century ; but  it  is  precisely 
that  which  was  to  determine  all  the  transformations 
of  political  geography  in  western  Europe  for  three 
centuries  after  Machiavelli’ s death. 

In  The  Prince  the  chief  heads  of  the  discussior 
are,  first  the  acquisition  and  second  the  exten 
sion  of  princely  power.  Under  the  first  head  are 
set  forth  the  methods  by  which  principalities  are 

1 Veramente  alcuna  provincia  non  fu  mai  unita  o felice,  se  la  noi 
viene  tutta  alia  ubbidienza  d’  una  Repubblica  o d’  un  Principe,  coni' 
e avvenuto  alia  Francia  ed  alia  Spagna.  — Discorsi , I,  12. 


THE  EXTENSION  OF  PRINCELY  POWER 


311 


founded,  illustrated  by  the  policy  of  characters  so 
diverse  as  those  of  Moses  and  Caesar  Borgia.  The 
former,  with  Cyrus,  Romulus  and  Theseus,  is  taken 
to  illustrate  the  acquisition  of  power  by  the  indi- 
vidual’s own  resources  and  ability ; 1 while  the  Bor- 
gia is  taken  as  a typical  instance  of  those  who  owe 
their  success  to  good  fortune  and  the  aid  of  others. 
All  these  heroes  were  founders  of  new  states.  The 
extension  of  dominion  by  a prince  already  at  the 
head  of  a government  gives  rise  to  what  Machia- 
velli  calls  a mixed  principality  ( principato  misto). 
His  discussion  of  the  methods  best  adapted  to 
the  creation  and  enlargement  of  such  organiza- 
tions exhibits  most  fully,  at  the  same  time,  the 
philosopher’s  intellectual  acumen  and  his  moral 
indifferentism. 

The  line  of  least  resistance  to  the  ambitious  prince 
is  through  peoples  of  his  own  race.  It  is  easy  to 
hold  acquisitions  made  in  the  same  country  ( pro- 
vincial) and  where  the  same  language  is  used ; the 
conqueror  has  merely  to  extinguish  the  line  of  the 
former  prince  and  let  the  old  institutions  remain. 
But  acquisition  of  states  ( stati ) in  a country  differ- 
ing in  language  and  institutions  from  that  of  the 
conqueror  involves  more  complex  problems,  the 
solution  of  wrhich  was,  on  the  whole,  achieved 
most  successfully  by  the  Romans.2  The  most 
serious  difficulties  to  a conquering  prince  arise  in 

1 Virtu.  This  term  is  used  by  Machiavelli,  like  the  Latin  virtus 
an,  1 the  Greek  aperrj,  without  any  ethical  connotation. 

Y The  Prince,  c.  5. 


312 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


connection  with  a state  that  has  been  under  repub- 
lican government  prior  to  the  conquest.  Here  the 
name  of  liberty  and  the  memory  of  the  ancient 
constitution  will  always  serve  as  an  inspiration  to 
revolt ; and  the  only  safe  policy  is  utterly  to  destroy 
the  community.1 

With  all  his  admiration  for  the  strong  man,  and 
all  his  confidence  that  the  ability  and  resources  of 
one  truly  great  can  determine  the  fate  of  states, 
Machiavelli  nevertheless  has  a just  appreciation  of 
the  persistent  power  inherent  in  the  fundamental 
institutions  ( cjli  ordini)  of  a community.  The  surest 
test  of  the  great  man  is  his  ability  to  introduce 
and  maintain  a new  social  and  political  constitu-; 
tion.  The  reformer  is  hampered  by  the  open  hos- 
tility of  those  who  derive  profit  from  the  old  order,, 
and  by  the  lukewarmness  of  those  who  have  only] 
hope,  but  no  certainty,  of  benefit  from  the  new. 
The  prince  who  takes  over  the  sovereignty  of  a 
state  and  leaves  it  to  go  on  under  its  old  institu- 
tions has  a simple  task ; but  he  who  assumes  power 
in  order  to  reform  the  constitution  undertakes  the 
most  doubtful  and  dangerous  of  enterprises.2  Suc- 
cess in  this  respect  is  what  justifies  the  assignment 
of  high  position  among  statesmen  to  Moses,  Cyrus. 
Romulus  and  Theseus;  and  the  key  to  their  success 
Machiavelli  characteristically  finds  in  the ' fact  that 
they  all  took  pains  to  have  at  hand  armed  force 

1 Chi  diviene  padrone  di  una  cittk  consueta  a vivere  libera,  e nor 

la  disfaccia,  aspetti  di  essere  disfatto  da  quella.  — The  Prince , c.  IL 


REPUBLICAN  EXPANSION 


313 


sufficient  to  defend  the  new  constitutions  when 
persuasion  ceased  to  be  effective.  That  the  inherent 
excellence  of  a new  constitution  is  no  guarantee  of 
its  permanence  is  proved,  Machiavelli  thinks,  by 
the  failure  of  reforming  prophets  who  have  not 
sustained  themselves  by  arms,  and  notably  by  the 
recent  case  of  Savonarola. 

The  tendency  toward  extension  of  dominion  is,  in 
Machiavelli’s  opinion,  inevitable  in  both  republics  and 
monarchies.  A prince  is  resistlessly  impelled  to  such 
a policy  by  the  insatiable  craving  for  power,  Avhich 
is  natural  to  men,  and  a republic,  if  not  impelled  by 
choice,  is  sure  to  be  driven  to  it  by  necessity.1  If 
the  constitution  of  a republic  is  not  such  as  to  be 
suited  to  a policy  of  expansion,  the  foundations  of 
the  state  will  be  torn  away  when  the  necessity  for 
such  a policy  arises,  and  the  constitution  will  be 
destroyed.2 

In  carrying  out  the  extension  of  its  dominion,  the 
Roman  Republic  set  an  example  which,  in  Machia- 
velli’s opinion,  no  commonwealth  can  do  better  than 
implicitly  follow.  The  elements  of  the  Roman  sys- 
tem he  summarizes  thus : Increase  the  population 
of  the  city ; acquire  allies  rather  than  subjects  ; estab- 
lish colonies  in  the  conquered  territory ; turn  all  booty 
into  the  treasury ; carry  on  war  rather  by  field  cam- 
paigns and  pitched  battles  than  by  sieges ; keep  the 
state  rich  and  the  individual  poor;  and  with  the 

1 Discourses,  I,  6 ; II,  19. 

2 Avendo  ordinata  una  Repubblica  atta  a mantenersi  non  ampli- 
ando,  e la  necessity  la  conducesse  ad  ampliare,  si  verrebbe  a torre  via 
i fondamenti  suoi,  ed  a farla  rovinare  piu  presto.  — Discorsi,  I,  6. 


314 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


utmost  care  maintain  a well-trained  army.1  It  is 
noteworthy  that  the  greatest  stress  here,  as  in  the 
discussion  of  successful  monarchy,  is  put  upon  the 
force  of  arms.  It  is  Machiavelli’s  fixed  belief,  due 
as  much  to  his  observation  in  Italian  politics  as  to 
the  teachings  of  history,  that  a well-trained  citizen- 
soldiery  is  indispensable  in  a republic,  not  only  for 
the  purpose  of  aggrandizement,  but  even  for  main- 
taining existence.  Both  his  active  career  in  the 
Florentine  administration  and  his  philosophical  writ- 
ings testify  to  his  interest  in  the  substitution  of  a 
popular  militia  for  the  mercenary  bands  that  con- 
stituted  the  bulk  of  the  fighting  forces  of  his  day.2 
In  the  Discourses  he  devotes  a very  clever  chapter 
to  demonstrating  the  falsity  of  the  common  saying 
that  “ money  is  the  sinews  of  war.”  3 Not  money, 
hut  good  soldiers,  are  in  reality  the  essence  of 
strength;  for,  he  says,  “ money  will  not  always 
procure  good  soldiers,  but  good  soldiers  will  always 
procure  money.” 

But  with  all  Machiavelli’s  cynical  exaltation  of 
physical  force  as  the  foundation  of  the  greatness  of 
states,  he  will  not,  in  last  analysis,  concede  that  this 
factor  is  as  decisive  as  craft.  He  holds  it  unques- 
tionable truth  that  men  never  rise  from  insignificance 
i to  greatness  without  the  use  of  force  and  craft ; but 
while  force  without  craft  is  never  sufficient,  craft 

1 Discourses,  II,  19. 

2 He  carried  out  in  Florence  a project  for  the  organization  of  a 
citizen  militia.  See  Villari,  Niccolo  Machiavelli  e i suoi  tempi,  I,  509 
et  seq. 

3 Discourses , II,  10. 


MACHIAVELLI 


315 


without  force  will  meet  with  success.1  This  principle 
applies  not  only  to  principalities,  but  also  to  repub- 
lics, as  he  amply  demonstrates  by  reference  to  the 
career  of  the  Romans. 

7.  On  the  Preservation  of  Dominion 

While  the  more  or  less  definite  conviction  that 
every  government  must  either  extend  its  authority 
or  perish,  gives  to  Machiavelli’s  doctrine  of  aggran- 
dizement the  chief  importance  in  his  philosophy,  nev- 
ertheless his  works  abound  in  striking  presentations 
of  the  principles  on  which  depends  the  ordinary 
peaceful  working  of  both  monarchic  and  republican 
institutions. 

For  the  stability  of  princely  governments,  the  first 
great  rule  of  policy  is  respect  for  the  established 
institutions  and  customs  of  the  land.  Men  who  are 
well  governed,  and  whose  familiar  ways  of  life  are 
let  alone,  will  not  seek  for  any  further  liberty.2  This 
is  a consideration  which  should  guide  both  hereditary 
and  usurping  monarchs.  In  the  former  class,  how- 
ever, Machiavelli’s  interest  is  not  very  great ; with 
ordinary  sagacity  the  hereditary  prince  has  an  easy 
task.3  But  the  newly  established  prince  has  to  con- 
front a more  troublesome  situation,  and  the  dictates 
of  sound  policy  for  such  a ruler  are  always  more  par- 
ticularly in  Machiavelli’s  mind.  The  Prince  embodies 

1 Io  stimo  che  rado  o non  mai  intervenga  che  gli  uomini  di  piccola 
fortuna  vengono  a gradi  grandi  senza  la  forza  e senza  la  fraude.  . . . 
Ne  credo  si  truovi  mai  che  la  forza  sola  basti,  ma  si  troverk  bene  che 
la  fraude  sola  basterk.  — Discorsi , II,  13. 

2 Discourses , III,  5.  3 The  Prince , c.  2. 


316 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


a comprehensive  analysis  of  the  art  of  tyranny,  with 
conclusions  that  in  very  many  respects  coincide  with 
^fchose  of  Aristotle  in  his  discussion  of  the  same 
% subject.1 

Because  all  government  rests  ultimately  on  force,2 
the  prince  must  have  a good  army  — a proposition 
which  excludes  dependence  on  foreign  mercenaries  or 
allies.  He  must,  on  the  whole,  be  parsimonious  with 
his  own  money  and  that  of  his  subjects,  but  lavish  in 
distributing  the  spoils  of  war.3  Severity  rather  than 
mildness  must  characterize  his  attitude  in  public 
affairs,  but  above  all  things  he  must  keep  his  hands 
off  the  property  and  the  women  of  his  subjects.4  He 
should  endeavour  to  be,  so  far  as  possible,  at  the  same 
jtime  feared  but  not  hated  by  the  people  ; and  accord- 
ingly those  duties  of  administration  which  involve 
odious  responsibility  should  be  performed  by  subordi- 
nates, while  acts  of  grace  should  be  attended  to  by 
the  prince  in  person.5  He  must,  moreover,  embrace 
every  opportunity  to  develop  a reputation  for  exalted 
purposes  and  character.  He  must  keep  the  people 
busy  with  great  enterprises,  must  surround  all  his 
actions  with  an  air  of  grandeur,  must  take  open  and 
decided  part  in  the  controversies  of  neighbouring 

1 In  The  Politics ; cf  supra , p.  91  et  seq. 

2 I principal!  fondamenti  che  abbino  tutti  gli  stati  . . . sono  le 

buone  leggi  e le  buoni  armi ; e . . . non  possono  essere  buone  leggi 
dove  non  sono  buone  armi.  — II  Principe , c.  12.  8 Ibid.  c.  16. 

4 Ibid.  Abuse  of  subjects  in  these  two  respects  is  the  most  fruit- 
ful cause  of  conspiracies.  See  Discourses,  III,  6,  where  conspiracies 
receive  most  elaborate  and  exhaustive  discussion. 

6 The  Prince , c.  19.  Machiavelli  regards  the  French  parlement  as 
an  institution  devised  by  the  king  to  relieve  the  crown  of  the  hostility 
aroused  by  curbing  the  power  of  the  nobles. 


THE  PRESERVATION  OF  REPUBLICS 


317 


states,  must  pose  as  the  patron  of  distinguished 
ability  in  the  fine  arts,  and,  finally,  must  liberally 
encourage  the  useful  arts  of  commerce  and  agricul- 
ture, and  refrain  from  interfering  with  them  by  bur- 
densome taxation. 

These  dictates  of  enlightened  despotism  are  thor- 
oughly blended,  in  their  presentation,  with  the  max- 
ims of  non-moral  conduct  which  have  already  been 
described.1  The  combination  is  a pretty  good  picture 
of  the  actual  working  of  monarchic  government  in 
Machiavelli’s  own  time.  His  corresponding  discus- 
sion of  the  principles  of  republican  government  also 
involves  a faithful  reflection  of  actual  conditions. 
But  on  this  subject  there  is  distinguishable  at  times 
an  undertone  of  personal  feeling  which  is  totally 
lacking  in  The  Prince , and  which  gives  evidence  of 
the  fact  that  at  heart  Machiavelli  had  a preference 
for  popular  government. 

His  idea  of  a commonwealth,  or  republic  ( Repub - 
blica),  is  wholly  that  of  antiquity,  namely,  a city- 
state.  The  thought  that  popular  government  could 
be  organized  for  a whole  “ province”  never  appears. 
So  also,  as  in  ancient  thought,  the  commonwealth 
implies  the  rule  of  the  mass  of  the  people  ( il  pojoolo) 
as  distinguished  from  the  aristocracy  (i  grandi ; la 
nobilta).  “Liberty”  ( liberta ) is  used,  without  dis- 
crimination, to  designate  either  independence  with 
respect  to  any  external  power,  or  a condition  in  which 
government  is  in  the  hands  of  the  people  rather  than 
of  the  nobles  or  an  individual.2  The  ancient  distinc- 

1 Supra , p.  298  et  seq.  Cf Discourses,  II,  2. 


318 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


tion  between  “pure”  and  “corrupt”  republics  is 
maintained  by  Machiavelli,  “corruption”  meaning 
the  absence  of  a sense  of  equality  among  the  citi- 
zens. “ Corruption  ” is  recognized  as  an  economic 
rather  than  a political  phenomenon,  caused  by  the 
unequal  accumulation  of  wealth,  and  as  such  the 
philosopher  does  not  undertake  to  discuss  the  ways 
and  means  of  preventing  it,  but  merely  assumes  its 
existence.1  His  problem  is  to  indicate  what  is  essen- 
tial for  the  maintenance  of  popular  government  in 
either  pure  or  corrupt  communities.  The  example 
of  Rome  is  so  influential  in  determining  his  philoso- 
phy on  these  points  that  his  views  amount  to  a 
panegyric  on  the  Roman  Republic  as  idealized  by 
the  poets  and  historians  of  the  post-republican  age. 
It  is  worth  while  to  consider,  however,  a few  par- 
ticular judgments  in  which  Machiavelli,  while  basing 
himself  primarily  on  the  recitation  and  eulogy  of 
Roman  practice,  gives  to  his  reflections  the  char- 
acter of  universal  political  science. 

Here  belongs  his  analysis  of  the  interrelationship 
of  constitution,  custom  and  law  in  their  bearing  upon 
the  permanence  of  republican  government.  The  dis- 
tinction between  the  fundamental  law  of  the  state 
(, gli  ordini)  and  ordinary  legislation  ( le  leggi)  is  con- 
sistently maintained  by  Machiavelli.2  Legislation 

1 He  does,  however,  repeatedly  declare  that  the  citizens  should  be 
kept  poor,  even  if  the  state  become  rich. 

2 In  the  Discourses,  I,  18,  he  uses,  in  addition  to  the  collective 
term,  gli  ordini,  the  phrase  V ordine  del  governo,  o vero  dello  stato,  indi- 
cating the  sense  of  a distinction  between  state  and  government,  such 
as  was  a little  later  put  into  systematic  form  by  Bodin. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  CUSTOM 


319 


and  custom,  he  sees,  are  closely  interdependent;  a 
change  in  custom  will  easily  be  followed  by  corre- 
sponding changes  in  the  laws.  But  the  constitution 
does  not  thus  share  these  changes.  Remaining  intact, 
it  becomes  by  degrees  out  of  harmony  with  custom  and 
legislation,  and  therefore  a source  of  ruin  to  the  state. 

Cm  adaptation  of  constitution  as  well  as  law  to  the 
arying  conditions  in  a state  is  indispensable  to  the 
preservation  of  republican  government.  If  the  con- 
stitution is  not  flexible,  the  necessary  adjustment  will 
be  effected,  after  disastrous  delay,  suddenly  and  by 
violence  rather  than  gradually  and  by  peaceful  pro- 
cedure, and  the  result  is  likely  to  be  the  entire 
destruction  of  the  old  order,  as  happened  in  Rome. 
But  modification  of  the  fundamental  law  in  republics 
should  always  be  made  with  the  least  possible  devia- 
tion from  ancient  forms,  however  great  the  change 
in  substance ; for  people  are  in  general  content  with 
appearances  and  do  not  penetrate  to  the  realities  of 
things.1 

No  less  noteworthy  than  this  appreciation  of  con- 
stitutional reform  as  a means  of  escaping  revolution 
is  Machiavelli’s  appreciation  of  the  necessity  of  pro- 
vision in  a republic  for  the  exercise  of  absolute  power 
by  some  officer  of  the  government  in  great  emergen- 
cies. The  dictatorship  he  regards  as  one  of  the  most 
essential  features  of  the  republican  constitution  of 
Rome,  and  one  of  those  which  contributed  most  to 
the  greatness  of  the  state.2  Popular  governments 

1 L ’universale  degli  uomini  si  pasce  cosi  di  quel  che  pare  come  di 
quello  che  h.  — Discorsi,  I,  25.  2 Discourses,  I,  34. 


320 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


particularly  need  provision  for  prompt  and  efficient 
action  in  critical  times,  from  the  fact  that  the  normal 
action  of  the  administration,  requiring  as  it  does  the 
cooperation  of  many  wills,  is  feeble  and  slow.  If  the 
constitution  does  not  provide  for  the  necessary  con- 
centration of  authority,  the  constitution  will  be 
broken  when  the  stress  comes  and  the  requisite 
action  will  be  taken  regardless  of  the  fundamental 
law.  Thus,  however,  a precedent  will  be  created  in 
a good  cause  which  may  later  be  followed  in  a bad. 
The  Roman  dictatorship,  therefore,  carefully  limited  as 
it  was  by  well-defined  methods  of  creation  and  termi- 
nation, furnishes  a model  for  all  free  governments.1 

This  judgment  upon  the  necessity  of  dictatorial 
power  in  republics  was  as  sound  as  it  was  unusual. 
On  another  prominent  feature  of  Roman  history, 
Machiavelli  likewise  takes  issue  with  the  common 
opinion.  The  party  controversies  between  plebs  and 
nobles  he  regards  not  as  evidence  of  unsoundness  and 
sources  of  disaster  in  the  state,  but  as  an  indispen- 
sable condition  of  Roman  greatness.2  His  reasoning 
approaches  that  of  the  modern  school  which  sees  iip. 
friction  and  strife  the  conditions  of  continuous  exist- 
ence. One  must  not  be  deceived,  he  in  substance  sa-\  l 
by  the  noise  and  tumult  of  party  contention.  The 


1 The  idea  that  it  was  the  existence  of  the  dictatorship  that  ena- 

bled Caesar  to  enslave  Rome,  and  that  hence  such  an  institution  i 
dangerous,  is  dismissed  with  the  characteristic  observation  that  it  w 
the  power  and  not  the  official  title  of  Caesar  that  overthrew  the  repu  > 
lie,  and  that  if  the  name  and  office  of  dictator  had  not  been  at  hr  a 
the  power  which  he  employed  would  merely  have  taken  some  o+  »i 
name.  Discourses,  I,  34.  2 Ibid.  I,  34. 


PARTY  STRIFE  AND  FOREIGN  WAR 


321 


are  not  of  the  essence  of  the  matter.  Under  cover  of 
the  shouting  and  the  stress  of  the  controversy  are  pro- 
duced results  which,  while  not  consciously  in  the  pur- 
pose of  the  contestants,  are  of  vital  importance  to 
the  state.  Party  struggles  furnish  a necessary  vent 
to  the  emotions  and  ambitions  of  the  common  peo- 
ple, test  the  powers  and  demonstrate  the  ability  of 
the  leading  citizens,  and  call  into  existence  the  insti- 
tutions and  laws  which  prove  the  mainstay  of  the 
government  in  later  days.  All  these  results  are  dis- 
coverable in  the  history  of  Rome,  and  all  are  essen- 
tial to  an  expanding  republic.1  Channels  through 
which  the  feelings  (umori)  of  the  common  people 
may  find  adequate  and  harmless  expression  are,  in 
Machiavelli’s  opinion,  of  the  greatest  importance, 
and  he  suggests  various  other  means  to  this  end,  par- 
ticularly approving  ample  facilities  for  the  making 
and  judicial  investigation  of  charges  against  public 
characters.2  Men  of  real  distinction  and  marked 
ability  are  always  looked  upon  with  suspicion  by  the 
masses.  In  times  of  peace  and  quiet  they  are  wholly 
glected  in  republics,  and  the  leadership  falls  into 
+V*Q  hands  of  the  rich  and  well  connected.3  An  es- 
c from  the  perils  of  such  a tendency  was  found 
tome,  he  thinks,  in  the  policy  of  incessant  war, 
ugh  which  the  best  of  her  citizens  were  kept 
ays  to  the  front. 

or  the  republic  which  would  correspond  most 

1'aarta  and  Venice,  as  types  of  the  non-expanding  republic,  did 
li  t idbit  the  phenomena  of  party  strife.  Discourses , I,  6. 
dd.  I,  7.  3 Ibid.  Ill,  16. 


Y 


322 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


closely  to  Machiavelli’ s ideal,  therefore,  vehement 
internal  party  strife  and  an  ever  aggressive  foreign 
policy,  would  be  normal  and  indispensable  conditions 
of  existence.  This  again  throws  a strong  light  on  the 
divergence,  which  the  many  resemblances  serve  to  em- 
phasize, between  the  Machiavellian  and  the  Aristotelian 
politics. 

8.  Summary  and  Conclusion 

The  influence  of  Machiavelli  upon  the  history  of 
political  theories  can  hardly  be  exaggerated.  Not 
only  the  method  and  substance  of  his  philosophy  but 
also  the  marvellous  literary  art  with  which  it  was 
expressed  served  to  win  for  it  universal  attention. 
Criticism  of  his  doctrine  developed  into  vehement 
controversy,  in  which  a grotesquely  distorted  concep- 
tion of  his  system,  labelled  Machiavellism  by  its 
adversaries,  brought  much  open  obloquy  upon  the 
philosopher,  and  at  the  same  time  stimulated,  though 
less  conspicuously,  much  respect  for  and  adoption  of 
his  method  and  his  real  principles.  By  far  the  fore- 
most among  the  ideas  which  the  Florentine  made 
prominent  in  political  science  was  that  of  a distinc- 
■y,j  tion  between  the  standards  of  public  and  of  private 
morality.  On  this  point  has  turned  most  of  the  dis- 
cussion of  which  Machiavellism  has  been  the  centre. 
The  whole  trend  of  theory  under  the  influences  which 
characterized  the  time  of  the  Reformation  was  against 
the  view  which  Machiavelli  propounded ; but  the  prac- 
tice of  the  age  continued  to  furnish,  like  all  preceding 
ages,  incontestable  evidence  that  the  “ reason  of  state  ” 


INFLUENCE  OF  MACHIAVELLI 


323 


took  precedence,  in  political  life,  of  the  moral  code 
which  was  recognized  as  valid  between  man  and  man. 
In  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia  Machiavellian  doc- 
trine received  a particularly  noteworthy  confirmation. 
For  Frederick,  as  a youthful  amateur  in  philosophy, 
soundly  berated  the  Italian  for  the  immoral  teachings 
of  The  Prince  ; but  in  later  life,  as  the  ambitious  head 
of  a struggling  and  sorely  beset  state,  he  exemplified 
in  his  policy  some  of  the  very  maxims  which  he  had 
most  solemnly  denounced. 

Next  in  importance  to  his  view  of  the  relation 
between  politics  and  morality,  in  its  influence  on 
later  political  philosophy,  was  Machiavelli’s  method 
— his  reunion  of  theory  and  practice.  Though  the 
mediaeval  tendency  to  philosophize  “ in  the  air  ” — 
to  speculate  on  the  basis  of  conditions  which  had 
lost,  if  they  ever  had  possessed,  the  semblance  of 
reality  — by  no  means  entirely  disappeared  after 
Machiavelli’s  time;  though  it  continued  for  a century 
or  more  to  characterize  a large  body  of  political  lit- 
erature : yet  his  relentless  empiricism  gave  an  impulse 
to  the  method  of  observation  and  experience  which 
was  not  exhausted  till  the  last  vestiges  of  medievalism 
in  political  theory  had  vanished. 

Finally,  a summary  of  the  chief  influences  which 
radiated  from  Machiavelli  into  the  broad  field  of 
political  science  must  include  reference  to  his  doctrine, 
of  aggrandizement.  In  the  assumption  that  extension 
of  power  was  the  test  of  excellence  in  government, 
he  establisHedTa  philosophTc~basTs  for  accepting  as 
rational  and  as  a fit  subject  for  reflection,  that  con- 


324 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


solidation  of  states  which  was  so  prominent  a fact  of 
the  times.  In  suggesting  — for  he  did  not  strongly 
press  the  idea— that  the  logical  limit  of  this  con- 
solidation in  any  case  was  the  limit  of  ethnic  homo- 
geneity, he  projected  an  influence  which  was  felt 
in  the  nineteenth  century.  But  the  doctrine  of 
nationality,  which  has  thus  far  played  so  prominent 
a part  in  the  expansion  of  states,  has  in  reality  no 
logical  relation  to  Machiavelli’s  fundamental  principle. 
Already  a multitude  of  other  bases  for  conquest,  more 
adequate  to  later  necessities,  are  familiar  to  current 
thought.  To  justify  the  extension  of  political  power 
the  Aryan  is  devised,  with  a claim  to  dominate  the 
Semite  or  the  Turanian,  the  “political  peoples”  are 
assigned  the  desired  preeminence  over  the  “ non- 
political,”  the  civilized  over  the  uncivilized.  Nation- 
ality has  proved  merely  a temporary  and  transitional ! 
phase  of  the  trend  toward  expansion  on  Machiavellian 
lines,  which  has  in  fact  no  logical  limit  save  that  of 
power. 

\ 

Macliiavelli  is  sometimes  called  the  first  modern 
political  philosopher.  It  is  quite  as  accurate  to  say 
that  he  ends  the  mediaeval  era  as  that  he  begins 
the  modern.  Great  as  was  his  influence  in  stimu- 
lating reflection,  it  was  not  by  his  radical  rejection 
of  all  the  characteristics  of  mediaeval  political  theory 
that  the  modern  era  was  introduced.  Western  Europe 
could  not  be  rationalized  and  paganized  off-hand. 
Before  the  death  of  Machiavelli,  Luther  gave  the 
signal  for  the  movement  which  was  to  keep  the 


MACIIIAVELLI 


325 


intellectual  energy  of  Europe  fully  occupied  for  a 
hundred  and  fifty  years  in  the  fields  of  theology  and 
morals.  Machiavellian  doctrine  was  influential  dur- 
ing this  time,  though  Machiavelli’s  name  was  exe- 
crated by  all  parties.  Only  after  the  Reformation 
had  been  succeeded  by  the  Revolution  was  frank  <-. 
and  open  recognition  given  to  Machiavelli’s  philo- 
sophical depth  and  practical  political  sagacity. 

SELECT  REFERENCES 

Blake y,  Yol.  1^  pp.  266-273.  Bluntschli,  Gescliichte  der 
neuern  Staatswissenschaft , pp.  13-26.  Detmold,  The  His- 
torical, Political  and  Diplomatic  Writings  of  Niccolo  Machia- 
velli,  trans.  Ellinger,  Die  antiken  Quellen  der  Staatslehre 
MachiavelliSj  in  Zeitsclirift  fur  die  gesamte  Staatswissenschaft , 
Yol.  44.  Franck,  Reformateurs  et  Publicistes,  moyen  dge , 
p.  287  et  seq.  Hall  am,  Literature  of  Europe,  Yol.  I,  pp.  411- 
417.  Janet,  Yol.  I,  p.  491  et  seq.  (Bibliography  of  Machia- 
velli,  pp.  596-601).  Macaulay,  Machiavelli,  Essays,  Yol.  I, 
pp.  267-320.  Mohl,  Gescliichte  und  Literatur  der  Staatswissen- 
schaften , Bd.  Ill,  S.  521  et  seq.  (Bibliography  of  Machiavelli 
literature).  Morley,  Machiavelli  (Romanes  Lecture,  1897). 
Morley’s  Universal  Library,  The  Prince,  trans.  Owen,  Skep- 
tics of  the  Italian  Renaissance,  pp.  165-172.  Symonds,  Renais- 
sance in  Italy  (Age  of  the  Despots),  pp.  308-370.  Thomson, 
Machiavelli’s  Discourses  on  the  First  Decade  of  Livy,  trans. 
Villari,  Niccold  Machiavelli  e i suoi  tempi , esp.  Yol.  II,  pp. 
268-473  (II  Principe  e i Discorsi) ; Yol.  Ill,  pp.  198-292 
(Istorie  Florentine) ; Yol.  I,  trans. 


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I.  TEXTS  AND  EDITIONS  OF  WRITERS  RECEIVING 
SPECIAL  CONSIDERATION 

Aegidius  Romanus. 

De  Regimine  Principum.  Roma,  1482.  For  a French 
version  see  below,  Molenaer. 

-®neas  Sylvius. 

Tractatus  de  Ortu  et  Autoritate  Imperii  Romani,  in 
Goldast,  Monarchia,  Vol.  II,  p.  1558  et  seq. 

Agobard,  Bishop  of  Lyons. 

Works  in  Migne,  Patrologia  Latina,  Vol.  104. 

Ambrose,  Bishop  of  Milan. 

Works  in  Migne,  Vols.  14-17.  A few  letters  are  also  in 
Goldast,  Monarchia,  Vol.  II. 

Aristotle. 

The  Politics : ^usemihl,  Aristoteles  Politik.  Leipzig, 
1879.  Susemihl  and  Hicks,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle. 
A revised  text,  etc . London,  1894.  For  translations 
of  The  Politics,  see  Jowett,  Welldon,  in  second  part  of 
this  list. 

The  Nicomachean  Ethics  : Greek  text  with  English  notes, 
by  Sir  Alexander  Grant.  4th  ed.  London,  1885.  For 
translation  of  the  Ethics,  see  Peters. 

Augustine,  Bishop  of  Hippo. 

De  Civitate  Dei.  Libri  22.  Lipsiae,  Teubner,  1877. 

Bernard  of  Clairvaux. 

Works  in  Migne,  Vols.  182-185.  The  work  De  Consid- 
eratione  is  also  in  Goldast,  Monarchia,  Vol.  II,  p.  68 
et  seq. 

Cicero. 

M.  Tullii  Ciceronis  Scripta  quae  manserunt  omnia  recog- 
novit C.  F.  W.  Mueller.  (Sumptibus  et  typis  B.  G 
Teubneri.)  Lipsiae,  1878.  Part  IV,  Vol.  II,  pp.  271- 
379  (De  Republica),  380-450  (De  Legibus).  For  trans- 
lation of  the  Republic,  see  below,  Featherstonhaugh. 

327 


328 


POLITICAL  THEORIES 


Dante  Alighieri. 

De  Monarchia,  in  Opere  Latine,  edited  by  Giuliani,  Flor- 
ence, 1878.  The  De  Monarchia,  translated  by  F.  J. 
Church.  London,  1879. 

Dubois,  Peter. 

De  Recuperatione  Terre  Sancte,  in  Collection  de  textes 
pour  servir  a P etude  de  l’histoire ; edited  by  Langlois. 
Paris,  1891. 

Gebhard  of  Salzburg. 

Work  in  Migne,  Yol.  148 ; also  in  Monumenta  Germaniae 
Historica,  Libelli  de  Lite,  Yol.  I,  p.  261. 

Gerson,  Johannes  Carlier. 

Opera,  edited  by  Louis-Ellier  du  Pin.  5 vols.,  in  fol. 
Amsterdam,  1703.  His  chief  treatises  on  subjects  of 
political  import  are  also  in  Goldast,  Yol.  II,  1384  et  seq. 

Goldast,  Melchior. 

Collectio  Constitutionum  Imperialium.  4 vols.  Franco- 
forti,  1713. 

Monarchia  Sancti  Romani  Imperii;  sive  Tractatus  de 
jurisdictione  imperiali  . . . et  pontificia.  . . . Franco- 
fordiae  et  Hanoviae,  1611-1614.  3 vols. 

Gratian. 

The  Decretum  is  in  Migne,  Yol.  187,  and  also  in  every 
edition  of  the  Corpus  Juris  Canonici. 

Gregory  VII. 

Works  in  Migne,  Yol.  148. 

Henry  IV. 

Official  documents  in  Goldast,  Collectio  Constitutionum 
Imperialium ; also  in  Monumenta  Germaniae  Historica, 
Constitutiones,  Yol.  I. 

Hincmar,  Archbishop  of  Rheims. 

Works  in  Migne,  Yols.  125-126. 

Hugo  Floriacensis. 

Tractatus  de  Regia  Potestate  et  Sacerdotali  Dignitate,  in 
Monumenta  Germaniae  Historica,  Libelli  de  Lite,  Vol. 
II,  p.  465  et  seq. 

Huss,  John. 

Determinatio  de  Civili  Dominio  Clericorum,  in  Goldast, 
Monarchia,  Yol.  I,  p.  232  et  seq. 

Innocent  III. 

Works  in  Migne,  Yols.  214-217. 


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329 


John  of  Paris. 

De  Potestate  Regia  et  Papali,  in  Goldast,  Vol.  II,  p.  108. 

John  of  Salisbury. 

Works  in  Migne,  Vol.  199. 

Machiavelli,  Niccolo. 

Opere.  Milano,  1804. 

Historical,  Political  and  Diplomatic  Writings,  translated 
by  C.  E.  Detmold.  4 vols.  Boston,  1882. 

II  Principe,  edited  by  L.  Arthur  Burd,  with  an  Introduc- 
tion by  Lord  Acton.  Oxford,  1891. 

The  Prince,  translated,  in  Morley’s  Universal  Library. 
London,  1889. 

Discourses  on  Livy,  translated  by  Thomson.  London, 
1883. 

Manegold  of  Lutterbach. 

Work  in  the  Monumenta  Germaniae  Historica,  Libelli  de 
Lite,  Vol.  I,  p.  308  et  seq. 

Marsiglio  of  Padua. 

Defensor  Pacis.  Frankfort,  1612.  Also  in  Goldast,  Mo- 
narchia,  Vol.  II,  pp.  154-312. 

Migne,  Jacques  Paul. 

Patrologiae  cursus  completus  ab  aevo  apostolico  ad  tem- 
pora  Innocentii  III,  anno  1216.  Series  Latina.  221 
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Nicholas  I. 

Works  in  Migne,  Vol.  119. 

Nicolaus  Cusanus  (Nicholas  of  Cues). 

Opera  Omnia.  Basel,  1565.  De  Concordantia  Catholica 
is  in  Vol.  II,  p.  692  et  seq. 

Plato. 

Platonis  Scripta  Graece  Omnia,  edited  and  translated  into 
Latin  by  Bekker.  11  vols.  London,  1826. 

Stallbaum,  Platonis  Opera  Omnia.  10  vols.  London, 
1858-1860.  Same  without  notes.  1 vol.  Leipzig, 
1881. 

Jowett  and  Campbell,  Plato’s  Republic,  Greek  text,  essays 
and  notes.  3 vols.  Oxford,  1894. 

Por  English  translations,  see  below,  Jowett,  Davies. 

Stephen  of  Halberstadt. 

Work  in  Migne,  Vol.  148,  col.  1442. 


380 


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Theoderic  of  Verdun. 

Epistola  in  Monumenta  Germaniae  Historica,  Libelli  de 
Lite,  Vol.  I,  p.  280. 

Thomas  Aquinas. 

Opera  Omnia.  Paris,  1871-1880.  Sumina  Theologica,  in 
Vols.  I-VI;  on  Law  and  Justice,  see  esp.  Vols.  II  and 
III.  De  Regimine  Principum,  Vol.  XXVII,  opusc.  16. 

Waltram  of  Naumburg. 

Work  in  Migne,  Vol.  148;  also  in  Monumenta,  Libelli 
de  Lite,  Vol.  II,  p.  285. 

William  of  Ockam. 

Dialogus,  and  the  Octo  Quaestiones,  in  Goldast,  Monarchia, 
Vol.  II. 

Wyckliffe  (Wiclif),  John. 

De  Civili  Dominio,  edited  by  Poole.  London,  1885. 

De  Dominio  Divino,  edited  by  Poole.  London,  1890. 


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A History  of  Greece.  3 vols.  London,  1888-1900. 

Abbott,  Frank  Frost. 

A History  and  Description  of  Roman  Political  Institutions. 
Boston,  1901. 

Adams,  George  Burton. 

Civilization  during  the  Middle  Ages.  New  York,  1898. 

Arnold,  William  Thomas. 

History  of  Rome  (to  the  second  Punic  War).  3 vols. 

London,  1857 ; New  York,  1866. 

Roman  Provincial  Administration  to  the  Accession  of 
Constantine  the  Great.  London,  1879. 

Baillet,  Adrien. 

Histoire  des  demelez  du  Pape  Boniface  VIII  avec  Philippe 
le  Bel,  Roy  de  France  (additions  aux  Preuves  de  M. 
Dupuy).  2 pts.  Paris,  1718. 

Baumann,  Johann  Julius. 

Die  Staatslehre  des  h.  Thomas  von  Aquino.  Leipzig, 
1873. 

Baxmann,  Ernst  Valentin  Rudolf. 

Die  Politik  der  Papste  von  Gregor  I bis  auf  Gregor  VII. 
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Blakey,  Robert. 

The  History  of  Political  Literature  from  the  Earliest 
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Bluntschli,  Johann  Kaspar. 

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Boissier,  Gaston. 

La  Fin  du  Paganisme.  2 toms.  Paris,  1891. 

Bosanquet,  Bernard. 

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Boutaric,  Edgard  Paul. 

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Bradley,  Andrew  Cecil. 

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Brockhaus,  Clemens  Friedrich. 

Nicolai  Cusani  de  Concilii  Universalis  Potestate  Sententia. 
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Bryce,  James. 

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Burnet,  John. 

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Carlyle,  A.  J. 

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Church,  R.  W. 

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Congreve,  Richard. 

The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  with  Introduction  and  English 
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Cope,  E.  M. 

An  Introduction  to  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric.  London  and 
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Courtney,  William  Leonard. 

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Creighton,  Manuel. 

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Curtius,  Ernst. 

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Davidson,  Thomas. 

Aristotle  and  Ancient  Educational  Ideals.  New  York, 
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Davies,  J.  L.,  and  Vaughan,  D.  J. 

The  Republic  of  Plato,  translated,  with  Analysis  and  Notes. 
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Dill,  Samuel. 

Roman  Society  in  the  Last  Century  of  the  Western  Empire. 
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Droysen,  Johann  Gustav. 

Geschichte  des  Hellenism  us.  2 Bde.  Hamburg,  1836- 
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Dubois,  Edmond  Marcel. 

Les  Ligues  etolienne  et  acheenne.  Paris,  1885. 

Duncker,  Maximilian  Wolfgang. 

Griechische  Geschichte  bis  zum  Tode  des  Perikles.  5 
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Duruy,  Jean  Victor. 

Histoire  du  moyen  age,  395-1453.  2d  ed.  Paris,  1864. 

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Featherstonhaugh,  G.  W. 

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FouillSe,  Alfred  Jules  Emile. 

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Franck,  Adolphe. 

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Freeman,  Edward  Augustus. 

History  of  Federal  Government  from  the  Foundation  of 
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Comparative  Politics  . . . with  the  Unity  of  History. 
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Friedberg,  Emil  Albert. 

Die  mittelalterlichen  Lehren  liber  das  Yerhaltniss  von 
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Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Numa  Denis. 

La  Cite  antique ; etude  sur  le  culte,  le  droit,  les  institu- 
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The  Ancient  City : A Study  of  the  Religion,  Laws  and 
Institutions  of  Greece  and  Rome,  trans.  by  Willard 
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Gardner  (Percy)  and  Jevons  (F.  B.). 

Manual  of  Greek  Antiquities.  New  York,  1895. 

Gibbon,  Edward. 

The  History  of  the  Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire. 
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Gierke,  Otto  Friedrich. 

Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsrecht.  3 Bde.  Berlin, 
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Giesebrecht,  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Benjamine  von. 

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Aristotle’s  Conception  of  the  State,  by  Andrew  Cecil 
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Epicurus,  by  William  Leonard  Courtney,  pp.  223-243. 
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Manual  of  the  Political  Antiquities  of  Greece,  historically 
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Hildenbrand,  Dr.  Karl. 

Geschichte  und  System  der  Rechts-  und  Staatsphilosophie. 
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Hodgkin,  Thomas. 

Italy  and  Her  Invaders.  8 vols.  Oxford,  1880-1899. 
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Die  Constanzer  Reformation  und  die  Konkordate  von  1418. 
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Hunter,  William  A. 

A Systematic  and  Historical  Exposition  of  Roman  Law  in 
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Ihering,  Rudolph  von. 

Geist  des  romischen  Rechts  auf  den  verschiedenen  Stufen 
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Romische  Geschichte.  5 Bde.  Leipzig,  1868-1879. 
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INDEX 


Abel : symbol  of  priesthood,  171. 

Achsean  League,  100 ; Polybius  a 
hostage  of,  114. 

JEgidius  Romanus  (Colonna) : his 
treatise  on  politics,  208 ; holds  the 
kingdom  to  be  higher  than  the 
city-state,  209 ; prefers  monarchy, 
210  ; his  classification  of  law  and 
rights,  210  ; on  universal  property 
rights  of  Pope,  217. 

iEneas  Sylvius:  his  work  on  the 
Roman  Empire,  283. 

iEtolian  League,  100. 

Agobard,  Bishop  of  Lyons,  162. 

Ailly,  Peter  of,  266. 

Alexander  VI  (Pope),  policy  of, 
288. 

Alexander  the  Great : effect  of  his 
conquests  on  Greek  philosophy 
and  politics,  99;  conquests  of, 
promoted  cosmopolitism,  104-105. 

Ambrose,  Bishop  of  Milan : relations 
with  the  emperors,  133;  asserts 
theory  of  sacerdotal  authority 
over  emperors,  155 ; denies  impe- 
rial right  over  churches,  156  ; on 
greater  dignity  of  bishops  as  com- 
pared with  princes,  170 ; acts  of, 
cited  in  mediseval  argument,  175. 
Aquinas : see  Thomas. 

Aragon  : a fief  of  the  Pope,  149  ; 

power  of  nobles  in,  256. 
Areopagus  : constitution  and  func- 
tions of,  12  ; as  reformed  by  Solon, 
13 ; under  democratic  constitu- 
tion, 16  ;^fcptions  of,  in  Plato’s 
Laws, 

Aristocracy : in  early  Greek  states, 
2,  3;  relative  excellence  of,  in 


Plato’s  Statesman , 36 ; a pure 
form  of  government  in  Aristotle, 

72 ; based  on  virtue,  75 ; ideally 
the  best  form,  78 ; causes  and 
preventives  of  revolution  in,  88  ; 
in  Polybius’s  theory,  115 ; Cicero’s 
conception  of , 120 ; Wycliffe’sview 
of,  262  ; Machiavelli  on,  308-309. 

Aristotle  : compared  with  Plato,  49  ; 
study  of  existing  constitutions,  50 ; 
his  method  and  his  ideal,  51  ; dis- 
tinguishes politics  from  ethics,  51 ; 
interested  in  practical  rather  than 
ideal  politics,  53  ; doctrines  as  to 
justice,  rights  and  equity,  54; 
general  Greek  postulates  of  his 
theory,  93  ; on  the  conciliation  of 
liberty  and  authority,  94  ; on  the 
supremacy  of  public  opinion  and 
law,  95  ; on  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people,  95  ; on  the  three  neces- 
sary organs  of  government,  96  ; 
on  the  political  influence  of  eco- 
nomic conditions,  96  ; decline  of 
his  school  after  Alexander,  101 ; 
compared  with  Polybius,  118; 
introduction  of  his  works  into 
Western  Europe,  190;  influence 
in  scholasticism,  191  ; on  St. 
Thomas’s  theory,  192,  196,  199, 
202,  203,  205;  on  ^Egidius  Ro- 
manus, 208;  on  fourteenth-cen- 
tury adversaries  of  Papacy,  221 ; 
on  Dante,  230;  on  Marsiglio  of 
Padua,  239  ; on  Ockam,  246  ; re- 
lation of,  to  Machiavelli,  291,  294 
et  seq.,  298, 305,  306,  307,  309,  316. 
See  also  Politics. 

Athens:  hegemony  of,  in  Persian 


347 


348 


INDEX 


wars,  5 ; influence  of  its  constitu- 
tion on  Greek  political  theory, 
6 ; classes  of  people  in,  11 ; early 
aristocratic  government  of,  12 ; 
reforms  by  Solon  in,  12  ; tyranny 
of  Pisistratus  in,  13;  democratic 
policy  of  Kleisthenes  and  Pericles, 
14  ; constitutional  system  in  fifth 
century  b.c.,  14  ; carried  liberty  to 
ruinous  excess  (Plato),  40;  influ- 
ence of,  on  Plato’s  Laws , 45; 
Aristotle’s  work  on  the  constitu- 
tion of,  50;  slightly  esteemed  by 
Machiavelli,  296. 

Augustine,  Bishop  of  Hippo  : influ- 
ence of,  134;  his  Civitas  Dei , 
156;  exaltation  of  future  life  as 
compared  with  earthly,  157  ; justi- 
fication of  slavery,  157  ; on  justice 
in  the  state,  158 ; influence  of,  on 
mediaeval  reasoning,  163 ; influ- 
ence of,  on  scholasticism,  191 ; on 
St.  Thomas’s  theory  of  law,  192 ; 
on  his  theory  of  slavery,  199. 

Augustinus  Triumphus:  his  theory 
of  papal  power,  218. 

Augustus  Caesar:  his  modification 
of  the  Roman  constitution,  112. 

Avignon,  seat  of  Papacy  removed 
to,  150. 

Basel,  Council  of,  259;  more  radi- 
cal than  Constance,  270  ; follows 
theory  of  Cusanus,  271 ; is  de- 
feated by  Pope,  276. 

Bernard,  St.  (of  Clairvaux)  : writ- 
ings of,  162  ; general  character  of, 
181 ; his  work  De  Considerations , 
182 ; criticism  of  papal  adminis- 
tration, 183;  doctrine  of  “the 
two  swords,”  184. 

Boniface  VIII : conflict  with  Philip 
the  Fair,  150,  213,  215,  224. 

Brutus,  a Stoic,  106. 

Caesar  Borgia,  judgment  of  Machia- 
velli on,  301,  311. 


Canon  Law : content  and  impor- 
tance of,  in  fourteenth  century, 
222;  influence  on  Dante,  230; 
ignored  by  Machiavelli,  291. 
Castile,  power  of  nobles  in,  256. 
Cato  the  Censor:  and  the  Greek 
philosophers,  114. 

Cato  the  Younger,  a Stoic,  106. 
Censor  : in  the  Roman  constitution, 
108,  112. 

Charlemagne : crowned  Emperor, 
139,  142 ; coronation  of,  as  con- 
strued by  mediaeval  debaters, 
175. 

Charles  VIII  of  France,  286,  289. 
Charles  Martel,  139,  141. 

Check  and  balance : principle  set 
forth  by  Polybius,  117 ; actual 
working  at  Rome,  119. 
Chrematistics  : relation  to  econom- 
ics in  Aristotle,  60. 

Christian  Church : early  organiza- 
tion of,  132  ; increase  of  its  power 
in  declining  Western  Empire,  133 ; 
influence  of  Teutons  on,  134  ; con- 
dition of,  in  Eastern  Empire,  135 ; 
divided  into  Greek  and  Roman, 
138. 

Cicero:  Stoic  influences  in,  106; 
purpose  of  his  De  RepuUica  and 
De  Legibus , 119 ; on  origin  and 
nature  of  state,  120  ; on  forms  of 
government,  120 ; compared  with 
Polybius,  121  ; his  doctrine  of 
natural  law  and  rights,  123 ; this 
doctrine  criticised,  124  ; influence 
of,  on  Augustine,  157,  158  ; influ- 
ence on  St.  Thomas’s  theory  of 
law,  192. 

Citizens : constitute  the  state,  in 
Plato,  46 ; not  to  engage  in  com- 
merce or  trades,  46  ; limited  to 
5040  in  the  Laws,  46  ; Aristotle 
on  qualifications  of,  64  ; working 
classes  not  qualified  as,  in  Aris- 
totle, 82 ; under  Republican  con- 
stitution of  Rome,  107,  111 ; after 


INDEX 


349 


Caracalla,  113.  See  also  Cosmo- 
politism. 

City-state : the  ideal  of  Plato’s  phi- 
losophy, 47  ; assumed  as  typical 
organization  by  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, 93 ; supplanted  as  type  by 
military  empire,  99  ; held  less  per- 
fect than  the  province  and  king- 
dom, 197,  209 ; in  Italy,  287  ; in 
Machiavelli’s  philosophy,  317. 

Civil  Law  : content  and  importance 
of,  in  fourteenth  century,  222; 
influence  on  Dante,  230  ; ignored 
by  Machiavelli,  291 . See  also  J us- 
tinian. 

Clement  V,  218. 

Clovis  : founds  Frankish  monarchy, 
141. 

Comitia:  functions  of,  in  Roman 
constitution,  107, 109, 112  ; demo- 
cratic element  in  constitution 
(Polybius),  116. 

Commonwealth  in  Cicero  and  Mach- 
iavelli : see  Democracy. 
Communism : in  Plato’s  Republic, 
30  ; Aristotle’s  criticism  of  Plato’s 
ideas,  63. 

Consent  of  the  governed,  as  basis  of 
government:  Plato  on,  40  ; Marsig- 
lio  on,  251 ; Cusanus  on,  271, 273. 
Constance,  Council  of,  258 ; hostility 
to  Wycliffe  and  Huss,  265  ; adopts 
Gerson’s  theories,  270. 

Constantine : reforms  Roman  admin- 
istration, 113  ; adopts  Christianity, 
132.  See  also  Donation. 
Constitution : defined  by  Aristotle, 
65;  pure  and  corrupt  forms  of, 
according  to  Aristotle,  71  ; should 
embody  principle  of  check  and 
balance  (Polybius),  116,  (Cicero), 
121  ; reform  of,  a serious  task 
(Machiavelli),  312;  relation  of, 
to  custom  and  law  (Machiavelli), 
318. 

Consuls : functions  of,  in  Roman 
constitution,  108,  109,  112  ; mo- 


narchic element  in  constitution 
(Polybius),  116. 

Corporation : Cusanus’s  conception 
of,  274  ; legal  theory  of,  influential 
in’  conciliar  era,  277  ; furnished 
model  for  organization  and  action 
of  general  council,  278 ; conception 
of,  worked  against  monarchy,  279. 
Cosmopolitism : brought  into  promi- 
nence by  Stoics,  104  ; growth  and 
influence  of,  105. 

Council : see  General  Council. 

Cusanus : see  Nicholas  of  Cues. 

Dante  Alighieri : his  political  point 
of  view,  230 ; argument  for  uni- 
versal monarchy,  231 ; interpre- 
tation of  Roman  history,  232  ; on 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  233; 
refutation  of  pro-papal  arguments, 

234. 

Decretalists,  Dante  on,  233. 

Defensor  Pads : see  Marsiglio. 
Demagogue : produces  revolution  in 
democracies,  87. 

Democracy : disliked  by  Plato,  32  ; 
its  place  in  the  succession  of  gov- 
ernmental forms,  33  ; the  best  and 
the  worst  government,  36 ; based 
on  the  principle  of  liberty,  39  ; 
and  equality,  40  ; a corrupt  form 
of  government  in  Aristotle,  72 ; 
is  really  the  rule  of  the  poor  over 
the  rich,  74  ; based  on  liberty  and 
equality,  75  ; form  and  functions 
of  governmental  organs  in,  76  ; 
where  the  poor  are  much  more 
numerous  than  the  rich,  the  best 
state,  79  ; causes  of  revolution  in, 

87  ; preventives  of  revolution  in, 

88  ; in  Polybius’s  theory,  115 ; 
Cicero’s  conception  of,  120 ; Mach- 
iavelli’s ideas  of  government  in, 
307,  317  et  seq. 

Deposition  of  monarch:  right  of, 
asserted  after  Gregory  VII,  174 ; 
texts  and  precedents  in  support 


350 


INDEX 


of  right,  175 ; theory  of  Thomas 
Aquinas  on,  207  ; theory  of  Augus- 
tinus Triumphus  on,  218. 

Dictatorship : in  Roman  constitu- 
tion, 108  ; Machiavelli  on,  319. 

Diocletian,  113. 

Discourses  on  Livy , Machiavelli’s  : 
chiefly  a study  of  the  Romans, 
292  ; a study  of  the  strong  repub- 
lic, 294,  307  ; unmoral  doctrines 
of,  298-299  ; unreligious  doctrines 
of,  300 ; view  of  human  nature 
in,  305 ; on  the  methods  of  extend- 
ing dominion,  313  ; on  the  main- 
tenance of  republican  government, 
317. 

Divine  right  of  kings  : theory  of,  in 
Middle  Ages,  177 ; claimed  for 
French  monarchs,  225. 

Donation  of  Constantine,  175  ; Peter 
Dubois  on,  228  ; Dante  on,  234  ; 
discredited  by  Cusanus  and  Valla, 
259  ; ignored  by  Machiavelli,  291- 

Dubois,  Peter : his  doctrine  as  to 
French  monarchy  and  Papacy, 
228. 

Duel,  Dante’s  theory  of,  232. 

Economic  conditions  : political  influ- 
ence of,  recognized  by  Aristotle, 
74,  86,  96 ; divided  the  Roman 
people  and  ruined  the  Republic, 
119  ; Machiavelli  on  influence  of, 
307. 

Economics  : distinguished  by  Aris- 
totle from  chrematistics,  60. 

Education  : importance  and  system 
of,  in  Plato’s  Republic,  31 ; in 
Plato’s  Laws , 38,  43  ; Aristotle’s 
system  of,  83,  84  ; a preventive 
of  revolution,  90 ; indispensable 
function  of  state  in  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  93*. 

Ekklesia : under  Solonian  constitu- 
tion at  Athens,  13 ; under  the 
democratic  constitution,  14. 

Empire,  Holy  Roman:  origin  and 


character  of,  143 ; relations  of 
Germany  and  Italy  under,  144 ; 
disintegration  of,  in  thirteenth 
century,  148 ; rulers  of,  deter- 
mined by  popes,  149 ; jurists’ 
theory  as  to,  180  ; Thomist  the- 
ory of,  201 ; relative  insignifi- 
cance of,  in  fourteenth  century, 
224;  Dante’s  plea  for  rights  of, 
233  ; slighted  by  Marsiglio,  241. 

England : a fief  of  the  Pope,  149 ; 
nobles  crushed  in,  256. 

Epicureans : prominence  after  Alex- 
ander, 102 ; emphasized  ethics 
and  neglected  politics,  102  ; doc- 
trines of,  as  to  society,  law  and 
justice,  103. 

Equality  : the  foundation  of  democ- 
racy, 40  ; absolute  and  proportion- 
ate, 40 ; method  of  filling  offices 
determined  by,  41 ; various  ideas 
of,  the  general  cause  of  revolu- 
tion, 86  ; of  men  under  natural 
law,  128,  273. 

Equity : defined  by  Aristotle,  54 ; 
John  of  Salisbury’s  idea  of,  186. 

Ethics : Aristotle’s  treatment  of  its 
relation  to  politics,  51  et  seq. ; 
separated  from  politics  by  Machi- 
avelli, 298. 

Excommunication : early  theory  and 
practice  of,  144,  145 ; held  analo- 
gous with  death  penalty  in  Mosaic 
law,  174  ; Peter  Dubois  on  papal 
employment  of,  229 ; subject  to 
control  of  secular  sovereign  (Mar- 
siglio), 243  ; Wycliffe’s  theory  of, 
263. 

Executive : distinguished  from  legis- 
lator by  Marsiglio,  240 ; by  Cu- 
sanus, 274. 

Expansion : Machiavelli’s  idea  of, 
and  its  influence,  323. 

Federal  government : in  Greece  after 
Alexander,  100. 

Ferdinand  of  Spain,  286,  287. 


INDEX 


351 


Feudal  aristocracy,  decline  of,  in 
fifteenth  century,  256. 

Florence : centre  of  Renaissance, 
290 ; workings  of  government  in, 
301. 

Forms  of  Government:  in  Plato’s 
Eepublic , 33  ; in  Plato’s  States- 
man, 36  ; Aristotle’s  classification 
of,  72 ; principles  underlying, 

75 ; Aristotle’s  test  of  excel- 
lence in,  79  ; in  Polybius,  115  ; in 
Cicero,  120  ; Machiavelli  on,  306 
et  seq. 

France  : strength  of  royal  power  in, 
during  thirteenth  century,  150 ; 
nobles  crushed  in,  256  ; has  mixed 
form  of  government  (Gerson), 
269. 

Franciscans : their  theory  of  evan- 
gelical poverty,  236. 

Frankish  monarchy:  saved  popes 
from  Lombards,  139;  early  his- 
tory of,  141 ; mediaeval  theory  as 
to  origin  of,  225. 

Frederick  Barbarossa,  encourage- 
ment of  lawyers  by,  179. 

Frederick  the  Great:  on  Machia- 
velli, 323. 

French  monarchy : its  influence  on 
political  theory  in  fourteenth  cen- 
tury, 223 ; theory  of  its  indepen- 
dence of  pope  and  emperor,  225  ; 
Dubois  on  hegemony  of,  229;  its 
control  over  the  popes  at  Avignon, 
236. 

Friendship : considered  by  Plato  an 
important  principle  in  politics, 
40. 

Gelasius  (Pope)  : dictum  as  to  the 
two  powers,  166,  167,  168. 

General  Council : French  lawyers’ 
theory  of,  227  ; fourteenth-cen- 
tury imperialists’  theory  of,  238  ; 
Marsiglio’s  theory  as  to  organiza- 
tion and  functions  of,  241 ; Mar- 
siglio  on  representation  in,  251 ; 


Ockam’s  scheme  of  representation 
in,  252  ; introduced  into  constitu- 
tion of  the  church,  258  ; theory 
of  the  corporation  applied  to, 
277-278. 

Germany  : relations  with  Italy  under 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  144  ; power 
of  nobles  in,  256. 

Gerson:  his  conciliar  theory,  266; 
theory  of  necessity  as  basis  of 
council,  266  ; on  plenary  power, 
267  ; his  preference  for  mixed 
form  of  government,  269  ; moder- 
ate views  of,  270. 

Government : origin  of,  according  to 
Polybius,  115  ; distinguished  from 
state  by  Marsiglio,  250.  See  also 
Forms. 

Gratian : the  Decretum  of,  162 ; on 
the  two  powers,  166  ; dictum  of, 
as  to  subordination  of  princes  to 
church,  180. 

Greece:  early  political  institutions 
of,  2 et  seq.  ; conflict  of  oligarchy 
and  democracy  in,  4 ; influences 
making  for  national  unity  in,  5 ; 
effect  of  Persian  and  Peloponne- 
sian wars  in,  19;  Aristotle  on 
constitutional  transformation  in, 
85  ; characteristic  political  life  of, 
extinguished  by  Alexander,  99 ; 
persistence  of  forms  of  city-state 
in,  100. 

Greeks  : assumed  by  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle to  be  superior  to  other  races, 
93. 

Gregory  I (the  Great)  : influence  of, 
in  development  of  Papacy,  138  ; 
character  of,  158  ; view  of,  as  to 
chief  end  of  imperial  authority, 
159  ; influence  of,  on  political  lit- 
erature, 160  ; on  mediaeval  rea- 
soning, 163. 

Gregory  VII : reforming  decrees  of, 
146 ; conflict  with  Henry  IV , 
147  ; writings  of,  162 ; on  the 
dogma  of  the  two  powers,  166  ; 


352 


INDEX 


« on  greater  dignity  of  priests  as 
compared  with  princes,  170  ; on 
jurisdiction  of  priests  over  princes, 
173. 

Hellas : see  Greece. 

Hellenistic:  moral  and  intellectual 
type,  99 ; literature  lacking  in 
f original  political  thought,  101; 
spirit  transformed  Roman  govern- 
ment in  East,  131. 

Helots : position  of,  in  Spartan 

state,  7. 

Henry  IV : conflict  with  Gregory 
VII,  147  ; writings  of,  162. 

Henry  VII,  Emperor,  218. 

Henry  VII,  of  England,  266,  286. 

Hesiod : political  point  of  view  of, 
19. 

Hildebrand  : see  Gregory  VH. 

Hincmar,  Archbishop  of  Rheims, 
162  ; on  the  dogma  of  the  two 
powers,  166 ; on  the  jurisdiction 
of  priests  over  princes,  172. 

Hobbes,  resemblance  of  Machia- 
velli  to,  303. 

Homer : depicts  patriarchal  regime, 
18. 

Horace:  an  Epicurean  in  view  of 
life,  104. 

Household  : distinguished  from  state 
by  Aristotle,  67  et  seq. 

Hundred  Years’  War,  256. 

Huss:  promotes  ideas  of  Marsiglio 
and  Wy cliff e,  264-265  ; con- 
demned by  Council  of  Constance, 
265. 

Imperialism : sought  in  vain  by  , 
Athens  and  Sparta,  6 ; no  proper 
aim  for  individual  or  state,  accord-  , 
ing  to  Plato,  46 ; according  to 
Aristotle,  81 ; the  necessary  aim 
of  a state  according  to  Machiavelli, 
295,  315,  323. 

Imperium  Continuum , 180  ; ignored  » 
by  Machiavelli,  291. 


s Innocent  III : extensive  influence 
a of,  149 ; writings  of,  163  ; on  the 
, two  powers,  167 ; on  the  greater 
dignity  of  priests  as  compared 
with  princes,  171 ; on  jurisdiction 
of  priests  over  princes,  173;  on 
1 the  universal  church,  180. 
l Investitures : conflict  over,  146. 

; Israelitish  state : theocratic  char- 
acter of,  164  ; considered  a mixed 
government  by  Gerson,  270. 
i Italy : relations  with  Germany 

under  Holy  Roman  Empire,  144  ; 
r political  condition  of,  in  Machia- 
velli’s  time,  287,  289. 

Ius  Civile : character  of,  126 ; 

blended  with  ius  gentium , 127. 

Ius  Gentium:  character  of,  126; 
blended  with  ius  civile,  127 ; 
identified  with  ius  naturale , 128  ; 
limits  human  legislation  (Ockam), 

■ 248. 

Jeremiah,  God’s  commission  to,  175. 

Jerome,  influence  of,  134. 

Jesus:  unpolitical  character  of  his 
teaching,  152,  177 ; held  to  have 
distinguished  spiritual  from  secu- 
lar power,  167 ; power  to  bind 
and  loose  conferred  by,  173 ; 
pastoral  power  given  to  Peter  by, 
173. 

John  XXII : conflict  of,  with  Lewis 
of  Bavaria,  213,  218,  235  ; contro- 
versy with  Franciscans,  236. 

John  of  Jandun:  attacks  John 
XXII,  237  ; collaborates  on  Defen- 
sor Pads , 238. 

John  of  Paris:  his  work  in  behalf 
of  Philip  the  Fair,  226. 

John  of  Salisbury : general  charac- 
ter of,  181 ; on  “ the  two  swords,” 
185  ; his  Polycraticus,  185 ; po- 
litical ideas  of,  186 ; on  tyrants 
and  tyrannicide,  187. 

Julius  Caesar:  his  modification  of 
the  Roman  constitution,  111. 


INDEX 


353 


Jurists:  work  of,  in  Roman  Em- 
pire, 127  ; work  of,  in  fourteenth 
century,  222. 

Justice : immutable,  according  to 
Plato,  27  ; real  subject  of  Plato’s 
Republic,  28  ; definition  and  rela- 
tion to  law  in  Aristotle,  54  ; Epi- 
curean view  of,  103  ; Stoic  view 
of,  104  ; distinguishes  pure  from 
corrupt  forms  of  government 
(Polybius),  115;  Cicero’s  concep- 
tion of,  122  ; Augustine  on,  158  ; 
Thomas  Aquinas  on,  196 ; Dante 
on,  231. 

Justinian’s  Digest:  study  of,  at 

Bologna,  179 ; basis  of  the  Civil 
Law,  222.  See  also  Civil  Law. 

Kingdom : a self-sufficing  political 
organization  in  Thomas  Aquinas, 
198 ; theory  of,  in  John  of  Paris, 
226  ; Ockam’s  definition  of,  246. 

Kleisthenes : legislation  of,  at 

Athens,  14;  democratic  reforms 
disliked  by  Plato,  45. 

Law  : written  and  unwritten,  distin- 
guished by  Socrates,  23;  com- 
pared by  Plato  with  discretion  of 
all-wise  philosopher,  35 ; as  basis 
of  classification  of  governments 
by  Plato,  36;  indispensable  in 
actual  states,  37  ; written,  cannot 
do  away  with  unwritten,  42  ; held 
by  Aristotle  to  be  better  than  man 
as  sovereign,  71 ; supreme  over  all 
personality  in  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
93;  Cicero  on  divine  origin  of, 
123  ; held  to  be  source  of  rights 
(• ius ),  123;  will  of  prince  has 
force  of  (Roman  jurists),  129; 
defined  and  classified  by  Thomas 
Aquinas,  192  ; rational  and  voli- 
tional elements  in,  193  ; classified 
by  iEgidius  Romanus,  210 ; the 
basis  of  government  (Marsiglio), 
239  ; Cusanus’s  theory  of  consent 
as  basis  of,  273. 

2 a 


Laws  (The)  of  Plato:  his  only 
strictly  political  work,  27  ; em- 
bodies a practicable  code  for  an 
actual  state,  37  ; communism  of 
the  Republic  abandoned,  38 ; 
amount  of  private  property  lim- 
ited, 39  ; people  classified  accord- 
ing to  wealth,  39  ; governmental 
organization  a mean  between  ^ 
monarchy  and  democracy,  39; 
combines  liberty  and  authority, 

40 ; magistrates  and  assemblies, 

41 ; the  nocturnal  council,  42  ; the 
theory  of  the  expose  de  motif,  42  ; 
miscellaneous  subjects  treated, 
43;  Athenian  institutions  incor- 
porated in,  45 ; suggests  an  Atti- 
cized  Sparta,  97. 

Legislation : less  useful  than  educa- 
tion in  maintaining  social  order, 

31 ; no  place  in  ideal  state,  »>5 ; 
distinguished  by  Marsiglio  from 
executive  function,  240. 

Leo  I,  Bishop  of  Rome:  saved 

Rome  from  Attila,  134. 

Leo  III : crowns  Charlemagne, 

139. 

Levites : regarded  as  prefiguring 
Christian  priesthood,  164;  judi- 
cial authority  of,  as  type  of  sacer- 
dotal jurisdiction,  173. 

Lewis  of  Bavaria : conflict  of,  with 
John  XXII,  213,  218,  235. 

Liberty : the  principle  of  democracy, 
39  ; not  incompatible  with  subjec- 
tion to  law  (Aristotle) , 94  ; Dante 
on,  231  ; Machiavelli’s  conception 
of,’ 317. 

Lombards,  career  of,  in  Italy,  137 
et  seq. 

Lothaire,  King  of  Lorraine,  contro- 
versy over  divorce  of,  145. 

Louis  XI  of  Prance,  256,  286. 
Lycurgus : institutions  ascribed  to, 
in  Sparta,  8;  influence  of  his 
institutions  on  Plato’s  theory,  44  ; 
praised  by  Polybius,  116. 


354 


INDEX 


Macedon : theory  on  which  Greece 
was  absorbed  by,  6 ; Aristotle’s 
connection  with  the  court  of, 
51. 

Machiavelli : suggested  by  Peter 
Dubois,  228 ; European  politics  in 
time  of,  285  et  seq. ; influence  of 
absolute  monarchs  on,  286 ; in- 
fluence of  national  states  on,  287 ; 
official  life  of,  in  Florence,  289 ; 
influence  of  Renaissance  on,  290  ; 
his  method,  291 ; his  point  of 
view,  293 ; compared  with  Aris- 
totle, 294 ; preference  for  Rome 
over  Greece,  296;  separation  of 
politics  from  ethics,  298  ; attitude 
toward  religion,  300  ; admiration 
for  the  strong  man,  301  ; studies 
rnalj  not  ideal,  politics.  .302 ; 
takes  Hobbesian  view  of  human 
nature,  303  ; materialistic  individ- 
ualism of,  306  ; on  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, 307  ; expansion  the  ideal 
of,  309 ; on  the  extension  of 
princely  power,  311 ; on  exten- 
sion of  power  by  republics,  313  ; 
on  the  importance  of  military 
force,  314  ; on  the  art  of  tyranny, 
316  ; on  the  principles  of  repub- 
lican government,  317  ; on  party 
controversies,  320 ; influence  of, 
in  political  theory,  322. 

Majority  : Marsiglio  on  rule  of,  250. 

Manegold  of  Lutterbach,  162. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  Stoic  doctrines  of, 
106. 

Marsiglio  of  Padua  : attacks  John 
XXII,  237  ; on  the  corruption  of 
the  times,  239  ; on  popular  sover- 
eignty in  state,  240,  250  ; on  pop- 
ular sovereignty  in  church,  241 ; 
on  distinction  between  ecclesias- 
tical and  secular  functions,  242  ; 
on  the  limits  of  priestly  authority, 
243 ; on  the  Petrine  dogma,  244 ; 
on  sovereignty  (plenary  power), 
249 ; on  representative  system, 


251 ; influence  of,  on  Wyclifie, 
260  ; relation  of,  to  Gerson,  266. 

Maximilian  of  Germany,  286. 

Michael  of  Cesena : attacks  John 
XXII,  237. 

Mixed  form  of  government : pre-  I 
ferred  by  Cicero,  121 ; and  by  ' 
Gerson,  269  ; approved  by  Machi-  j 
avelli,  306. 

Mohammedanism:  consolidated 
state  and  church  in  Eastern  Em- 
pire, 136 ; diverted  Eastern  em- 
perors from  care  of  Italy,  138; 
spread  of,  stopped  in  West  by 
Charles  Martel,  141. 

Monarchy : based  on  principle  of 
authority,  39 ; considered  prac- 
tically an  impossible  government 
by  Aristotle,  73 ; Polybius’s  theory 
of,  115 ; Thomas  Aquinas  on, 
200  ; Dante’s  conception  of,  230  ; 
ruler  of,  a mere  agent  of  people 
(Marsiglio),  240  ; Ockam  on,  246 ; 
Wycliffe’s  view  of,  262  ; Machi- 
avelli’s  judgment  on,  308.  See 
also  Universal. 

National  monarchy : tendency  to 
development  of,  255;  realized  , in 
Europe,  286 ; Machiavelli’s  con- 
ception of,  310. 

Natural  law : Stoic  doctrine  of, 
104  ; Cicero’s  conception  of,  123- 
124 ; Thomas  Aquinas  on,  192, 
194  ; iEgidius  Romanus  on,  211;  I 
relation  of  Pope  to  property 
under,  219  ; limits  all  human  legis- 
lation (Ockam),  248  ; ignored  by 
Machiavelli,  297. 

Natural  right  or  rights  (ius  natu- 
rale ) : Aristotle  on,  54  ; Cicero 
on,  124  ; all  men  equal  in  (Roman 
jurists),  128 ; Thomas  Aquinas  on, 

196  ; idea  of,  in  fifteenth  century, 
281. 

Nature  : as  used  by  Aristotle,  61  ; 
by  Cicero,  124. 


INDEX 


355 


New  Testament,  influence  of,  in 
mediaeval  reasoning,  163. 

Nicholas  I : conflict  with  Lothaire 
of  Lorraine,  145  ; writings  of,  162. 
Nicholas  V,  policy  of,  288. 

Nicholas  of  Cues : discredits  Dona- 
tion of  Constantine,  259  ; his  De 
Concordantia  Catholica,  271 ; his 
theory  of  harmony,  271 ; general 
council  as  source  of  power  in  both 
state  and  church,  272  ; consent 
the  basis  of  all  authority,  273; 
on  popular  sovereignty,  274; 
on  representation  in  government, 
275 ; becomes  supporter  of  Pope, 
276. 

Nicomachean  Ethics , Aristotle’s, 
54. 

Noah  : symbol  of  priesthood,  171. 

Ochlocracy:  in  Polybius’s  theory, 
115. 

Ockam,  William  of : 221 ; attacks 
John  XXII,  237;  obscurity  of 
bis  method,  244;  his  political 
works  and  general  conceptions, 
245-246  ; on  the  functions  of  state 
and  government,  247 ; on  sover- 
eignty (plenary  power),  249  ; on 
representative  system,  252;  doc- 
trines of,  promoted  by  Wy cliff e 
and  Huss,  265. 

Offices : lot  compared  with  election 
as  method  of  filling,  41 ; should  be 
held  in  turn  by  all  citizens,  66  ; 
appropriate  methods  of  filling,  in 
democracy,  oligarchy  and  polity 
respectively,  76,  77  ; rotation  in, 
the  principle  in  oligarchy,  88 ; 
should  not  be  means  of  pecuniary 
gain,  89 ; nor  be  monopolized  by 
any  one  class,  89. 

Old  Testament : influence  of,  in  me- 
diaeval reasoning,  163  ; arguments 
from,  as  to  royalty,  165,  179. 
Oligarchy  : conflict  with  democracy 
in  Greece,  4 ; in  Spartan  system, 


11 ; Plato’s  conception  of,  33  ; rel- 
ative excellence  of,  36 ; a corrupt 
form  of  government  in  Aristotle, 
72 ; is  really  the  rule  of  the  rich 
over  the  poor,  74 ; based  on  wealth, 
75  ; form  and  functions  of  the  gov- 
ernmental organs  in,  77 ; where 
the  rich  are  greatly  superior,  the 
best  form,  79;  causes  of  revolu- 
tion in,  87  ; preventives  of  revo- 
lution in,  88  et  seq. ; unsalaried 
offices  the  best  rule  in,  89 ; in  Po- 
lybius’s theory,  115. 

Otto  the  Great,  143. 

Papacy  : early  recognized  as  pre- 
eminent, 136 ; sustained  Ortho- 
doxy against  Arianism,  137  ; led 
in  defence  of  Italy  against  Lom- 
bards, 138 ; alliance  of,  with  the 
Franks,  139 ; relations  of,  with 
people  of  Rome,  140;  relations 
of,  with  Charlemagne,  142  ; atti- 
tude toward  German  emperors, 
144  ; power  of  excommunication 
assumed  by,  145  ; claims  of,  as  to 
investitures,  146  ; prestige  of,  en- 
hanced by  Crusades,  148  ; exalted 
position  of,  in  thirteenth  cen- 
tury, 149  ; decline  of  prestige  in 
fourteenth  century,  150 ; seat  of, 
transferred  to  Avignon,  150 ; 
claims  of,  under  Boniface  VIII, 
215 ; exaltation  of,  by  Augustinus 
Triumphus,  218 ; under  French 
influence  at  Avignon,  219  ; four- 
teenth-century assaults  on,  220  ; 
lawyers’  theory  of  subordination 
to  general  council,  227 ; Peter 
Dubois  on,  228  ; Dante  on,  234  ; 
claims  of,  as  against  Lewis  of 
Bavaria,  235  ; Marsiglio’s  theory 
of,  244  ; effect  of  the  Great  Schism 
on,  258  ; triumphs  over  Council  of 
Basel,  259  ; Gerson’s  theory  as  to 
relation  of  council  to,  267  ; sub- 
ject to  law  (Gerson),  269 ; cor- 


1 

v 

356  INDEX 


poration  law  determines  relation 
of,  to  general  council,  278  ; secu- 
lar policy  of,  in  time  of  Machia- 
velli,  288 ; Machiavelli’s  opinion 
of,  288. 

Papinian,  Stoic  influence  on,  106. 

Parties,  benefits  from  conflicts  of 
(Machiavelli),  320. 

Passive  obedience,  theory  of,  in 
Middle  Ages,  177. 

Patriarchal  government : depicted 
by  Homer,  18. 

Patricians,  political  rights  of,  in 
early  Rome,  107. 

Paul  the  Apostle : his  injunction  of 
passive  obedience,  153,  178. 

Paul,  the  Roman  jurist,  Stoic  influ- 
ence on,  106. 

Peloponnesian  War,  effect  of,  on 
Greece,  6. 

Pericles : influence  of,  at  Athens,  14 ; 
his  democratic  reforms  disliked 
by  Plato,  45. 

Perioikoi,  rights  and  position  of,  in 
Spartan  state,  7. 

Persia  : carried  principle  of  author- 
ity to  ruinous  excess,  40. 

Peter  the  Apostle  : his  injunction  of 
passive  obedience,  153,  178. 

Petrine  dogma : effect  of,  169 ; at- 
tacks of  Marsiglio  on,  244. 

Philip  the  Fair : conflict  with  Boni- 
face VIII,  150,  213,  215,  224; 
anti-papal  work  of  jurists  under, 
222. 

Pippin  the  Short,  139,  142. 

Pisa,  Council  of,  258. 

Pisistratus,  tyrant  of  Athens,  13. 

Plato : method  in  treatment  of  polit- 
ical topics,  24  ; relation  to  work 
of  Socrates,  24 ; theory  of  knowl- 
edge and  the  general  notion,  24  ; 
theory  of  virtue,  25 ; psychology 
of,  26 ; definition  of  justice,  26  ; 
his  political  dialogues,  27 ; con- 
nection of  his  theories  with  Greek 
practical  politics,  43 ; influence 


of  Spartan  institutions  dominant 
in  the  Bepublic , 44 ; of  Athens,  fi 
especially  Solon,  more  noticeable  in 
theZaws,45;  his  philosophy  deter-  I 
mined  by  the  city-state  idea,  46 ; I 
compared  with  Aristotle,  49  ; ideas  £ 
on  communism  criticised  by  Aris-  $ 
totle,  62 ; general  postulates  of  j| 
his  political  theory,  93  ; decline  of  E 
his  school  after  Alexander,  101;  I 
compared  with  Polybius,  117 ; I 
method  and  form  of  philosophy  j 
of,  adopted  by  Cicero,  120  ; influ-  I 
ence  of,  on  Cicero’s  theory  of  j 
law,  122  ; influence  of,  on  Augus-  1 
tine,  157.  See  also  Bepublic;  I 
Statesman;  Laws. 

Plebeians : in  early  Roman  state,  j 
107  ; special  governmental  organs  £ 
of,  108. 

Plenary  power  ( plenitudo  potesta-  I 
tis ) : Augustinus  Triumphus  on, 
218 ; defined  by  Marsiglio  and  1 
Ockam,  249  ; Gerson’s  theory  of,  j 
267. 

Politics  ( The)  of  Aristotle : defec-  j 
tive  condition  of  text,  54 ; origin  J 
and  character  of  the  state  (7r6\ts),  1 

55  ; political  life  essential  to  man,  j 

56  ; distinction  between  state  and  1 
household,  57  ; rational  justifica-  I 
tion  of  slavery,  58 ; analysis  of  j 
concepts  of  wealth  and  exchange,  1 
60;  ambiguous  use  of  “nature,”  j 
61 ; criticism  of  Plato’s  commu- 
nism, 62  ; citizenship  defined  and 

' described,  64  ; nature  and  content  ] 
of  a constitution  and  of  sover-  j 
eignty,  65 ; participation  of  all 
citizens  in  offices,  66  ; sovereignty 
primarily  in  the  mass  of  the  people, 

68  ; but  exercised  mainly  through 
election  and  censure  of  officers, 

70 ; the  one  overwhelmingly  su- 
perior man  would  be  the  true 
sovereign,  70 ; but  law  is  better 
than  man,  71 ; classification  of  con- 


INDEX 


357 


stitutions,  72  ; monarchy  a practi- 
cally impossible  form,  73 ; oli- 
garchy and  democracy  mean  rule 
of  rich  and  of  poor  respectively, 
74  ; liberty,  wealth  and  virtue  as 
principles  in  organization  of  gov- 
ernment, 75 ; the  three  organs 
essential  in  every  government,  76 ; 
functions  of  each  organ  in  the 
various  forms,  77  ; the  best  state, 
78;  virtue,  not  power  or  wealth,  the 
true  end  of  the  state,  81  ; external 
conditions  of  an  ideal  city,  81  et 
seq. ; education  the  ultimate  func- 
tion of  the  state,  83 ; revolutions 
in  Hellas,  85  ; general  and  special 
causes  of  revolutions,  86  et  seq.  ; 
preventives  of  revolutions,  88  et 
seq. ; the  art  of  tyranny,  91 ; sug- 
gests a Spartanized  Athens,  97. 

Polity  : a pure  form  of  government 
in  Aristotle,  72  ; based  on  blend- 
ing of  two  principles,  liberty  and 
wealth,  75  ; form  and  functions 
of  governmental  organs  in,  77  ; 
on  the  average,  and  where  the 
middle  class  is  the  strongest,  the 
best  form,  79 ; causes  and  pre- 
ventives of  revolution  in,  88. 

Polybius : his  acquaintance  with 

Roman  politics,  114  ; his  cycle  of 
governmental  forms,  115 ; theory 
of  check  and  balance,  116 ; its 
application  to  the  Roman  consti- 
tution, 116  etseq.;  ideas  of,  taken 
by  Machiavelli,  305,  306. 

Polycraticus,  of  John  of  Salisbury, 
185. 

Poor,  care  of,  a function  of  the 
government  (St.  Thomas),  203. 

Pope : see  Papacy. 

Popular  government:  see  Democracy . 

Population : classes  of,  in  Plato’s 
Republic , 28 ; classes  of,  in  Pla- 
to’s Laws , 39  ; Aristotle  on  neces- 
sary elements  of,  82. 

Prsetor:  functions  of,  in  Roman 


constitution,  108;  juristic  wor; 
of,  127. 

Prince  ( The)  of  Machiavelli : in- 
fluence of  contemporary  politics 
on,  293  ; a study  of  the  strong 
monarch,  294,  307  ; unmoral  doc- 
trines of,  298,  299 ; unreligious 
doctrines  of,  300  ; view  of  human 
nature  in,  304  ; principles  of,  as 
to  extension  of  power,  311 ; the 
art  of  tyranny  in,  316  ; criticised 
by  Frederick  the  Great,  323. 

Principate  (Roman)  : administra- 

tive work  of,  125 ; juristic  work 
of,  127. 

Proconsul : in  the  Roman  constitu- 
tion, 111,  112. 

Property : communistic  theories  of, 
in  Plato’s  Republic , 30 ; limi- 
tations on  amount  of,  in  Plato’s 
Laws , 39 ; principle  of,  assumed 
by  Aristotle,  59  ; ultimate  owner- 
ship held  to  be  in  Pope,  217,  219  ; 
John  of  Paris  on  relation  of  Pope 
to,  226 ; distinction  between 
ownership  and  jurisdiction  over, 
227  ; controversy  over  theory  of, 
between  John  XXII  and  the  Fran- 
ciscans, 236,  237  ; Wycliffe’s 
views  on,  ‘261  et  seq. ; fifteenth- 
century  idea  of,  281  ; Machiavelli 
on  men’s  devotion  to,  305. 

Prophets  : regarded  as  prefiguring 
Christian  priesthood,  164. 

Public  mess  : in  Sparta,  8 ; in  Plato’s 
Republic,  29;  in  Plato’s  Laws,  38. 

Public  opinion:  indicated  by  Aris- 
totle as  controlling  force  in  state, 
95. 

Renaissance : influence  in  political 
theory,  259 ; influence  of,  on 
Machiavelli,  289;  rationalism  of, 
302. 

Representation : Marsiglio’s  theory 
as  to,  251 ; Ockam’s  scheme  of, 
252. 


358 


INDEX 


Republic  (as  form  of  government)  : 
see  Democracy. 

Itepublic  ( The)  of  Plato  : general 
character  of,  24 ; idealism  in,  25  ; 

. predominantly  ethical,  27  ; classes 
of  population  in,  28 ; the  guar- 
dians and  their  functions,  29 ; 
communistic  doctrine  of,  30  ; edu- 
cational system  in,  31 ; an  aris- 
tocracy of  intellect,  32 ; relation 
to  actual  states,  33. 

Revolutions : frequency  in  Greece, 
85  ; Aristotle’s  theory  as  to  causes 
of,  86 ; as  to  preventives  of,  88 
et  seq. 

Right  or  Rights  ( bUaiov , ius)  : nat- 
ural distinguished  from  legal  by 
Aristotle,  54 ; ambiguous  mean- 
ing of,  122  ; source  of,  to  be  found 
in  law  (Cicero),  123 ; Imperial 
jurists’  treatment  of,  128 ; nat- 
ural distinguished  from  positive 
(Thomas  Aquinas),  196  ; ASgid- 
ius  Romanus  on,  211 ; Wycliffe’s 
view  of,  261. 

Roads,  care  of,  a function  of  the 
government  (St.  Thomas),  203. 

Roman  Constitution : in  royal  pe- 
riod, 107  ; in  time  of  conflict  be- 
tween patricians  and  plebeians, 
108  ; government  of  dependencies 
under,  110;  as  transformed  by 
Julius  and  Augustus,  112;  as  re- 
formed by  Diocletian  and  Con- 
stantine, 113 ; as  analyzed  by 
Polybius,  116  ; working  of  check 
and  balance  system  in,  119 ; as 
viewed  by  Cicero,  121,  125;  the 
ideal  of  Machiavelli,  296. 

Rosellinus  (Antonius  de  Rosellis), 
281  note,  282,  291. 

Royal  power:  distinguished  from 
priestly,  166  et  seq. 

Royalty : relative  excellence  of,  in 
Plato,  36  ; Aristotle’s  idea  of,  72  ; 
ideally  the  best  form  where  one 
man  is  preeminent,  78 ; prac- 


tically an  extinct  form  for  en- 
lightened peoples,  90;  Cicero’s 
conception  of,  120.  See  also 
Monarchy. 

Sacerdotal  power : distinguished 

from  royal,  166  et  seq. ; argument 
for  preeminence  of,  169  et  seq. 

Sceptics  : neglect  of  politics  by,  102. 

Schism,  the  Great,  257  et  seq. 

Scholasticism,  general  character  of, 
189  et  seq. 

Senate  : organization  and  functions 
of,  in  Roman  constitution,  107, 
109,  112  ; Polybius  on,  116. 

Seneca,  a Stoic,  106. 

Sixtus  IV,  policy  of,  288. 

Slavery : justified  on  rational 

grounds  by  Aristotle,  58  ; assumed 
by  Plato  and  Aristotle  as  neces- 
sary, 93  ; effect  of  cosmopolitism 
on,  105  ; contrary  to  natural  rights 
(Roman  jurists),  128 ; justified 
by  St.  Augustine,  157  ; by  Thomas 
Aquinas,  199  ; Wycliffe’s  view  of, 
262. 

Socrates : relation  of,  to  Sophists, 
21  ; his  method  and  ethical  doc- 
trine, 22  ; on  laws,  written  and 
unwritten,  23  ; relation  of  Plato 
to  work  of,  24. 

Solon : reforms  of,  at  Athens,  12  ; 
influence  of  his  constitution  on 
Plato’s  theory,  45. 

Sophists : nature  of  work  of,  20,  21  ; 
doctrines  of,  renewed  by  Epicu- 
reans, 103. 

Soul,  Plato’s  analysis  of,  26. 

Sovereignty : defined  by  Aristotle, 
65  ; argument  for  basis  of  num- 
bers, of  wealth  and  of  intelli- 
gence, 67  ; should  be  in  mass  of 
people,  according  to  Aristotle,  68  ; 
various  ideas  of,  in  Greece,  69 ; 
claims  of  the  one  perfect  man,  70; 
impersonal  law  better  than  any 
person  as  bearer  of,  71 ; of  people 


INDEX 


359 


subject  to  that  of  law  (Aristotle), 
95 ; in  people  as  legislator  (Mar- 
siglio),  239  ; Marsiglio  and  Ockam 
on,  248  et  scq. ; held  by  Cusanus 
to  be  in  people,  273.  See  also 
Plenary  Power. 

Sparta : no  early  aristocracy  in,  2 ; 
leader  of  conservatives  in  Greece, 
5 ; hegemony  of,  in  Persian  Wars, 
5 ; influence  of,  on  Greek  political 
theory,  6 ; classes  of  people  in,  7 ; 
Lycurgean  institutions  in,  8 ; con- 
stitutional organization  of,  9 ; oli- 
garchic character  of  government 
in,  10  ; a timocracy,  according  to 
Plato,  33 ; in  Plato’s  opinion,  a 
nroperly  limited  monarchy,  40 ; 
many  institutions  of,  in  Plato’s 
Republic,  44 ; Polybius’s  view  of 
institutions  of,  116 ; slightly  es- 
teemed by  Machiavelli,  296. 

State  (as  a concept  of  political 
science):  Aristotle  on  origin  and 
character  of,  55  ; necessary  to  hu- 
man existence,  56 ; distinguished 
from  household,  57  ; identity 
changes,  according  to  Aristotle, 
with  change  of  constitution,  65; 
Aristotle  on  best  form  of,  78  etseq.; 
on  the  true  end  of,  81 ; Ockam  on 
functions  of,  247  ; distinguished 
from  government  by  Marsiglio, 
250.  See  also  Government. 

State  of  Nature,  idea  of,  in  fifteenth 
century,  282. 

Statesman  ( The ) , of  Plato : idealism 
of,  25 ; deals  primarily  with  dia- 
lectic, 27;  develops  “idea”  of 
ruler,  34 ; depreciates  practical 
statesmanship,  34 ; and  legisla- 
tion, 35  ; classification  of  govern- 
ments in,  36. 

Stephen  (Pope):  crowns  Pippin, 
139. 

Stoics  : prominence  after  Alexander, 
102 ; emphasized  ethics  and  neg- 
lected politics,  102 ; theory  of 


justice  and  law,  104 ; develop- 
ment of  cosmopolitism  by,  105  ; 
in  the  Roman  state,  106  ; influ- 
ence of,  on  Cicero’s  theory  of 
natural  law,  122  ; influence  of, 
on  Roman  jurisprudence,  127 ; 
principles  of,  in  relation  to  Chris- 
tianity, 154 ; influence  on  St. 
Thomas’s  theory  of  law,  192. 

Sun  and  moon : symbol  of  spiritual 
and  secular  powers,  167,  171. 

Swords,  the  two,  text  referring  to, 
168,  184. 

Teutonic  nations:  transformed  Ro- 
man government  in  West,  131 ; 
influence  of,  on  Christian  Church, 
134. 

Theodoric  of  Verdun,  162. 

Theodosius : excommunicated  by 

Ambrose,  134;  recognizes  sacer- 
dotal sway  over  morals,  155. 

Thomas  Aquinas : general  character 
of  his  philosophy,  190  et  seq. ; po- 
litical works  of,  191  ; his  theory 
of  law,  192  ; on  justice  and  rights, 
196 ; on  politics  proper,  197  ; on 
the  province  or  kingdom  as  more 
perfect  than  city-state,  198 ; on 
slavery,  198 ; prefers  monarchy 
to  democracy,  199 ; on  tyranny, 

200  ; on  the  Holy  Roman  Empire, 

201  ; on  certain  novel  functions  of 
government,  203  ; on  the  preemi- 
nence of  priest  over  king,  205 ; 
on  the  treatment  of  infidels  by 
Christian  rulers,  206 ; on  the  depo- 
sition of  princes  by  the  church, 
207 ; his  influence  on  iEgidius 
Romanus,  209  ; his  system  in  re- 
lation to  political  facts,  213. 

Timocracy  : Plato’s  conception  of, 
33  ; Gerson’s  idea  of,  269. 

Towns,  political  significance  of,  in 
fifteenth  century,  256. 

Translatio  imperii , 180  ; Dante  on, 
234. 


6 


(?\  INDEX 


1 


Tribune,  powers  of,  at  Rome, 
108. 

Twelve  Tables,  code  of  the,  126. 

Tyranny : Plato’s  conception  of, 

33,  36 ; held  by  Aristotle  to  be 
a corrupt  form  of  state,  72 ; the 
least  permanent  form  of  govern- 
ment, 91 ; may  be  maintained  by 
uniform  severity  and  harshness, 
91 ; or  by  uniform  mildness  and 
craft,  92 ; in  Polybius’s  theory, 
115 ; distinguished  from  royalty  in 
Middle  Ages,  178  ; John  of  Salis- 
bury on,  187  ; Thomas  Aquinas 
on,  200 ; Machiavelli  on  the  art 
of,  316. 

Ulpian,  Stoic  influence  on,  106. 

TJnam  Sanctam , the  Bull,  216. 

Unity : essential  in  government  of 
church,  but  not  of  state,  226 ; 
Dante’s  exaltation  of,  231 ; Cu- 
sanus  on,  271 ; influence  of  theory 
of  corporation  on  mediaeval  idea 
of,  279. 

Universal  Monarchy  : as  normal  po- 
litical organization,  180 ; argument 
against,  by  John  of  Paris,  226 ; 
Dante’s  plea  for,  230  et  seq. ; the- 


ory of,  slighted  by  Marsiglio,  24l  s 
discussed  by  Ockam,  246. 

Valentinian  II:  defied  by  Ambrose, 
133. 

Yalentinian  III:  decrees  appellate 
supremacy  of  Roman  Bishop,  137. 

Yalla:  discredits  Donation  of  Con- 
stantine, 259. 

Waltram  of  Naumburg,  162. 

Wars  of  the  Roses,  256. 

Wycliffe  : general  position  as  to  pol- 
itics, 260  ; his  theory  of  lordship, 
261 ; on  monarchy  and  aristocracy, 
262  ; on  slavery,  262  ; on  relation 
of  church  to  property,  263  ; influ- 
ence of  feudalism  on,  264  ; views 
of,  adopted  by  Huss,  264 ; con- 
demned by  Council  of  Constance, 
265. 

Xenophon  : record  of  Socrates’s  doc- 
trine as  to  justice  and  law,  23. 

Zacharias  (Pope)  : sanctions  usur- 
pation by  Pippin,  139 ; cited  by 
mediseval  debaters,  175. 

Zeno  the  Stoic,  102. 


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